Burke Class Cost Breakdown

Here’s an informational post on ship construction costs as typified by the Burke class.  Data is taken from the Navy’s Shipbuilding and Conversion budget submission for 2017 (1).

Burke Class Cost Breakdown

Planning                        $40M   2%

Basic Construction             $739M  44%

Change Orders                  $114M   7%

Electronics                    $173M  10%

Hull, Mechanical, Electrical    $81M   5%

Ordnance                       $508M  30%

Other                           $40M   2%

Total                         $1697M

From the detailed cost category breakdowns in the document, here are examples of the kinds of items included in each broad category.

Construction

• Basic hull and superstructure construction

Electronics

• SQQ-89 ASW
• SLQ-32 SEWIP
• IFF/TACAN
• CEC
• Navigation
• SLQ-25 Nixie
• Exterior Communication Systems
• Internal Networks

Hull, Mechanical, Electrical

• STC 3 IVCS
• Main Reduction Gear
• Machinery Control System
• Integrated Bridge Navigation System

Ordnance

• Aegis
• SPY-6 AMDR
• Mk 41 VLS
• Mk 45 5” Gun
• Mk 37 Tomahawk Control System
• CIWS
• SPQ-9B
• Mk 32 Torpedo
• EO System
• Mk 160 Gun Fire Control System

We see that the major cost, by far, is the basic physical construction of the shell of the ship, meaning the hull and superstructure.  This makes up 44% of the total shipbuilding cost.  This also gives lie to the oft repeated “truism” that “steel is cheap and air is free”.  In fact, it’s clear that steel is not cheap and air is not free – not even remotely.  All the people who casually call for a little bigger ship because the added steel is cheap, are wrong.  We’ve already discussed this topic (see, “Steel Is Cheap and Air Is Free”) and disproved it and this data simply adds more support to the recognition that steel is not cheap and air is not free.  Another “truism” dies!

Hand in hand with the claim that steel is cheap and air is free, is the claim that electronics make up the major cost of a ship.  As we see, electronics accounts for only 10% of the ship cost.  Aegis, oddly, is grouped under ordnance and costs around $220M.  That's around 13% of the ship's cost - not an insignificant amount but nowhere near the major portion of a ship's cost.  Another “truism” dies!

As a sidelight, from the same document, here are the Burke class unit costs for the last several years.  It is interesting to see the very wide variation in unit cost.  There is a very loose relationship between quantity and cost but I emphasize loose.  For example, the highest cost is not associated with the lowest quantity.  Of course, over that time frame the Navy has been tinkering around with the Flt III modifications so some variation could be due to that.  There were also restarts and partial technology insertions.  My tentative conclusion is that there likely is a quantity-cost relationship but that other factors outweigh and obscure the quantity effect.  The Navy’s recent practice of deferring major portions of construction until after delivery also obscure the true construction costs.

Year    Qty.  Unit Cost

2010  1  $2.133B

2011  2  $1.561B

2012  1  $1.904B

2013  3  $1.437B

2014  1  $1.731B

2015  2  $1.497B

2016  2  $2.253B

2017  2  $1.697B

As I said, this is just an informational post that sheds a bit of light on the cost contributors to the construction of a ship.

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(1) Dept of Defense 2017 SCN Budget, Exhibit P-5c, 2017 DDG-51, FY2017 data column

Modern Day Marine 2016

In the course of researching other posts, I happened across Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Neller’s speech at the Modern Day Marine Exposition 2016 and it offered some interesting insights into his views of the future combat and the role the Marines will play in it (1).  Here are some of the highlights.  Rather than transcribe long passages, I’ve summarized most of the salient points.  If you want to hear the speech, you can follow the link below.

Neller astutely noted that recent enemies have had very little modern combat capability.  This seems like a “duh” moment but I call it an astute observation because so many people in and out of the military have come to believe that we’ve been fighting actual wars against valid opponents.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  Nothing we’ve done the last couple decades has been remotely like a real war.  Sure, there has been the odd firefight but, for the most part, it’s basically been a live fire exercise.  This is not to take anything away from those who served and especially those who gave their lives.  However, there’s no getting around the reality that our opponents, while deadly, offered no real military opposition.  Any success they had was because we foolishly allowed it – but that’s a topic for another time.  Thus, I give Neller credit for recognizing the basic truth about the utter lack of military competency in our recent enemies. 

Neller went on to describe future combat which, according to him, would involve the electromagnetic spectrum, space, complex terrain / urban sprawl, coastal regions, dense population centers, and slums.  This is superficially likely but completely fails to enumerate the fundamental characteristics of future peer combat which include, on our enemy’s part, if not our own,

• Wanton destruction
• Profligate use of high explosive and cluster munitions far beyond all pre-war estimates
• Complete disregard for collateral damage including civilian casualties
• Focus on explosives over technology
• Shocking willingness to sacrifice troops to achieve objectives
• Heavy use of artillery and armored vehicles
• Military barbarism on a scale we will have trouble believing

Thus, we see that Neller, while recognizing that we haven’t been militarily challenged and therefore need to prepare for more challenging combat, then fails to correctly anticipate what those challenges will actually be!  You can see from his list of future warfare characteristics that he’s still anticipating the kind of nation building, anti-insurgency warfare that we’ve been fighting.  Reread his list of characteristics and you’ll see the complete lack of high end combat references.

He then goes on to describe what he feels are the future domains (I hate buzzwords!) of combat and notes that there are six:

• Air
• Sea
• Land
• Cyber
• Space
• Information (public relations - PR)

Note that he’s added PR to the common domains.  This, yet again, demonstrates that he is fixated on fighting a low end battle and replaying the “hearts and minds” nation building that we’ve been doing for the last couple of decades.  This is all the more baffling given that there is absolutely no evidence that “hearts and minds” works!

Neller devoted a significant portion of his speech to the subject of winning the PR battle in various ways.

His lack of acceptance or recognition of the reality of high end combat can be summed up in this phrase in which he referred to how we will deal with enemies.

“… defeat the enemy, destroy them, if necessary …”

Again, this betrays a mindset that has not recognized and accepted the reality of the sheer brutality of peer warfare.  Destroy them “if necessary”????  That’s the only way to defeat an enemy!

Gen. Neller  - No Grasp of Peer Warfare

Neller referred to Gen. Krulak’s three block war and cited the three blocks as humanitarian assistance, counter insurgency, and training partner nations and added a fourth block, the public affairs officer.  Note that this is a slight modification of Krulak’s concept which contained full combat as one of the blocks.  Again, though, note the utter lack of reference to full combat and destruction of the enemy.  He appears to believe that future peer warfare will be a “hearts and mind” PR exercise with isolated bits of low end combat.

To sum up, Neller correctly recognizes that the US military, and Marines in particular, have not been facing militarily competent opponents and need to begin preparing for more challenging warfare but then goes on to describe an only somewhat higher end combat.  He betrays his utter lack of understanding of what a peer war will really be like.  Thus, the Marines are going to be unprepared for peer combat.  We already see this with the Marine’s and Neller’s focus on light infantry, mobility, and flexibility at the expense of firepower and armor.

We will relearn what peer warfare is like and will pay a bloody bill doing so.

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(1)wn.com website, Modern Day Marine Exposition 2016, Commandant Gen. Neller speech,

https://wn.com/gen._robert_neller_speaks_at_modern_day_marine_expo

Let's 3D Print Some Stupid

The Marines are learning how to 3D print small quadcopters. (1)

“… Marines built an initial batch of 25 Nibbler UAVs – quadcopters with a dwell time of about 20 to 25 minutes, which can carry cameras or other intelligence payloads and cost about $2,000 apiece to print …”

Wow, you say!  What’s not to like about that?  Unlimited 3D quadcopter printing.  That’s fantastic! 

Uh, back the quadcopter up, for a moment, and let’s look at this a bit closer and make sure it’s as fantastic as we and the Marines seem to think.

Let’s start with capabilities.  A quadcopter with a 20 min endurance is very small, very light, and can carry only a very small payload.  This is not a battlefield roaming, omniscient, eye in the sky, see everything sensor.

“The Marines built, The Nibbler, a four- rotor UAV with a 20-minute flight time capable of looking over hills and around buildings …”

This is a peek-around-the-corner or look-over-the-next-hill type of capability.  That’s nice, I guess, but haven’t soldiers been doing that kind of recon for a thousand years?  Plus, a quadcopter stands a better chance of being spotted and alerting the enemy to our presence than a properly trained soldier who understands stealthy recon.  So, that’s a disadvantage to the quadcopter.  Still, I’m sure there are circumstances where it might be convenient to have a flying, pinhole camera.  That’s right, a pinhole camera – that’s about all a quadcopter this size could carry.  This size craft is not going to be carrying radar, FLIR, or anything else that might actually be useful.

Now, let’s look at logistics.  People tend to think that a 3D printer creates objects out of thin air.  It doesn’t.  It uses a print medium that has to be supplied in bulk.  If you want to print a 10 lb part, you need at least 10 lbs of print medium and that’s only if you have 100% conversion of the medium.  And you don’t.  Printers have a degree of waste.  The conversion is 50% to 90% depending on the printer and part.  So, to make that 10 lb part you actually need 11-15 lbs of print medium. 

Thus, the printer doesn’t actually save any weight or volume in terms of logistics.  If you think you’ll need 100 quadcopters printed, you’ll need to transport 150% more than their weight of print medium with you into the field.  You’ve gained nothing, logistically, and have likely increased your transportation weights and volumes.

How Many People Does It Take To Operate A Quadcopter?

Let’s look at personnel requirements.  A 3D printer is not quite like your home PC printer.  It requires some fairly sophisticated programming and operating techniques.  In other words, you’re going to have to pull riflemen off the line to sit somewhere doing 3D printing. 

“A total of 48 personnel were taught to run the 3D printers …”

We’ve pulled 48 riflemen off the line in order to create a very marginal recon capability.  Is that really the best use of Marines? 

Let’s look at cost. 

“…cost about $2,000 apiece to print …”

You can buy this kind of quadcopter from almost any retail store in America for around $125, ready to fly, with controllers and small cameras.  What are we saving?

Let’s look at time.  It takes a very long time to print an object.  People tend to think a printer can produce a complete, fully functional quadcopter that flies out of the printer and straight to the battlefield.  That’s not even remotely correct.  The printer produces individual components – each component can take minutes to hours to produce - that have to be tediously and laboriously assembled, wired, and tested.  More people, more time.  Why not just have a pre-purchased, complete unit boxed and ready to go?

I have no idea but I would guess that to print all the components for a small quadcopter would require many, many hours.  In contrast, you can open a boxed quadcopter and have it in the air in 15 minutes.  If you have a sudden, urgent need for a quadcopter in the field, printing is not the way to go.  Sure, you could have a supply of them printed up and sitting in a pile, ready to go but then why not have pre-purchased ones in boxes ready to go?  What have you gained?

Let’s look at firepower.  This kind of effort continues the Marine’s trend away from firepower and towards becoming a light infantry with only very limited use.  Quadcopters aren’t going to win a peer war with China, firepower and numbers are.

This smacks of technology for the sake of technology with no real warfighting benefit.  It costs more than buying the same item, it saves nothing logistically, takes far more time, and offers only a marginal capability, if that.  Personally, I’d rather have a scout-sniper do my recon.

The military is so caught up in the technology craze that no one bothers to ask how any of this will result in greater lethality on the battlefield.  Instead, the military seems like it’s desperately searching for some use for 3D printing just to be able to say they can do it. 

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(1)USNI News website, “Marines’ 3D-Printed ‘Nibbler’ Drone Creating Lessons Learned on Logistics, Counter-UAS”, Megan Eckstein, 27-Sep-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/09/27/marines-3d-printed-nibbler-drone-creating-lessons-learned-logistics-counter-uas

MV-22 Assessment Methodology

War Is Boring website posted an article a few years ago about the MV-22 that I managed to miss which is a shame because it offered some insights into the MV-22. (1)

The author’s main point is that people want to view the MV-22 as a one for one replacement for the CH-46 and, therefore, compare it to the CH-46 and this is not the correct way to look at it.  Here’s the author’s perspective,

“…the Osprey didn’t replace the CH-46—it displaced the CH-46. The older copter made way for an entirely new type of aircraft, not another helicopter.”

Thus, says the author, to compare the MV-22 to the CH-46 on an exact one for one capability and performance basis is inappropriate.  Here’s an example from the article,

“To argue that an V-22 is junk because it doesn’t loiter like a CH-46 is to assume that the V-22 is a helicopter and should loiter like one.”

And,

“…the Osprey’s fragility and susceptibility to heat are notable weaknesses. … It’s not a helicopter. It’s a tilt-rotor aircraft. It should act accordingly. … To prevent overheating, Osprey pilots avoid helicopter mode. They quickly transition to plane mode and move around their objective.”

This is a potentially insightful way to look at, and evaluate, the MV-22 or any new and different platform.  If it can accomplish the mission, just in a different way, then a direct point for point comparison is invalid and misleading.

Note:  The point of this post is not to evaluate the MV-22, it’s to note the author’s point about how to evaluate a new and different platform.

The author also goes on to acknowledge that there are missions and tasks that the MV-22 simply can’t do that the CH-46 can, and vice versa.  He also makes an interesting point about the combination of the MV-22 and the UH-1Y being able to fill all the needed missions.

The author’s point about not evaluating new and, especially, different platforms on a direct point for point basis comparison with the platform they are “replacing” is an excellent one and is my takeaway from the article.  I’ll attempt to factor that approach into my future assessments of platforms.  The LCS, for example, is not a Perry FFG and should be evaluated on its own merits rather than directly compared to the Perry.  Now, that doesn’t mean that the LCS is suddenly a good platform – it just means that there is a better assessment methodology.  That assessment may still reveal a substandard platform!

The F-35 is another example.  So many people want to compare the F-35’s air to air combat capability directly to an F-16/15/18 and that may not be appropriate.  F-35 supporters claim that the aircraft will perform air to air quite effectively, just in a different way.  If it can, that’s fine.  If it can’t, then it’s a failure.  Of course, there are other factors like cost, maintenance, reliability, availability, etc. that can render the aircraft a failure irrespective of any given mission/task performance.

The other takeaway from the article is the author’s more realistic “specs” for the MV-22.  He notes, for example, that the troop carrying capacity is not the commonly cited 24 but rather 18 or less under actual field conditions.  Similarly, he notes that the CH-46 never carried more than 12 troops, despite theoretical claims.

The author also notes that the MV-22’s range with a load of troops is around 233 miles on a single tank.  Compare that to some of the range figures floating around the Internet.

-          Navy Fact File:  860 nm (unstated fuel load) (2)

-          Air Force Fact Sheet for CV-22:  500 (one internal auxiliary fuel tank) (3)

-          Aviation Zone:  2100 nm (unstated but obviously with max internal fuel tanks) (4)

-          Global Security:  251 nm (24 troops; unstated fuel load) (5)

-          Boeing Website:  428 nm (24 troops, unstated fuel load) (6)

That’s quite a range (sorry about that!) of ranges!  It appears that 200 nm is about the actual field range.  Interesting.  I have no idea how that compares to the CH-46 actual field range with a load of troops.  The wide range of ranges further illustrates the points made in the recent post about combat radius (see, “CombatRadius”) 

The article was fascinating and I encourage you to follow the link and read it for yourself.  There was a lot more to it.  It was one of the more balanced articles I’ve seen on the MV-22.

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(1)War Is Boring website, “Actually, The V-22 Ain’t Half Bad”, Vincent Mazzurco, 25-Jul-2014,

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/actually-the-v-22-aint-half-bad-25a39df9a336

(2)http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1200&tid=800&ct=1

(3)http://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104531/cv-22-osprey/

(4)http://www.theaviationzone.com/factsheets/v22_specs.asp

(5)https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/v-22-mission_req.htm

(6)http://www.boeing.com/defense/v-22-osprey/

McCain and Fitzgerald Collisions and Repercussions

ComNavOps has called for a complete and total housecleaning by firing every Admiral and staff member in the 7^th Fleet chain of command as one response to the rash of collisions and groundings the fleet has experienced.  While the housecleaning has not anywhere near approached that level, I do note that several figures have paid for their gross negligence.  Here’s the current list of personnel who have been fired.

• 7th Fleet Commander VAdm. Joseph Aucoin
• Task Force 70 commander Rear Adm. Charles Williams
• Destroyer Squadron 15 commander Capt. Jeffrey Bennett
• USS Fitzgerald CO Cmdr. Bryce Benson
• USS Fitzgerald XO Cmdr. Sean Babbitt
• USS Fitzgerald CMC Brice Baldwin

In addition, two admirals have put in for early retirement.  Reading only slightly between the lines, both were likely given the option to retire or be fired.

• Naval Surface Forces commander VAdm. Thomas Rowden
• Pacific Fleet commander Adm. Scott Swift

I would like to see CNO Richardson accept responsibility for the avoidable deaths of US Navy sailors and resign.  Failing that, Congress and/or SecNav ought to fire him.

This is nowhere near the total housecleaning that is needed but it is more severe than the usual tepid Navy response such as after the Iranian seizure of our riverine boats.  I would like to see the entire chain of command stand trial for negligent homicide.  Absent that, hopefully, this will prompt other Navy leaders to take their duties a bit more seriously.

Marine's "Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment" Document

The Marine Corps has just released the 2017 unclassified version of “Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment”.  I began reading this with great interest, hoping to have many heretofore puzzling and contradictory doctrinal conundrums explained.  For example, I’ve been reading statements by Marine leadership that in order to effect a landing, they must first land and secure the landing area.  That’s a Catch-22 if I’ve ever heard one!

Unfortunately, I was absolutely stunned by a sentence in the opening paragraphs defining the scope of the document.  From section 2. (Scope), 2.b.1/2 describes the range of operations that the document applies to.  At the low end are what are described in 2.b.1 as “Crisis Response Operations in Uncertain Environments” which include humanitarian assistance, evacuations, and embassy reinforcements – generally non-combat or occasionally very low end combat scenarios.  At the other end of the range, 2.b.2 describes “Contingency Operations in Hostile Environments. 

The latter, presumably describes actual combat … war.  However, the following statement casts severe doubt on how much combat/war this entire concept applies to.

“…major combat operations (MCO) and campaigns versus peer competitors are beyond the scope of this concept.”

What???  Major combat operations and peer combat are not covered by this concept?  Are the Marines really saying that their capabilities and this concept are not useful in a peer war?  That’s what it seems to be saying – that none of the littoral capabilities described in this document apply to actual war?!

Did the Marines really just develop an entire concept that has no applicability to peer war?  Did they really just acknowledge that they have no role in peer combat? 

I can’t believe that’s what was intended but I see no other way to interpret it.  All I can hope is that it was just a very poorly worded sentence but given the Corps’ trend towards lightness, they may be acknowledging that they are no longer a serious warfighting organization.  I’ve got to get a clarification on this.

I’m not going to go any further in analyzing this document for two reasons. 

1. Until I understand the actual scope of the document, I can’t perform a valid assessment.
2. The rest of the document is garbage that reads like a generic sales brochure to Congress.

Technology Or Firepower?

Western militaries are caught up in a technology craze:  networks, unmanned, remote, cyber, open architecture, data sharing, software, integration. 

The belief, I guess, is that floods of data, data sharing, networking, etc. will allow us to know where every enemy asset is and then we can use the wonders of our distributed, light, mobile, flexible, adaptable forces to destroy the enemy. 

Of course, all the Aegis radar, navigational radars, EO/IR sensors, satellite monitoring, aerial surveillance, and “big picture” data sharing in the fleet hasn’t prevented us from completely losing track of where giant, slow moving cargo/tanker ships are and colliding with them or running aground so one can’t help but question the very foundation of the entire technology push. 

Unfortunately, the UK’s Royal Navy is now getting in on the technology craze, as described by First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff Adm. Sir Philip Jones and reported by USNI News website (1).  Here are some snippets from the First Sea Lord’s vision.

“autonomous systems operating in squads”

“artificial intelligence-assisted decision making”

“autonomy”

“robotics”

“3D printing”

“novel weaponry”

“power of data” 

“cyber”

“ultra-modern communications”

“information exploitation”

“lightweight deployable IT system”

“vertical lift unmanned air system “

“open architectures”

“augmented reality”

“…bandwidth acceleration technology, which slashed the time for chest x-rays to pass through a handheld SATCOM terminal from half an hour to under five minutes.”

“drones that dissolve on demand”

“algae electric propulsion systems”

What do all those technologies have in common?  With the possible exception of the vague, buzzword-ish “novel weaponry”, whatever that might mean, none go “BOOM”.  None produce a bigger explosion.  None make the RN more lethal.  None increase the combat resilience of the RN.  None allow the RN to take more hits and keep fighting.  None increase the number of ships, aircraft, or personnel in the fleet.

They’re mostly technology for the sake of technology.

And all depend on the enemy cooperating by allowing us to send and receive data and to network systems without hindrance.  Think about it.  We’re putting all our eggs in the data basket.  A basket which is easily upset by enemy electronic warfare, cyber warfare, jamming, etc.  Would you buy a rifle that only works if the enemy doesn’t jam it?  Of course not!  And yet, that’s exactly what we’re doing with the whole data and networking movement.

Meanwhile, China and Russia are steadily producing bigger, heavier, better armed and armored tanks, more artillery, more cruise and ballistic missiles, bigger mortars, and better cluster munitions. 

Consider a few more detailed statements from the First Sea Lord.

“…integration of all weapon systems, engineering sensors and off-board logistics in the future, we have specified that the new Type 31e general purpose frigate should be designed with open architecture from the outset.”

Open architecture sounds appealing, doesn’t it?  It allows us to easily upgrade, incorporate third party and commercial software, and make it so that many, many people and companies can support our efforts.  Of course, all that openness also means that the systems are vulnerable to hacking and cyber attack!  Recall the U.S. software attack on Iran’s centrifuges?

Here’s another interesting statement from the First Sea Lord.

“We proved, for example, that a drug smuggler is no longer a bobbing needle in an oceanic haystack but has an identifiable algorithmic fingerprint. In the engineering world, we can predict, and therefore prevent, component failures.”

It’s a dubious leap from finding a drug smuggler to predicting and preventing component failures.  A relevant example is the U.S. LCS which has mammoth amounts of automated monitoring of its machinery intended to predict component failures, minimize maintenance down times, reduce the number of people needed for maintenance, and save untold amounts of maintenance money.  Of course, the reality is that the maintenance aspect of the LCS has been an abysmal failure.  Every LCS has suffered major engineering breakdowns, most ships having suffered multiple failures – all unforeseen, maintenance down times have almost exceeded operation times, and maintenance personnel requirements and maintenance costs have far exceeded expectations.  Of course, perhaps the RN will be the organization to make this all work.

Another good example is the state of the art (I use that phrase laughingly) ALIS comprehensive and predictive maintenance software that runs the F-35.  Far from streamlining maintenance, reducing costs, and predicting component failures, the F-35’s ALIS program has been an abject failure with aircraft unable to get off the ground without substantial workarounds to the software interlocks.  Aircraft have caught fire with no prediction whatsoever!  Of course, perhaps the RN will be the organization to make this all work.

The First Sea Lord goes on.

“As modern warfare becomes ever faster, and ever more data driven, our greatest asset will be the ability to cut through the deluge of information to think and act decisively.”

No, your greatest asset will be large enough munitions inventories to keep fighting for more than a week (recall the 2011 Libyan affair when the European militaries ran out of certain munitions after just a few weeks – and that was hardly an all out war!) and sufficient numbers of aircraft, ships, and tanks to absorb the inevitable attrition losses and cover the necessary territory and missions.

“…technologies that senior officers hope will keep the RN “at the forefront of capability in the decades to come”.

What’s the point of being at the forefront of irrelevant technology if you haven’t got the firepower and numbers to actually win a war of attrition which is what a war with Russia, China, NKorea, or Iran will be.  We may not want a war of attrition but those countries will most certainly make it so.  Remember, the enemy gets a vote and when it comes to attrition, if the enemy is willing to engage in attrition warfare you won’t have much choice but to follow.  A human wave attack doesn’t care about your data sharing.

Now, how does the First Sea Lord propose paying for all these irrelevant technological advances? 

“This requires big decisions with far reaching consequences. Are we, for instance, prepared to remove existing platforms from service in order to create the financial and manpower headroom to introduce new systems …”

His solution is to drop existing platforms and further decrease numbers in an already numerically challenged military!  Let me repeat – the enemy is not going to give you a choice about attrition warfare.  In fact, given the steadily decreasing size of Western militaries, our potential enemies may well see attrition warfare as a major advantage for them. 

Decreasing numbers to pay for highly questionable technologies that do little or nothing to increase firepower and lethality is foolish.

Now, I’ve been focused on the Royal Navy and the First Sea Lord’s comments but this post is really about the U.S. Navy which is doing all these same things.  The First Sea Lord’s comments simply provided a handy platform to work from.

The technology path we’re on is insane.  We’re ceding firepower and numbers to the enemy in the desperate hope that data will make up for it. 

Let’s be objective.  Recon is incredibly important to a military and plays a huge role in who wins and data is a form of recon.  I’m not arguing against data.  I’m arguing against abandoning the pursuit of firepower in favor of data.  Data should complement firepower not replace it.  Let me repeat – because it’s vitally important – the US Navy, for all its myriad sensors, Aegis radar, electro-optical sensors, infrared sensors, satellite imagery, aerial surveillance, drones, data sharing, and networks, couldn’t see giant, slow moving, cargo/tanker ships as they collided with our warships and couldn’t keep track of their own locations to prevent running aground – and this happened during peacetime with absolutely no electronic countermeasures or stealth on the part of the commercial vessels.  Come a peer war, do we really think we’ll be able to track stealthy ships and aircraft that are intentionally “hiding” and using electronic countermeasures, cyber attacks, hacking, jamming, decoys, etc.?  Well, despite all evidence to the contrary, this is exactly what we’re betting our future military capability on.

Someday, after a monumental military disaster, people will look back and wonder why no one saw it coming.  Well, they did.  This is the warning!

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(1)USNI News website, “DSEI: First Sea Lord Jones Plots High-Tech Future for U.K. Royal Navy”, Jon Rosamond, 12-Sep-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/09/12/dsei-first-sea-lord-jones-plots-high-tech-future-u-k-royal-navy