Screaming, Here I Am!

As we know, the Navy, with absolutely no concept of operations (CONOPS) or any validation testing, is proceeding full speed ahead with the unmanned craze.  The plan, for a while, called for two unmanned surface vessels: a very small surveillance (ISR) vessel and a somewhat larger mini-missile barge.  Apparently, to no one’s surprise, the Navy’s thinking is changing again.  Here’s the latest plan, as best I can tell.
 

The U.S Navy is seeking a wide range of new medium and large USVs as part of its Modular Attack Surface Craft (MASC) program … [1]

Don’t you love how everything has to have ‘modular’ in it, now, whether it makes any sense or not?  ‘Modular’ shows that it’s high tech, innovative, and cutting edge.  It also shows that it’s stupid but, I digress …
 

The MASC program looks to deliver three distinct USV types to the U.S. Navy … [1]

Okay, what are the three (instead of the previous two, I guess) types?
 

Vessel one is the baseline Modular Attack Surface Craft (MASC) which the U.S. Navy says addresses “the need for a fast, high capacity, embarked payloads platform”. MASC will carry two 40-foot ISO containers that consume 75kW of power each. The baseline range with a payload of 25 metric tons is set at 2,500 nautical miles, all while maintaining 25 knots up to Sea State 4.[1] [emphasis added]
 
Vessel two is a High-Capacity MASC with double the payload of the baseline variant. It will carry four 40-foot ISO containers each drawing 45kW of power while maintaining a “high endurance, high capacity” capability. A configuration of four such containers would allow a High-Capacity MASC to carry four reloadable Mark 70 launchers for sixteen single-packed missiles like Tomahawks or Standard missiles, or sixty-four quad-packed missiles like the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM).[1] [emphasis added]
 
Vessel three is a single-payload USV, dubbed the Single Payload MASC, embarking a single 20-foot ISO container drawing 75kW of power. The documents explicitly state that the container should have no obstructions at the rear, likely for a towed array ASW capability or similar anti-submarine system like the Liberator concept, which Naval News recently covered. Liberator aims to pair heavyweight torpedo launchers to unmanned ships.[1] [emphasis added]

So, vessel types one and two will carry missiles inside 40 foot ISO containers with each container holding four large missiles or sixteen ESSM missiles in quad packs.  Let’s give some thought to the advantages and disadvantages of each vessel type.
 
Firepower. 
 
Vessel One type will carry two ISO containers with a total of 8 larger missiles and Vessel Two will carry up to four containers with 16 missiles.  Contrast that with a Burke’s 96 VLS cells or even a Constellation’s 32 cells.  The unmanned vessels carry very little firepower payload.  An individual unmanned vessel can’t successfully strike a target or defeat an attack.  To give some perspective, it would require 12 Type One vessels to equal a Burke and 6 Type Two vessels.  That’s not a very efficient or effective distribution of firepower given that each vessel adds to the complexities and difficulties of controlling, monitoring, maintaining, and refueling for the overall group.
 
In other words, these unmanned vessels are of no effective use individually and can only be useful in significant numbers which carries significant difficulties with it.
 
 
Communications / Stealth
 
As noted, each vessel must be controlled, monitored, positioned, maintained, refueled, and provided remote fire control data among other needs.  That’s a lot of time and effort on someone’s part and, more importantly, that’s a lot of communications going on.  While I’m sure we’ll attempt to use line-of-sight and various other low probability of detection communication methods, there’s no such thing as truly undetectable communications.  The only undetectable communications is no communications.  The more vessels we need to control (refer to the previous point about the very small firepower payloads), the more likely it is that we will be detected.  In essence, using unmanned vessels is the equivalent of continually screaming, here I am!  Come sink me!
 

Additional attributes include USVs built to commercial construction standards , automatic RF control with respect to EMCON mission requirements … [1]

RF (radio frequency) control is not inherently stealthy and this suggests that the Navy is looking to build and operate these vessels to commercial standards.  That’s find as a peacetime business case but not as a combat operation.  It’s bad enough to not be stealthy on the modern battlefield but to literally broadcast your location is pure folly.
 
Endurance / Logistics
 
As a general statement, small vessels are slow and will need to be refueled frequently.  Yes, it is possible to design a long endurance, small vessel by giving up combat payload for more fuel and decreased weight but that almost seems counterproductive relative to the intended combat function of the vessel.  The more small, unmanned vessels we have to operate (refer to the previous point about the very small firepower payloads), the more refueling we’ll have to conduct.  Given that we don’t have stealthy oilers, that means even more chance of being detected.  In addition, those oilers will have to be protected and escorted which is an example of the ripple effect of disadvantages of small, unmanned vessels.
 

Additional attributes include USVs built to commercial construction standards , automatic RF control with respect to EMCON mission requirements … [1]

 
Conclusion
 
All of this is not to say that there can’t be a valid, effective use for small unmanned ships but I have yet to see anyone articulate a viable CONOPS.  We’re pursuing the technology with no idea how to use them.  We’ve seen the disastrous consequences of that path, repeatedly, and yet, inexplicably, we’re doing it again.
 

 
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[1]Naval News website, “U.S. Navy Sets Sights on Fleet-Wide Family of Unmanned Ships”, Carter Johnston, 29-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/u-s-navy-sets-sights-on-fleet-wide-family-of-unmanned-ships/

It’s Not About One Versus One

Far too often (all the time?) commenters and analysts focus on one-on-one assessments of the weapon systems they are arguing for or against.  The US has more carriers than China.  A Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile can’t be stopped.  This missile has a ten mile greater range than that missile.  This weapon can penetrate that tank’s armor.  And so on.  That’s fine but it completely ignores the big picture.  Where does the weapon system fit into the larger military scheme?  Can it be produced in quantity?  Can it be serviced in the field?  Is it reliable?  And so on.
 
How many times have you heard the argument that if this weapon can beat that ship/plane/tank then that ship/plane/tank is obsolete and useless?
 
One-on-one, the WWII German Tiger tank was nearly unbeatable but that’s not how the war was fought.  Tiger tanks and US Sherman tanks didn’t line up, one against one, in a series of jousts.  The Tiger tank was difficult to produce, lacked numbers, was hard to maintain, hard to repair, and suffered from critical fuel shortages due to Allied attacks on Germany’s raw materials, factories, refineries, etc.  The war against the Tiger tank was fought in many ‘domains’ not just one-on-one.
 
We, as observers and analysts, need to stop the one-on-one thinking that dominates our discussions and begin recognizing and considering the many other factors that make up the larger military picture.
 
Let’s take a look at a current example involving Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian fuel capacity which is impacting the general Russian military effort.
 

Ukraine has intensified its campaign of drone strikes on Russian oil infrastructure, hitting refineries in recent weeks and deepening fuel shortages across the country.[1]
 
About 40% of Ukraine's long-range strike missions this year have focused on refineries, while others have hit storage and pumping facilities. [1]
 
Independent estimates suggest up to 20% of Russia's refining capacity has been disabled, cutting more than 1 million barrels a day of output, mostly gasoline. Refineries that have been hit repeatedly have sustained lasting damage, especially to cracking units that are difficult to replace under Western sanctions. [1]
 
The impact has been felt nationwide. Motorists face fuel shortages, long lines, and record prices. Wholesale gasoline prices have jumped 54% since January, prompting authorities to suspend exports and impose rationing in some regions. [1]

We see, then, that the Russian military effort can be impacted not just by one-on-one weapon contests but by many other factors such as fuel supply – a lesson straight out of WWII (and every other conflict in history!).  No longer can we, as analysts, talk about one-on-one assessments without considering the larger picture and all the other factors that impact and determine a weapon system’s actual usefulness and effectiveness.
 
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On a bit of side note, albeit closely related, here’s a bit of information about Ukraine’s drone effort.
 

The FP-1 long-range "kamikaze" drone, introduced in May, now accounts for about 60% of strikes inside Russia. Produced at an estimated 100 units a day, it carries a 60- to 120-kilogram warhead with a range of up to 1,600 kilometers.
 
Despite a price of about $55,000, it is said to feature advanced guidance software that maintains accuracy under electronic jamming. [1]

This highlights so many lessons we’ve discussed in past posts.  For example, not every weapon has to be bleeding edge, light years ahead technology.  Had the US tried to produce this drone, it would have been 10x the size, 1000x the cost, and been partially ready in a decade or two.  In the non-US procurement world, simple and just plain effective will almost always be sufficient.  Low cost, easy to mass produce, reasonably useful characteristics … this is what effective weapons procurement should look like.
 
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “Russia Faces Gasoline Crisis as Ukrainian Drones Strike”, Sandy Fitzgerald, 5-Sep-2025,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/russia-ukraine-war/2025/09/05/id/1225208/

F-35 Block 4 – Total Crap

As you know, the F-35 does not yet have its full combat capabilities.  Those were part of the incremental Block software upgrades and should have happened years ago.  Now, the Block 4 upgrade effort has been delayed yet again.
 

The Pentagon now anticipates the F-35’s Block 4 modernization won’t be complete until 2031 at the earliest, a five-year delay from its original timeline, even as the department rescopes the effort to include fewer capabilities than originally envisioned … [1]

Note the phrases,
 
“at the earliest”
 
“include fewer capabilities than originally envisioned”
 
You know, beyond the slightest shadow of a doubt, that the even the much delayed 2031 date will slip further still and the already downgraded capabilities of the Block 4 will be further downgraded.  Honestly, at the rate we’re going, Block 4 isn’t going to deliver much in the way of new capabilities, at all.  Many features have already been deferred to a nebulous, non-existent. Unfunded, future upgrade instead of the Block 4.
 
In addition, the Block 4 program is being reorganized, yet again.  GAO reports,
 

According to program officials, the new Block 4 major subprogram will have fewer capabilities, will experience schedule delays, and will have unknown costs until the program office finishes developing its cost estimate.[1]

The cost for this pile of digital crap is stunning, even by Department of Defense standards.
 

An updated cost estimate for the Block 4 effort, which was $16.5 billion as of 2021, is expected “later in 2025,” according to the GAO.[1]

Well over $16B and counting (with at least five more years of costs still to come!) and with next to nothing to show for it.  I really don’t know how to apply any value-added analysis to that.  People should be rotting in jail for this.  Okay, I guess that was my value-added analysis.
 
On the off chance that you aren’t angry about this, yet, the following should correct that.
 

The F-35 program’s use of incentive fees has largely been ineffective at holding the contractors accountable to delivering engines and aircraft on time,” the GAO stated. “For lot 15 aircraft, where the program originally tied incentives to on-time delivery, the program gave the contractor a second chance to earn fees by redirecting those incentives to other aspects of the program when it was clear that Lockheed Martin would not deliver any aircraft on time.[1]

So, we set up a contract with incentives and then paid the manufacturer incentives even after they failed to deliver aircraft on time.  People should be rotting in jail for this.  See?  More value-added analysis.
 
This is exactly the kind of thing I had hoped that SecDef Hegseth would address but he is disappointing me.  Heads should be littering the halls of the F-35 program.  What is Hegseth doing with his time?
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “F-35 Block 4 upgrade delayed until at least 2031: GAO”, Valerie Insinna, 3-Sep-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/09/f-35-block-4-upgrade-delayed-until-at-least-2031-gao/

Can You Afford To Lose It?

Newsmax website has an article about a Chinese jet powered VTOL drone intended for surface ships.[1]  The article goes on to rave about the advantages this will confer upon the Chinese navy … according to Chinese sources/propaganda.  Setting the dubious nature of the claims aside, the article does raise an interesting and highly relevant issue that the US Navy/military is struggling with, generally unsuccessfully, and that is the question of whether the supposed warfare-changing technology of the moment actually has any value.
 
For example, let’s consider a hypothetical example of an advanced drone with all kinds of near-magical capabilities for surface ships.  Who wouldn’t want it, right?  I mean, it could potentially change the future of warfare … until you start asking a few simple questions.
 

• Can it be produced in quantity?  -answer: no, it’s so magically advanced that it’s hideously expensive
• Can it be produced in large quantities?  -answer: no, it’s too expensive and its complexity and advanced technology means it takes months or years to produce
• Can it be serviced in the field?  -answer: no, its advanced technology and complexity requires advanced depot level maintenance support
• Can it do anything combat-useful?  -answer: it can probably carry only one small munition which is almost insignificant in the big picture;  ISR might be a useful function
• Is it small enough to not impact existing ship’s functions?  -answer: no, complexity, range, capability etc. all come at a cost and one of those costs is size
• Can a ship carry enough to compensate for attrition or simple mechanical failure?  -answer: no, its size and cost preclude large quantities on a single ship
• Can it perform its function without giving away the host ship’s location?  -answer: no, it will require frequent/continuous two-way communication for sensor analysis and command/control

 
 
Conclusion
 
Sounds good on paper but fails the real world, value test.
 
The US (and good to see China is susceptible to this, as well) is so focused on the technology that we forget to ask the real world combat questions.  Sometimes (well, most of the time!) that amazing feat of technology simply has no real world value.  LCS … Zumwalt/LRLAP … EMALS … magic elevators … large non-stealthy UAVs … etc.

 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “China Makes Major Leap With 'Jet Drone'”, Sandy Fitzgerald, 15-Aug-2025,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/china-navy-jet-drone/2025/08/15/id/1222629/