Changing the Calculus

You’ve probably heard, by now, about the Navy’s AIM-174B air-to-air missile.  It’s a Standard SM-6 surface to air missile adapted to be air launched from F-18 Hornets.  The key characteristic of this missile, in this role, is its 200-300 mile range.  There is no exact published spec on the range, yet, but the ship launched version has a range of 150 – 290 miles, depending on the flight profile.  Various reports suggest that the air launched range is 300+ miles. 
 
Other performance characteristics of note include a weight of around 1,900 pounds, a length of more than 15 feet, a speed of up to Mach 3.5, and an impressive 140-pound blast-fragmentation warhead. In comparison, the Sidewinder has a 20 lb warhead and the AMRAAM has a 44 lb warhead.
 
Of course, this performance comes at a staggering cost of $4.3M per missile.[1]
 

AIM-174B

This missile is intended to be the very long range air to air missile (VLRAAM) that’s been missing from the inventory and is an answer to the very long range Chinese and Russian air to air missiles.  The Chinese have the PL-15 which is reported to have a range of 120-190 miles and a speed of Mach 5, the PL-17 which is reported to have a range of 250-310 miles and a speed of Mach 6, and the PL-21 which has a reported range of 190+ miles.  The Russians have the AA-13 (R-37) Arrow which has a reported range of up to 250 miles and a speed of Mach 6.  A similar, though shorter ranged US missile is the AIM-260, currently under development.  It is reported to have a range of 120 miles and a speed of Mach 5.

 
This category of very long range, very fast missile is a severe problem for high value units such as tankers and E-2 Hawkeyes.  We’ve discussed the impact of this missile and noted that it could force our Hawkeyes, in particular, to operate so far back from the aerial battle as to lose awareness and control which is, of course, the doctrinal key to US aerial combat.  This would, for example, cede aerial supremacy to the Chinese over Taiwan in the event of an invasion.  Our carrier aircraft would be unable to operate effectively in the area with each aircraft forced to operate independently instead of with the benefit of an all-seeing controller.  It would also force each aircraft to radiate instead of remaining emissions silent and allowing the E-2 to detect and designate targets.  The negative impact of Chinese very long range air to air missiles (VLRAAM) cannot be overstated.
 
 
Targeting
 
This is, as always, the crucial and limiting factor.  A 300+ mile missile is useless if we can’t generate targeting at that range.  No fighter radar is going to see modern enemy fighters at anything approaching that range and certainly not enemy stealth fighters.  My best semi-informed guess is that a fighter won’t see an enemy stealth fighter until 20 miles or less.
 
In a match up between the Navy’s F-18, the only plane currently designated to carry the AIM-174B, and an enemy stealth fighter, the enemy is going to get first detection every time.
 
A large radar plane (AWACS or E-2 Hawkeye) might be able to see enemy fighters at somewhat longer ranges but, still, nothing approaching 300+ miles.  So, where do we get targeting for these missiles?  There are a few viable options.
 

• The F-35 (or the occasional F-22 from Guam?) might have the stealth to get close enough to provide targeting against HVUs (though not enemy stealth fighters).  HVUs are not stealthy and are relatively easily detected.  Note: this is one reason I’ve called for stealthy ‘Hawkeyes’, possibly based on the B-21 (see, “B-21 Hawkeye”), to thwart enemy attacks against our HVUs.
• A B-2/21 equipped with passive sensors could be used to provide targeting although it is questionable whether it would be worth the risk.
• Taiwan ground assets might well be able to provide targeting, particularly using passive EO and IR sensors.  It would be almost impossible for the Chinese to completely eliminate this kind of small, non-radiating, hard to find asset.

 
The reverse case of the Chinese providing targeting for their VLRAAMs is interesting.  They would have their own stealth aircraft to provide targeting, land based over- the-horizon radars, and suicide aircraft.  The latter is concerning.  The Chinese do not have the same view of the value of the individual pilot that we do and the idea of sending throwaway fighter aircraft on semi-suicide runs straight at our HVUs, either to shoot them directly or to provide targeting for remote VLRAAM shooters, is viable and concerning.  From the Chinese perspective, if they can trade a handful of second tier fighters to kill a US HVU, that would be a win for them.  The Russians essentially had this as the cornerstone of their anti-carrier strategy during the Cold War.  They were doctrinally willing to sacrifice many Tu-95 Bear search aircraft to provide detection and targeting for their naval aviation bomber regiments.
 
 
Taiwan Scenario
 
The problem with any contemplation of a Taiwan-centered war with China is that it presents a massive advantage for China due to physical proximity.  The skies over Taiwan can safely be assumed to be packed with Chinese aircraft and only occasionally challenged by US sorties from Guam, if it remains operational or carrier aircraft.  The advantage becomes all the greater for Chinese aviation through their uncontested use of AEW and EW aircraft supporting the aerial fight from a safe distance.  Until now, we simply didn’t have a VLRAAM of our own to threaten Chinese AEW and EW aircraft.
 
Conversely, Chinese VLRAAM missiles would be used to push US AEW, EW, and tanker aircraft back, thereby relinquishing control of the air battle.
 
For many decades, US military operations have assumed aerial supremacy.  Chinese VLRAAMs have upended that assumption.  Now, however, the AIM-174B offers the ability to regain control of the aerial battle or, at least, force an even contest (which is not how you want to fight but it’s better than fighting from a disadvantaged position!).
 
 
Summary
 
The AIM-174B VLRAAM offers the possibility of establishing aerial supremacy (or, at least, equality) in the Taiwan scenario.  The key, as always, is targeting.  As usual, the US military has focused on the weapon and ignored the sensor/targeting issue.  We should be working just as hard at solving the targeting issue.
 
We also need to be working on tactics for the Taiwan scenario and I guarantee that we have not addressed this in any realistic fashion.  We need to figure out how best to deploy the AIM-174B and how best to take advantage of the opportunities it creates.  Will this allow our F-18s to fight with a reasonable chance of success or is the F-18 simply outclassed by Chinese aircraft?  Are there tactics that can make the F-18 effective?  This, by the way, is why I’ve repeatedly called for a new, very long range, stealthy, air supremacy carrier fighter and end this idiotic combination strike-fighter nonsense that produces an aircraft that is neither a good strike asset nor a good fighter.
 
We can win the Taiwan aerial battle but it means focusing on what’s important and letting go of our paradigms.  We need new approaches, new tactics, and new aircraft optimized for the Chinese war.  The AIM-174B is one piece of the puzzle but we can’t stop there, as we are almost certain to do.  We need to develop the accompanying tactics and fighter aircraft that will take advantage of the AIM-174B.  And no, we can’t simply stand off and lob these missiles into the skies over Taiwan.  The missiles are far too expensive, complex, and time-consuming to produce to ever have that kind of inventory.
 
We’ve taken the first step.  Now, we need to finish the job.
 
 
 
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[1]https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/05/aim-174b-is-navys-new-air-launched-missile-a-hypersonic-killer/

Memorial Day

Enjoy your Memorial weekend and please remember those who gave their lives in the service of our country.

Leadership and the CNO

Everyone thinks they’re an interior decorator and you see the results almost every time you visit someone’s home.  They’re generally pretty poorly decorated.
 
Similarly, everyone thinks they’re a leader or know what makes a good leader … but they aren’t and don’t.
 
Breaking Defense has an article on the Navy’s vacancy at the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) position which attempts to point out the problems with a vacancy for CNO.[1]  Consider the following statement
 

“It’s not good,” Wills [Steven Wills, naval historian and associate at the Center for Maritime Strategy] said flatly, “to be operating without a CNO.”[1]

Think about that for a moment.  How has having a CNO worked out for the Navy these last several decades?  The Navy’s CNOs have guided the Navy straight into the toilet.  I’m not going to bother listing all the problems.  You read this blog so you know what they are.  If that’s what having a CNO gets us, maybe we’re better off without a CNO?
 
We have an acting CNO, Adm. James Kilby, Vice CNO.
 
Wouldn’t that be a great opportunity for Kilby to give us an on-the-job audition?  After all, he was/is the VCNO so he should be more than capable of stepping in and showing outstanding leadership, right?  Here’s what Breaking Defense and Mr. Wills think,
 

But even with Kilby in place, Wills and others said major strategic or programmatic decisions will likely be postponed with no empowered, confirmed CNO to back them up.[1]

Why would decisions need to be postponed?  If they’re good decisions, they should be implemented immediately and decisively.  Why hesitate?  If they’re not good decisions then you shouldn’t be in the position.
 
Take bold, decisive action until someone stops you.  Don’t cower in fear that someone might disagree.  Don’t wait for approval from above.  You’re the highest ranking Naval officer there is.  Act like it.
 
Here’s yet another person who doesn’t understand what leadership is.
 

Even the best acting leaders are reluctant to make tough calls on hard issues,” Erik Raven, former under secretary of the Navy, told Breaking Defense.[1]

If you’re reluctant to make tough calls then you shouldn’t be in that position.  Step aside and let someone else take over the acting CNO job.
 
Congress doesn’t understand leadership or how bad the Navy’s CNOs have been, either.
 

Sen. Tim Kaine, the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services seapower subcommittee, told Breaking Defense he was “nervous” about the lack of a CNO.[1]

Nervous about the lack of a CNO????  Given their record, I’d be more nervous about having a CNO!  Heck, paralysis would be better than the incompetence we’ve seen from our CNOs.
 
Here’s a few sentences that should tell us everything we need to know about Navy leadership and officer ranks.
 

To cope with the strain of doing two jobs at once, the acting service chief must delegate tasks to subordinate officers, who then do the same as they become overburdened with new responsibilities. Those officers also become reluctant to act when asked to make decisions that are historically above their paygrade.[1]

Isn’t the entire idea of the Navy (or any military combat structure) that you’re always ready to step into the next highest job, at a moment’s notice?  Sure, you may lack experience and maybe you’ll make a mistake but hesitation shouldn’t be one of your problems.  If you’re a professional warrior, you’ve been studying naval warfare your entire career.  You should know what needs to be done.  If not, you’re a failure and in the wrong line of work.
 
There’s nothing magic about being CNO … as our string of abject failures confirm.  CNOs have no special knowledge or capabilities.  They’re just the guys who played politics better than the rest.
 
Consider this damning statement,
 

“When Adm. Franchetti was the vice chief, and acting as CNO, she was hesitant to roll out a plan for the Navy under her term of leadership,” Wills added.[1]

Shouldn’t that have told us what kind of CNO she’d be?  ComNavOps predicted her pathetic failure almost on day one because ComNavOps understands what leadership is and can recognize the glaring lack of leadership qualities in others.
 
Where’s the next Halsey?  Where’s Nimitz?  Where’s Willis ‘Ching’ Lee?  Instead, we get Franchetti and Kilby.
 
I’m not worried about the absence of a CNO;  I’m worried about having a CNO … another stinking, steaming pile of CNO since no one around the Navy seems to understand what real leadership is.
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “What a historic absence of its top officer means for the Navy”, y   Justin Katz and Valerie Insinna, 23-May-2025,
http://breakingdefense.com/2025/05/what-a-historic-absence-of-its-top-officer-means-for-the-navy/

Ship Order Quantities

Continuing on a little bit of an acquisition theme, we have become conditioned to think of military acquisition ordering, specifically ship ordering, as occurring in large quantities.  For example, here’s some planned or built orders for some classes:
 

 
 

But, this was not always the case.  In fact, this is an anomaly in the history of the Navy.  Historically, most shipbuilding programs resulted in small orders.  Consider the following sequential list of combat ship types in the WWII era and note the size of each class, as shown in the table below.

 

We see that even in the midst of an emergency wartime crash construction program that would see the Navy ultimately build a fleet of 6000 ships, the individual class sizes were still very small … stunningly small by today’s norm.
 
Even the smaller ships, of which the Navy needed many hundreds, were built in fairly small quantities as shown below.
 

 

Even these larger destroyer and destroyer escort class numbers are deceptive in that they were all built in the span of a few years.  Thus, although the numbers may have been larger, the construction period for the classes was very short which is almost the same as being a very small class as far as how it impacts ordering, construction, and pricing.  Contrast this with the LCS class, a corvette size ship, which has been under construction for some twenty years or the 3-ship Zumwalt class which began construction in 2009 and is still continuing, sixteen years later!
 
 
Future Proofing
 
One of the major impacts of class size has to do with the misguided notion of future proofing, the concept so beloved by so many naval observers.  The idea of future proofing is that if we build excess capacities (weight margin, electrical power, internal hull volume, hull length, extra cabling and ducting, etc.) into the new ship it will be much cheaper to upgrade it in the future as new technologies emerge.  While superficially appealing, the concept has failed almost completely in practice and has resulted in more expensive ships that never get ‘futured’, meaning, they never receive those nebulous, undefined future upgrades.
 
Future proofing results in compartments that have no function, cables and ducting that are dead ends, and length, width, and volume added to the ship for future needs that, history tells us with near 100% certainty, will never happen.  In short, we increase the cost of ships trying to future proof them despite knowing full well that we’ll never apply the future upgrades.  Instead, when the time comes for adding future upgrades, the Navy will claim, as they always do, the ships are too old and that it is no longer cost effective to upgrade the ship and that the ship is too worn out to be worth upgrading and that we must buy new hulls.  How many times have we seen this happen and yet naval observers keep calling for future proof designs?  Remind me, what’s the definition of insanity?  Oh yeah, that’s right …
 
In WWII, there was zero future proofing built into ships.  Future proofing, meaning the incorporation of new technology, was handled by building small classes so frequently that classes with new technologies (or the lessons of actual combat) were always just around the corner.
 
 
Order Size
 
One might think that industry would love large orders and, in theory, that would be correct if the Navy ever followed through on the large order (see, “Follow Through”).  In theory, large orders would lend stability to shipbuilders since they could plan years ahead for their workloads, better manage workforce levels, and intelligently plan facility improvements.  Of course, this is not what happens in practice.  In practice, shipbuilders are left unsure about future workloads since every program is always on the verge of being cancelled or reduced, orders surge and wane resulting in frantic attempts to hire workers followed shortly by layoffs, and facility improvements and, indeed, basic maintenance, keeps getting pushed into an undefined ‘someday’ that never arrives.  What’s the point of large orders that just get cancelled or reduced?
 
Contrary to what one might think, small orders actually promote stability in the shipbuilding industry because industry has a much higher confidence that the order will be fully carried to completion and that subsequent small orders are coming.
 
Large orders have had the effect of reducing new classes and new projects to near zero.  For example, we’re down to one new combat aircraft order every twenty or thirty years now.  This results in one winner in industry getting all the work for decades (Lockheed Martin and the F-35, for example) and the other manufacturers being forced to consolidate and/or die due to lack of work.
 
It is time to return to the historically more normal practice of building frequent, small classes of ships with short life spans (10-20 years).  We knew this, once upon a time, but stupidly abandoned timeless wisdom.  Let’s study our history, recall the lessons, and return to sanity.

Follow Through

We are constantly amazed – but, by this time, not surprised – by the inevitable increases in prices on military acquisition programs and the 100% guaranteed cost overruns.  We’ve discussed many of the factors that cause this but here’s one that we haven’t emphasized enough:  quantity reductions.
 
The more you build of something, the cheaper it gets due to economy of scale … at least, that’s the theory although it’s almost impossible to find evidence of that in any acquisition program.  But, what happens when the initial quantities get reduced as the program progresses?  Prices skyrocket for the remaining items and subsequent construction bids soar.
 
As a reminder, consider the historical programs listed below and the change from the initial quantities to the final purchased amounts, as shown.  Note that some of the quantities, especially the planned quantities, vary depending on source.  I’ve listed the most commonly cited quantities that I’ve found.  For programs with international sales, the figures shown are for US sales only.
 
 

• Seawolf-class - planned 29, built 3
• Zumwalt-class – planned 32, built 3
• Zumwalt AGS – planned 64, built 6
• F22 - planned 750, built 195
• LCS – planned 55, built 35
• LCS Modules – planned 64, built 35
• B-2 – planned 132, built 21
• M10 Booker – planned 504, built 80
• MQ-8C – planned 177, built 38
• EFV – planned 1025, built 0

 
 
There are also programs that have not yet concluded but appear to be on their way to reducing the planned quantities.
 

• LRASM – interest has died and the program is on the verge of termination
• F-35B – planned 353, now planned 280
• F-35C – planned 353, now planned 280
• ACV – planned 1122, now planned 632
• P-8 – planned 138, now planned 128
• F-35   planned 2866, now planned 2470
• MQ-4C Triton – planned 70, now planned 27

 
With this background, does anyone think programs such as the B-21, Columbia-class, and Constellation-class will survive with no quantity reductions?
 
 
Discussion
 
To return to the original premise, how do quantity reductions impact costs and future program bids?  Think about it.  If you’re running a defense industry company and you’re asked to bid on a project, you know, with near 100% certainty, that the quantity you’re bidding on will be reduced at some point.  So, what do you do?  Obviously, you calculate the actual cost to produce the specified number of products and then you add a significant extra amount to your bid to cover the inevitable reduction in quantity.  You have to do this to ensure your profit.  This isn’t price gouging … it’s just basic, common sense business.
 
The military’s instability in program quantities drives up costs as a simple matter of business.  If the military would hold to the planned quantities, the savings would be huge.

Surface Ship Aviation

It has been some 80+ years since WWII and in that time we have seen some truly remarkable advances in tank design, aircraft design, missile development, sensors, etc.  One would think that ship design would have advanced at least as much and yet this is clearly not the case.  Not only has ship design not advanced, in many respects it has regressed.  Armor, weapon density, survivability, redundancy, endurance, sailing range, etc. have all regressed.  Well, at least we can say that surface ship aviation has advanced with the development of the helicopter … right?  Or has it?  Let’s look.
 
As a reminder, WWII US cruisers typically carried four seaplanes operated from two catapults and recovered with one or two cranes.  The seaplanes they used included, primarily, the OS2U Kingfisher and, at other times in the war, the Curtis SC-1 Seahawk and Curtis SOC Seagull.  Today, Burke class destroyers Flt IIa and beyond carry one SH-60 type helo (theoretically capable of two but never done, as far as I know) and provision for a small Fire Scout type UAV which have rarely been used and are being phased out (see, “Fire Scout Status”).  Flt I/II Burkes, have no hangar and carry no helos.  The Constellation class carries one SH-60 type helo and one Fire Scout type UAV.  The LCS carries one SH-60 type helo and one Fire Scout or smaller UAV.
 
 
Aircraft
 
Just as the value of an aircraft carrier is wholly dependent on the size and abilities of the air wing, so too is the surface ship aviation value dependent on the aircraft they carry.  Following is a comparison of the primary aircraft from WWII surface ships and today’s surface ships.

OS2U Kingfisher

Discussion

 
The main function of ship’s aviation both in WWII and today is scouting/targeting.  In WWII, ship’s planes, with a few hundred miles of search radius and an enemy ship speed of advance of only 30 kts maximum, a ship/scout could ensure the ship’s safety for the better part of a day.  Today, with enemy weapons having a speed of advance of several hundred miles per hour or more, long range searches are more critical than ever and yet today’s shipboard aircraft have around half the range of WWII aircraft.  Does that make sense?  What ship designer thought, “Hey, let’s cut the range of our shipboard aviation in half and go with that.”  and everyone agreed with him instead of laughing him out of a job?
 
The other notable regression is in the number of embarked aircraft.  A WWII cruiser carried four aircraft.  Today’s ships carry one full size helo and a small UAV.  Quite a drop!  Admittedly, a WWII cruiser is a bit bigger than even a Burke but the WWII cruiser also didn’t have the 100 ft flight deck and enormous hangar that a Burke has.  Approximately one third of a Burke’s total length is devoted to aviation.  WWII ships devoted almost no length to aviation.  Catapults were placed wherever there was a small amount of room available, including on top of gun turrets!  

The one area where an argument can be made that aircraft have significantly improved is anti-submarine warfare (ASW).  Helos have proven quite useful and effective at this thanks to sonobuoys, dipping sonar, and air-dropped torpedoes.  Unfortunately, the reduction in number of embarked aircraft have rendered the ASW helo only marginally useful unless several ships can pool their aircraft.  As the saying goes, if you have one helo, you have none.  This is recognition of the very high maintenance demands of helos and their inability to maintain a high readiness rate.
 
So, while ASW helos are theoretically significantly improved, the reality of reduced numbers and readiness rates have rendered any theoretical improvement only marginally useful.
 
As with so many other aspects of ship design, today’s surface ship aviation capabilities have not significantly improved and have, in many ways, regressed.  Today’s ships carry fewer (half or less) aircraft with significantly shorter ranges.  
 
How can we address the shortcomings in surface ship aviation?  We have, potentially two possible alternatives to today’s aviation problems:
 
1. Revert to shipboard seaplanes.  With modern engines, enhanced aerodynamic designs, stealth shaping, etc., we should be able to design a ship’s seaplane with range in excess of a thousand miles and a reasonable degree of stealth for survivability and the ability to scout without being instantly detected.  Four (to use the historical number) such aircraft would go a long ways towards providing ships with effective situational awareness and target detection.
 
2. UAVs.  We’ve discussed the use of small, stealthy UAVs for shipboard surveillance many times.  Operated by the dozens at a time, small UAVs can be quite effective while representing little financial risk if some are lost (see, “UAV’s – Numbers Matter”).

Comment Quality

Comment quality has nosedived, recently.  I’m seeing far too many uninformed, unsupported, argumentative, pedantic comments.  As a reminder, and as stated in the Comment Policy page, the reader is responsible for knowing the basics of military history, strategy, and tactics.  Also, any statement of fact that is not commonly known should be supported.  Finally, the purpose of the blog is to discuss and learn.  Arguing for the sake of arguing is not allowed.
 
I suspect that many/most of the offending comments are the work of one or a few newer readers and, if so, I will weed them out in relatively short order.  I want productive comments or no comments.  I’m happy either way.
 
Once again, I urge commenters to append a username to the end of comments to avoid confusion about who said what.
 
Discuss, learn, and enjoy or find another blog.

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