US Weapon Failures in Ukraine

How often have you heard someone say, sure, previous weapons of this *fill in the blank” type weren’t successful but this new generation will be because it has new and improved *fill in the blank* technology?  Plus, the manufacturer claims *fill in the blank*.  And, how often has ComNavOps flatly stated that all systems will significantly underperform in actual combat regardless of the new and improved, miracle technology they’re built on?  Most of you have your own favorite, pet weapon/sensor system that you’re convinced will be a world beater … but you’re wrong.
 
Well now, courtesy of Ukraine and our giveaway weapons transfers, we have some actual combat performance to look at for various weapons.  The Daily Caller website has a fascinating article about several US weapons that have been provided to Ukraine and have been found to significantly underperform compared to claims.  Here they are with quotes from the article: [1]
 
 
Abrams Tanks 

Ukraine has withdrawn some of the U.S. M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks from the front lines after Russian drones destroyed five of the heavy Western tanks it fought for months to obtain …
 
Droves of Russian surveillance and hunter-killer drones have been able to detect and pursue the tanks more quickly than expected.

 
Excalibur Artillery Shells 

Excalibur precision artillery rounds initially had a 70% efficiency rate hitting targets when first used in Ukraine. However, after 6 weeks, efficiency declined to only 6% as the Russians adapted their electronic warfare systems to counter it.

 
Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System (GMLRS)
 
Russian electronic warfare has successfully redirected the Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), another long-range precision munition off its planned course, according to reports.
 
 
Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb 

It didn’t work for multiple reasons, including [electromagnetic interference] environment, including just really the dirt and doing it on ground …

Switchblade 300 Drone 

The first weapon that showed itself vulnerable to Russian electronic warfare was the Switchblade 300 …

 
According to the article, the common thread in most of these is that Russian electronic warfare (EW), which includes GPS spoofers, has proven effective at disrupting the weapons guidance by redirecting them away from their intended targets.
 
To be fair, the military has belatedly recognized, to some degree, that earlier GPS guided weapons are, indeed, vulnerable to EW and have been incorporating multiple guidance methods in more recent weapons.  Ominously though, this suggests that the majority of our current weapon stocks, being older, are of questionable effectiveness in the face of peer enemy EW and other countermeasures.
 
This demands that we begin instantly testing all our weapons under realistic EW conditions to see which work and which don’t (probably all of them!).  The military, however, steadfastly refuses to conduct rigorous, realistic testing which is why the Ukraine findings are coming as a surprise to the military.
 
Equally disturbing should be the realization that each of these weapons was pronounced a miracle for the ages and passed all tests with flying colors … … … and yet they’ve failed in combat.  This demonstrates the uselessness and simplicity of our so-called testing.
 
Now, this doesn’t mean that these weapons can’t be fixed and improved.  Most probably can … now that we know what’s wrong with them.  However, what about the rest of our weapons that haven’t been tested in combat or under realistic conditions?  What’s wrong with them?  It’s guaranteed that they have problems but we just don’t know what, yet.  I guess China will let us know when we use them and they fail.  Of course, that will too late but, at least, we’ll finally know.
 
 
 
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[1]Daily Caller website, “The US Sent Billions In Military Aid To Ukraine. Many Weapons Are Massively Underperforming”, Micaela Burrow, 3-May-2024,
https://dailycaller.com/2024/05/03/ukraine-aid-weapons-russia-tactics/

LCS and Speed

Recent posts have seen some speculation on what the LCS speed was intended for.  As many pointed out, speed is not a useful feature in and around mines.  So, what was the LCS speed intended to do?  Why was it such a major design requirement?  One could make a good argument that speed was the number one design requirement … but why?
 
I have no idea.
 
Well, that was a short post.
 
Actually, the purpose of the post is to, yet again, emphasize the purpose and importance of a concept of operations (CONOPS) prior to committing to a finalized design and, ultimately, production.
 
The Navy has publicly acknowledged that it never developed a CONOPS for the LCS.  Thus, we have no idea what purpose the LCS speed was to have served.
 
The best speculation I’ve seen is that the speed was intended to move the ship as quickly as possible between the operational/combat area and the nearest module swapping port which, logically, would be quite a long distance from the combat area.  Of course, the Navy abandoned the module swapping concept fairly early on thus rendering the speed feature moot.
 
In addition, the intra-theater speed concept was highly questionable to begin with.  The LCS had short range to begin with and the DOT&E reports and trials quickly reported that the range capability was nowhere near the design spec and they significantly downgraded the range.  Further, high speed consumes fuel at a prodigious rate, further reducing the effective range.  An LCS that made a sustained, high speed, long distance dash from a module swapping port to an operational area would have a useful loiter time in the operational area of just a few hours or days, having consumed its fuel in the dash to get there.  That’s not a combat-useful feature.  A well thought out CONOPS would have revealed that prior to final design and production … assuming that was even the reason for the speed requirement.  This is why you do CONOPS.
 
The LCS provides an object lesson in the need for a CONOPS.
 
CONOPS, CONOPS, CONOPS!
 

LCS Mine Countermeasures Miracle

The Navy, in a miracle of technological speed, has managed to deliver the first full mine countermeasures (MCM) module to an LCS although the first planned deployment is still a year or so away. 

The U.S. Navy embarked the first Mine Countermeasures Mission Package (MCM MP) aboard USS Canberra (LCS 30), April 18, service officials announced. With the MCM mission package now onboard LCS 30, the Navy is looking forward to the first MCM Mission Package deployment in Fiscal Year 2025.[1]

How long has the MCM module been in development?  Well, the first Independence ship was laid down in 2006 so MCM module development must have been well underway by that time.  So, it’s been 18+ years.  That’s a remarkable pace of development!  Well done, Navy!
 
I know … you’re wondering the same thing I am.  Are we sure the Navy didn’t cut corners in order to deliver the MCM module this quickly?  Well, here’s our answer: 

The MCM mission package achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) on March 31, 2023, following rigorous initial operational testing and evaluation (IOT&E) of the full mission package … [1]

Okay, I see that the module was rigorously tested and the Navy is famous for its rigorous test standards so that alleviates my concern.  The module is truly ready to go  …  although it’s odd that it would require another year or so to reach a state of deployment.  I assumed the crew would be ready to go as soon as the module was installed.  What has the crew been doing for the last 18 years if not training for MCM operations?
 
Well, moving on …
 
Who’s leading this miraculous effort? 

PEO [ed. Program Executive Office] Unmanned and Small Combatants leads the Navy’s efforts to provide littoral combat ships with mission-tailored capability to Combatant Commanders to provide assured access against littoral threats, leveraging unmanned naval capabilities for enhanced operational effectiveness.[1]

Bingo!  I just filled my mindless platitude, buzzword bingo card with that sentence!  Again we see - as we so often do - that creative writing is more important in the Navy than actual testing or combat effectiveness.
 
By the way, someone be sure to let me know when we’ve actually demonstrated that ‘unmanned’ is leveraging anything except the budget from Congress.
 
On a related note, many of you are probably trying to recall what an LCS was.  I don’t blame you.  It hasn’t been in the news much, lately.  I had to look it up because the only LCS I could recall was a very short-lived, insignificant ship class that I thought was abandoned and early retired several years ago.  For those of you who would like a reminder, here’s the Navy’s description of the LCS: 

Littoral Combat Ships are fast, optimally-manned, mission-tailored surface combatants that operate in near-shore and open-ocean environments, winning against 21st-century coastal threats.[1]

Just a few thoughts about that …
 
“optimally-manned” ?  Every report I’ve ever states that the ships are woefully undermanned and, in fact, the manning has been increased a few times yet they remain undermanned and incapable of conducting on-board maintenance.
 
“mission-tailored”???  How can the ship be mission-tailored when there are no functional mission modules and, in fact, the ASW module has been abandoned?
 
“operate in near-shore and open-ocean environments”  What else is there?  Isn’t that just a wordier way of saying, ‘it’s a boat’?
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “First Mine Warfare USV Embarked On US Navy LCS”, Staff, 26-Apr-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/04/first-mine-warfare-usv-embarked-on-us-navy-lcs/

Do You Trust Them?

China is developing their own stealth aircraft fleet.  If we think our stealth aircraft will be effective, presumably theirs will be, too, right?  Well, the US military doesn’t think so.  For example, here’s the public assessment of China’s copy of the B-2 bomber, the H-20, by a Department of Defense official speaking on condition of anonymity:  

… the H-20 is when you actually look at the system design, it’s probably nowhere near as good as US LO [low observable] platforms … [1]
 
Asked whether the H-20 is a concern, the official replied “Not really.”[1]

For a Navy that is hollowed out worse than I can ever recall, has systemic maintenance problems, is steadily shrinking in numbers, has personnel and leadership character issues, and has had a long string of failed acquisition programs, that’s an incredibly arrogant attitude to have.  Now, perhaps the Navy has access to information about top secret Chinese aircraft that give them reason to be dismissive but I seriously doubt that.
 

Artist Concept of H-20 Bomber

 
It’s not just the H-20 that the Navy is dismissive of but also the J-20 stealth fighter and it’s not just an anonymous official but an Air Force general who publicly offered this comment: 

Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach told reporters that the J-20 stealth fighter isn’t “anything to lose a lot of sleep over.”[1]

Again, barring inside information about China’s most secret weapons, this is beyond belief arrogant.
 

J-20 Stealth Fighter

 
Given all the failed programs, misguided policies, and incorrect assessments of our own needs and capabilities, do you really think the military has correctly assessed China’s capabilities?  We’ve been wrong about most of our own stuff;  do you think we’re suddenly right about China’s?  Do you trust our military’s assessment?
 
Now, here’s the kicker – even if the military’s assessment is correct and the Chinese stealth aircraft are not as good as ours, our own aircraft and pilots are badly degraded.  Mission availability rates are abysmal and pilot training has fallen off badly with pilots struggling to get enough flight hours to even stay flight certified let alone tactically superior.  So, even if the Chinese aircraft are not as impressive as they’re claimed, neither are our own aircraft and pilots.
 
This is highly reminiscent of the US military’s dismissive attitude toward the Japanese just prior to WWII.
 
Those who will not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “China’s new H-20 stealth bomber ‘not really’ a concern for Pentagon, says intel official”, Michael Marrow, 22-Apr-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/04/chinas-new-h-20-stealth-bomber-not-really-a-concern-for-pentagon-says-intel-official/

The Best of Us

It’s no secret that the military is struggling.  Recruiting is in the tank.[1]  Readiness is near zero.  Maintenance is non-existent.  Gender, diversity, and environmental concerns dominate over warfighting.  The Secretary of Defense has listed climate as one of the top priorities.[3]  The fleet is shrinking despite the Navy stating that a war with China is imminent.  Ships are being retired decades early due to poor planning (LCS, MLP, AFSB, etc.).  Our reserve fleet is nearly non-existent.  Unbelievably, the Army is looking to recall retirees to active duty.[2]
 

The Army has launched far-reaching reforms that will transform how it attracts and recruits new soldiers, its top leaders said in a press conference today.
 
The moves come after the service failed to meet its recruiting targets for two consecutive fiscal years, which caused its end strength to fall from an original level of 485,000 in late 2021 to around 452,000 active duty soldiers today — its smallest full-time force since 1940, the year before the U.S. entered World War II.[1]

All these problems stem from the quality of the people populating the military.  These kinds of problems don’t just happen like the common cold.  They’re the result of decisions by people.  Bad decisions.  Cowardly decisions.  Stupid decisions.  Traitorous decisions.  Criminal decisions.
 
It’s the quality of our people and the quality of our decision making people is extremely poor.
 
What’s our solution?  Lower standards, of course!  We’re now looking to accept people who failed to pass high school.  We’re now looking to accept people with drug problems.  We’re looking to bring back retirees.  We’re looking to increase the proportion of women.  And so on.
 
Why are we not only accepting poor quality people into the military but actively seeking them out?  It’s because we’ve made the [bad, stupid] decision to purge the best of our personnel in the name of gender, diversity, and social representation.
 
Can you name the one organization in the country that is not, should not, and indeed, cannot be representative of society at large?  It’s the military.
 
Representative is another way of saying ‘average’.  A representative military would be the average of our society.  Do we really want our military to be average?  Of course not!  The military should be better than our average.  It should be the best of our society.  The military needs the best traits from our society and those traits are not present in the average of our society.  We want, and need, people who are stronger, braver, more focused, more aggressive, more combative, more patriotic, and have greater fortitude, integrity, and honor than society at large.  Sadly – and realistically – those traits are not present in equal proportion among all sub-groups in society.  Females, for example, do not embody most of those traits.  That doesn’t mean they can’t serve admirably in certain, limited functions but they are not the ones we want for combat.
 
We need to remember that the military should be the best of our society not the average.  It needs to embody characteristics that are not necessarily prevalent in society or in all sub-groups.  By definition, that means that the military will not, and cannot, be representative of society at large.  We need to recognize and embrace that concept and then recruit those individuals and groups that have those characteristics. 
 
 
 
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[1]https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2023/10/03/after-missing-goal-again-army-announces-sweeping-recruiting-reforms/
 
[2] https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/u-s-army-seeking-retirees-to-come-back-to-work-amid-manpower-crisis/ar-BB1knJe9
 
[3] https://media.defense.gov/2021/Mar/04/2002593656/-1/-1/0/SECRETARY-LLOYD-J-AUSTIN-III-MESSAGE-TO-THE-FORCE.PDF#:~:text=We%20face%20a%20growing%20climate%20crisis%20that%20is,into%20the%20Department%27s%20policies%2C%20strategies%2C%20and%20partner%20engagements.

Damn the Facts – Full Speed Ahead

Remember the recent announcement about diesel engines operating unattended for 30 straight days and how smugly proud the Navy and manufacturer were?  Except, it turned out that the engines didn’t run continuously.  They were allowed to stop as frequently as they needed as long as no human intervened.
 
Well, we have more of the same as NavSea proudly bragged about its unmanned vessels
 

… Capt. Searles [Capt. Scot Searles, Programme Manager, Unmanned Maritime Systems] explained how USVs performed under the supervision of crews during the Integrated Battle Problem (IBP) 23.2 multi-domain unmanned capabilities exercise under U.S. Pacific Fleet’s Experimentation Plan. During the exercise, which concluded in January 2024, four USVs – Mariner, Ranger, Seahawk, and Sea Hunter – traveled a combined 46,651 nautical miles to make port visits to Pearl Harbor, Papua New Guinea, Yokosuka (Japan), and Sydney (Australia).[1]

So, unmanned vessels managed to sail to various ports, as opposed to actual combat operations under realistic conditions.  Still, nearly 47,000 nm unattended … impressive?
 
Well, it’s not quite what you think.  It turns out there was LOTS of human intervention.
 

IBP 23.2 has allowed the USN to identify 157 distinct human interventions – I.e., crew stopping the USV – due to on vessel issues. That is equivalent to one intervention every 28 hours. However, of those interventions over two thirds were related to issues with Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) C4I systems (reloading crypto or losing crypto synchronization) or were done for operator convenience (take control of the system to go faster or slower than autonomous navigation). Of the remaining 48 human interventions, only 17 interventions were done for sensing and perception issues, and of those only 9 related to concerns with maneuvering decisions from the autonomous system.[1][emphasis added]

The Navy’s conclusion?  Everything’s wonderful according to Capt. Searles.
 

“This all puts the meantime between human interventions for autonomy at once every 4 days but under good weather conditions (I.e., not chasing false contacts) it is more like once every 12 days,” Capt. Searles concluded.
 
“As such, autonomy reliability requires interventions only once every 12 days and HM&E only once every 17 days, so we are very pleased with performance of systems but also happy that we are finding limits and getting those limits addressed.”[1]

So … the Navy discounts most interventions in order to contrive more favorable statistics and then further twists the data by conditioning it on ‘good weather conditions’.  That seems fair.  I mean, most combat occurs only in good weather, right?  And the oceans are famous for good weather so what could go wrong?
 
It doesn’t really matter why an intervention took place;  it only matters that it did.  The fact is that a human intervention was required once every 28 hours by the Navy’s own accounting … and I’m betting that it occurred more often than that but was deemed insignificant and wasn’t reported.  Regardless, human intervention every 28 hours is not exactly the dream of unattended operation for weeks and months on end, is it?  In fact, what this exercise proved is that unmanned operations are not yet feasible.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “SAS 2024: NAVSEA’s Unmanned Maritime Systems Update”, Alix Valenti, 15-Apr-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/sea-air-space-2024/2024/04/sas-2024-navseas-unmanned-maritime-systems-update/

Precision Guided Stupidity

ComNavOps has long decried the US (and, to be fair, the Western World) emphasis on precision guided munitions (PGM), believing that dependence on such weapons is a fool’s path (see, “Saturation Firepower”).  Why?  Because another word for precision guidance is expensive.  Because another word for precision guidance is scarce.  Because another word for precision guidance is unreliable.
 
ComNavOps, of course, is wise and knows all but how can the rest of the world be assured that ComNavOps is right?  The answer is by looking at the Ukraine-Russia war. 
 
Both sides have used precision guided weapons and what has it achieved?  Nothing. 
 
What has the US policy of supplying precision weapons to Ukraine demonstrated?  That in a real war we’ll run out of PGMs in short order and we lack the industrial capacity to replace them in any useful time frame.
 
The main weapon on both sides is dumb artillery with both sides expending tens of thousands of rounds per day, if reports can be believed.  That should be telling us something.
 
 
Conclusion
 
The conclusion is stunningly obvious:  we cannot wage a major war with PGMs as our main weapon.  If supplying Ukraine has depleted our PGM inventories and strained our industrial capacity beyond the ability to resupply in a useful time frame, how much worse will it be when we engage China?  We’ll expend ten thousand PGMs in the first week and then … we’ll be out of PGMs and China will be 99% unaffected.  What do we do then?
 
Our current production capacity for PGMs is something on the order of a hundred weapons per year per weapon type.  In a war, our expenditure rate will be something on the order of a hundred (or thousands or tens of thousands) weapons per day.  Do you see the gaping mismatch between expenditure and production?
 
We need weapons that can be produced at a rate of thousands per day (or more!) at an affordable cost.  You wage war with industrial capacity not a handful of PGMs.
 

Fool's Weapons

We need to end this worship of PGMs which are a weapon suited for the luxury of peacetime usage and production rates.  They are not a major war weapon.  Sure, I’ll gladly take any that are available but not at the expense of production rates and unaffordable costs.
 
ComNavOps is always cautioning about drawing lessons from Ukraine-Russia but this lesson is crystal clear.