Amphibious Construction Battalion 2 Eliminated

The Navy is deactivating Amphibious Construction Battalion 2 (ACB).[1]  The ACB was tasked with supporting amphibious landings by providing engineering support for causeways, cranes, and ferries among other duties.  ACB 1 is still being maintained although, apparently, at greatly reduced manning levels.[1]
 

The Navy decided in July to deactivate the battalion after the elevated causeway system — a modular pier stretching up to 3,000 feet to provide logistic support to Marine Corps and Joint Expeditionary Forces — was removed from the command’s Table of Allowance.[1]

Elevated Causeway System

  

I don’t necessarily have a problem with deactivating the unit as I see very little realistic need for amphibious landings in the foreseeable future.  However, the move does raise a few questions. 

1. If the elevated causeway system has been eliminated, how will supplies get from ship to shore?  We seem to be early retiring the MLP/AFSB so one has to wonder how sustainment materiel will get to shore.  Have we pigeon-holed ourselves into only fighting/sustaining from secure ports?  In today’s world of multi-thousand mile missiles, there are no secure ports!
   
   
2. This is yet another indication that the Marines, the Navy, and the military are out of the amphibious assault business.  If that’s the case, why are we still building multi-billion dollar amphibious ships?
   
   
3. If ACB 2 serves no purpose, why maintain ACB 1?

More generally, the Marines – and the military, in general - are eliminating lots of units and capabilities and I don’t see any corresponding establishment of new combat capabilities to replace them other than the completely unproven and, thus far, demonstrably combat-incapable unmanned fad.
 
I’ve long stated that the Marine’s core mission should be port seizure and this is yet more proof of that need.
 
 
 
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[1]Stars and Stripes website, “Navy Seabee battalion honored in decommissioning ceremony after 80 years of building and fighting”, Caitlyn Burchett, 3-Mar-2023,
https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2023-03-03/gator-bees-decommissioning-9334218.html

Marines Eliminate Scout-Snipers

From the beginning of the history of warfare, few types of soldiers have exhibited the disproportionate impact on the battlefield that snipers have.  Normally, I’d launch into a recitation of historical examples of the outsized impact of the sniper but, in this case, I think the point is too obvious and too indisputable to justify the effort so I’ll just say, snipers are gods on the battlefield.
 
With that in mind, we see that the Marines are eliminating snipers. 

As part of the Marine Corps' ongoing and controversial attempt to reinvent the service for future warfare, it had decided to get rid of the scout ... 

As part of the plan, all three training locations for the grueling three-month Scout Sniper course will stop accepting new students starting in fiscal 2024 … [1]

Gone or significantly reduced:  tanks, artillery, mortars, snipers.  The Marines are being systematically eliminated as a fighting force.  It would be impossible for a Chinese agent to do more harm to the Marine Corps than the Commandant is doing.
 

 
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[1]Newsmax, “Marine Corps Eliminates Elite Scout Sniper Platoons”, 28-Feb-2023,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/marine-corps-eliminate-elite-scout-sniper/2023/02/28/id/1110503/

Fuel Logistics for a Pacific War

One of the ‘givens’ that I assumed about any China war was that the US would be hard-pressed to supply enough fuel (or any other materiel, for that matter!) for sustained combat operations.  In other words, I assumed that the US would face extremely problematic logistics.  However, reader ‘Austin Vernon’ has written an article on his website that suggests that fuel logistics are not only possible but actually not very problematic.  Do I need to re-think my assumption?  I urge you to follow the link (see, “Fuel Logistics for a Pacific War”) and read the article.  Here’s a few quotes from the article to whet your appetite:
 

The vast majority of fuel usage is for aviation. The Air Force requires nearly 750,000 barrels per day, and Naval Aviation another 100,000 barrels per day. Warships and amphibious units only use ~160,000 barrels per day at full steam. I'm not including Army figures, but ten armored divisions would use about the same as the Navy's ships.[1]

Not only are China's ~9 million barrels per day of seaborne imports vulnerable, but ~30% of China's four million barrels per day of crude oil production comes from offshore platforms. Those facilities should be easy targets that are difficult to repair. The country will suffer a 75% reduction in oil supply, leaving onshore production and Russian pipeline imports.[1]

There are 800+ Very Large Crude Carriers that hold 2 million barrels, 570+ Suezmax tankers that hold 1 million barrels, 650+ Aframax tankers, and ~1000 misfits that hold a few hundred thousand barrels.[1]

There are ~650 tankers worldwide in just the Aframax classification, and ~10 could keep the Navy supplied from the US West Coast since each ship holds 500,000+ barrels.[1]

 
The author discusses US military fuel usage rates and presents tables itemizing the consumption according to branch/type.  In addition, he addresses capacity and delivery methods.  Not to be one-dimensional, he also discusses China’s needs and capacity.
 
All of this is accomplished in a relatively short, very easy to read, well written piece.  If amateurs discuss tactics and professionals discuss logistics, this is your chance to enhance your professionalism.  Read the piece and come back here to discuss it!
 
 
Here’s a few of my own questions/thoughts for potential discussion:
 
Desert Storm demonstrated that bulk delivery of supplies to a theater is only part of the issue.  The other part is distribution to the individual units.  In other words, we saw that individual units had to stop due to lack of fuel even though bulk fuel at ‘depots’ was readily available.  Do we have the unit level distribution capability to support sustained operations?
 
What happens to our capacities if a reasonable amount of combat losses (destroyed fuel farms, sunk tankers, etc.) occurs?
 
Can China significantly interdict our fuel shipments/convoys?
 
While there may be many tankers in the world, how many can the US actually obtain given that few are US flagged (according to my understanding)?
 
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By the way, if any of you have a topic you’re knowledgeable on and passionate about to the point of writing about it, let me know.  I’m quite open to hosting/referencing reader writings.
 
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[1]austinvernon website, “Fuel Logistics for a Pacific War”, Austin Vernon, 1-Mar-2023,
https://austinvernon.site/blog/fuellogistics.html

Rebuilding the Soviet Union

The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and splintered into 15 (14 + Russia) independent countries.  Putin seems determined to reassemble the Soviet Union, by force where necessary, although some say that he’s trying to reform the empire of Peter the Great rather than the Soviet Union.  In any event, I decided to do a quick check on the status of the erstwhile components of the Soviet Union.  The status is described in the table below. 
 
ü = NATO/EU/Independent
ü = Mixed leanings
ü = Russian occupied or leaning 
 

Status of Former Soviet States
ü	Armenia	Close military ties with Russia
ü	Moldova	Russian troops occupy portions of Moldova;  leaning towards the EU but 100% dependent on Russian gas supplies
ü	Estonia	NATO / EU 2004
ü	Latvia	NATO / EU 2004
ü	Lithuania	NATO / EU 2004
ü	Georgia	Invaded by Russia in 2008 and now partially occupied by Russia
ü	Azerbaijan	Mixed relations; Russian military ties
ü	Tajikistan	Strong historical, cultural, military, and economic ties with Russia
ü	Kyrgyzstan	Strongly pro-Russian and hosts Russian military forces
ü	Belarus	Despite periodic spats, Belarus is a solid Russian ally and has offered to assist in the Ukraine invasion
ü	Uzbekistan	Seeks relations with Russia and the West
ü	Turkmenistan	Independent while seeking Russian trade arrangements
ü	Ukraine	Russia invaded and seized Crimea in 2014 and invaded the rest of Ukraine in 2022
ü	Kazakhstan	Strong relations with Russia now strained by Russian invasion of Ukraine

 
  
It would appear that of the 14 former Soviet entities, 3 are never rejoining Russia other than by military occupation, 3 are strongly pro-Russia, and the remaining 8 are somewhere in the middle.  Putin has his work cut out for him if he hopes to reform the empire!
 
Note:  This is by no means a comprehensive assessment of the state of relations between Russia and the former Soviet states.  It’s just a quick and dirty ‘scorecard’.  Don’t read more into it than it is.

Forgotten Purpose

I try very hard to avoid politics on this blog and for good reason.  However, from time to time the politics intrudes on military/Navy matters and must be discussed.
 
Here’s a quote from a Department of Defense (DoD) tweet, as noted by Redstate website:

Diversity is a strategic imperative critical to mission readiness and accomplishment.[1]

Here is Elon Musk’s reply to that tweet:

Your strategic imperative is defending the United States.[1]

Musk sees what the DoD does not.  The job of the military is not social equality, diversity, gender sensitivity, ecology, or any of the other social pursuits that plague our country.  The job of the military is to protect the United States.  We accomplish that by killing the enemy and destroying everything they have.  That’s the basic, ugly truth of the matter.
 
The Biden administration has lost its military way in pursuit of social objectives.  That’s not a political statement, it’s a simple and dangerous - bordering on treasonous - fact.
 
 
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “Biden's Department of Defense Gets Schooled by Elon Musk On Its 'Strategic Imperative'”, Brandon Morse, 20-Feb-2023,
https://redstate.com/brandon_morse/2023/02/20/bidens-department-of-defense-gets-schools-by-elon-musk-on-its-strategic-imperative-n705998

F-35C Ramp Strike Lesson

The investigation of the Jan 2022 ramp strike by an F-35C has become public and is presented in a USNI News website article.[1]  I’d like to draw a lesson from it that the Navy won’t and yet it’s the most important one.

To summarize the incident, a pilot was attempting to perform an abbreviated landing procedure, wound up with too low an approach speed, couldn’t recover, and suffered a ramp strike.  The Navy’s investigation determined that the cause was pilot error for failing to switch on two automated landing aids which control approach speed (glide slope) and angle of attack.  From the article/report, 

The junior officer had performed a specialized landing approach to Vinson for the first time, but he did not realize a built-in aid that helped control the plane’s power during landing was switched off.[1] 

… the [pilot] remained in manual mode when he should have been (and thought he was) in an automated command mode designed to reduce pilot workload during landings.[1] 

After the turn, the pilot didn’t engage the two landing assist tools on the fighter, the Approach Power Compensation Mode (APC) and the Delta Flight Path (DFP), which automate some of the pilot’s necessary tasks for landing on an aircraft carrier. When activated, DFP automatically adjusts the throttle to keep the aircraft on correct glide scope to land on a carrier, while the APC maintains the fighter’s angle of attack.
 
The Navy’s simplistic conclusion was pilot error.  While technically true, it completely ignores the larger error and the more important lesson to be learned from it.
 
The larger error was the pilot’s dependence on automation.  The automated landing aids, designed to increase the safety of landings, actually make landings less safe by decreasing the pilot’s skills due to dependence on automated aids.  This is analogous to our lost map reading and ground/ship navigation skills due to dependence on GPS. 
 
Note that when I use the term ‘dependence’, I mean it in the context of drug use dependency where the user becomes unable to function without the dependency.  The user is addicted.  Our pilots/soldiers/sailors have become addicted to automated aids and are unable to perform basic functions without their electronic aids.
 
What is the proper lesson from this incident?  It’s that we should either eliminate automated landing aids (and GPS and other dependencies!) from aircraft or restrict their use to emergency or extreme hazardous weather conditions. 
 
Dependence on automation should not be the normal condition.
 
Instead of this vital lesson, what did the Navy investigators recommend? 

… investigators recommended that aviators stop performing Sierra Hotel Breaks, that policy require F-35C pilots to always use Approach Power Compensation Mode (APC)/Delta Flight Path (DFP) throttle assists and that heads-up displays include indicator lights showing when flight aids are activated.[1] 

This is just increasing our dependence on automated aids.  What will future pilots do when the automated aid won’t work due to electrical failure or combat damage?  How will they land, having never learned/practiced manual landings or never been forced to maintain a level of expertise?  By increasing dependency on automation, we’re ensuring that pilots will become less capable and less skilled and will have more mishaps, not less.

We are dependent and addicted to technology and are losing our ability to function normally.

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Note:  We see this in society, in general, too.  For example, the routine use of calculators in school has produced a generation of students who have no mathematical ability.  They are unable to calculate change at a register without aids.  They are unable to estimate large number manipulations (exponential manipulations and order of magnitude manipulations).  They don’t know multiplication tables.  In short, they’re mathematically ignorant.  I see it every day.
 
 
 
 
 
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[1]USNI News website, “Pilot Error After ‘Sierra Hotel Break’ Resulted in South China Sea F-35C Crash, Investigation Says”, Sam LaGrone, 21-Feb-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/02/21/pilot-error-after-sierra-hotel-break-resulted-in-south-china-sea-f-35c-crash-investigation-says
 

Wrong Focus

USNI News website has an article describing the Marine’s efforts to establish battlefield networks that … you know … work.  The article, meant to laud the Marine’s efforts instead reveals one of the fundamental flaws in the US military approach to problem solving.  The US military believes, unwisely and incorrectly, that every problem has a technical/equipment solution rather than a ‘people’ (training, maintenance, etc.) solution.  Here’s a statement from Col. James Lively, I Marine Expeditionary Force assistant chief of staff, which amply illustrates the fundamental problem.
 

“How do we pick winners faster and put equipment in the hands of warfighters?” he said. “That’s our challenge at hand, for sure.”[1]

 
Every one of us has experienced, repeatedly, at home and/or work, the phenomenon of barely beginning to learn one new technology only to find it’s been quickly replaced by another and our learning process starts all over again, never to finish or even reach a minimal level of competence, far less a level of expert competence.
 
What Col. Lively fails to grasp is that putting equipment/technology into the hands of soldiers faster just guarantees that our soldiers will fall further and further behind the competency curve, never learning one system before the next one – the next flavor of the month - takes its place.

Recall the recent Burke collisions which were due, in large part, to the bridge crew's lack of familiarity with the navigation displays/equipment?  We're putting equipment into the field faster than we're able (or willing) to train to a level of competency on it.  

Of course, the inability to train is a conscious decision we've made to prioritize other activities over combat training.  We're finding all the time we need for sensitivity, ecological, wokeness, gender training  ...  but not combat training.

 
Our focus in problem solving needs to be on people as the solution, not technology/equipment.
 
 
 
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[1]USNI News website, “Marines Testing Battlefield Networks for Future Conflicts”, Gidget Fuentes, 15-Feb-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/02/15/marines-testing-battlefield-networks-for-future-conflicts