Monday, May 6, 2024

US Weapon Failures in Ukraine

How often have you heard someone say, sure, previous weapons of this *fill in the blank” type weren’t successful but this new generation will be because it has new and improved *fill in the blank* technology?  Plus, the manufacturer claims *fill in the blank*.  And, how often has ComNavOps flatly stated that all systems will significantly underperform in actual combat regardless of the new and improved, miracle technology they’re built on?  Most of you have your own favorite, pet weapon/sensor system that you’re convinced will be a world beater … but you’re wrong.
 
Well now, courtesy of Ukraine and our giveaway weapons transfers, we have some actual combat performance to look at for various weapons.  The Daily Caller website has a fascinating article about several US weapons that have been provided to Ukraine and have been found to significantly underperform compared to claims.  Here they are with quotes from the article: [1]
 
 
Abrams Tanks 
Ukraine has withdrawn some of the U.S. M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks from the front lines after Russian drones destroyed five of the heavy Western tanks it fought for months to obtain …
 
Droves of Russian surveillance and hunter-killer drones have been able to detect and pursue the tanks more quickly than expected.
 
Excalibur Artillery Shells 
Excalibur precision artillery rounds initially had a 70% efficiency rate hitting targets when first used in Ukraine. However, after 6 weeks, efficiency declined to only 6% as the Russians adapted their electronic warfare systems to counter it.
 
Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System (GMLRS)
 
Russian electronic warfare has successfully redirected the Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), another long-range precision munition off its planned course, according to reports.
 
 
Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb 
It didn’t work for multiple reasons, including [electromagnetic interference] environment, including just really the dirt and doing it on ground …

Switchblade 300 Drone 
The first weapon that showed itself vulnerable to Russian electronic warfare was the Switchblade 300 …
 
According to the article, the common thread in most of these is that Russian electronic warfare (EW), which includes GPS spoofers, has proven effective at disrupting the weapons guidance by redirecting them away from their intended targets.
 
To be fair, the military has belatedly recognized, to some degree, that earlier GPS guided weapons are, indeed, vulnerable to EW and have been incorporating multiple guidance methods in more recent weapons.  Ominously though, this suggests that the majority of our current weapon stocks, being older, are of questionable effectiveness in the face of peer enemy EW and other countermeasures.
 
This demands that we begin instantly testing all our weapons under realistic EW conditions to see which work and which don’t (probably all of them!).  The military, however, steadfastly refuses to conduct rigorous, realistic testing which is why the Ukraine findings are coming as a surprise to the military.
 
Equally disturbing should be the realization that each of these weapons was pronounced a miracle for the ages and passed all tests with flying colors … … … and yet they’ve failed in combat.  This demonstrates the uselessness and simplicity of our so-called testing.
 
Now, this doesn’t mean that these weapons can’t be fixed and improved.  Most probably can … now that we know what’s wrong with them.  However, what about the rest of our weapons that haven’t been tested in combat or under realistic conditions?  What’s wrong with them?  It’s guaranteed that they have problems but we just don’t know what, yet.  I guess China will let us know when we use them and they fail.  Of course, that will too late but, at least, we’ll finally know.
 
 
 
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[1]Daily Caller website, “The US Sent Billions In Military Aid To Ukraine. Many Weapons Are Massively Underperforming”, Micaela Burrow, 3-May-2024,
https://dailycaller.com/2024/05/03/ukraine-aid-weapons-russia-tactics/

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52 comments:

  1. John DallmanMay 6, 2024 at 2:32 AM

    "Now, this doesn’t mean that these weapons can’t be fixed and improved. Most probably can … now that we know what’s wrong with them."

    Not yet, you don't. You know Russian EW was somewhat effective against them, but I seriously doubt the US knows the details of the vulnerability, or its limits. Real testing is required to find the problems, and verify the fixes.

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    1. ComNavOpsMay 6, 2024 at 6:23 AM

      I don't mean that we understand every nuance of every problem that the weapons have. I mean that we've now been hit across the forehead with a 2x4 stamped 'Problems!' and that we know they are GPS/EW related. We can now begin detailed testing and problem solving.

      Are there other hidden problems? Quite likely but the GPS/EW vulnerabilities jumped out and that gives us a starting point for fixing/improving (or discarding) the weapons.

      Delete
    2. AnonymousMay 11, 2024 at 6:17 AM

      The one nuance I would add to this conversation is Ukraines fundamental lack of SEAD/EW assets of their own. There’s a reason so many SEAD weapons have a home on Jam feature. I’m not at all saying this elevates the issue. There’s no way possible it will. But it will absolutely make troupes on the ground more cautious when using any emitter then they are in that battle field.

      Delete
  2. AnonymousMay 6, 2024 at 4:19 AM

    Note that GLSDB is on the cheaper and simpler side of PGMs, intended to attack fixed static targets, and it's being defeated fairly easily. Kinda calls into question the idea that cheap simple weapons can be viable on the contested battlefield.

    GLSDB, like all American GPS guided weapons, has backup INS guidancez but it would appear this was not sufficient to compensate for GPS jamming.

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    1. ComNavOpsMay 6, 2024 at 6:28 AM

      "Kinda calls into question the idea that cheap simple weapons can be viable on the contested battlefield."

      Not in the least! It calls into question that simplified smart weapons should be our main weapons. It suggests that we should return to dumb weapons that have no electronics that can be jammed, spoofed, hacked, or whatever. We need more dumb, area weapons.

      "INS guidance"

      INS is not precise. That's why GPS was so enthusiastically embraced.

      Delete
    2. Austin VernonMay 6, 2024 at 12:25 PM

      The GLSDB is at a pretty big disadvantage because it was meant to be a 150 km range weapon and it glides instead of having a ballistic arc. So it is especially vulnerable to jamming being that far behind enemy lines, has less accurate INS because of its profile, and has a small warhead that can't make up for that inaccuracy. Notice the Russian glide bombs aren't very accurate but they going up to 1500 kg sizes to make up for it. And these are mostly only useful for attacks on front line fortifications, as discussed in previous posts.

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  3. AnonymousMay 6, 2024 at 4:22 AM

    I think Militaries will re-learn that most of these weapons are already weapons not precision.

    Example, Artillery rounds, Dumb bombs

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    1. AnonymousMay 6, 2024 at 4:23 AM

      Correction: please read "Area weapons", not "already weapons".

      Delete
    2. AnonymousMay 6, 2024 at 5:09 AM

      Ofc the issue with unguided artillery is that you have to drive it deep past the enemy's frontline.

      GLSDB and Excaliber are meant to give you more options for artillery beyond pounding the frontline 12 miles ahead of you: it lets you shoot 40, 50 miles behind the frontline, into the backline where the enemy has their logistics and command nodes. Only other way is to fly aircraft, but dumb bombs need to.be dropped right on the target, whoch is an iffy sell against air defenses: airstrikes are just not an optiom for either Ukraine or Russia because their CAS and BAI is supprrssed by the other side's air defense.

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsMay 6, 2024 at 6:37 AM

      "GLSDB and Excaliber are meant to give you more options "

      That would assume that they work. Options that don't work are useless.

      "lets you shoot 40, 50 miles behind the frontline"

      We have many ways of dealing with the deeper fires requirement: air-launched cruise missiles, ship and sub launched cruise missiles, stealth bombers, ATACMS, etc.

      There's nothing wrong with trying to develop long range artillery IF IT DOESN'T TAKE AWAY RESOURCES FROM CONVENTIONAL ARTILLERY. We are so focused on making every weapon a globe-spanning weapon that we're ignoring simple, dumb, are weapons like conventional artillery. The Marines, for example, in their obsessive quest to be long range, anti-ship shooters have no self-propelled artillery that I'm aware of.

      Delete
    4. AnonymousMay 6, 2024 at 7:21 AM

      My brother in christ, the Ukranians don't have cruise missiles and stealth bombers - which, I'll point out, are the expensive PGMs that you argued against two weeks ago.

      And you have also argued that JDAMs are not a viable weapon for attacking defended targets because of the short range of the weapon.

      So you tell me.

      Delete
    5. ComNavOpsMay 6, 2024 at 8:14 AM

      "the Ukranians don't have cruise missiles and stealth bombers"

      You're factually incorrect, at least in part, as the Ukrainians do have cruise missiles and have used them.

      Beyond that, who, other than you, stated that they did?

      Your comment is devoid of useful information and does nothing to further the discussion. As you noted in the Comment Policy page, this the definition of an undesirable comment. In the future, either present useful information or refrain from commenting as this type of comment will be deleted. Thank you and I look forward to reading something useful and insightful from you.

      Delete
    6. AnonymousMay 6, 2024 at 6:20 PM

      "Beyond that, who, other than you, stated that they did?"

      From a comment from your April 15th Blog post, "Precision Guided Stupidity." (https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2024/04/precision-guided-stupidity.html)

      ComNavOpsApril 15, 2024 at 12:37 PM
      "short but reasonable range"

      Against a peer defender there is no such thing as a short but reasonable range. The several to a few dozen mile range puts the launch aircraft smack in the heart of a defensive system of not just SAMs but also enemy aircraft. Also, remember that the enemy defenses may (and likely will) extend many miles out from the actual target location.
      = = = = =
      ComNavOpsApril 15, 2024 at 1:08 PM:
      High above enemy defenses is no place to be! SAMs (and enemy aircraft) love high targets. It doesn't matter how cheap a JDAM type bomb is (it could be free) if it isn't combat effective. Having to send a plane high above enemy defenses is not combat effective. JDAM is great ... IF THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT DEFENSES. Of course, any weapon is great if there are no significant defenses.
      = = = = =

      You are also arguing a false equivalency. The bulk of the money spent on artillery is still being spent on conventional artillery, not on Excalibur. The US Army has recently put it's long range artillery development programs on hold in order to allocate that funding towards buying more conventional shells and more replacement barrels.

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    7. Ghiskey WolfMay 6, 2024 at 6:56 PM

      Calm your tits fellas, we're trying to have productive discussions in this space.

      I'm of the opinion that this problem has been around for a while. AirLand Battle codified the idea that the Air Force would be responsible for providing long range fires, so the Army of Excellence never really invested into organic longrange fires of its own, because the doctrinal provider of said long range fires was an Air Force airstrike - America uses tactical air the way the Russians use rocket artillery and cruise missiles.

      This could work in the 80s and 90s, because the USAF was an order of magnitude of its current size, and worked during the GWOT because there was no AD to speak of, unlike the 2030s and 2040s, where we'll be going up against the Chinese and Russians with their air defenses. The USAF is now banking on using Wild Weasels for SEAD and F-35's stealth and sensor fusion to be able to penetrate deep enough to provide long range fires. Your mileage may vary on that.

      The issue is that we've spent the last quarter century fighting the GWOT against people with no air defences, and we've forgotten what that was like.

      So if you, as an American commander, want to strike the enemy backline to take out their logistics hubs and command nodes, so that you can weaken their frontline and hammer through, your first option is airstrikes. This means sending multiple strike packages with Wild Weasel escort, rolling the dice that the Wild Weasels will suppress the air defenses long enough that your package can get through. Observed behaviour from Kosovo was that when enemy SAMs targeted a single aircraft in the strike package, everyone would drop their bombs for maximum kinematic performance for evasive maneuvers, and have to abort the strike - at least with internal weapons carriage, the F-35 is essentially in clean aerodynamic profile, and so can keep the weapons inside, take evasive action, and then try again. (This would apply to any aircraft with an internal weapons bay, like the Vigilante, to be fair.)

      Alternately, if you expect that air is suppressed, you still have rocket artillery options - GLSDB, ATACMS, PrSM, G-MLRS - that will let you hit from 70 to 300 miles out, but the problem is that even basic unguided MLRS launchers are quite rare compared to the more common short tube M107 SPGs. (As an aside, it's interesting to observe the South Korean army and it's high preponderence of TBM launchers and rocket artillery. The South Koreans are heavy on tactical ballistic missiles because they want to suppress and destroy North Korea's own tactical ballistic missiles).

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    8. Ghiskey WolfMay 6, 2024 at 6:57 PM

      When you look back at the above context, the US Army's long range gun programs are coming from a quite reasonable starting point: In a major war against a peer opponent, it is likely that both sides air defenses and air power will symmetrically suppress the other.

      Therefore, if USAF airstrikes are not available, and with ATACMS being so limited in supply, the Big Army needs long range guns of its own in order to attack the enemy backline, so that the frontline can be weakened to enable the breakthrough, otherwise the fighting will devolve into a static symmetrical slugging match.

      The US military does not like fair even symmetrical fights; it's all about stacking the deck with your advantages and reducing the advantages the other side has.

      Being able to fire rounds at 70 miles would have been a near-tripling of the existing gun range (24 miles), allowing Army commanders options to strike at the enemy backline and supply routes, while siting guns further behind to reduce counterbattery risk and be closer to resupply (because guns are VERY ammunition hungry). Of course, at that range, accuraccy and dispersion would be an issue, but it's a goddamn tube artillery piece: use guided rounds on point targets and unguided rounds on area targets. Done and dusted.

      As for the 1000 mile gun, I've always opined that it was a way to skirt the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; the treaty bans conventional cruise missiles and ballistic missiles with 1000 mile range from being used by the Army, which means no ground-launched Tomahawk. It doesn't ban artillery guns, however. And to Big Army, having batteries of guns that you can site far in the backline and fire at the enemy with near-impunity is a pretty tempting prospect. At 1000 miles range, the only option the adversary has to counter this weapon would be cruise missiles or MRBMs, both of which are in limited supply. It forces a dilema on him: does he take out the gun battery, and earn himself some relief, or does he take out the C3I nodes and logistics hubs to weaken the front and give him an easier time?

      All that said, Big Army probably made the right decision in icing the 1000 mile gun. The tech really isn't there yet, not with conventional propellants, and with the US withdrawl from INF, there's nothing really stopping Big Army from using ground launched Tomahawks beyond cost and availability.

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    9. Ghiskey WolfMay 6, 2024 at 6:59 PM

      I'll argue that this problem has been around for a while. AirLand Battle codified the idea that the Air Force would be responsible for providing long range fires, so the Army of Excellence never really invested into organic longrange fires of its own, because the doctrinal provider of said long range fires was an Air Force airstrike - America uses tactical air the way the Russians use rocket artillery and cruise missiles.

      This could work in the 80s and 90s, because the USAF was an order of magnitude of its current size, and worked during the GWOT because there was no AD to speak of, unlike the 2030s and 2040s, where we'll be going up against the Chinese and Russians with their air defenses. The USAF is now banking on using Wild Weasels for SEAD and F-35's stealth and sensor fusion to be able to penetrate deep enough to provide long range fires. Your mileage may vary on that.

      The issue is that we've spent the last quarter century fighting the GWOT against people with no air defences, and we've forgotten what that was like.

      So if you, as an American commander, want to strike the enemy backline to take out their logistics hubs and command nodes, so that you can weaken their frontline and hammer through, your first option is airstrikes. This means sending multiple strike packages with Wild Weasel escort, rolling the dice that the Wild Weasels will suppress the air defenses long enough that your package can get through. Observed behaviour from Kosovo was that when enemy SAMs targeted a single aircraft in the strike package, everyone would drop their bombs for maximum kinematic performance for evasive maneuvers, and have to abort the strike - at least with internal weapons carriage, the F-35 is essentially in clean aerodynamic profile, and so can keep the weapons inside, take evasive action, and then try again. (This would apply to any aircraft with an internal weapons bay, like the Vigilante, to be fair.)

      Alternately, if you expect that air is suppressed, you still have rocket artillery options - GLSDB, ATACMS, PrSM, G-MLRS - that will let you hit from 70 to 300 miles out, but the problem is that even basic unguided MLRS launchers are quite rare compared to the more common short tube M107 SPGs. (As an aside, it's interesting to observe the South Korean army and it's high preponderence of TBM launchers and rocket artillery. The South Koreans are heavy on tactical ballistic missiles because they want to suppress and destroy North Korea's own tactical ballistic missiles).

      (1/2)

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    10. Ghiskey WolfMay 6, 2024 at 7:00 PM

      I'll argue that this problem has been around for a while. AirLand Battle codified the idea that the Air Force would be responsible for providing long range fires, so the Army of Excellence never really invested into organic longrange fires of its own, because the doctrinal provider of said long range fires was an Air Force airstrike - America uses tactical air the way the Russians use rocket artillery and cruise missiles.

      This could work in the 80s and 90s, because the USAF was an order of magnitude of its current size, and worked during the GWOT because there was no AD to speak of, unlike the 2030s and 2040s, where we'll be going up against the Chinese and Russians with their air defenses. The USAF is now banking on using Wild Weasels for SEAD and F-35's stealth and sensor fusion to be able to penetrate deep enough to provide long range fires. Your mileage may vary on that.

      The issue is that we've spent the last quarter century fighting the GWOT against people with no air defences, and we've forgotten what that was like.

      So if you, as an American commander, want to strike the enemy backline to take out their logistics hubs and command nodes, so that you can weaken their frontline and hammer through, your first option is airstrikes. This means sending multiple strike packages with Wild Weasel escort, rolling the dice that the Wild Weasels will suppress the air defenses long enough that your package can get through. Observed behaviour from Kosovo was that when enemy SAMs targeted a single aircraft in the strike package, everyone would drop their bombs for maximum kinematic performance for evasive maneuvers, and have to abort the strike - at least with internal weapons carriage, the F-35 is essentially in clean aerodynamic profile, and so can keep the weapons inside, take evasive action, and then try again. (This would apply to any aircraft with an internal weapons bay, like the Vigilante, to be fair.)

      Alternately, if you expect that air is suppressed, you still have rocket artillery options - GLSDB, ATACMS, PrSM, G-MLRS - that will let you hit from 70 to 300 miles out, but the problem is that even basic unguided MLRS launchers are quite rare compared to the more common short tube M107 SPGs. (As an aside, it's interesting to observe the South Korean army and it's high preponderence of TBM launchers and rocket artillery. The South Koreans are heavy on tactical ballistic missiles because they want to suppress and destroy North Korea's own tactical ballistic missiles).

      (1/2)

      Delete
    11. Ghiskey WolfMay 6, 2024 at 7:02 PM

      It would seem that the blog keeps eating part of my post.

      Delete
    12. Ghiskey WolfMay 6, 2024 at 7:04 PM

      So, for a bit of historical context:

      I'll argue that this problem has been around for a while. AirLand Battle codified the idea that the Air Force would be responsible for providing long range fires, so the Army of Excellence never really invested into organic longrange fires of its own, because the doctrinal provider of said long range fires was an Air Force airstrike - America uses tactical air the way the Russians use rocket artillery and cruise missiles.

      This could work in the 80s and 90s, because the USAF was an order of magnitude of its current size, and worked during the GWOT because there was no AD to speak of, unlike the 2030s and 2040s, where we'll be going up against the Chinese and Russians with their air defenses. The USAF is now banking on using Wild Weasels for SEAD and F-35's stealth and sensor fusion to be able to penetrate deep enough to provide long range fires. Your mileage may vary on that.

      The issue is that we've spent the last quarter century fighting the GWOT against people with no air defences, and we've forgotten what that was like.

      So if you, as an American commander, want to strike the enemy backline to take out their logistics hubs and command nodes, so that you can weaken their frontline and hammer through, your first option is airstrikes. This means sending multiple strike packages with Wild Weasel escort, rolling the dice that the Wild Weasels will suppress the air defenses long enough that your package can get through. Observed behaviour from Kosovo was that when enemy SAMs targeted a single aircraft in the strike package, everyone would drop their bombs for maximum kinematic performance for evasive maneuvers, and have to abort the strike - at least with internal weapons carriage, the F-35 is essentially in clean aerodynamic profile, and so can keep the weapons inside, take evasive action, and then try again. (This would apply to any aircraft with an internal weapons bay, like the Vigilante, to be fair.)

      Alternately, if you expect that air is suppressed, you still have rocket artillery options - GLSDB, ATACMS, PrSM, G-MLRS - that will let you hit from 70 to 300 miles out, but the problem is that even basic unguided MLRS launchers are quite rare compared to the more common short tube M107 SPGs. (As an aside, it's interesting to observe the South Korean army and it's high preponderence of TBM launchers and rocket artillery. The South Koreans are heavy on tactical ballistic missiles because they want to suppress and destroy North Korea's own tactical ballistic missiles).

      Delete
    13. Ghiskey WolfMay 6, 2024 at 7:11 PM

      Well, I had a nice long post talking about the historical context that the blog keeps eating - the gist of things is that we've spent the last 50 years expecting the Air Force to provide long range fires, ever since AirLand Battle was codified, and I'd argue that there's an institutional complacency within the US military that expects, like SAC did of old, that the airstrike will always get through.

      There's also the other issue that the effort expended to get the airstrike through is something only the US can reasonably expect to afford (and even then, there are limits to how many times you can throw up full strike packages with jamming, SEAD and fighter escort support).

      The Army has looked at the options for long range fires in absence of airstrikes and has realised that they're wanting, and so began its long range gun programs.

      Delete
    14. ComNavOpsMay 6, 2024 at 7:15 PM

      "From a comment"

      None of that stated anything about what weapons Ukraine does or does not have. You seem to want to argue about something no one has said. That will cease.

      " The bulk of the money spent on artillery is still being spent on conventional artillery, not on Excalibur."

      Again, did someone state otherwise?

      In more general terms, the Army seems to be focused on more and more sophisticated weapons to the neglect of conventional weapons. However, this is a Navy blog so we'll keep the focus on that and the Navy is utterly ignoring conventional weapons like large caliber naval guns, mines, torpedoes (having only just restarted the Mk48 production line), etc. in favor of ever more complex and sophisticated systems.

      If you wish to comment further, be sure it's about something someone actually said. You might also do well to review the Comment Policy page.

      Delete
    15. ComNavOpsMay 6, 2024 at 7:20 PM

      " let you hit from 70 to 300 miles out"

      An often overlooked or ignored aspect of that is that you can only hit known, fixed targets as there will be no targeting assets operation 70-300 miles inside enemy territory. An intelligent enemy is not going to provide very many known, fixed targets. One has to ask, then, just how useful and widely applicable long range, precision guided weapons will be.

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    16. ComNavOpsMay 6, 2024 at 7:22 PM

      "Big Army needs long range guns of its own in order to attack the enemy backline,"

      Again, where will the targeting come from?

      Delete
    17. ComNavOpsMay 6, 2024 at 7:24 PM

      "It would seem that the blog keeps eating part of my post."

      What's happening is that a small percentage of user comments go the site spam folder for unknown reasons. I have no control over this. All I can do is check the spam folder frequently and when I see legitimate comments I manually okay them for publishing. If a comment does not show up right away, be patient and it will show up the next time I check which is several times a day.

      Delete
    18. AnonymousMay 7, 2024 at 7:58 AM

      "Again, where will the targeting come from?"

      The same place you're getting your targeting for your cheap, unguided weapons, I presume.

      Delete
    19. ComNavOpsMay 7, 2024 at 10:09 AM

      "The same place you're getting your targeting for your cheap, unguided weapons, I presume."

      Your snide, unhelpful comment aside, this is an issue that far too many people simply hand wave aside (the Marines included, with their missile shooting and no way to find a target). The whole point of cheap, unguided weapons is that they can be (and usually are) used as area weapons that don't require precise targeting. So, that leaves our million mile, precision guided, ultra-sophisticated weapons largely useless unless the enemy obligingly holds still and offers us fixed targets.

      Your comment thus illustrates the glaring weakness in our entire precision guided fixation: we can't target as far as we can shoot and even our closer range targeting is going to be spotty. For example, in Desert Storm we used laser guided bombs but that required a painter aircraft to loiter over the target. That will be suicide against a peer defender.

      So, why don't you give the range/targeting issue some more thought and see if you can offer a more substantive, useful comment about how we can address the issue?

      Delete
    20. Ghiskey WolfMay 7, 2024 at 7:08 PM

      Long range targeting is indeed a challenging problem, particularly for the Navy, where ships are constantly in motion, and a 1 degree deviation can mean many miles of error. The issue is simplified to an extent for the Army because most of the long range targets we want to attack are fixed and static, and it's a matter of putting in the time and effort to find them so we can attack them.

      Note that long range allows us to either attack further into our enemy's backline, or push our own backline further behind while remaining in range to support attacks on the frontline. An example of both approaches being exploited is with observed Chinese basing and launches of DF-21 and DF-26 missiles, but for the sake of the discussion I'll focus purely on backline attack.

      The starting point is map reconnaisance. We look at the maps to identify main supply routes and locations that will form logistics hubs. The bulk of logistics movement is via railhead and road, it's only the dozen or so mile delivery to units at the front where logistics movement is done tactically, offroad. Rail transport is the easiest to attack with this method - rail stations are fixed known targets that can't really be camoflagued. Logistics hubs and repair depots are harder, but map recon lets us narrow it down somewhat: we know that you need an area X size in order to fit Y volume of supplies, and based on that criteria, we can narrow the potential target list to locations A, B, C, D and E. At which point, if we have enough long range weapons stocked up, we can either say "good enough, I've got enough weapons to hit all these targets, I'm going to blast them all and then observe enemy behaviour and radio traffic," or we can continue refining our search with more data.

      The same principles apply for finding enemy command posts, albeit they're more relevant for higher echelon CPs like brigade HQs: a company and battalion CP is expected to be a significantly more mobile target, repositioning every 24-48 hours, following behind the advance of it's maneuver elements (except unless if the frontline has degenerated into a static fight). Brigade HQ and higher is generally more static and takes longer to reposition on account of being situated outside the range of tactical fires available on tap, and having so many moving parts trying to coordinate the brigade-sized formation.

      Then we go into using signal intercepts: if we can break the enemy's comms and listen in to them talking, so much the better, but if not, we can still build a heat map of activity and use that to guide us.

      Aerial reconnaisance with surveilance assets like J-STARS can provide us with long range tracking of enemy ground movements (albeit safe orbits outside of LR SAM range will reduce the effectiveness of this measure, as we saw in Kosovo). Alternatively, back in the day we would have Kiowas flying nape of earth to scout past the frontline - a risky endeavour to be sure, but that was just the cost of doing business. And if time permits and the stars of NRO align, we can utilise satellite imagery for verification of our targeting (this is going to be more relevant for logistics nodes, which are significantly more static than a company CP).

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    21. AnonymousMay 7, 2024 at 7:09 PM

      The sucessful Ukranian attacks on Russian oli refining infrastructure, with their cheap An-2s converted into suicide drones, show that there is room for long range attack on static targets with cheap guided weapons - with the caveat that this is a weapon that can only attack enemy infrastructure, which is in known positions and may not be adequetly defended.

      On the other hand, that's how 8th Air Force stalled the Germans: by pounding their infrastructure and transport links - and while you might not be able to target a company CP at 300 miles, you can absolutely target their infrastructure at that range. Power plants, weapons factories, rail links, oil refineries, airports, airbase fuel farms - these are all targets big enough that even if GPS guidance is spoofed, INS will still get you on target well enough. A CP can survive a miss of 100 feet; a factory is still getting hit from a miss of 100 feet.

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    22. ComNavOpsMay 8, 2024 at 6:21 AM

      " I've got enough weapons to hit all these targets"

      You realize you're describing area bombardment, right?! We don't need precision guidance to blanket target possibilities. We can't afford it!

      "On the other hand, that's how 8th Air Force stalled the Germans: by pounding their infrastructure"

      Whether you intended to or not, you're also making a distinction between strategic and tactical bombing and those responsibilities are assigned to different branches/units. Air Force is responsible for the deep/strategic strike. Army is responsible for the closer, operational/tactical strike (with AF support). Where our military has gone off track in recent years is with EVERY branch trying to do EVERY role instead of staying in their own lanes and doing that their own responsibility well. For example, the Marines are trying to do sea control and ASW! The Army is trying to do deep/strategic strike. Stay in your lane!

      The attempt to do EVERYTHING is wasteful duplication of resources and budget and, worse, dilutes the focus and training of what should be the primary role. You can't train for everything and still be competent at anything.

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    23. Ghiskey WolfMay 8, 2024 at 8:49 AM

      "You realize you're describing area bombardment, right?! We don't need precision guidance to blanket target possibilities. We can't afford it!"

      I think enthusiasts on the internet get too wrapped up in neat definitions of "precision targets" and "area bombardment"; the reality is a little more fluid than that. You seem to think that any engagement of multiple targets is area bombardment, but I submit that's a definition that's overly loose. By that metric, the 700 TLAMs and 5000 JDAMs dropped in OIF was an area bombardment! Anyhow, as I said with the example, we have options - we can either engage these multiple individual targets that are not physically located together, or we can conduct more intelligence gathering to refine our targeting.

      In any case, at 40,000 dollars and 168,000 dollars respectively, GLSDB and Guided MLRS are on the cheaper end of PGMs, cheap enough that we can use them on these sort of probing fire missions. We've been issueing Javelin as a SQUAD weapon for decades, and those suckers cost 178,000 dollars a pop! (Meanwhile, every other nation on earth has ATGMs as a company-level weapon, with some fortunate souls having ATGMs at the platoon level.)


      "Air Force is responsible for the deep/strategic strike."

      I'm surprised you're arguing to maintain the current doctrinal dogma with regard to long range fires, when you've questioned Army doctrine in other matters, particularly armored recce, and have questioned the validity and viability of strikefighters in past.

      Do note that this pursuit of organic longrange fires isn't just a US Army brainbug - it's been part of Russian doctrine since the cold war that the army maneuver group will have long range fires assigned to it (rocket artillery, TBMs) that are under army control and more responsive to the situation on the ground.

      Weapons wise, of course airstrikes with JDAMs are the cheapest way of delivering massed PGMs on targets (JDAMs cost 25,000 dollars apiece and an F-35 can carry two 1000lbs-class weapons internally and a further eight weapons externally), but these are short ranged weapons, and come with the problem of having to fight one's way through enemy air defenses: LR SAMs, MR SAMs, and defending fighters. This means massive operations like Package Q, which involved over 70 aircraft, which also means there's limits to how often such airstrikes can happen.

      The worst case scenario is that we are in a conflict where our forces are symmetrically matched against our adversary; in that situation, both air forces are going to be mutually suppressed, unable to conduct actions in support of the ground forces. When that happens, Big Army can forget about the Air Force providing CAS, BAI, or deep strike.

      Delete
    24. ComNavOpsMay 8, 2024 at 9:27 AM

      "You seem to think that any engagement of multiple targets is area bombardment"

      No, I think guessing where a target might (or might not be) and blanketing all of the possible locations with munitions is the very definition of area bombardment.

      "cheaper end of PGMs"

      And that's part of what I'm calling for. IF - and that's a very big IF - we can produce cheap guided weapons THAT ARE ACTUALLY EFFECTIVE then I'm all for it and it fits my call. However, the number of cheap guided weapons in our inventory that we can afford to mass produce is extremely limited - arguably non-existent.

      "strikefighters "

      I am absolutely not calling for the use of strikefighters for deep strike. They're not survivable which makes them ineffective. Deep strike has to be done by standoff weapons - from the AF perspective, that would be air launched, stand off missiles and bombs.

      You quite nicely described deep strike. It's mainly known, fixed point targets and SIMPLE missiles and glide bombs are sufficient as opposed to ultra-sophisticated missiles with unnecessary capabilities.

      "questioned Army doctrine in other matters"

      Questioning Army doctrine in one area does preclude acceptance of the division of responsibilities across the mission spectrum. I firmly believe in separation of powers, so to speak. It prevents the very overlap and wastefulness that we're seeing today. The services need to stay in their lane. Instead of the Army working on deep strike, the AF should be laser focused on how to deliver deep strike firepower.

      "This means massive operations like Package Q, which involved over 70 aircraft,"

      We've completely forgotten that carrier air strikes during WWII generally involved HUNDREDS of aircraft! The fact that we think 70 aircraft in a strike is 'massive' today demonstrates that we've forgotten what peer war is like. Note, I'm not calling for large strikefighter strikes. I'm just pointing out that we've forgotten what real war entails.

      "both air forces are going to be mutually suppressed"

      That is quite likely. In that case, we have to resort to ... ah, gee ... what's the word? ... something we used to do in WWII but I can't remember the word ... we don't do it anymore ... ... ... ... ... oh, yeah ... PLANNING! The art of war is creating the conditions for success through competent (one hopes brilliant!) operational planning. Don't initiate a mission where air superiority can't be obtained. Instead, use maneuver, deception, massing, etc. to create the conditions the give us air superiority. This is why I constantly say that the carrier's role, today, is NOT strike but air superiority in support of operations.

      "I'm surprised "

      Remember that every dollar, hour, training hour, and purchase that goes to the Army's deep strike effort is a dollar, hour, training hour, and purchase that gets subtracted from the Army's main mission. It's a zero-sum game unless we want to greatly increase the Army's budget. Of course, that means someone else's budget gets reduced - again, a zero-sum game.

      The services need to stay in their lane.

      Delete
    25. AnonymousMay 8, 2024 at 5:45 PM

      To be fair, the cluster submunition warhead of GMLRS is the literal definition of an area bombardment weapon, which is the whole point of why MLRS was purchased in the first place. One MLRS is expected to delete a grid square by itself - that's the area of 187 football fields.

      It's just that unguided rockets are inherently inaccurate when fired in parabolic arcs - and when I say inaccurate, I mean "landing in the wrong COUNTY" inaccurate, not the 500 foot CEP of unguided bombs - so GPS guidance is almost mandatory if you want to make these rockets effective and usable.


      "The art of war is creating the conditions for success through competent (one hopes brilliant!) operational planning."

      If you believe the Air Force's planning, they believe that they will be able to penetrate the peer battlefield by using Wild Weasels to suppress enemy air defenses, allowing smaller, multiple strike packages (i.e. aircraft in the dozens , instead of a single 6 dozen-strong formation) to slip below the detection threshold and penetrate the enemy airspace to press the attack. They also believe that Kosovo was an aberration, and that the future peer adversary won't be able to pull virtual attrition and threat in being shenanigans because the USAF and Army will be attacking the enemy ground forces, which will force enemy AD to unmask themselves and manfight our air to try protect their ground forces, thus affording USAF a significantly greater chance to SEAD/DEAD them.

      If you believe the Air Force, anyhow. They still seem to think, like SAC of old, that the bomber will go through, and don't seem particularly interested in increasing their ALCM stockpile. On the other hand they've also been working on measures to turn their fleet of cargo transports into ad-hoc ALCM shooters, so maybe they do plan to ramp up their ALCM buys? The world wonders.

      Delete
  4. CDR ChipMay 6, 2024 at 5:03 AM

    "This demands that we begin instantly testing all our weapons under realistic EW conditions to see which work and which don’t (probably all of them!). The military, however, steadfastly refuses to conduct rigorous, realistic testing which is why the Ukraine findings are coming as a surprise to the military."

    Suppose none of our vaunted drone systems work in a full-blown EW envitonment. What then? That's been my concern for years.

    "Equally disturbing should be the realization that each of these weapons was pronounced a miracle for the ages and passed all tests with flying colors … … … and yet they’ve failed in combat. This demonstrates the uselessness and simplicity of our so-called testing."

    One more reason why we need a revival of the inter-bellum Fleet Problems that taught us how to fight the Japanese in WWII. The more you sweat in training, the less you bleed in war.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsMay 6, 2024 at 6:30 AM

      "need a revival of the inter-bellum Fleet Problems "

      Of course we do but understand that Fleet Problems were exercises in strategy, ops, doctrine, and tactics not realistic assessments of individual weapons. Thus, reviving Fleet Problems would be wonderful but wouldn't root out individual weapon problems.

      Delete
    2. AnonymousMay 6, 2024 at 8:06 AM

      One wonders if the SWIP block 3 will be effective.....test, test & test. Can a cruise missile be deflected from it's flight path ?

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsMay 6, 2024 at 8:16 AM

      "One wonders if the SWIP block 3 will be effective"

      Ominously, I'm unaware of any remotely realistic testing having been performed.

      Delete
    4. CDR ChipMay 6, 2024 at 5:18 PM

      "Thus, reviving Fleet Problems would be wonderful but wouldn't root out individual weapon problems."

      If conducted under sufficiently realistic conditions, they would tell us what works and what doesn't. I would like to see a Fleet Problem run in a full ECM environment. Probably have to shut it down on day 2.

      Of course, it would be far better to conduct sufficiently realistic testing before a Fleet Problem, but it has to happen somewhere.

      Delete
  5. John GaltMay 6, 2024 at 6:13 AM

    As with all weapon systems it is the combined approach that makes them effective or ineffective when used in isolation. Even in WW II the best tanks (Tigers and Panthers) were completely vulnerable to CAS aircraft when not given air cover or weather masking. Even the good Russian tanks lost over 600 to one man Hans Rudel, and they used combined forces. The Abrams is no different. You can't put a tank on the front lines and not have it move or have supporting arms or aircraft supress the anti-tank systems. Precsion guided munitions are not effective when used without EW or EW supression systems.

    Tactics are what combine weapons systems effectively and allow them together to be very effective. One CANNOT make a single weapon system invulnerable and effective against a set of combined weapon systems. Even if you could try to make a perfect weapon system, you couldn't afford it (USS Ford for example?). So to repeat ComNavOps CONOPS, CONOPS, CONOPS and Tactics, Tactics, Tactics.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Fighting IrishMay 6, 2024 at 11:55 AM

      Exactly!

      Delete
    2. Chinese GordonMay 7, 2024 at 9:50 AM

      Everyone remember their Archer Jones* ?
      Light cavalry (drones) can defeat Heavy cavalry ( MBTs)
      * The Art of War in the Western World

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsMay 7, 2024 at 10:17 AM

      "Everyone remember their Archer Jones* ?"

      I'm guessing you're referring to Archer Jones, the historian and author? He's written a couple books that I'm aware of (maybe more?). Was there a specific book or passage you'd like to draw our attention to?

      Your analogy between light cavalry and drones is interesting. Would you like to expand on it?

      One possible reply might be that, yes, light can defeat heavy but not if heavy is properly prepared. I've done a few posts on drones and concluded that they represent no great threat TO A PREPARED DEFENDER which includes striking at the source of the drones (raw materials, manufacturing locations, storage, transport, and launch sites) as well as point defense.

      How would you visualize drones being able to penetrate a multi-layered defense consisting of aviation (aircraft, helos, and anti-drone drones), infantry screens, mobile short and medium range anti-air vehicles, and point defense EW given that drones have no great speed, stealth, maneuverability, or defenses?

      Delete
    4. ComNavOpsMay 7, 2024 at 10:20 AM

      cont'd,

      Yes, if you stick a tank out in the middle of nowhere, completely on its own, with no support, and just leave it there then it's inevitable that it will eventually be destroyed. This is exactly what Ukraine appears to do which is why I keep saying that the utter doctrinal and tactical ineptitude of both the Ukrainians and Russians renders lessons from this conflict highly suspect.

      Delete
    5. Chinese GordonMay 7, 2024 at 6:03 PM


      Light Cav (LC) operate against Heavy Cav(HC) by using their superior manuverablity to attack the flanks of HC
      and their speed to retreat from attack of HC.

      On drones, I class them as LC since they're more maneuverable can attack the flanks and rear of HC, unlike Light infantry which is firing into the front of the advancing HC.

      LC are quite useless against a prepared defence,
      LC only tactic in that case is to goad the enemy to attack by harassing fire. Once the HC advance then the LC can operate against the HC.

      The book is "The Art of the War in the Western World"

      Delete
    6. John GaltMay 7, 2024 at 7:06 PM

      Sometimes the important lesson is a reminder NOT to do something or a reminder to stick to your tactics.

      Delete
  6. G2milMay 6, 2024 at 9:08 AM

    The new Russian tactic in Ukraine is to employ cheap tiny grenade drones against tanks at first. They are everywhere in infantry units, so if a tank approaches, these hit their vison slots/cameras and blind the crew. They are afraid to open hatches, so try to drive blind and fall off the road or drive off and get stuck or hit a mine. Otherwise they sit for an hour until a big Lancet drone shows up and smashes them in the rear.

    ReplyDelete
  7. greywolfMay 6, 2024 at 9:20 AM

    It seems at least something is moving, JDAM-ER with home on jam seeker has been contracted https://www.twz.com/air/jdam-er-winged-bombs-with-seekers-that-home-in-on-gps-jammers-headed-to-ukraine
    Reading the article it seems that it has been available since 2018, so pprobably the service leader ignored the risk of GPS jamming by following the party line

    ReplyDelete
  8. AnonymousMay 6, 2024 at 9:46 AM

    The greatest lessons one can glean is that inventories are way too low for a real war, buzzwords used in weapons capabilities don’t always translate to real world use (GPS SMART ETC) and can be defeated but more importantly - bullet, cannons, dumb munitions will always have a place on todays attritional battlefield

    ReplyDelete
  9. LonfoMay 6, 2024 at 11:20 AM

    "Excalibur precision artillery rounds initially had a 70% efficiency rate hitting targets when first used in Ukraine. However, after 6 weeks, efficiency declined to only 6% as the Russians adapted their electronic warfare systems to counter it."

    Another extremely underrated argument against sending weapons to "third party" countries right there.

    ReplyDelete
  10. AnonymousMay 6, 2024 at 12:24 PM

    Successes of the 90-91 Gulf War and Soviet Union collapse made people think US high tech weapons and electronic warfare rule. Despite strong fire power, Iraqi army and air force were crippled quickly by US.

    Real problem was (still is) that many think rest of world are still like then Iraq.

    Russia under Putin is very good in "learning how to fight from battles".

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Austin VernonMay 6, 2024 at 12:29 PM

      The problem with this argument is that a very low percentage of the munitions used were PGMs. The number I usually see cited is 10%. Most were conventional artillery, DPICM, rockeyes, etc.

      Delete
    2. AnonymousMay 6, 2024 at 12:32 PM

      You can sense a nation's electronic warfare capabilities from its civilian communication technologies, especially wireless. Communication, radar, electronic jamming, ... are in same technological branch.

      A mobile phone can function under poor signal conditions while competitors cannot is a good indicator. Unfortunately, Huawei performs best in this area in the world. This is why nations defy strong US arm-twists to use Huawei (German, etc.) since communication is a vital infrastructure in economy as many things (E-commerce, etc.) depend on good internet.

      Huawei heavily uses AESA related technologies in civilian wireless communications. Therefore, if China's defense industry run into problem, they can call Huawei to help.

      Delete
    3. AnonymousMay 7, 2024 at 6:27 PM

      Technologies keep progressing. Yesterday's poster weapons could be easily countered today. Military R&D is a game of use money to buy time. You have to update ahead of potential opponents than let them come up with new technologies to counter yours. This requires strong scientific capabilities.

      Delete

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