As you also know, the Navy’s restructuring of the LCS force
has resulted in two squadrons, one on each coast. Each squadron consists of a single 4-ship
group of each of the three mission areas:
ASW, MCM, and ASuW. In each group
of 4 ships, one of the ships is designated as a non-deployable training
vessel. Thus, each mission area consists
of just three ships. That means that
each squadron has 3 ASW, 3 MCM, and 3 ASuW ships and that, in turn, gives a total
fleet force of 6 ASW, 6 MCM, and 6 ASuW ships.
The LCS-MCM is the total replacement for our aging Avengers
which are long overdue for retirement (see, "LCS MCM - What's the Point?").
The 6 total LCS-MCM will replace the 14 ships of the Avenger class
minesweeper.
The LCS-ASW is the replacement for the ASW aspect of the
Perry class frigates. Thus, the 6 total
LCS-ASW will replace the 51 ships of the Perry class frigate.
The LCS-ASuW is the replacement for the ASuW aspect of the
Perry class frigates. Thus, the 6 total
LCS-ASuW will replace the 51 ships of the Perry class frigate.
Okay, with that reminder of the LCS force structure, let’s
get back to the LCS and distributed lethality (DL). There is only one question that needs to be
asked:
Given the immense importance of mine countermeasures and with
only 6 deployable LCS-MCM, does it make sense to risk them in distributed
lethality?
Our entire mine countermeasure force is going to be 6
LCS-MCM. If those are sunk (or even just
a one or two!) our MCM efforts will go from woefully inadequate to nearly
non-existent. Does that seem wise to
anyone other than the Navy?
 |
| Another LCS Sunk, Alone, in Distributed Lethality |
The preceding also applies to the LCS-ASW and LCS- ASuW.
With that simple consideration, the idiocy of the Navy’s
distributed lethality concept and the use of the LCS in it becomes clearly
manifest. There’s really nothing else
that needs to be said.
Against stunningly obvious idiocy of the LCS at this point, I'm not sure distributed leathality matters or makes things any worse. As you point out the lunacy of replacing the Avenger (already had in too small numbers) with a far smaller number of almost certainly less capable ships is already beyond DL problems.
ReplyDeleteTo the extent DL gets the navy a real order of the NSM such that real ships and planes carry that is a good thing. For example the NSM is small enough to be used by F-35 in stealth mode. Similarly if it gets the empty harpoon boxes on the Burkes filled/replaced that's a good thing (It less expensive than a SM 6. Also it would be an upgrade for US subs arsenals.
But after typing that I started thinking...
The improvement of US anti ship missiles should have happened anyway. Realistically the Navy back in 2007 not 2014 should have said wow look Norways got a better missile the harpoon that we don't use and its being deployed let's roll. Or any time in the previous decades simply gone with the offered Harpoon improvement. Also frankly why the anti ship version of the Tomahawk took so long to get rolling is mystery. The sudden dash to upgrade the SM-6 (new block 1B) again something that could have been done a while ago...
That leads to the sinking feeling the distributed lethality is really a buzz word. Designed to hoodwink Congress, trying to show the LCS in not an utter fiasco, and thus please keep building them so we can pretend thay are anything but useless.
"To the extent DL gets the navy a real order of the NSM such that real ships and planes carry that is a good thing. For example the NSM is small enough to be used by F-35 in stealth mode. Similarly if it gets the empty harpoon boxes on the Burkes filled/replaced that's a good thing (It less expensive than a SM 6. Also it would be an upgrade for US subs arsenals."
Delete@Kath:
That's a big ticket question, isn't it? If Distributed Lethality wasn't a concept the Navy invested in, would the OASuW missile program even have been pursued? There wasn't any real drive to return over the horizon missiles to the DDGs. 2/3rds of the Burkes are the Flight IIA variant, the one that doesn't have any canister Harpoons at all (to say nothing of how Harpoon is an unstealthy 40-year old missile with only incremental updates at best). Without a VLS AShM, the only way those DDGs are contributing against surface targets is if you sail them into visual range of the enemy and fire SM-2, SM-6 and ESSM in LOS mode - and it's going to take a while to get into LOS if your adversary's already shot his load of OTH missiles and is now turning tail: a stern chase is a long chase, afterall.
I think the problem is that Distributed Lethality as a concept has gotten too conflated with LCS, resulting in people being unable to properly evaluate the concept on its merits. The way I see it, it's a recognition of reality: long range over the horizon missiles mean that you don't necessarily meed to mass your shooters in the same geographic region in order to mass your firepower: you can spread out your ships over a greater distance, thereby increasing the difficulty of the enemy to find and fix your shooters, and it doesn't matter how spread out your shooters are when the missile salvo arrives at the same time onto the same target. If the DDGs have long range over the horizon missiles of their own, it gives you more options to prosecute targets, you can generate higer missile salvoes (DDG + airwing is inherently larger than airwing alone), and the adversary has multiple threat vectors that he must respect.
Boiled down, Distributed Lethality essentially has two parts: offboard sensor asset(s) and dispersed shooters - hence the whole effort on Cooperative Engagement Capability, where you've got things like E-2s and P-8s and F-35s feeding data back to the DDGs for over the horizon missile shots (such as that test a few years ago where an F-35 cast Summon Standard Missile and guided an SM-6 fired from USS Desert Ship). Logically, it's not that far a stretch: you're sending out fighters to sink an enemy fleet, your fighters are going to be locking onto those ships to guide the AShMs they're carrying. Since they're already generating that targeting data anyway, why not share it with the DDGs and get some more missiles in the air?
Something IMO, that's telling, is that China is pursuing their own form of Distributed Lethality. Oh, they're not calling it by the same name, but they're doing the same things: building up offboard sensor assets to feed targeting data to dispersed shooters.
The big problem/question in the Distributed Lethality model, which neither the USN nor the PLAN is publicly acknowledging, is the survivability of the sensor asset, and time to kill, to use a videogame term. F-35 aside, the existing sensor assets the USN has are fairly obvious targets that can be engaged with fighters and long range SAMs* (of course, the same also applies for the Chinese). It's partly why the Chinese ASBMs aren't credible threats to a CVBG on the open see: the eight minute flight time of DF-21 means that a carrier has a good chance of putting enough distance between the last known position and exiting the field of view of the missile's seeker cone. The obvious solution to that is offboard sensor assets feeding midcourse updates to the missile, but that requires you to 1) be able to contact a missile in orbit (which is iffy) and 2) assuming that you can do part 1, your sensor asset needs to stay alive long enough to keep transmitting midcourse guidance until the missile is capable of using terminal guidance to sucessfully locate the carrier, which is a really big if.
DeleteChina has a better chance of pulling off distributed lethality within their A2/AD zone, since they've got plenty of airbases to support massed takeoffs of search drones and MPA, and they've got a shorter distance to search and secure. On the open sea, PLAN CVBG vs USN CVBG? It gets a fair bit doubtful for both sides to actually pull it off.
* SAM vs sensor asset engagement depends on a whole host of factors, with the most immediate being radar detection range vs SAM engagement rang. Russian assessments claim a range of 450km for the E-2D to detect surface ship targets. The Chinese HHQ-9 naval SAM is estimated at a maximum ballistic range of 300km; SM-6 is estimated at 240km, the Russian 48N6DMK (for the S-400 system) is estimated at 250km.
Also, if you tilt your head and squint a little, one might argue that Distributed Lethality has been a thing in fact, if not name, ever since the first spotter aircraft guided a battleship's guns! :P Afterall, the spotter is serving as an offboard sensor asset, guiding the battleship's guns.
Delete(or maybe not, arguably you'd need a single spotter walking the fire of multiple BBs to really call that distributed lethality, but eh, i was trying for a little levity.)
@Wild Goose
Delete"The Chinese HHQ-9..."
One assumes that is the reason for the SM-6 upgrade in range. Still seems for the amount of tax dollars the Pentagon spends it would be nice if our rivals were scrambling to upgrade.
Wild Goose said, "F-35 aside, the existing sensor assets the USN has are fairly obvious targets that can be engaged with fighters and long range SAMs* (of course, the same also applies for the Chinese)."
DeleteF-35s + Maritime Strike Tomahawks may end up being the keys to DL. MSTs may not be stealthy, but fire enough of them and some will get through.
" enough of them and some will get through."
DeleteThis is the quantity over quality argument and it's completely valid and you are quite correct. The numbers argument is the basis for my small surveillance UAV concept.
I don't see the F-35 functioning in DL because F-35s will be based, and operationally tied to, carriers which are not part of DL. However, large numbers of small UAVs can provide the needed targeting. Of course, communications reliability is, as always, the key.
Good comment.
“I don't see the F-35 functioning in DL because F-35s will be based, and operationally tied to, carriers which are not part of DL. ”
DeleteThe first rule of DL is everything is part of DL.
No, not in the Navy concept. The Navy wants to operate the LCS and other vessels as the WWII PT boats did: deep inside enemy territory, hiding in secret island bases. Carriers are not part of that. At $15B each, they'll be held well away from any potential combat unless they're conducting a specific, high reward mission and then they certainly won't be revealing themselves to conduct some half-baked DL shootout.
DeleteThe Navy's stated version of DL is quite messed up. You may have a different (maybe better?) idea of what DL should be but it's not the Navy's version.
"F-35s + Maritime Strike Tomahawks may end up being the keys to DL. MSTs may not be stealthy, but fire enough of them and some will get through."
Delete@Anon2:
I don't see MST being as relevant, because of the flight time issues - while theoretically a sensor asset or an F-35 could cue a DDG 1600 km away to fire a Maritime Strike Tomahawk, the travel time involved (2 hours!) means that the sensor asset has to remain on station for the duration to feed midcourse guidance. That's not workable.
Like I've said, the most likely workable implementation of distributed lethality will be F-35s making a run on a PLAN SAG or CVBG and casting "Summon LRASM/NSM/TASM" to cue the DDGs to be firing their LRASMs.
"The Navy wants to operate the LCS and other vessels as the WWII PT boats did"
DeleteI recall this was looked here I think but it remains madness or delusion. Has the USN brass forgotten how heavily armed the late war PT boats were? Or simple in design they were.
If that what the USN wants as part of DL why not a new Cyclone built around a 4 NSM box and some torpedo tubes?
ComNavOps said, "At $15B each, they'll be held well away from any potential combat unless they're conducting a specific, high reward mission and then they certainly won't be revealing themselves to conduct some half-baked DL shootout."
DeleteAn F-35C has an unrefueled combat radius of more than 600nmi. With an air refueling or two, it can stay out that far for a while.
That's a lot of standoff for the carrier.
WIId Goose said, "I don't see MST being as relevant, because of the flight time issues - while theoretically a sensor asset or an F-35 could cue a DDG 1600 km away to fire a Maritime Strike Tomahawk, the travel time involved (2 hours!) means that the sensor asset has to remain on station for the duration to feed midcourse guidance. That's not workable."
DeleteI think it can be done.
Send out a pair of F-35Cs to locate the enemy task force. When found, launch another pair and then the strike behind them. The first pair can keep tabs until they're bingo. By then the second pair should be close enough to reacquire and radio mid-course updates to the missiles.
The enemy task force can only be at most 40-60 miles away from where it was when the missiles launched. And they may be following a predictable path (e.g. heading towards Taiwan).
"most likely workable implementation of distributed lethality "
DeleteNo, that's not DL, that's just a simple strike. The Navy's DL envisions widely dispersed LCS (and amphibs and logistics and whatever else) in hidden locations deep inside enemy waters all conducting individual or coordinated strikes. Besides, Burkes don't just hand around during a war - they execute missions. If they're not executing a mission, they're in port getting ready for one.
"An F-35C has an unrefueled combat radius of more than 600nmi."
DeleteNot in the real world. See the "Combat Radius" post in the 'best' list above.
"That's a lot of standoff for the carrier."
Hanging around (or 'standing off') is not what a carrier does in war. Carriers execute specific missions. When they're not executing a mission they're in port preparing for the next mission.
"Send out a pair of F-35Cs "
DeleteSetting aside the fact that the F-35 is not some sort of magic broad area maritime surveillance sensor and will have a hard time finding a target, what you're describing is just a simple carrier strike. The concept is potentially valid but it's not DL as the Navy envisions it.
The only way a F-35 finds unknown enemy ships is pure dumb luck, the WWII 'fan' search, or you already have a pretty good idea of the location. The next problem is that the F-35 can't talk to anyone and remain stealthy. No Navy ship has the equipment to communicate via the F-35 Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL). There are plans to upgrade a Nimitz but no carrier currently has the capability. Even the Ford, which was built to operate F-35s, lacks the capability.
When you start digging into it, the Navy has a whole lot of problems with its strike capability (or lack thereof).
ComNavOps said, "Not in the real world. See the "Combat Radius" post in the 'best' list above."
DeleteThe F-35C combat radius is based on a defined Navy profile that includes climb out, landing, and so on, and assumes 2 x 2,000lb JDAMs and 2 x AMRAAM. It still manages a 670nmi radius. Assuming one outbound and one return refueling, it can likely execute a several hour search mission at that radius, especially if only carrying 4 x AMRAAM.
APG-81 at high altitude can search a lot of sea in those hours.
Providing CAP sorties over a DL operating area is a fringe benefit to their surface search role.
"Hanging around (or 'standing off') is not what a carrier does in war. Carriers execute specific missions. When they're not executing a mission they're in port preparing for the next mission."
A CSG can move a lot while the aircraft are searching. There's no reason it needs to stay in one spot. If the mission is to find and kill an enemy task force, then it will hang out until it finds them, runs out of expendables, is driven off, or is sunk.
"Besides, Burkes don't just hand around during a war - they execute missions. If they're not executing a mission, they're in port getting ready for one."
Delete@ComNavOps: *shrug* I was seeing this as a way for the CVN's escort DDGs to contribute to the fight, instead of leaving the striking burden solely on the air wing. The other alternative is a DDG SAG that's operating in concert with a CVN, while not being physically present in the same grid square.
Regardless of the merits or demerits of distributed lethality as envisioned by the USN, I think it's telling that the both the US and China, and to a lesser extent Japan, are all working on ways for offboard sensor assets to cue fires from dispersed shooters. One day this will be a workable, mature technology, but that day is going to be decades away. I'm reminded of how the USN SAM roadmap essentially called for Aegis in the 1950s, but it took until the late 80s for that to become a reality
If you believe that then you believe the LCS is the greatest warship in history, the Ford is a flawless, invincible war machine, and the Zumwalt will revolutionize fire support.
DeleteNot a single thing we've been told about the F-35 was true. The lies and spin associated with this program are beyond belief.
"APG-81 at high altitude can search a lot of sea in those hours."
DeleteMost of the 'search' time is travel time to and from the suspect area. The actual search time and area covered is minimal. Further, if the aircraft is radiating, it's revealing its location.
“ Most of the 'search' time is travel time to and from the suspect area. The actual search time and area covered is minimal. Further, if the aircraft is radiating, it's revealing its location.”
DeleteNo. With air refueling the search time is in the search area and can be several hours.
Yes, it has to radiate, but it doesn’t have to do so constantly and can use LPI techniques to make it difficult to localize.
" air refueling"
DeleteNo one is going to risk tankers anywhere near a contested air space.
"LPI"
If you believe that an aircraft can radiate for hours, even with LPI, near enemy forces and remain undetected then you probably also believe the claims about the F-35 combat radius.
The way a radar becomes LPI is by dialing the power way back. When you do that, your detection range/resolution goes way down. So, you can potentially remain undetected but you won't find anything. There's no such thing as an undetectable radar with infinite range and 100% search effectiveness (a bit of hyperbotle). If there were, we wouldn't need/have Aegis, AWACS, E-2, etc. This is yet another example of manufacturer's claims that aren't true.
To clarify, I use LPI as a synonym for AESA radar. That said ComNavOps is correct that LPI/AESA radars use lower emission strength - the tl;dr of the above is that an AESA radar is constantly changing the waveform it is tuned to, compensating for lower emission strength with higher gain/sensitivity (and you still have the option to go full active no fucks given and crank up the power to full if you really wanted to).
DeleteI deleted a an incorrect comment.
DeleteWIId Goose said, "To clarify, I use LPI as a synonym for AESA radar. That said ComNavOps is correct that LPI/AESA radars use lower emission strength - the tl;dr of the above is that an AESA radar is constantly changing the waveform it is tuned to, compensating for lower emission strength with higher gain/sensitivity (and you still have the option to go full active no fucks given and crank up the power to full if you really wanted to)"
DeleteLPI uses a variety of techniques, lower power just being one. Others include spread spectrum, frequency and pulse modulation, and low sidelobe antennas coupled with short, unpredictably-timed pulses. These can be used in combination and don't necessarily reduce detection ranges.
Regardless, the key here is not that the aircraft is entirely undetectable while radiating. The enemy may still get chirps on his ESM. The key is to make the aircraft less likely to be detected and more difficult to localize.
LPI is most useful when used on stealth aircraft. It's less useful on AESA-equipped 4th gen aircraft (but still situationally valuable).
Once detected, ship tracking can be managed with very low revisit rates. In even 5 or 10 minutes, a ship won't be very far from its predicted position. A fleet of ships will be even more predictable.
"No one is going to risk tankers anywhere near a contested air space."
DeleteDepends on the situation. "Near" implies outside contested airspace, which means uncontested. Obviously threat dependent.
Super Hornets or MQ-25s may be better here. If it hits its specs, a single MQ-25 could nearly top off the pair of F-35Cs at 500nmi from the carrier.
"The enemy may still get chirps on his ESM. The key is to make the aircraft less likely to be detected and more difficult to localize."
DeleteThis kind of sums up one of the major problems our military has. We believe that everything we do will work perfectly and nothing the enemy does will work at all.
Consider this specific case that we're discussing. The implicit belief is that an F-35 is going to be able to leisurely cruise through the Chinese first island chain A2/AD zone, radiating whenever it wants, for hours on end, detecting everything that's there, and never be detected itself. I think that summed it up nicely.
Apparently, the Chinese have no ESM, no stealth detection capability, no aircraft of their own, no stealth assets of their own - in short, in order for the claim to be true, the Chinese must be deaf, dumb, blind, and lined up in obliging rows waiting for us to find them.
Here's the reality: The A2/AD zone will have dozens/hundreds of sensors of all types - some air, some land, some optical, some radar, some ESM, etc. Presumably, the Chinese are working on networked sensors just as we are. Any F-35 radar will be sensed and localized. Any F-35 aircraft will be sensed, eventually, since stealth is not magic and the F-35's rear stealth aspects are relatively poor.
The reality is quite a bit different than the blind faith claims made by F-35 supporters.
"my summary says the same thing"
DeleteNo, your summary acknowledged that LPI was achieved by decreasing output power along with other techniques. Your original statement claimed that LPI was achieved through frequency modulation alone which is not correct.
You made an incorrect statement and instead of owning it and moving on you're trying to spin it and wasting my time and confusing readers.
This is a recurring bad habit and won't be allowed.
ComNavOps said, "This kind of sums up one of the major problems our military has. We believe that everything we do will work perfectly and nothing the enemy does will work at all."
DeleteI think you're succumbing to the reverse of this. You're assuming the Chinese sensors will magically detect everything in their A2/AD zone, 100% of the time, regardless of stealth, LPI or whatever.
The truth of the matter is LPI and stealth will just reduce the likelihood of detection and intercept, but other aspects of support an mission planning will still be necessary. And the enemy will still get a vote.
I'm under no illusion that this is a perfect, unstoppable plan. I think it just can be made to work better than the Navy's current plan for DL.
"I think it just can be made to work better than the Navy's current plan for DL."
DeleteWhat you're describing is not DL - at least not the Navy's version of it - it's a simple strike which, notably, REQUIRES the presence of a carrier to host the F-35s. On a related note, if one has a carrier group handy, one doesn't need DL. Anyway, as a simple strike concept, what you've described is viable with the constraints, limitations, and risks that I've described and you've acknowledged.
DL, on the other hand, envisions an array of hidden LCS, amphibs, logistics ships and whatever else skulking among South China Sea islands and leaping out to strike the enemy devastating blows and then retreating back into invisibility. Yes, that's almost a word for word description of the Navy's statements on the subject.
So, to repeat, what you're describing is not DL, it's a simple strike by a carrier group. As you say, it would be more effective than the Navy's DL fantasy though not as straightforward and easy as you're suggesting.
"You're assuming the Chinese sensors will magically detect everything in their A2/AD zone, 100% of the time, regardless of stealth, LPI or whatever."
Now this is an interesting statement. Yes, it's the reverse of the military's overly optimistic thinking and would be just as wrong. Of course China isn't going to instantly see everything that approaches or enters the first island chain. HOWEVER - and this is key - the sheer density of surveillance assets present in the S/E China Seas will make undetected penetration very unlikely. Consider the array of land based over-the-horizon radars, land based 'regular' radars, 'multi-static' (to borrow terminology from the sonobuoy realm) networked radars, radio direction finders, ESM sensors, optical sensors on ships and aircraft, IRST, FLIR, aircraft patrols, ship patrols, fishing fleet observations, and good old Mk1 eyeballs. We're talking a concentrated collection of hundreds of various sensors all scanning the fairly concentrated E/S China Seas. You tell me - what's the odds of a semi-stealth F-35 (poor rear aspect stealth) remaining undetected for any significant period of time while using a radar? The idea that a F-35 is going to fly through all that, remain completely undetected while using its radar, find targets, and hang around to direct and control attack missiles seems just a bit wishful, doesn't it?
So, I don't believe that Chinese sensors are somehow magically able to instantly detect anything that moves. What I do believe is that the sensor density will be so great that the likelihood of penetrating the zone for any significant period of time is quite low. It's just a numbers/statistics game. I don't believe that the Chinese have magic sensors. Their sensors will be no better (or worse!) than ours. Each sensor will have a low individual probability of detection but the numbers will ensure that detection occurs.
All this depends on where in the SCS you're operating and the nature of your fight. Forcing a fight with a PLAN CVBG toward the southern end of the SCS, near Singapore/Indonesia, does a lot to reduce the density of sensor assets the Chinese can deploy. At 1700 km from shore (DF-21 range) they don't have the density of sensor assets to keep a carrier under observation for ASBM strike. Over the horizon radars can only tell that there is something there, but do not have the sensitivity for target discrimination.
DeleteConversely, if you were sailing up into the Taiwan Strait attempting to launch an airstrike into Chinese waters, well. Play stupid games, win stupid prizes.
"At 1700 km from shore (DF-21 range) they don't have the density of sensor assets to keep a carrier under observation for ASBM strike."
DeleteThis … this is EXACTLY my point about our belief that everything we do will work and nothing the enemy can do will work. We believe - and just laid out in several comments - that we believe we can penetrate a densely sensor populated zone, find a target, keep it in sight until a strike launches, and control the strike with mid-course guidance …………. and yet the Chinese can't. They can't find our carrier, can't target it, can't keep it in sight, and can't control a strike missile.
Why do we think they don't have stealth aircraft (they do)? Why do we think they don't have LPI radars (they do, I'm sure)? Why do we think they can't maintain contact on the target (they've got stealth aircraft, after all)? Why do we think they can't provide mid-course guidance (they have the capability)?
"density of sensor assets"
Read your own sentence. We only need one sensor, apparently … the mighty F-35 stealth aircraft. They have stealth aircraft. If we only need one stealth aircraft to find a target, why would they need more than one?
The arrogance and foolishness of this way of thinking is breathtaking. Thank you for perfectly illustrating my point.
@ComNavOps:
DeleteEverything I've said for the Chinese applies also to the US, which is why I'm highly skeptical of being able to exploit the Tomahawk's 1000 mile range. Note that the scenario I raised, unlike Anon2, is that of the air wing attacking a hostile SAG/CVBG: the fighters are already engaged, they are already detected, they're already locked on to the enemy ships and lose nothing by being able to datalink missile shots from other USN ships.
"Read your own sentence. We only need one sensor, apparently … the mighty F-35 stealth aircraft. They have stealth aircraft. If we only need one stealth aircraft to find a target, why would they need more than one?"
You're conflating me with Anon2, I think. I don't share his optimism on the F-35's chances. Don't get me wrong, I think stealth is useful, LPI radars are useful, but that usefulness is to increase the area of uncertainty that you can operate it. Recall Andy Pico's article "How to Hide a Task Force": there are three prongs: detection: they know something is there; location - they know where it is; identification - they know who/what it is. You can already do this to a degree with non-stealth aircraft (cf NORPAC 82); stealth gives you more margin in all three aspects. But if you're deliberately acting in a way that reduces your own margin, well. Play stupid games, win stupid prizes.
"Why do we think they don't have stealth aircraft (they do)? Why do we think they don't have LPI radars (they do, I'm sure)? Why do we think they can't maintain contact on the target (they've got stealth aircraft, after all)? Why do we think they can't provide mid-course guidance (they have the capability)?"
I've always said that they can maintain sensor density in their own back yards: the Taiwan Strait today is already a no-go area. The problem is that all these sensor assets are range limited. 1700 km is 1056 miles, it's the distance from Shanghai to Tokyo. Pushing out sensor assets that far drastically increases the area needed to search, while taking more time for sensor assets to arrive at the search grid, and less time available to search, because it's simple physics: you trade patrol time for patrol range, and vice versa.
At that range and further, you have only two real options for a Chinese sensor asset: either it's a large unstealthy slow target (MPA/AWACS/long range maritime surveillance drone), or it's a detectable Chinese Flanker off the deck of their carrier, because they don't have any stealth carrier fighters.* "Fishing boat" swarms should have been driven off long ago; if not, well, serves you right.
*This assumes the fight happens now, within the next decade or two. Neither of China's stealth fighters, the J-20 or J-31, have demonstrated carrier capability, and there is no word on china developing a new carrier fighter to replace their naval Flankers. Right now their focus is getting their carriers and doctrine working: once they do that, stealth carrier fighters are the obvious and logical next step, but at the most optimistic, it's going to be at least a decade from now before the prototype starts flying.
(As a point of interest, while China has undergone a fairly rapid naval expansion and appears to have entered carrier aviation overnight, it's interesting to note that they're actually 25 years late by the PLAN roadmap - their present capability was initially targeted to be achieved in 1998.)
"To illustrate the math"
DeleteYou're babbling without a point. This blog is not for you. You should look elsewhere.
Eh, i think you're being a.little hard on the guy. He was doing the math to suppprt his assertion, following in Pico's footsteps.
DeleteI think he was probably.a.little too focused on Pico's NORPAC 82 experience of CVN vs shore, and didnt sufficiently account for the CVN vs CVN context where both parties are in motion. In CVN vs shore, you've got the luxury of freedom of movement while knowing exactly where your adversary is.
I'm sorry all.
DeleteI wasn't trying to describe a full-fledged, detailed operations plan that accounts for other enemy actions or reactions. I was just laying out a concept of employment for MST using stealth aircraft as scouts.
Obviously, if the sensor density poses too great a risk, we would have to deal with it, probably using the same methods we use over-land. Namely, rolling them back or punching holes in them.
The enemy has stealth aircraft too, though only very limited air refueling. They could use the same concept of employment.
I apologize for the ruckus this caused. Have a nice day.
"I apologize for the ruckus this caused."
DeleteNothing to apologize for! This is the kind of discussion that the Navy ought to be having, internally - gaming these concepts out.
My overarching point is that we can't consider concepts in isolation (our F-35 will spot for Tomahawks). We have to consider the enemy's capabilities and how they impact our concept (the enemy's sensor density may preclude our F-35 from effective spotting). What I try to do is to challenge readers/commenters to develop concepts that consider the capabilities of BOTH sides.
So, from the preceding discussion, do you still view the F-35/Tomahawk concept as viable or do you need to modify it to account for enemy capabilities?
ComNavOps said, "So, from the preceding discussion, do you still view the F-35/Tomahawk concept as viable or do you need to modify it to account for enemy capabilities?"
DeleteI still think it's viable. I always thought it needed to be part of a larger operations plan. Just like anything else. Sorry for not making this clear at the outset.
I think it may be better suited towards large, massed strikes against many and/or heavily defended ships.
This is an area where traditional, carrier aircraft-based, anti-surface warfare historically struggles.
@Anon2:
DeleteFor the same reasons I outline above, I do not consider Tomahawk at 1000 miles to be an effective strike weapon against maneuvering warships. DF-21 is already a difficult proposition at 8 minuites flight time, DF-26 at 16 minutes is even more so, Tomahawk takes TWO HOURS to fly 1000 miles. No, if you're having a subsonic stealthy AShM fired from DDGs to support an F-35 strike that means NSM or LRASM, which have a much shorter range than Tomahawk but won't take two hours to arrive at the target zone.
A Two hour flight time is perfectly viable for attacking a stationary target that isn't moving: it is unacceptable for attacking a maneuvering target on the high seas. This is before getting into the unsubtle unstealthy nature of Tomahawk, and how it is inferior in the sensor department to NSM and LRASM's multimode guidance.
That said...
Japanese R&D is developing a VLS-launched hypersonic AShM. The US currently does not (officially) have such a program under devenlopment; I would argue that it would be worthwhile to get in on that, and if the missile works out, buy it COTS from our allies (or at least see what mistakes are being made so we don't repeat them). What hypersonic missiles give up in stealth they do gain in lower time to target over the same distance...
WIId Goose said, "For the same reasons I outline above, I do not consider Tomahawk at 1000 miles to be an effective strike weapon against maneuvering warships. DF-21 is already a difficult proposition at 8 minuites flight time, DF-26 at 16 minutes is even more so, Tomahawk takes TWO HOURS to fly 1000 miles. No, if you're having a subsonic stealthy AShM fired from DDGs to support an F-35 strike that means NSM or LRASM, which have a much shorter range than Tomahawk but won't take two hours to arrive at the target zone."
DeleteIt's not doable if they are fired and forgotten. It only works if you can generate reasonably frequent target course and speed updates and communicate them to the missiles in flight.
That's where the F-35s (plural) come in. They don't just generate the initial track. They also refresh the track throughout the fly-out.
Now I say F-35, but it can really be any asset with the requisite capability. Bombers, P-8s, Tritons, UAVs, satellites, or submarines could also contribute. The source doesn't really matter that much. A submarine might gain the initial track, then satellites might provide an update, followed by F-35s vectored to gain subsequent and final tracks.
The F-35 just happens to be stealthy, has decent range, can defend itself if needed, and has a capable sensor suite.
I wouldn't expect to be able to use this tactic a out to the full range of the Tomahawk. But I think It could be done out to maybe 5-700nmi. This is within the natural combat radius of the F-35, and allows for some leeway for missile course changes, or temporary loitering of missiles while the final target track is regained.
Even though 5-700nmi isn't out to the full range of MST, it's still much further than NSM or surface-launched LRASM. And it means you only have to deal with an 1-1.5 hour flyout. With a 1 hour flyout, a 30kt task force can only be within a radius of 30nmi from the initial track. 1.5 hours yields a 45nmi circle.
A radar like APG-81 should be able to detect a formation of large ships out to its radar horizon. (identification of specific ships may require it to get closer) At 20,000ft that would be around 180nmi. So an F-35 could see the entire 45nmi circle from 90nmi away.
If the enemy task force is radiating at all (radars or jamming), they'll be detected even sooner.
Communicating to the missiles is another potential complication, especially if SATCOM is dead.
Obviously this is a more complex method than just flying missiles out on aircraft. But generating a strike of 50+ anti-ship missiles (which might be needed to deal with a heavily defended target like a carrier) would require an alpha-strike level commitment from a carrier.
This way, the carrier air wing can just act as eyes, and let a distributed group of shooters launch the strike.
"APG-81 should be able to detect a formation of large ships out to its radar horizon. ... At 20,000ft that would be around 180nmi."
DeleteUnless you have classified information, let's be very clear that this is speculation and not fully informed speculation, either.
The only claim I've seen for the APG-81 is 150 km (93 miles) with some citings indicating that's for a 1 sq.m target which suggests that range is for an aerial target. I've seen no mention of range for a surface target.
When you factor in wave clutter, weather, and the fact that any enemy warship will be stealthy, any claimed range (of which there are none for the APG-81) will be greatly reduced. Manufacturer's claims for stealth ships all say things like 'size of a fishing boat at 15 miles' or some such. How do we reconcile the radar manufacturer's claims of spotting a pinhead size target at a million miles with the stealth ship manufacturer's claims of invisible at ten feet? They can't both be right. The reality is that both are vastly overclaiming. An APG-81 isn't going to see a stealth warship at 180 miles. What range is it going to be able to positively identify a 'fishing boat' size return as a stealth warship and not an actual fishing boat? No one knows but it's going to be WAY less than 180 miles. My only very slightly informed speculation is around 30 miles. You're free to believe that bit of speculation or not but to suggest 180 mile detection range is not realistic.
"If the enemy task force is radiating at all (radars or jamming), they'll be detected even sooner."
DeleteHere it is again - that tendency to believe that everything we do will work and nothing they do will work. Our F-35 can radiate freely and detect anything within a 180 mile radius without being spotted but if the Chinese radiate 'at all (radars or jamming), they'll be detected even sooner'. We have magic and they're deaf, dumb, and blind. Awesome! Seriously, this is just wishful thinking with a heavy dose of fantasy thrown in.
This blog is based on data and logic and this kind of statement lacks both.
No enemy ships are stealthy to the degree you mention (that I'm aware of). Really only the Visby and DDG-1000 go to the extent required to appear like a fishing boat or smaller. And both have walked back from their extreme promise of stealth with the addition of external blisters, antennas and other non-stealthy features.
DeleteAt best, the stealth features on most warships just reduce the RCS a modest degree. Maybe they make a cruiser look like a destroyer, or a destroyer look like a frigate. But large combatants will still have large RCS (thousands of square meters). Carriers will still have huge RCS (100,000 square meters).
So even if APG-81 can't detect every frigate and corvette at long range, it probably will still detect carriers, cruisers, amphibious ships, and large commercial ships that far out.
"This blog is based on data and logic and this kind of statement lacks both."
I'm sorry. I used imprecise language. How about this?
If the enemy task force is radiating at all (radars or jamming), they _may_ be detected even sooner.
I believe APG-81 is roughly a 20-30kw peak power radar.
A large phased array on a Chinese destroyer or cruiser will be in the megawatt class. While the same LPI techniques could be used, it will still be dumping out orders of magnitude more energy, and it will need that energy if it wants to detect a stealth aircraft.
"destroyer look like a frigate."
DeleteFrom a Quora discussion,
"I was Navigator on a Spruance-class destroyer when the first Arleigh Burke arrived in Pearl Harbor. The ships are similar length and tonnage, though the newer Burke got an upgrade with angular construction and radar absorbing coating. I remember coming into Pearl as the stealth ship was exiting. I looked out the bridge window, saw the large ship, looked at the radar, and only saw a tiny blip that faded in and out with the Pacific swell. I was astonished. The tech had turned a 500 foot, 8000 ton warship into a mere 12 foot, 100 pound fishing skiff. Missiles “see” in the electromagnetic spectrum, so the Burke had practically disappeared."
Based on many similar anecdotal statements, I think your assessment of the ship stealth is significantly underestimated. Of course, none of the statements can be independently verified.
Given the absence of public domain data, I can't definitively say you're wrong (but you are!) so you're welcome to your opinion. I think your overall scenario is way too optimistic. We've laid out the arguments so I'll drop it at this point. Feel free to have the last word.
That sounds like a sea story.
DeleteIf the Burke is that stealthy, why did we spend billions to build the DDG 1000s with their tumblehome hull and extreme attention to RCS reduction?
As I said, anecdotal evidence that's unverified. As far as I know, there is not even that degree of evidence for the performance of the APG-81 in surface mode. Hence, your suggestions for its performance are pure speculation.
DeleteVisby is claimed to have a detection range of 8-13 miles, as I documented in my post on it. A Burke-ish ship is, of course, larger and less stealthy but I seriously doubt it pushes the detection range out to 180 miles! China's recent Burke-ish classes appear, visually, to be more stealthy than the US Navy's Burkes.
Again, to believe that an F-35 will detect stealth ships at 180 miles defies what circumstantial evidence we have.
As far as the Zumwalts, they were NOT built for 'all scenario' stealth and I have serious doubts about how stealthy they are in normal operations. I've got a post coming on this. They were built for a very specific scenario: close to shore fire support where the detection radars would be land based as opposed to aerial radar detection. I don't think the Zumwalts are particularly stealthy when viewed from altitude. They're 'stealth shaping' was influenced as much by construction economies (long, flat 'planks') as stealth. You'll have to wait a bit but you'll find the post interesting.
"If the Burke is that stealthy, why did we spend billions to build the DDG 1000s with their tumblehome hull and extreme attention to RCS reduction?"
DeleteAnd if the F-35/APG-81 is so powerful and undetectable, why haven't we scrapped our AWACS, P-8, Triton, BAMS, E-2 Hawkeyes? We'd save billions!
Gentlemen, I believe you're both missing the point of stealth. It's not to become invisible (although modern ECM can no-sell pulse-doppler radars, as we saw in Cope Thunder), it's to reduce your radar cross section enough that it stymies detection.
DeleteIs X radar sensitive enough to detect Y stealth on radar, maybe. But if Y stealth's rcs is at the size that X filters out as noise, then it's practically invisible, isn't it? Aegis, for example, is.claimed to be able to track bird sized objects, but nobody's gonna tune the gain that high and see a screen full of contacts.
"The LCS-ASW is the replacement for the ASW aspect of the Perry class frigates. Thus, the 6 total LCS-ASW will replace the 71 ships of the Perry class frigate."
ReplyDeleteThis laughable statement is somthing that should cross every Congressman's, as well as the President's desk... Maybe the best callout I've seen of the Navy's recent decades of idiocy. Maybe itd make someone take a look and start asking questions and put feet to the fire.....
"and put feet to the fire....."
DeleteNot enough because Congress is still allowing the LCS to be built.
"...gives a total fleet force of 6 ASW, 6 MCM, and 6 ASuW ships."
ReplyDeleteWell they certainly seem to have the Distributed part of this covered.
I'm not as sure about the Lethality end of it.
The really disappointing and baffling part of this is that, by the Navy's accounting and organization, we have 18 combat deployable LCS and yet we've built/building 32. What are the rest going to be doing? I know the first 4 have been designated non-deployable and one out of every group of four is designated a training ship. That's a very poor combat investment on our part - 18 out of 32.
DeleteEven combat deployable seems to amount to just drug interdiction. The USN doing the USCG's job at 3 to 5 times the cost. Although maybe they can test out their ASW ability against Narco semi-submersable smuggler craft?
DeleteMy understanding of recent report by Seth Cropsey of Hudson’s Center for American Seapower and Bryan McGrath of The Ferrybridge Group looking at the Navy Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, ISR, required to support force plans to operate more spread out and to fight at longer ranges. Talks of dispersed surface combatants armed with long-range anti-ship missiles requiring organic targeting in comms/satellite denied or degraded environments. Navy has been using F-18's and satellites but satellites will likely be down or degraded by Chinese attacks and F-18s too short range (no mention made of F-35) to counter the very long range anti-ship missiles, saying Navy will have to rely on too few ISR platforms, manned or unmanned.
ReplyDeleteDegraded ISR result would be accepting high casualties or withdrawal from the first island chain (east and south China seas) allowing China choice of when and where to launch attacks or US launching high risk attacks in the face of unknown opposition.
The Cropsey and McGrath answer is to double down on more drones, mentions BAMS MQ-4C Triton; MQ-9 Reaper; MQ-25 ISR Stingray variant; V-247 Vigilant etc which looks to me like $billions for the UAV manufacturers and a turkey shoot for the Chinese, even third world Iran has shown the capability to shoot down a RQ-4 Global Hawk last June over the Persian Gulf.
Do agree with Cropsey and McGrath analysis which is what CNO has been posting for some time, but not their answer, I'll leave that to CNO:)
I was with you right up to the last sentence and then you lost me. What answer are you referring to? Is it the use of expensive UAVs? I've advocated small, cheap UAVs to be operated from individual ships as their own organic ISR. Is that what you're referring to?
DeleteYes, your "small, cheap UAVs to be operated from individual ships as their own organic ISR"
DeleteYour thoughts on possible long range ISR in the fog of war when opposed by peer enemy.
@Nick: The Chinese recently unveiled a new UAV during their National Day parade, which is meant to operate in concert with bomber-launched ALCMs. Essentially it's a missile that replaces the warhead with sensors and datalink: the idea is that it's fired immediately ahead of the ALCM salvo, arrives minutes before to the target point, and sends picture back to the ALCMs in its wake - and if it's destroyed, well, it'll have soaked up some of the interception fire that would have been aimed at the ALCM salvo.
DeleteTo be sure, it's very immediate, very limited ISR, but it's an example of thinking outside the box.
" it's an example of thinking outside the box."
DeleteThe Soviets had this decades ago.
It's a further evolution of what the Soviets had, yes. To go into a little more detail for Nick, what they did was they'd have a missile in the salvo climb up to see picture now (Hi, Granit!) and send that picture back to the other missiles.
DeleteThe US, meanwhile, has no such ability, because it seems the USN's assumption is that the fighter will always get through.
Excellent post, you keep hammering on how out of touch our Navy's operators are, chasing bad concepts which will not survive first engagement with a determined foe. I think our current Navy leaders are too conditioned by predominantly asymmetric fights. Toss in a little symmetry, and I fear they may hit the canvas more times than Rocky Balboa - but without the stamina and persistence to keep getting back up and stay in the fight. It doesn't help when they keep chasing new technology squirrels (rail guns, lasers, and now unmanned vehicles) instead of honing skills and tactics (ASW, as an example you have ably pointed out) needed in conflict with near peer enemies.
ReplyDeleteI have a suggestion for your consideration, since I have seen you use a metric as an argument point more than once. Consider revising your Perry Class FFG count for purposes of arguing a capability just to those ships which were actually in our Navy. True, 71 ships were constructed, but only 51 of those ships flew the US flag as part of our Navy. Of the other 20 ships, 4 were built in the US for Australia, and the remaining 16 were built overseas. Those 20 ships were never ours to begin with, although they were owned and operated by allies (AUS, Taiwan and Spain).
"only 51 of those ships flew the US flag"
DeleteAgggh! I knew that and completely mind-glitched. That's the danger in depending on a quick Wiki-check without double checking. I've got too many numbers in my head and they all run together. Good catch and I've corrected the post to reflect the correct number. I'll try harder. Thanks!
You're also absolutely correct about the symmetry issue. We are in for a rude awakening, I fear.
"I think our current Navy leaders are too conditioned by predominantly asymmetric fights."
DeleteQuite right! This is analogous to a sports team. If you only play decidedly inferior opponents, you develop bad, lazy habits. When you have to face an equal opponent, your bad habits will betray you.
Our military has developed bad habits (no ground ECM, no ASW, no MCM, no naval gun support, and on and on) because we've been 'playing' such inferior opponents and haven't need those capabilities. When we fight China, those bad habits will betray us.
It has its roots for both the US and China in the 1991 Gulf War. It scared the Chinese military and got them on their feet, forgetting everything about revolutionary war and started thinking in a military that could survive the onslaught that Iraq suffered. On the other hand, such a one sided war created a boost of confidence in the US military. It usually requires a defeat to reconsider things, and the Chinese are intelligent enough to use a foreign defeat as revulsive.
Delete"I think our current Navy leaders are too conditioned by predominantly asymmetric fights."
DeleteI think it's a military-wide problem. It's one reason why I have thought of giving the Marines the asymmetric warfare mission and refocusing the rest of the military on conventional peer-on-peer warfare. We don't fight asymmetric warfare well or efficiently, so let's devise strategy and tactics for doing it better. I think a large part of it has to be revising rules of engagement. As long as we are unwilling to risk collateral damage, the bad guys are going to use human shields. I think we need to redefine how much risk we are willing to take in that regard, and if it's not much then a military solution is not the right one.
Been thinking distributed leathality seems like a fail in concept or a best a band aid. Not so much that it could/can not work but that it does not make sense for the USN. It seems to me the USN is more or less invested in Carrier and SSN leathality. DL seems thus like a distraction. It will be nice say that the Burkes can get a land/ship attack orientated SM-6 missile as a backstop. But if the USN is doing things right a Burke really should only ever be worried about shooting down missiles, ballistic missiles and keeping subs from sinking CVs (or I suppose the FF(x) can do the last one).
ReplyDeleteSomehow after the cold war the USN lost its way. Its telling their CVs are not filled to capacity and lacks some kind of modernized combo of the A-6 and F-14 (with the some new phoenix like missile). The desire for both stealth and making everything a jack of trades seems a key point is lost of focus. In retrospect it hard not to feel that a model of a limited number of F-117 like second generation craft combined with not quite always bleeding edge and not always stealth first planes might have been a better option particularly if they were equipped with all kinds of new long rang missiles. For example a Harrier improvement is a good thing. But why turn it into a stealth aircraft? If the marines are evacuating people from some failed state it nice to have some air cover from a Wasp, but do really need a F-35B? Why not just a VSTOL aircraft that might be as good as a Gripen E?
"For example a Harrier improvement is a good thing. ... but do really need a F-35B?"
DeleteSo what do you do when you're called to a peer war and don't have a F-35B? I'm not agreeing or disagreeing with you - I'm just interested in how you see balancing lower end assets with the demands of high end, peer war which is, of course, the military's ultimate responsibility.
Distributed lethality only works--if at all--when what you distribute has lethality. The LCS is distributed nothing. Let's look at the notional mission areas:
ReplyDeleteMCM: Does the MCM module even work? The one capability that the LCS has--high speed--is the last thing you want in a minefield. The Navy hates what it needs--dedicated mine warfare ships. I see a need for two types, 1) a mother ship for drone and helo sweeps, basically like a smaller LPD/LSD with a helo deck for two helos and a well deck for drone sweepers and helo sleds, but with no troop berthing or equipment spaces, and 2) an MHC. Basically, the mother ship launches something like CpmNavOps's destroy everything mini-torpedoes, then the helos and drones sweep the channel, and then the MHC cleans up.
ASW: The engines are too loud for good sonar performance. What we need is a dedicated ASW frigate--IEP or CODLAG for quiet running, a bow sonar and passive side panels like the Virginias and VDS and/or a towed array, ASROC and torpedoes and a Hedgehog/RBU-type rocket-projectile-launcher, 2 ASW helos, and defensive SuW/AAW weapons--and we need about 80 of them.
SuW: The anti-ship missiles being tried on some of them may represent some nonzero capability. But the 57mm popgun adds little or nothing. Spending that much for minimal SuW capability seems a waste.
Bottom line, the LCSs are useless expensive junk. There's really no way to revive them. There best use is probably sunk as diving reefs. If only we could get the Spruances, Perrys, and Knoxes that we Sinkexed back in return.
Why is Distributed Lethality even a concept? Every surface combatant, from patrol boat on up, should be equipped to defeat a similar or slightly larger surface combatant. And, most should be equipped to defeat submarines.
ReplyDeleteThe Chinese Type 056 corvettes have half the displacement of an LCS, but is equipped with 4 antiship missiles amidship. The Ambassador Mk III boats we built for Egypt are armed with 8 Harpoon missiles. The Sa'ar V boats (about 1,300 tons displacement) we built for Israel are each equipped with 8 Harpoon missiles. Even the Knox-class could fire a Harpoon from a box launcher.
This shouldn't be a new concept for the Navy.
The armament is not the new concept (although, for the LCS it is!). The new part is the fantasy idea of ships skulking deep inside enemy waters, hidden by islands (not sure how islands hide a ship), and connected in a vast regional network, all waiting to swarm their weapons in a magical coordinated attack, wiping the seas clear of enemy ships. Makes for a good story, doesn't it?
DeleteI'm late to the party, but want to through out something.
ReplyDeleteWhy is the LCS (and most warships, it seems) limited to just 8 ASM's? But filled with Phalnx/SeaRam/ESSM/SM2?
It's like sending a soldier out with 20 layers of kevlar, but only a single magazine for their rifle.
Although the LCS flight deck is not strong, you can still put another 8-16 ASM's on there, given a total of 16-24 ASM's. Using CEC, that's a reasonable distributed lethality tactic. Add another 1-2 SeaRam for defence.
I can see this working. Hide near an island, moving close to enemy fleet, fire everything, and use that vaunted 40 knot speed to get away.
Andrew
"That's a legacy of Cold War operational research,"
DeleteNever heard that. Provide a reference.
"It came up in a conversation"
DeleteLet me know when you have an actual reference.
"It's kinda hard to provide an actual reference when all the relevant workings are classified and there's nothing out on the open sources as to specific assumptions"
DeleteTHEN YOU DON'T PRESENT IT AS FACT!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Instead, if you choose to present it at all, you make it clear that you are engaged in unsupported speculation.
Fellas, dial it down a little and try not to aggro so much, okay? We're all here to learn from each other, but thats not gonna happen if y'all keep looking for excuses to have tiffs.
DeleteLet's just admit that all have fallen short of the glory and try to do a bit better next time, okay?
@Andrew:
DeleteYou can make some guesses. Plenty of Western designs originating from the cold war have 8 missiles -why? The logical inference is they run with 8 because that's what their OR told them was the optimal number. Wild Goose wasn't wrong when he said that ships in that era expected to fight other ships with their own sensors - that puts limits into your combat lifespan.
You mentioned a soldier, think of it this way: the average GI Joe carries maybe 210 rounds of ammo. Could he carry more, sure, but thats pointlessmif he's not gonna live.long enough to use all his ammo.
Navies now seem to be assuming that offboard sensors are going to give them a.longer engagement time/combat.lifespan, so you might well see missile counts increase.
"The logical inference is they run with 8 because that's what their OR told them was the optimal number."
DeleteThat's one possible logical inference. Another equally logical inference is that 8 was simply a convenient number. It wasn't too big physically to mount. It didn't take up too much space. It didn't consume too much ships utilities.
Yet another logical inference is that the number was driven by cost. Eight was an affordable quantity.
I note that the Soviet Navy, for example, didn't settle on 8 as the magic number. Their main anti-ship vessels, the Kirov and Slava classes mounted many more than 8. The Sovremenny did mount 8 but that was a space limitation due to the size of the missiles.
It does not seem to me that 8 was derived from any operation analysis. Cost or space seem more likely explanations. I suspect 8 is an after the fact rationalization that we're attempting to apply today. For example, the number of actual Harpoons on Burkes is drive by inventory constraints rather optimal combat loads.
I mean, the soviets did their own OR and they had different assumptions in play, it wouldn't surprise me that they had different conclusions. One only needs to look at NATO vs Soviet tanks to see an example of two parties pursuing differejt solutions to the same problem because their operating assumptions are different.
DeleteI would be willing to agree that deck space can also be a factor, with how cramped warships tend to be.
CNOps, what do you think about some sort of stealth-based DL concept?
ReplyDeleteUsing something like that new Swedish corvette (see https://i.imgur.com/Yd1seqh.png) it might be feasible, I think.
There are small, stealthy, missile boat designs that would be somewhat preferred. However, the main flaw(s) in DL is not the stealth of the individual vessels, it's the lack of effective organic sensors, the lack of self defense capability on small vessels, and the questionability of the data sharing network that is the foundation of the entire scheme.
DeleteYou know I missed this the Tuo Chiang-class corvette out of Taiwan.
ReplyDeletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tuo_Chiang-class_corvette
At what something like real cost of 600+ million per ship for the LCS the USN could have licensed 35 of these and still had money to spare to build 35 Italian upgraded Gaeta class type ships as well for Mine warfare. For something like half of the pointless waste that is the LCS covering 2 of 3 missions with a dedicated ship and crew. Use the savings to buy more SSNs for anti sub.
Sure they have to helped to actual operational zones, but they can do their jobs. And it not like Iran has a blue water fleet that going anywhere but the Persian gulf and surrounds, nor is it going to mine San Fransisco Bay.