Saturday, January 12, 2019

Type 055 Cruiser vs. Burke

Let’s take a brief look at the new Chinese Type 055 cruiser (I can’t bring myself to call it a destroyer) and how it compares to the Burke.

As a reminder, the Navy is retiring the Ticonderoga class and is not directly replacing it.  Navy descriptions of the replacement suggest a wide range of possibilities with most sounding like a collection of buzzwords rather than an actual ship design concept.  The Navy has stated that the replacement cruiser may not be a cruiser at all but, rather, a “family of ships” or a “systems of systems”.

Currently, the Ticonderogas are being replaced by more Burkes, specifically, the Flt III which the Navy has acknowledged is too small to support the required AMDR radar and will, thus, be fitted with a smaller, less capable radar.

In contrast, the Chinese are building a true cruiser, the Type 055, with four already launched and at least two more underconstruction.  Sources suggest at least 8 ships will be built with more being possible. 

Here are some basic comparative specs for the Type 055 and the Burke, per Wikipedia.

                        Burke  Type 055

Length, ft                509       590
Displacement, tons      9,100    13,000
Range, nm               4,400     5,000
Gun                     1x 5”   1x 5.1”
VLS, cells                 96       112

The specs show that the Type 055 is significantly larger although the radar and weapons are reasonably similar in number and capability. 

So, what else can we infer about the Type 055 as compared to the Burke?

Stealth.  One obvious difference is the shape of the ship with the Type 055 being decidedly stealthier than the older Burke, at least by visual observation.  Of course, it’s anyone’s guess what the true degree of stealth of the two ships is but the Type 055 certainly looks stealthier!  Assuming that’s true, this gives the Type 055 an advantage in terms of detection range.  Aircraft will have to approach closer to “see” it and it can approach its targets much closer without being seen.  The Burke, being an early stealth design, and cluttered with all manner of topside gear, is at a distinct disadvantage.  I would go so far as to say that the Burke is no longer a front line warship design as regards stealth and its impact on the ship’s combat capabilities.

Type 055 Cruiser
Photo from China Defense Blog

Power.  Another likely difference is that the Chinese are actively and aggressively pursuing directed energy weapons (lasers) and it would be almost inconceivable that a high degree of excess electrical energy generation hasn’t been built into the design.  The Chinese have seen that electrical power limitations are one of the US Navy’s challenges with their current fleet and with the Burke Flt IIIs and it’s unlikely that they haven’t incorporated that lesson into the Type 055 design. 

Upgradability.  The Type 055 design has much greater potential for future upgrades and new sensors/weapons due to its much greater size and, presumably, power, than the Burke class does.  Despite the inherent limitations and very limited growth potential of the Burke, the Navy continues to build them even at the cost of sub-optimal equipment performance.

Almost unbelievably, the Navy continues to build Burkes and are now going to build sub-optimal Flt III Burkes rather than a clean sheet design.  China has opted to build a new design cruiser.  To be fair, the Chinese had no Burke type class worth upgrading so a new design was a given.  That aside, the Type 055 appears to be larger, carries more weapon cells, and has more growth potential.  Of course, it’s an open question about the radar performance and control software.  On paper, the Type 055 is setting the standard for modern cruisers while the US Navy continues to build sub-optimal, nearly obsolete Burkes.


  1. Why isn't the Type 55 a destroyer? It displaces significantly less than the Zumwalt, which you have no issue referring to as a destroyer, regardless of its many issues. In term of role, the Type 55 doesn't seem to differ heavily from the previous generation of PLAN Type 052D ships.

    1. I have zero interest in terminology. Call the Type 055 a patrol boat, if you wish. Of all the discussion-worthy aspects of the Type 055, what it's called is last on the list.

    2. Finally, I saw Americans discussing Chinese warships.

    3. It's size and capability is more on par with the Ticonderoga class cruiser.

  2. Weaponized lasers are an exercise in futility, for an overwhelming number of reasons.
    I'll just lead you to Carlton Meyer's article on the subject :

    1. I would imagine that someone told the Wright brothers that airplanes were an exercise in futility. I would imagine that someone told Edison that light bulbs were an exercise in futility. I would imagine …

      Every technological advance in human history has been met with initial skepticism and scorn and yet each eventually became commonplace. Practical laser weapons will become a reality some day and you'll take your proud place among the untold millions throughout history who have claimed a technology can't work and were proven wrong.

      Don't let endless historical examples sway you. Stick to your belief that lasers are an exercise in futility!

    2. Weaponized lasers are a technology that's been "right around the corner" for the last 40 years or so.

      Compare that to the atomic bomb : between the first proposal in 1935 and the first operational example, merely a decade happened.

      What I'm trying to say is : technological advancement usually happens relatively quickly if the idea is feasible. When a technology spends several decades in development and has yet to deliver something that works, it usually is a dead end.

      Since no working laser weapons exist today and none will exist in the near future, we'd be better off spending our money on off-the-shelf, proven technologies rather than endlessely pursuing "unobtainium".

    3. The first airplane flight was in 1903. It wasn't until WWII, forty years later, that aircraft advanced beyond the curiosity stage and became practical weapons. It also took the prompting of two real wars to push the development even that quickly. Lasers are currently at the WWI "curiosity" stage and there have been no world wars to push development. So, I have no problem with the pace of development. Nothing indicates that lasers can't, someday, become practical weapons.

      That said, lasers should be left in the realm of R&D until they're ready and the Navy should not be designing non-existent laser capacity into ships.

      I have no problem with 'endlessly' researching lasers. R&D costs nothing on a relative basis.

    4. Aircrafts were very much a practical weapon by the end of WWI. Notably, the french 1st Air Division, comprising nearly a thousand fighters and bombers, played a decisive role in stopping the last german offensives in 1918, especially during the Second Battle of the Marne.

    5. Lasers today can down UAVs and possibly damage small boats. That's equivalent to the barely airworthy aircraft of WWI. Your bias against lasers is stopping you from seeing that steady progress is being made. No one is claiming that Star Wars lasers are a reality yet but they are progressing, if slower than we'd like. It's important to be objective.

    6. I have no bias against lasers, I'm just a concerned taxpayer first and a military sci-fi nerd second ;)

    7. If you have no bias then you have to acknowledge that laser weapons are an inevitable development. The only question is the time frame. As I said, we shouldn't be designing them into ships yet since they're clearly still solidly in the development stage but their eventual use is inevitable. All new technologies are plagued with seemingly unsolvable problems which eventually, inevitably, get solved. The early steam engines had nothing going for them and seemed unlikely to ever displace sail - and yet they eventually did. And so on, with endless examples throughout history.

  3. One point. I think you are overstating the range. Global Security gives it only 7,000 nm @ 16 knots that is less than the Burke's cruising range at 20 knots.

    "Almost unbelievably, the Navy continues to build Burkes and are now going to build sub-optimal Flt III Burkes rather than a clean sheet design"

    No arguments - lunacy.

    Why not take the ROK Sejong the Great-class destroyer as a model. Add a complete low profile mast (I mean if they could added to the Spruance-class surly you could add that now to a new design). A solid design from a trusted ally with significantly more fire power than a Burke vIII.

    Am I mistaken the 'New' Burkes will have no box mounted Anti-ship missiles and still only one CIWS option/emplacement? That seems risky for a billion dollar plus ship.

    1. " I think you are overstating the range."

      I'm not overstating anything. As stated in the post, I just repeated Wikipedia's numbers and they were reported without associated speeds so they border on meaningless.

      " less than the Burke's cruising range at 20 knots."

      ????? Wiki lists the Burke range as 4400 nm at 20 kts. I have no idea where you're getting a number greater than 7000 nm at 20 kts???? I think you need to double check your source.

      StG class is just a slightly scaled up version of a Burke and suffers from the same flaws in terms of stealth and obsolescence. A clean sheet design would offer the opportunity for greatly enhanced stealth, greatly enhanced power systems, significantly more short range AAW weapons, significant UAV facilities, redesigned exhaust systems to greatly reduce IR signature, enhanced ECM, heavier and multiple guns, incorporation of armor, designed in acoustic isolation, etc.

    2. "StG class is just a slightly ...."

      Yes but so far every recent clean slate ideal the USN has tried is not exactly impressive - you handed me the same list to me LCS, Zumwalt, Ford...

      My point was if you are desperate to build more Burkes or something a bit better there are better Burkes being built.

    3. There are better Burkes being built. However, that's not the answer. If that were the approach we'd still have sailing ships with VLS added. Eventually, you have to move on to a new design and that time is now. The Burkes have reached the end of the line.

      You're correct that the Navy's record of accomplishment isn't great but that can't be the reason to stay firmly locked in the past. If you/we're that worried about a new design then we need to build a single ship prototype of a new class rather than commit to 55 ships before the first design is even completed (LCS). Build the prototype, learn the lessons, improve it, and then build the rest of the class. If the prototype is an unsalvageable mess then scrap it and try again. That's how you embrace the future, not with obsolete Burkes because you're too scared to try a new design.

      Even the Navy's frigate competition is an attempt to prevent design disaster by insisting on an existing base ship rather than a new design. Again, the answer is prototypes. We've completely forgotten that we used to build prototypes. We've forgotten what a prototype is and what it's used for.

      We also need to reinstitute BuShips, our in-house engineering expertise so that we can design and evaluate designs. Then we can move forward with confidence in new designs.

    4. "We also need to reinstitute BuShips,"

      Sounds fine but that would likely be a long term solution. Something to bridge the gap of old Burkes and no Ticonderogas seems like it should come of the self. I don't agree with endless Burke ideal. But if it is the stop gap why do they look like the least best Burke option?

      "...but that can't be the reason to stay firmly locked in the past. ... try a new design."

      No argument. But the culture of Pentagon seems to be otherwise and it looks not to be changing. Either build something you trust to death or build a techno gizmo. Both are safe choices for the navy. The former means you are not rocking the boat and they work and you add to fleet numbers. The latter means you are likely retired and working for a defense contractor before anyone notices the problem behind the BS of tech wonder and Power Point shows.

    5. " But the culture of Pentagon seems to be otherwise and it looks not to be changing."

      All the more reason to aggressively embrace the needed change. If we simply accept the status quo, nothing will ever change. Rickover didn't accept status quo. Billy Mitchell didn't accept status quo. And so on.

      You, personally, need to identify the path you desire and push for it rather than sit back and accept the status quo.

      I've stated many times that the last thing the Navy needs is more Burkes and one of the reasons is that they're bordering on obsolete. I don't want to build any more obsolete ships. I know quite clearly what the culture of the Pentagon and Navy leadership is but that isn't going to stop me from pushing a better way.

      Pick your path and push it!

    6. I Forgot I meant to revisit my comment on range.

      You did indeed post the range for the 055 and the Burke from wiki. From other sources the range of the Burke is widely claimed to be exactly the same you noted at 20 knots. My argument for overstatement of range for the 055 is that the source is Jane's and that is 5000 nmi at only 12 knots. Global security gives a whole mess of range guessing but at only 16 knots tops.

      Now the 055 is a big ship closer to the Spurance. Its range via Global Security was [wiki agrees on the first 2]

      3300 nmi @ 30 knots
      6000 nmi @ 20 knots
      8000 nmi @ 17 Knots

      Napkin graphing puts the Spurance at some 11000 nmi at 12 knots.

      The 055 is a big ship but seems to have far less range at 12 knots than one would expect. Conversely at either 12 or 16 knots the Burke would seem likely to have more range than its 20 knot rating. The same gain of Spurance at 17 Knots puts the Burke at more faster than any cruising speed I have seen for the 055 (12 or 16 knots).

    7. Calcification - I meant 16 knots is the highest cruising speed I found for the 055 published max range. I did not mean to imply top speed.

    8. Bear in mind that range for a Chinese ship is almost irrelevant since they don't do world wide deployments and in a war in the foreseeable future would operate inside the first island chain which means any range is more than sufficient.

    9. "Bear in mind that range for a Chinese ship is almost irrelevant"

      That is what I thought. But they are expensive ships effectively cruisers and clearly built to be comparable to the top flight ships of other navies.
      If they can only limb along at 12 knots to make maximum ranger then... Your point is probably valid that they simply don't care about range now. But its possible that its also comparable to fairly well recorded issues China has with aircraft engines. China can posture a lot more easily than the Pentagon because they control the info in a way that is not always possible/desirable in the US. Do they have a rail gun on a test ship that does anything? Maybe and maybe there is simply not an active press willing to talk to insiders who are not likely to suffer worse than firing (not a squad)for talking.

      Obviously arrogance gets you nowhere and USN should know that - re Perl Harbor. But I think the US should not fall into the trap of letting hype from Russia or China drive decisions.

      In this case I can't see why all the Ticonderoga are not simply going to get the upgrades that were planning on a faster pace vs retire. Since the new FF is clearly going to be a mini Burke no matter what the base hull... why build more Burkes? I mean if you want distributed leathity build more mini Burkes. The latest price estimate looks like almost 2-1.7:1. Just build mini Burkes and spend the savings on crew training. Even if the mini Burke is not a clean slate I'd rather have them and well trained crews if the navy can produce them fast. Does every ship need a bow sonar? Save some money and simply build three variants (primary role, vs secondary(s))from the start and no pretending you can swap in pieces.

  4. It seems as though the Zumwalt-class is getting poised for a comeback. The deletion of the S-band SPY-4 was practically criminal, as is the lack of close-in defense weapons.

    With no ammo for those 155mm guns, I wonder how many VLS cells could be fit into the volume for the guns and ammo handling systems. The current 80 cells is a dissapointing number for such a ship.

    If we proceed with actually determining the seakeeping capabilities of the hull, perhaps the future destroyer/cruiser is a Zumwalt 2.0 with the various Lessons Learned incorporated, with the full radar systems and more VLS. We have no other suitable large hull designs, although as a fan of this blog, I would love to see what a CNO-helmed design team could come up with.

    China is playing for real, and I wish that it felt like the surface Navy was doing the same thing.

    If you're looking for a decent and recent report on the Burke and Zumwalts, FAS has a good one up:

    It reinforces points regularly made here.

    1. "China is playing for real, and I wish that it felt like the surface Navy was doing the same thing."

      Quite right! Until the Navy acknowledges that the Chinese are already at war with the US (across the entire spectrum of financial, military, cyber, social, geopolitical) we won't make any significant changes or improvements. Thus far, we are still a peacetime Navy and have no interest in actual warfighting, despite occasional lip service from leadership.

    2. To follow up on Joe Taxpayer. It "surprises" me that no effort was made when the Zumwalt order was cut to three, essentially making it a class of experimental ships, to embrace this experimental quality and modify the design of the 3rd vessel as a prototype air-defense ship. There is clearly space in the superstructure for a much more capable radar fit than has actually been installed, and the lack of any remaining value in the gun system (except as ballast) was pretty obvious years ago.

      I find it hard to believe that at least one of the AGS spots (which is supposedly a modular installation) couldn't be taken by a suitable set of VLS cells (presumably the forward gun would be the one to replace). Given the first thing that is done with the Zumwalt's after they complete preliminary sea-trials is to send them to San Diego for the installation of a variety of combat systems, including a plethora of additional radars and communication warts on the superstructure, it appears, to this non-expert at least, that there is an opportunity, even if the ship has to be laid up for a couple of years to make some useful modifications to DDG-1002.

      This would allow the US Navy to test out the operation of a large dedicated air-defense vessel (cruiser? destroyer? munchkin? - names don't matter) with reasonably advanced computing architecture and command spaces as well as new propulsion and power distribution systems.

      As things stand the Arleigh Burke Flt III design is clearly excessively tight and doesn't meet the requirements outlined by the navy for the role it is expected to fulfill. The equivalents that come to mind are the Fiji sub-class of the Royal Navy's pre-WW2 Crown Colony light cruisers which were notoriously tight and were incapable of receiving upgrades such as radar without landing critical armament.

      Apologies if this seems a little to o much of a ramble.

    3. Completely agree. We've posted on prototype uses for the Zumwalt and there are many options.

  5. Good post, completely agree. Not much to add except that we are sticking with an evolution of the Burke class NOT REALLY because we want too BUT BECAUSE USN has nothing else! USN seems incapable to design a new ship or just come up with a new hull form to stick what it's trying to pigeonhole inside a to small Burke.....while it sure looks like China with newer Type 055 seems to have it's new hull in the water already....which leads to only a sad conclusion, USN is really a STEP behind in it's new CG class design, even if it launched the program today, no way,no how the new CG is in service before 2030. So USN is going to be facing a newer, stealthier CG for the next 10 years ( at least) and when it does get closer to fielding a new CG (2035?) China will have plenty of time to evolve the 055 or come up with a newer design to face and take into account the new USN design. Sad....

    1. Very good point about the timing and speed of development of the two countries. China is simply outpacing us.

    2. It should also be noted that China is under a crash program to recapitalise its Navy, as opposed to the US which used to be building a Burke a year. China has a sense of urgency because a lot of its ships are of 80s & 90s vintage and it wants as many modern ships as it can get, now.

      Also, if you look at previous Chinese shipbuilding, it looks very much like they build a few ships of varying classes and fitouts in order to throw things at the wall and see what sticks, then when they're satisfied with/finalise the design they want, they go into large scale production of that ship. Perhaps the US should take a page out of that book.

    3. "a sense of urgency because a lot of its ships are of 80s & 90s vintage"

      You do know when the bulk of the US fleet was built, right?

    4. "You do know when the bulk of the US fleet was built, right?"

      Yes, throughout the 90s. I get the feeling that the USN doesn't have as much of a sense of urgency because it used to be steadily building and launching multiple ships every year; in a sense, the US has already had its naval buildup, spread out over a longer period of time.

      Meanwhile the impression I get is that PLAN planners basically looked at things and went "our ships, built in the same era as the USN's Burkes, will not cut it, we need to first figure out what we want our new ships to be, and then we need to do a crash program to recapitalise the fleet as much as possible, as fast as possible."

      It doesn't really detract from what I'm saying though, in that I see the PLAN having a greater sense of urgency vs the USN.

  6. The USN doesn't seem to be making many good decisions in the last 20 years. I think they're making AB's because at least it's a known quantity that can still be built without delays.

    The USN did built ships to counter 055's- the Zumwalt. In some ways it's quite successful- the stealth seems to be amazing, and no one has disputed the improvements from using the peripheral missile cells- one hit doesn't knock out every missile in the normally clustered missile cells (remember the German ship last year?), and a hit disperses the explosive force outwards away from the innards of the ship.

    I have no engineering knowledge, so to me, imho as an armchair amateur, remove the 2 155mm guns, and replace them with 2 x 64 cells VLS's, and place 1-2 3/5 inch guns. There was a commenter last year, who said he thought there'd be room for such a set up- he helped design the Zumwalt.

    So there you are- The USN does have a cruiser design. Again- should you go with good enough, or go with perfection?


    1. "should you go with good enough, or go with perfection?"

      I'm a big believer in good enough. However, I don't believe that a Zumwalt meets even the good enough criteria. Here's the attributes I listed for a cruiser:

      -greatly enhanced stealth - Z may have this; there is no data to indicate whether the Z stealth is effective

      -greatly enhanced power systems - Z has this

      -significantly more short range AAW weapons - Z completely lacks short range AAW

      -significant UAV facilities - Z lacks this but the existing hangar/flight deck could be converted

      -redesigned exhaust systems to greatly reduce IR signature - no idea about Z IR signature

      -enhanced ECM - lacking, as far as I know

      -heavier and multiple guns - none

      -incorporation of armor - none

      -designed in acoustic isolation - unknown

      So, a cruiser Z would have a couple of the cruiser attributes but lacks several others. That's not "good enough" in my book. Combine that with the compromised open ocean seakeeping and a limited radar suite and it doesn't make a strong case for the Z as a basis for a cruiser.

  7. Flight III - according to Navy pdf, now withdrawn, quoted 10,600t, presuming EOL displacement.

    Ships inevitably get heavier and become less stable, as new equipment and systems are added above the center of gravity and exacerbated by undocumented weight growth during life, all new/variants of Navy ships designed to accommodate growth throughout their lives without exceeding original weight and stability limits, except when Admirals change the rules eg LCS and FFG(X), the Navy combatants/destroyer standard is 10% of full load departure weight margin and 1 foot of full load departure KG margin.

    With all the weight of the new top heavy SPY-6 radar and associated equipment said only able to achieve 8" KG and 8% growth margin, so would expect FLD to be ~9,800t, they changed the hull form in the stern, its slightly wider above the waterline and slightly less flared that gives a little more volume that the ship will displace for another few hundred tons in service life (not mentioned in relation to the wider stern beam was that when accelerating from nominal cruise speed to full power the stern dug in and helicopter washed overboard from flight deck which only at 13 feet above sea level with the loss of its two pilots 2013, Congress later refused to authorize the Captain promotion to Admiral). To bring the ship’s center of gravity back down they made the hull with thicker plates in some places and thickened the scantlings with the added advantage of creating a more survivable hull in the event of an underwater explosion. My understanding is that they also raised the level of the V-line of the ships hull, the height of the hatches/openings.

    Flight IIA range quoted at 4,400nm at 20 knots, powered by one of its four GTs on a single shaft, the second shaft unpowered in the trailing mode. Assuming the max range requirement was set by transit from Pearl Harbor to Japan  ~3,300nm and with minimum 5th and 7th fleet fuel safety levels set at 60% and in extremis 30%, that would give an operational range of only 1,760 nm at 60% reserve and 3,080nm at 30%, so in neither case could Burkes make transit at 20 knots without an oiler. Navy planned to update to Flight IIAs with Hybrid Electric Drive powered by its GT gensets to extend its relatively short range during the same time period as designing Flight IIIs, which required 50% new drawings by both Ingalls and BIW as unable to reach a common design, HED was not included in Flight IIIs as unable to take the weight.

    HED - Why Flight IIA and III needed HED for lower speeds is that though its four propulsion GTs have big advantages over diesels, with compactness, very high power density, quietness, acceleration and low start-up time, a GT is only most efficient at maximum power output, at lower rotational speed the pressure of the compressed air drops and thus thermal and fuel efficiency drop dramatically and GTs become gas guzzlers.

    PS Flight IIA HED upgrade cancelled last year, only the one ship to be upgraded

    Another indication of the limitations of the Burke hull is that an accommodation block has had to be installed on the aft weapons deck on the Flight III as accommodation displaced from the mid hull where ship is most stable and usual position due to the need for additional space required for the new radar.

  8. The Chinese VLS cells are also significantly larger than the Mk 41 and Mk 57 cells. This conceivably allows them to carry weapons with greater range compared to their US counterparts and possibly weapons like a tactical ballistic missile.

    1. Greater range sounds good in theory, but the problem with that is that in many cases, as noted in an earlier blogpost on this blog, your weapon outranges your sensors, meaning that to fully exploit the range of your weapons you need offboard sensors feeding you targeting data.

      What I am more interested in is what sort of CIC setup the Type-055 ships have; IMO what really differentiates a cruiser today, vs a destroyer, is flagship facilities. Burkes make poor flotilla leaders because of how the CIC has only 2 large displays and no space for additional operators, so the CIC crew must juggle fighting the ship with fighting the flotilla. On a Tico, there are 4 large displays and more operator stations, so you can have a portion of the CIC crew on handling flotilla things and supporting the desron commander, while the rest of the CIC crew focuses on fighting the ship.

    2. Note that while the JMSDF does use the Atago-class DDGs, their own take on the Flight II Burke, as flotilla leaders, the superstructure is larger to accomodate 2 additional decks for flagship facilities.

    3. "IMO what really differentiates a cruiser today, vs a destroyer, is flagship facilities."

      Why? When would a 'cruiser' be the flagship when carriers are the centerpiece of US naval strategy and operations? Are you saying that a Cyclone class patrol vessel, if it had room for flag facilities, would be a cruiser? Are you envisioning cruisers as independent operators rather than with a carrier/amphib group? How do flag facilities make the destroyer - now a cruiser - more lethal or is there no difference in lethality between a destroyer and cruiser?

      I'm not saying you're right or wrong, just trying to understand how you see flag facilities transforming a destroyer into a cruiser. Expand on your thesis.

    4. basically, what I mean is that unlike in WW2, today the difference between a cruiser and a destroyer is a lot closer. Look at the Burkes and Ticos: in terms of systems and weapons they're outfitted the same way. The only firepower difference is that a Tico has 1/3rd more VLS cells than a Burke, but the weapons and sensor fitout is basically the same.

      when I say flagship facilities, the context I'm talking about is the flotilla leader function, for escort desrons or SAGs on independant duties. Essentially the split between cruiser and destroyer, for me, is not based on firepower, but on function (although there's nothing keeping a clean sheet new cruiser from having more VLS cells than a burke).

      Although I think reusing the older term Destroyer Leader would be more accurate, prticularly when one recalls the DLGs that were reclassed as cruisers because of the Cruiser Gap panic.

    5. I think this point is about command and control and intended roles. The CVBG's escorts were centered around a CGN or two with DDGs subordinated for AAW tasks and DDs and FFGs for ASW tasks. Since the CGN had the superior sensors and was data-linked to the rest of the escorts, this made sense. Plus specialization of duties and such.

      The point that often comes up with the Burke's is that they are a compromise design that is sort of a super DDG that tries to fills all of the CVBG escort roles (AAW, ASW and escort TG leader), but is really only optimized for AAW.


Comments will be moderated for posts older than 7 days in order to reduce spam.