Monday, September 22, 2025

Screaming, Here I Am!

As we know, the Navy, with absolutely no concept of operations (CONOPS) or any validation testing, is proceeding full speed ahead with the unmanned craze.  The plan, for a while, called for two unmanned surface vessels: a very small surveillance (ISR) vessel and a somewhat larger mini-missile barge.  Apparently, to no one’s surprise, the Navy’s thinking is changing again.  Here’s the latest plan, as best I can tell.
 
The U.S Navy is seeking a wide range of new medium and large USVs as part of its Modular Attack Surface Craft (MASC) program … [1]

Don’t you love how everything has to have ‘modular’ in it, now, whether it makes any sense or not?  ‘Modular’ shows that it’s high tech, innovative, and cutting edge.  It also shows that it’s stupid but, I digress …
 
The MASC program looks to deliver three distinct USV types to the U.S. Navy … [1]

Okay, what are the three (instead of the previous two, I guess) types?
 
Vessel one is the baseline Modular Attack Surface Craft (MASC) which the U.S. Navy says addresses “the need for a fast, high capacity, embarked payloads platform”. MASC will carry two 40-foot ISO containers that consume 75kW of power each. The baseline range with a payload of 25 metric tons is set at 2,500 nautical miles, all while maintaining 25 knots up to Sea State 4.[1] [emphasis added]
 
Vessel two is a High-Capacity MASC with double the payload of the baseline variant. It will carry four 40-foot ISO containers each drawing 45kW of power while maintaining a “high endurance, high capacity” capability. A configuration of four such containers would allow a High-Capacity MASC to carry four reloadable Mark 70 launchers for sixteen single-packed missiles like Tomahawks or Standard missiles, or sixty-four quad-packed missiles like the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM).[1] [emphasis added]
 
Vessel three is a single-payload USV, dubbed the Single Payload MASC, embarking a single 20-foot ISO container drawing 75kW of power. The documents explicitly state that the container should have no obstructions at the rear, likely for a towed array ASW capability or similar anti-submarine system like the Liberator concept, which Naval News recently covered. Liberator aims to pair heavyweight torpedo launchers to unmanned ships.[1] [emphasis added]

So, vessel types one and two will carry missiles inside 40 foot ISO containers with each container holding four large missiles or sixteen ESSM missiles in quad packs.  Let’s give some thought to the advantages and disadvantages of each vessel type.
 
Firepower. 
 
Vessel One type will carry two ISO containers with a total of 8 larger missiles and Vessel Two will carry up to four containers with 16 missiles.  Contrast that with a Burke’s 96 VLS cells or even a Constellation’s 32 cells.  The unmanned vessels carry very little firepower payload.  An individual unmanned vessel can’t successfully strike a target or defeat an attack.  To give some perspective, it would require 12 Type One vessels to equal a Burke and 6 Type Two vessels.  That’s not a very efficient or effective distribution of firepower given that each vessel adds to the complexities and difficulties of controlling, monitoring, maintaining, and refueling for the overall group.
 
In other words, these unmanned vessels are of no effective use individually and can only be useful in significant numbers which carries significant difficulties with it.
 
 
Communications / Stealth
 
As noted, each vessel must be controlled, monitored, positioned, maintained, refueled, and provided remote fire control data among other needs.  That’s a lot of time and effort on someone’s part and, more importantly, that’s a lot of communications going on.  While I’m sure we’ll attempt to use line-of-sight and various other low probability of detection communication methods, there’s no such thing as truly undetectable communications.  The only undetectable communications is no communications.  The more vessels we need to control (refer to the previous point about the very small firepower payloads), the more likely it is that we will be detected.  In essence, using unmanned vessels is the equivalent of continually screaming, here I am!  Come sink me!
 
Additional attributes include USVs built to commercial construction standards , automatic RF control with respect to EMCON mission requirements … [1]

RF (radio frequency) control is not inherently stealthy and this suggests that the Navy is looking to build and operate these vessels to commercial standards.  That’s find as a peacetime business case but not as a combat operation.  It’s bad enough to not be stealthy on the modern battlefield but to literally broadcast your location is pure folly.
 
Endurance / Logistics
 
As a general statement, small vessels are slow and will need to be refueled frequently.  Yes, it is possible to design a long endurance, small vessel by giving up combat payload for more fuel and decreased weight but that almost seems counterproductive relative to the intended combat function of the vessel.  The more small, unmanned vessels we have to operate (refer to the previous point about the very small firepower payloads), the more refueling we’ll have to conduct.  Given that we don’t have stealthy oilers, that means even more chance of being detected.  In addition, those oilers will have to be protected and escorted which is an example of the ripple effect of disadvantages of small, unmanned vessels.
 
Additional attributes include USVs built to commercial construction standards , automatic RF control with respect to EMCON mission requirements … [1]

 
Conclusion
 
All of this is not to say that there can’t be a valid, effective use for small unmanned ships but I have yet to see anyone articulate a viable CONOPS.  We’re pursuing the technology with no idea how to use them.  We’ve seen the disastrous consequences of that path, repeatedly, and yet, inexplicably, we’re doing it again.
 

 
__________________________________
 
[1]Naval News website, “U.S. Navy Sets Sights on Fleet-Wide Family of Unmanned Ships”, Carter Johnston, 29-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/u-s-navy-sets-sights-on-fleet-wide-family-of-unmanned-ships/

28 comments:

  1. If you need a small of fleet of manned to do same mission as an arsenal ship, why not just go with the arsenal ship? I can guarantee this unmanned ships will require more personnel to operate, just distributed somewhere else.

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    1. Well, at least one of the concerns with the arsenal ship was concentration of risk. If you've got 500 Tomahawks in a single ship and it's sunk, then it takes 500 Tomahawks to the bottom with it. And that's a significant fraction of our total inventory. So there's something to be said for distributing them among multiple hulls. Now whether it needs this much distribution is another question entirely.

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  2. Well, looking at the bright side (which I try to do from time to time), at least they seem to have moved on from those wacky tiny Sail Drones!

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    1. They are actually building many really big sail drones at Austal now. Like 65 feet with a taller sail.

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    2. Oh, dear .....

      Do they have any idea what they will do?

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  3. My issue with the plan here is that it seems to be asking for a lamed up version of what they already have. Overlord is the big one, NOMARS the medium, and Seahawk/Sea Hunter the small except this time they are smart enough to ask for a TEU.

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  4. (unmanned ships will require more personnel to operate). couldn't agree more. This unmanned garbage just ain't going to get it when the shooting starts, enemy subs will have a field day picking these things off, not to mention EW, Cyber, air attack and the rest. I could kind of see some usefulness in unmanned vessels in a disposable mine laying role or sweeping, but if you want some kind of smaller missile shooter build a stealthy vessel (Visby or larger variant of the M hull Stiletto. manned by a small crew ( kinda like a bomber crew) operate them in squadrons that are forward based. An unmanned vessel can't fix itself or "think on its own", manned vessels can. What happens when these unmanned vessels loose their data link for targeting and shipboard operations, which is a good possibility.

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    1. Losing the data link more and more means they will use autonomy to keep going insofar as possible. In looking at a solution like NOMARS I am betting its pretty quiet being electric propulsion. If a sub wants to announce its presence on a small, cheap target, that might be for the best. Odds are the smallest version of the MASC ships is going to be towing a Sonar, probably the medium too in some scenarios. I think there is a case for a manned command version of some of these to patrol and shepherd a group of them as a stand alone force or picket.

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    2. "Odds are the smallest version of the MASC ships is going to be towing a Sonar"

      There are two problems with this:
      1. That would be adding cost, complexity, and construction time which negates the benefits of being small and unmanned.
      2. Simply towing some small, relatively low power sonar device is not the ultimate answer to anti-submarine warfare. If it were, we wouldn't have large, high powered sonars on ships and subs operated by highly trained and experienced people backed up by racks of electronic devices and computers trying to interpret the noise that is picked up and separate the real target, if any, from the ambient and biologic noise. A small, remote vessel towing a small sonar can collect noise but can't analyze it. That requires transmitting the data back to a host control ship and that kind of continuous, high volume transmission (multiplied by however many such vessels there are) is guaranteed to be detected and provide the enemy a free fix.

      "I think there is a case for a manned command version of some of these to patrol and shepherd a group of them as a stand alone force or picket."

      I have yet to see a viable CONOPS for unmanned. I'd love to see you lay out the basics of such a CONOPS. The Navy certainly hasn't got one!

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    3. The CUSV/MCM USV has 120kw of electrical power available for its anti mine sonar which is active. Obviously the small MASC solution would be using passive sonar which uses vastly less power and they only specify 75kw for the payload. With one of these you can put the sonar somewhere you don't want to put a manned ship and you can potentially place lots of them. If I were looking for options I'd try an MH-60R dipping sonar on a CUSV, but then you need a mother ship.

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    4. Are you aware of just how limited an anti-mine sonar or even a dipping sonar is? And, of course, any such solution is useless without a nearby mothership that can perform data analysis of the signals ... oh, that pesky continuous broadcast issue. We give away ourselves with only a miniscule chance of finding a target.

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  5. The long shadow of the Jeffersonian Gunboats casts itself once again upon the United States Navy...

    Ugh, why don't they just build some freaking manned combat ships already. This is not that complicated.

    Lutefisk

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    1. I think there is case for looking at our force structure in the modern sense and evolve it from those WWII comparisons most always try to make. No one was moving viable naval firepower by transport aircraft back then. We can do that now. We can also lift and drop relevant firepower with helos. Current focus on containerization is great, but its hardly the entirety of what's possible and uniquely advantageous to our forces.

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    2. "No one was moving viable naval firepower by transport aircraft back then."

      ??? What naval firepower are you envisioning being transported by aircraft? What are you envisioning lifting and dropping by helo?

      "hardly the entirety of what's possible and uniquely advantageous to our forces."

      I have no idea what you're thinking of. Care to offer an example?

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    3. I'm still working on it, but look at Ukraine's evolution of the Magura line of USVs. Went from being a suicide USV to now firing AIMs at aircraft. No reason that weapon portfolio can't expand. With our air mobility we could place those all kinds of places Ukraine can't.

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    4. It's one thing to operate a USV near land, in a confined area, with land support, against an inept enemy; it's another to try to make it work in the open ocean, far from land or any support mechanism or vehicle/ship, against a competent enemy.

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    5. If the Marines are in Philippino or Japanese outlying islands trying to keep Chinese forces inside the first island chain, I’d think they might want to use the water to get around and for a much larger area to hide a shooter than their current plan.

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  6. 8 to 16 AShMs per boat isn't too bad. Even the Ticos only carried 8 container Harpoons. At 16 tubes, that matches the Constellation's NSM throw weight of 16 canister missiles.

    Burkes have 96 VLS cells, but they have to carry a mix of land-attack Tomahawks, VL ASROC, and the varied flavors of LR SAM and interceptor SAM. Also, after all this time, they still don't really have a viable VLS-launched antiship missile - VLS NSM is still in testing, VLS Harpoon has been proposed, and VLS LRASM is not being procured in sufficient numbers.

    CONCEPTUALLY, this is an easy way to increase the throw weight of the surface ships, while also adding additional ships the Chinese must target their missiles at, which dilutes the salvo density.

    For example: 4 Chinese DDGs are attacking 4 American DDGs. The Chinese DDGs are flushing their cells, dumping a combined salvo of 120 missiles in the air. That means each DDG has to defend against 30 missiles each.

    Now, assume each DDG has 2 unmanned missile boats supporting it. The American SAG is now 12 contacts on the radar screens that the Chinese will have no choice but to engage, because that's what you do when you see a contact on the screen: you prosecute it. The missile density is now reduced; each DDG now only has to defend against 10 missiles. We don't care if the unmanned missile boats eat one, two, or even 10 missiles, because they're expendable.

    Meanwhile, in terms of outgoing fire, the missile boats allow us to generate a larger attack salvo than our chinese peers. Assuming Vessel 2 and flushing the racks, 8x 16 canister AShMs is 128 missiles, on top of the antiship missiles we are already carrying in our DDGs' VLS (I am assuming for the sake of this thought exercise that we have chosen a VLS ASCM for our DDGs).

    HOWEVER, while the concept looks nice and the math passes the vibe check, the proof is really in the pudding. Unmanned ships are not a mature technology and the command and control issues need to be worked out. I am observing with interest how the Dutch fare with their unmanned SAM boats supporting the De Zeven Provinciën-class AAW frigates (although in this case, I believe the choice of optionally manned ships carrying containerised Barak SAMs is due more to industrial/program choices the Dutch made with their radars and missile buys).

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    1. article in The War Zone recently shows that the German Navy is going all in on this unmanned craze as well. Kind of reminds me of a mother duck and chicks CONOPS. If I were the OPFOR, I would be all out to kill the mother duck and the chicks are then helpless (no control / targeting coomands).

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    2. Ofc, the big issue is finding the mother duck. Real life isn't a video game, where you have near perfect situational awareness, where you can individually identify each contact on the radar screen. On a radar screen, 12 blips are 12 blips. You have to manually assess and use your best judgement to tag each blip, and if you get it wrong, that's on you.

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    3. "On a radar screen, 12 blips are 12 blips."

      That's not exactly correct. I understand what you're trying to say but you're overlooking a bunch of factors that make target discrimination possible and, in many cases, easy. For starters, the early days of radar simply returning a "blip" are long gone. We can now assemble radar images of a target which gives us much information about the target identification. In addition, we use multiple sensor sources, each of which provides its own information about the target: IR imaging, emissions type/frequency/strength, acoustic profiles, and so forth. Combining those multiple sources generally gives a pretty good identification of the target. There are also behavior patterns: a target that hangs around a particular area or moves in a particular pattern can often reveal the purpose, and thus ID, of the target. In short, spotting and identifying a large, non-stealthy vessel that has to communicate frequently (continuously?) with its remote craft, and moves to and from replenishment/operation locations is not hard to do.

      Motherships in WWII were able to operate successfully because the prevailing sensor of the time was the eyeball which had a very limited range and could be thwarted by simple darkness, bad weather, etc. Those masking effects have largely been eliminated today.

      People who believe a mothership can loiter around the battle area, servicing and operating remote craft, are kidding themselves. Motherships would have to operate so far removed from the battle area as to invalidate any potential CONOPS. This is one of many reasons why I keep pointing out that no one has yet come up with a viable, combat-useful CONOPS for unmanned assets (other than my own concepts, of course!).

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    4. "For example: 4 Chinese DDGs are attacking 4 American DDGs."

      You can always concoct a scenario where this works but such scenarios would be vanishingly unlikely in real life. The main characteristics of unmanned vessels (no sensors, can't operate independently, increased maintenance and fueling, and constant communications (the opposite of the EMCON that modern war demands!) make any reasonable CONOPS non-viable.

      To use your example, the four US DDGs would have long since given away their position with the constant comms with the eight remote craft (as well as increasing the entire group's acoustic emissions and having eight more targets to be spotted on radar or by whatever sensors the enemy has) and would be facing saturation attacks from an enemy that can attack from a distance with pinpoint accuracy while remaining undetected by us. Quite likely, the enemy would also sink an associated oiler that is in the area to support the unmanned craft fuel needs.

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    5. To be honest, I've always felt that the symmetrical SAG on SAG fight was SWO propaganda and wishful thinking. There's been much criticism of Friedman's model of distributed lethality and numerous small boats attacking larger warships, but a lot of the problems of his model go away if we apply it to AIRCRAFT. What we really need to be looking at is bulking up our air wings, returning to 5 combat squadrons of ~12 aircraft instead of the current 4 combat squadrons of 10-12 aircraft. A Nimitz air wing in 1988 had some 68 aircraft capable of dropping bombs or firing Harpoon, which is one hell of a strike package.

      Even supposing they were only carrying 2 antiship missiles apiece, a 60 aircraft alpha strike will put 120 missiles into the air.

      Incidentally, I've spoken to someone who claims to have seen footage of the SM-6 shot against ex-Jarret. According to him, the missile went right through the bridge and detonated inside CIC. That's a hell of a thing. Hard to fight the ship when the bridge is gone and CIC is a mess of dead sailors.

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    6. "I've always felt that the symmetrical SAG on SAG fight was SWO propaganda and wishful thinking."

      Quite right! It's certainly theoretically possible but seems unlikely.

      "There's been much criticism of Friedman's model"

      I'm not familiar with his views. Do you mean Hughes?

      "bulking up our air wings,"

      Absolutely!

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    7. You're right, I meant to say Hughes, but I had a little brainfart (I was looking at a copy of Friedman's US Destroyers on my desk and my wires got crossed a little).

      "Quite right! It's certainly theoretically possible but seems unlikely."

      It's why, on the balance, while there was a clear capability gap in the Flight II Burkes lacking AShMs of their own (having given up the Harpoon canisters for the helo hangar), I don't consider it a crippling gap, because for much of the last 30 years the priority was to use the air wing to deliver the antiship strike.

      I think things have settled well into a niche of the DDGs firing land attack cruise missiles, with the air wing serving to protect the CSG and to prosecute enemy SAGs. Strikefighters attacking the chinese mainland is an unsurvivable proposition - far better to leave that to cruise missile salvos from the DDGs, and use the air wing to prosecute enemy SAGs, which is a more survivable prospect than a sophisticated land-based IADS.

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  7. https://thedefensepost.com/2025/09/16/us-navy-triton-drones-issues/
    Does this sound familiar ? The Navy makes the Triton drone operational before techinical issues are resolve. Per DOD IG.
    " Auditors concluded the navy “did not effectively manage the operational capabilities” of the Triton program and declared initial operational capability (IOC) in September 2023 before completing initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E). My Take : The same problem as with a number of Navy programs !
    ( Article dated 9-16-2025 )

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  8. Looks like a sales pitch by contractor rather than Navy requirements
    we need to reestablish Bureau of Ships in USN
    and follow principles set by
    1) Arleigh A. Burke
    2) Hyman G. Rickover
    3) Admiral Elmo  Zumwalt
    to create a better navy

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