LCS Support

We recently examined LCS Operating Costs and one of the issues identified was the shore-based component of the crew.  The difficulty in trying to assess that component was that nothing was known about its size.  Co-incidentally, Defense News website just recently published an article offering a glimpse at the Navy’s first attempt at sizing the shore based component (1).

“One sensitivity has been the number of US people supporting the LCS effort — a footprint the Singaporeans would like to keep small.

The current team of about 10 Navy people supporting Freedom has been about right, Taylor said, although one or two positions might be added as the LCS force builds up.

‘We’re not trying to build up a great big organization,’ Taylor said. ‘We’re trying to maintain a small footprint here in Singapore, and still reach out to a very large area.’

The shore support also includes nine contractors from Lockheed Martin, seven for the ship and two for the mission package, said Capt. Dan Brintzinghoffer, the LCS fleet introduction program manager at Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington. At least one contractor, and at times as many as three more, is embarked on Freedom to handle maintenance issues.”

Adding up the numbers from above we see 10 Navy personnel and 9 contractors plus 1-3 more contractors aboard ship.  So, for the original LCS embarked crew size of 40, the shore-based component increases the effective crew size by 25% and with the contractors figured in, the effective crew size increases from 40 to 60-63, a 50% or greater increase.

Of course, the shore-based component seems unlikely to increase linearly as additional ships are added.  Presumably, the shore-based component will be able to service multiple ships with only small incremental increases in support crew size.  On the other hand, Freedom’s experience so far indicates that the level of maintenance support required may exceed the anticipated support crew’s capacity.  We’ll keep an eye on this to see how it plays out.

(1) Defense News,  http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130926/DEFREG02/309260017/Keeping-LCS-Running-Matter-Ship-Shore-Support, Christopher Cavas, Sep 26, 2013

The Death of Navy Tradition

Navy Times website has an absolute must-read article on the death of Navy traditions.

Death of Navy Tradition

How To Win A War

We’ve had recent discussions about quantity versus quality, here and here, the supposed need for the F-35 because of the technological edge it provides, and so forth.  The underlying, if unstated, question in all these discussions is, of course, how best to win a war.  I won’t repeat the various points that were made.  Instead, I’d like to offer my prioritized list of factors that are most important for winning a war.

1. Numbers
2. Training
3. Maintenance
4. Technology

We’ve already discussed the importance of numbers and looked at the historical precedent from WWII so I won’t belabor it further.  Bear in mind that numbers refers not just to weapons and platforms but to men.  Japan lost the war as much because it couldn’t replace the trained naval aviators as because it couldn’t replace the aircraft.  The Soviets beat the Germans because of numbers, among other reasons.  Numbers also refers to the ability to deal with combat attrition.  Can you build enough weapons and platforms to compensate for losses.  If you’re building B-2 bombers, the answer is no.  If you’re building Sherman tanks, the answer is yes.

A superbly trained man with a knife is more deadly and valuable than a man with a gun who has no idea how to use it.  Training can make up for a LOT of technology.  Sadly, training is one of the Navy’s weakest areas.  As a general statement, our naval commanders have no idea how to get the best out of their ships because they don’t practice it.  The Navy believes that the key to improvement is new technology and has relegated training to an afterthought.  The reality is that training is a force multiplier.  Again, we’ve covered this extensively so I won’t belabor it. 

It’s of no use if it’s not available.  That statement can apply to anything.  We have ships that are barely able to deploy and many do so in a degraded state.  Aegis, fleetwide, is degraded to the point that the Navy had to implement a remediation program.  Ships are being retired early due to years of neglected maintenance.  This includes carriers which, given their enormous cost and strategic/tactical usefulness, is an absolutely stunning occurrence.  Likewise, individual weapon systems suffer all too frequent breakdowns.

Last on the list is technology.  Sure, who doesn’t want superior technology?  However, technology is only useful when it’s combined with numbers, training, and maintenance.  Failing that, technology is a false comfort that will prove to be a failure in combat.  Worse, technology costs LOTS of money and will take away from numbers, training, and maintenance.  Think of all the programs across the entire military that are being sacrificed to pay for the JSF.

Consider the impact of all of the above.  In Desert Storm, if Iraq and the US had completely switched weapons, meaning technology, the outcome would have been the same.  The US had far superior maintenance and training as well as numbers and those factors were far more decisive than technology.  Of course, when superior maintenance, training, and numbers are combined with superior technology, you get the overwhelming result that was Desert Storm.

I’d rather go to war with a WWII Fletcher class destroyer that was superbly trained in conventional and unconventional tactics, benefited from impeccable maintenance with every system performing at peak capability, and was available in overwhelming numbers than to go to war with Burke class destroyers crewed by barely adequate commanders and sailors who have only a nodding command of their equipment, suffers from equipment breakdowns on a regular basis, and is available in insufficient numbers.

JSF is the prime example of the reversal of the war winning list.  We are pursuing technology for its own sake at the expense of numbers, training, and maintenance.  As we pump more and more money into the JSF black hole, existing air wings are sitting idled or flying only minimal hours to maintain flight certification.  Our training is nearly non-existent and our aviation tactical expertise is evaporating before our eyes.  The Marines are sacrificing amphibious assault vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and heavy lift among other needs so that the F-35B can be procured.  JSF is directly reducing the numbers of all kinds of equipment and, ultimately, personnel as well.  As we pour money into the JSF, our ship’s maintenance is being skipped or indefinitely deferred.  When we go to war somewhere down the road, we’ll do so with insufficient numbers of everything, poorly trained soldiers and sailors, and inoperable or degraded equipment – but we’ll have the JSF.  We’ll lose the war – but we’ll have the JSF.

LCS Operating Costs

Before we go any further, let’s acknowledge that you can say anything you want about operating costs by manipulating the list of what’s included or not.  Therefore, citing actual numbers borders on pointless.  With a common set of criteria, you might be able to compare operating costs of various platforms on a relative basis but that’s about it and even then the criteria will determine the outcome.  That said, let’s take a conceptual look at the operating costs of the LCS compared to other ships.

The LCS has an added hurdle in trying to quantify operating costs and that is the fact that the operating and maintenance systems have yet to be worked out, even on paper.  Add to that the fact that the Navy still hasn’t figured out the crew size and the attempt to come up with numbers is nearly pointless.  Nonetheless, we’ll plunge ahead!

The Navy has identified personnel costs as the single biggest factor in operating costs.  With that in mind, the Navy designed the LCS to be minimally manned (some would say that was the main design criteria rather than combat capability!).  Of course, with minimal manning the crew is unable to perform shipboard maintenance or repair.  That function will be handled by permanent shore based support groups.  So, we see that the LCS, by design, has a dedicated “crew” that stays on shore rather than going to sea with the ship.  Thus, the effective crew size is not just the number of sailors on board the ship but is, instead, the total of the shipboard crew plus the maintenance personnel on shore.  A rational discussion of LCS operating costs must include the shore based personnel and recognize that the shore component supports multiple ships so it’s not a simple “add’em up” situation. 

Further, the Navy is using a 3:2 system of crewing.  Three crews rotate among two ships.

Thus, the effective crew size for discussion of operating costs is not the single ship, apparent crew size of around 40 (or 60 or whatever number the Navy eventually settles on) but, rather, three crews plus some portion of shore based personnel all divided by two ships.  See how difficult it is to discuss this?

The Navy is proudly proclaiming that the LCS is minimally manned and will save huge amounts of money in lifetime operating costs (mainly personnel).  While I don’t know the basis for their claims, I’m fairly confident that they aren’t accounting for the factors we just described.  A reasonable estimate of effective per ship crew size is probably on the order of 120 for the ship itself and an additional 40 or so helo crew/support and module specialists.  That would be a total of around 160 per ship.  Hey, wait a minute, isn’t that about what a Perry FFG crew size is?  But I digress …

The other unknown aspect to the LCS operating costs is the shore based maintenance system.  We’ve already seen that the Navy has had to scramble to fly in parts to support the USS Freedom in Singapore.  That kind of dynamic supply system for even simple parts will impose a huge cost burden.  Also, due to US law, the maintenance personnel must be from US companies.  Specialized maintenance personnel will be hopscotching around the world trying to take care of the ships.  When you factor in the personnel costs, the custom travel, the aircraft required for personnel and parts transportation, the maintenance of the transport aircraft, and the many other factors, it’s easy to see that the postulated maintenance system will be very expensive.  To be fair, conventional ships make use of shore based support, also, but not anywhere near the extent to which the LCS will. 

I’m not even going to attempt to guesstimate an actual lifetime operating cost number (and if the Navy does so, they’re making it up).  Suffice it to say that the costs are most likely going to be far higher than what the Navy has suggested and the LCS is probably going to turn out to be more expensive then a conventional ship, not less.

EMALS And AAG

A new GAO report (1) discusses, among other things, the progress of the Ford class Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) systems which have been beset by technical problems and cost overruns.

GAO has this to say about the EMALS and AAG costs.

“Since 2008, EMALS-related costs for the first-of-class Gerald R. Ford [CVN 78] have risen by 133.7%, from $317.7 – $742.6 million. AAG costs have also spiked, though its 124.8% jump is only from $75 – $168.6 million. This is so despite the Navy’s 2010 firm fixed-price contracts to produce these systems for CVN 78. Even with cost caps, however, late delivery and testing means that changes have to be made to a partially-complete ship. EMALS configuration changes have already forced electrical, wiring, and other changes within the ship; and instead of just being hoisted into place, the Advanced Arresting Gear will now have to be installed in pieces via a hole cut in the flight deck. AAG continues to undergo redesigns, most recently to its energy-absorbing “water twister,” and limited EMALS testing with the delayed F-35C risks forcing further changes after the ship has been built.”

As we’ve noted in previous posts about Navy contracts for other programs, the fixed price contract is anything but fixed.  The term “fixed price” is just a public relations phrase intended to sound good to the public and Congress but it has no actual meaning.



EMALS



Also, note the concurrency being demonstrated in this development.  The unproven AAG, having encountered problems and having failed to meet the schedule, will be installed out of sequence by cutting holes in the flight deck.  That’s construction money being spent at least three times over:  the initial flight deck installation, demolition of the flight deck, and rebuild of the flight deck.  That’s my tax dollars you’re throwing away, there, Navy!

The report goes on to note the following cost growths for EMALS and AAG.

                                    EMALS          134%

                                    AAG                125%

The GAO report has this to say about the development of the AAG.

“Developmental test failures led to system redesigns. Navy is presently executing the first phase of land-based testing concurrent with system production and installation on CVN 78. The system is scheduled to arrest its first aircraft in June 2014.” [emphasis added]

Note the phrase, “concurrent with system production and installation”.  Thus, we see that the same “build and buy before you test” approach is being used for the AAG acquisition as was done for the LCS.  We’ve seen the spectacular failure that resulted from that approach for the LCS and, yet, the Navy continues to use this badly flawed practice.

As an aside, weight margins are becoming a problem even before the ship has been completed. 

“To date, evolving information about the attributes of these technologies has produced a weight/stability configuration for CVN 78 that leaves little margin to incorporate additional weight growth high up in the ship without making corresponding weight trade-offs elsewhere or compromising the future growth potential of the ship.”

“According to shipbuilder representatives, additional weight growth to the advanced arresting gear was of particular concern and could trigger a need for future structural and space modifications around the installed system.”

We’ve already seen the impact of non-existent weight margins on the LCS.  It would be most unfortunate if the same were to happen to the Ford.  Again, this is due entirely to beginning construction prior to having a stable design from which weight calculations can be performed.

I have no doubt that the problems associated with EMALS and AAG will be solved but the cost in time, money, and growth margins will be steep.  Most of this could have been avoided by simply having a complete design and mature subsystems prior to construction. 

What’s the definition of insanity?  - Repeating the same actions and expecting a different outcome.  The Navy has seen the LCS debacle that resulted from having no design and immature technology and yet is doing the exact same thing for the Ford class and expecting a different outcome.  Granted, the Ford is not as immature as the LCS but the concept is the same, differing only in degree.  The Navy seems adamantly unwilling to learn from experience.

(1) Defense Industry Daily, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/emals-electro-magnetic-launch-for-carriers-05220/, Sep 8, 2013

Ship Design

We’re going to discuss ship design.  Now I know that many of you are hunched over the keyboard ready to pound out a scathing reply the moment I suggest what gun to use (if it’s not your favorite!) or how many VLS cells to have (if it doesn’t agree with your idea).  However, I’m not going to touch on any specifics.  There’s a broader issue here.

In theory, ships are designed to meet a set of requirements which allow the ship to conduct a mission.  Seems simple enough although the Navy has, lately, failed spectacularly to even define the missions for the ships that are being built let alone setting specific design requirements.  We’ve discussed that at length and I won’t address it further, here.  In conceptual terms, the designers apply various numbers and types of weapons, sensors, and characteristics so as to satisfy the requirements.  The cost of the ship is then a simple sum of the parts plus the labor to build it (I’m grossly simplifying for illustrative purposes).

Of late, meaning the last few decades or so, the Navy’s ship designs have shown a marked tendency towards overdesign.  Too many extraneous capabilities are being added that are not required to meet the ship’s intended purpose.  This causes the cost to increase.  With an unlimited budget, this may be acceptable.  In tighter budget times, as we’re experiencing now, this is a problem.

Let’s look at an example.  The Burke DDG, commonly hailed as a successful design, includes high end AAW, land attack (Tomahawk/VLS), anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and, for a while, mine countermeasures (MCM).  As I said, most people consider this to be a highly successful design and we were able to pay for it so what’s the problem?  Well, two things …

 

Burke - Successful Design?



First, the myriad capabilities in a single ship means that some of the capabilities are rarely ever used and are practiced even less.  MCM would be the most obvious example and, to be fair, the Navy dropped that capability from subsequent designs.  ASW would be the next obvious example.  Burkes are, first and foremost, AAW platforms.  Their secondary function is land attack.  Anecdotal feedback from the fleet strongly suggests that the ASW function is rarely exercised and the ships are nowhere near proficient at it.  That begs the question, why have a capability that the ship isn’t competent to perform?  Isn’t that adding a lot of cost for little or no benefit?  Well, sure, the ship may not be called on to perform ASW very often but when it’s needed you wouldn’t want to be without it, right?  That’s right, IF you can perform the task competently.  If you can’t, the function is useless or worse if it leads a captain to attempt a task the ship is not qualified to do.  Plus, do we really want to risk a $1B-$2B ship performing highly risky ASW operations?

Second, the more equipment and functions a ship has, the greater the size of the crew required to operate it.  Consider ASW on a Burke.  The ASW operators are carried at all times and yet the function is rarely used.  That’s inefficient manning, at best, and serves to greatly increase the lifetime operating costs.  If some other ship than the Burke were tasked with ASW we could eliminate most of the ASW operators, helo pilots, and aviation support crew as well as the crew that support them by providing mess, laundry, and similar functions.  Quite a reduction!

OK, the point is, perhaps, somewhat valid, you say, but, hey, we already paid for the ships and having even a marginally competent capability is better than not having it, right?  Those are sunk costs so no harm done, at this point, right?  … Wrong!  That approach has hurt the fleet badly and continues to do so.

Consider the Burke and what might have been.  Suppose the Burke had been designed and built as an AAW platform with a credible but secondary land attack role;  no ASW, no MCM, possibly not even a hangar (if you’re not doing ASW …).  The resulting ship would have been somewhat smaller, hence cheaper, and had less crew since there would be no need for an ASW contingent or embarked aviation detachment.  Let’s suppose, for sake of discussion, that the cost would have been 2/3 the actual cost.  For a billion dollar ship (closer to $2B, now), the resulting savings would have been $300M.  For the 70 ship run of Burkes, that’s $21B that could have gone towards small, specialized ASW vessels that we would be willing to risk in ASW.  Thus, we could have had the same number of Burkes with their primary and secondary functions intact plus dozens of specialized ASW vessels.

Want to be even more extreme?  Suppose the Burkes had been built with the New Threat Upgrade (NTU) instead of Aegis.  We’d still have had highly capable AAW platforms (even more so when amplified by Co-operative Engagement Capability, CEC, linked to Aegis cruisers) with a credible land attack capability and even greater savings – meaning even more additional vessels.

Still not a believer?  Consider the LCS with its 40+ knot speed requirement.  That capability has added a great deal of cost and consumed huge amounts of internal volume and weight.  All that despite the total lack of a tactical use for the speed.  It was added to the design just to add more functionality – there was no tactical rationale.

Really?  You’re still not seeing it?  How about the Zumwalt?  A $4B+ ship with an ASW function.  Do you really believe we’re going to commit a $4B+ ship to something as risky as playing tag with a submarine?  That’s a function that will never be used but has impacted size, cost, and manning.

We seen, then, that the Navy’s drive to load as many functions as possible onto a ship design is a false benefit.  The secondary, and especially tertiary, functions are less effective and drive construction costs up as well as increasing manning.

The Navy needs to design ships that are capable of executing their main function and, perhaps, a secondary one but no more.  The result will be more ships and more capabilities in the fleet at a cheaper cost and with smaller crews.  Less is more!

Space Based Vulnerability

I’m seeing multiple signs of nervousness by the Department of Defense regarding its dependence (addiction is a better word) on space based assets and capabilities.  I’m not going to bother citing examples because they’re just bits and pieces from all over the Internet.  What I see is platforms and weapons are being spec’ed, now, to function without the assistance of space based communications, GPS, and whatnot or, at the very least, including space assets as just one input among several.  For example, Defense Industry Daily website just posted an announcement about a recent Air Force white paper calling for a “disaggregation” of space capabilities onto multiple platforms for enhanced survivability.

What I take from all these bits is that the military is finally waking up to the vulnerability they’ve created by designing in a heavy, almost exclusive, dependence on space based assets for communications, relays, GPS, surveillance, etc.  We’ve lost our ability to read maps, navigate on land or sea without GPS, direct missiles, locate targets, talk to UAVs, etc. without space based assets.  Of course, potential enemies know this and are directing efforts towards neutralizing our space assets.  In a high level conflict, our space assets are going to be greatly diminished in performance if not destroyed outright.  We need to be able to function without them.

It’s good to see that the military has finally recognized the vulnerability, if somewhat late, and begun taking steps to mitigate it.  Presumably, we’ll begin seeing an expanded range of resources to supplement and replace our space assets such as improved inertial navigation systems, radio beacon positioning, star mapping, mobile communications relay platforms, alternate surveillance systems, indirect targeting and triangulation, and so forth. 

Too long in coming but better late than never!