It's been while since the last open post so let's do it again. This is your chance to offer a comment on whatever interests you.
Got a suggestion for a post topic?
Want to talk about something that's been neglected?
Want to tell me what you'd like more (or less) of?
Want to tell me how you'd make the blog better?
Want to give a shout out to your favorite foreign ship design?
Got a rant you want to get off your chest?
Have at it!
Warship sprint speed was critical before aircraft and missiles.
ReplyDeleteIs the way it constrains ship design and adds cost still worth it? If so, which classes? Should there be a reserve of slower ships with more reliable, less expensive powertrains and bulkier hull forms that allow spaced armor for missile and torpedo protection?
Speed is far less important than it used to be, however, it's still useful for operational positioning/maneuvering. This is along the lines of the WWII carrier tactic of 'run ins' to the target. Of course, given cruise missiles and longer range aircraft, even that's less important.
DeleteSpeed is nice to have but on the list of warship characteristics, it's nowhere near the top.
Is the speed requirement essentially keep up with the carriers?
DeleteThe speed requirement, to the extent it exists, is for rapid positioning on either the operational (reaching a launch position as quickly as possible) or tactical (sprinting to reposition around a convoy, for example). Again, though, speed is nice to have but does not make the top of the requirements list.
DeleteTurning radius also has some lingering value. Turning radius and in port maneuverability are nice to have in this day and age. Another almost upside for LCS.
DeleteOnce all the missiles have been expended and guns become the premier weapon systems again, wouldn't ships speed become important again for tactical maneuvers as ships jockey for position to shoot and not get shot?
Delete"wouldn't ships speed become important again for tactical maneuvers"
DeleteYep!
1) Future of Close-in Air Support
ReplyDeletehow different will it be from current A-10, will it be manned or unmanned ?
2) Role of Sea Planes in Pacific Theater
Which all types of mission should it cover ? Maritime Patrol, C2ISTAR missions ?
3) Various SIGINT, Command and Control Planes are getting at the end of their lifespan
like E-4 Nightwatch, E-8 Joint STARS, RC-26 Metro, RC-135 Rivet Joint, etc
What will be the Next Suitable platform(s) to host above capabilities ?
I gather you're suggesting these as possible post topics? I will give them some consideration. In the meantime, why don't you offer some thoughts on each or any? The sea plane concept, in particular, is one that keeps popping up but I've been unable to find a valid use for. What are your thoughts? Perhaps your thoughts can inspire a line of examination for a post?
DeleteI've seen images of sea planes rescuing downed pilots in WW2, probably not that role exactly but a limited role for tasks that require a quick arrival and moment in the water - delivering something/someone critical to a ship or submarine perhaps? Or is that a drone dropping something/someone into a net?
Delete"sea planes"
DeleteAre you suggesting we create a new aircraft just to deliver an occasional part or pick up an occasional downed pilot? Before you answer, consider the example of the Air Force KC-46 tanker. It was an existing aircraft that just needed to add a hose/boom to pass gas. What could be simpler? The reality is that it's turned into a multi-gazillion dollar disaster. What would happen if we try to create a 'simple' sea plane? Is there enough justification for taking on that headache?
" Future of Close-in Air Support"
DeleteWell, the Marines have publicly and repeatedly stated that they're out of the assault business. That raises the question, who is the Navy supposed to provide close air support for? Taken at face value, there is no need for close air support!
Consider this: naval air support was never intended to be a deep inland function - that's the AF's job. If we had heavy naval guns, that would be all the close fire support we need. Once the fighting moves more than 20 miles inland, support becomes the AF's job.
# ComNavOps
DeleteWhen I was suggesting about Role of Sea Planes in Pacific Theater
I had Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules in my mind
we already have a running Supply Chain making 20+ Aircraft per year
C-130J Super Hercules is currently used for variety of missions
1) C-130J-SOF - outfitted with extended ISR equipment for use with special forces.
2) HC-130J Combat King II - Long range patrol and air-sea rescue variant of United States Coast Guard.
3) KC-130J - Aerial refueling tanker and tactical airlifter version for United States Marine Corps
4) WC-130J - Weather reconnaissance ("Hurricane Hunter") version for the Air Force Reserve Command.
by adding Amphibious Capability we can extend its capabilities particularly the Time it can spend in its designated On-Station Area
Note: I assume at time of war, US bases in Philippines and Japan will not be safe to operate C-130Js
lets take KC-130J for example.
KC-130J can refuel 2-3 Super Hornets or 2 F-35s
Scenario 1: KC-130J Aerial refueling tanker WITHOUT Amphibious Capability
KC-130J takes off from lets say Guam.
fly about 1000-1500 nm and refueled a Navy Aircraft
then fly back to Guam
Scenario 2: KC-130J Aerial refueling tanker WITH Amphibious Capability
KC-130J takes off from Guam.
fly about 1000-1500 nm and then lands on water surface near its On-Station area
waits near On-Station area until time arrives
takes off and refuels Naval Aircrafts (it can do it multiple times if KC-130J is refueled by some other aircraft)
then fly back to Guam
same for Maritime Patrol, ISR, SAR, Convey Escort, Anti-Sub Warfare, Cargo Transport missions, etc.
What do you think about it from an Operational point of view ?
US Navy ww2 vs current damage stability criteria comperison. Current standards are readily avaliable but historic are harder to find
ReplyDeleteSurvivability design criteria have always been a matter of common sense and needed no formal writing. As a general statement, ships were designed to be survivable against others of their own kind. A cruiser was survivable against a cruiser, a battleship against a battleship, and so on. This common sense was formalized in 1988 via OpNavInst 9070.1. I'm not aware of anything written prior to 1988. In an attempt to deceitfully present the LCS as survivable, the Navy revamped survivability standards (essentially eliminating them) via 9070.1A.
DeleteIf you're asking about specific damage control margins such as reserve buoyancy, metacentric height, service allowance weight, etc., I am not aware of any formal listings other than the fairly readily available values of today (which the Navy has ignored in recent ship designs!).
9070.1 1988
9070.1A
If you're asking about specific damage control margins such as reserve buoyancy, metacentric height, service allowance weight, etc.,
DeleteYes, and damage length, righting moment, etc. These criteria do not depend upon vessel size, thus it would be interesting to see if for major surface combatants, criteria became more or less stringent trough time
"interesting to see if for major surface combatants, criteria became more or less stringent trough time"
DeleteUnfortunately, I'm unaware of any comprehensive listing of such criteria. With diligent searching, one can find some of the current criteria but nothing comprehensive enough to allow for any analysis of past vs present practices. If you know of a source, let me know!
An intel gathering / Presence / flag waving flying ship discussion
ReplyDelete- Pro's / Con's e.g. save fighty ships for in / out training = less days at sea = sailor retention rate / longer life / smaller fighty ships as less “hotel” accommodation required
One or more types?
Where would it be used?
Design /size / weapons / protection / sensors? / flight deck? etc
Secondary use as sea base for “seal activity?”
Use old / obsolete ships for this as weapons don’t need to be “cutting edge”?
When not “waving the flag” could be used (assuming properly equipped) in surveying seabed / shoreline etc
I know you are not a fan of this sort of activity but politicians do and having a cheaper ship on station does have some merits (in my opinion)
Just a thought.
"An intel gathering ... ship"
DeleteI'm not completely sure I understand what you're asking but you seem to be suggesting a dedicated intel/surveillance ship along the lines of the old Pueblo.
"I know you are not a fan of this sort of activity"
???! I'm 100% in favor of this and have so stated on many occasions. In fact, in a previous post I suggested that an LCS would be very well suited to exactly this SigInt role. See,
LCS Alternative Uses
LCS Alternative Uses
DeleteSometime ago, in a prior post, someone suggested it's use for Coast Guard missions. ( missions to stop seaborne contraband from coming to our shores.as well as search & rescue) The Independence lass has a large helicopter flight deck.
"LCS ... Coast Guard"
DeleteI've addressed this many times. The Coast has zero interest in the LCS since they lack the shore side maintenance capabilities that the LCS was designed for and requires. Further, the limited range of the LCS and the requirement for frequent returns to port make it an inefficient vessel for extended Coast Guard work. The LCS is too large and expensive for the CG to operate. In short, there's nothing appealing about the LCS for the Coast Guard.
Here's idea if we must have keep LCS's in service for the time being:
DeleteDisposable missile sponge for the carriers. Have them run very close the carrier, carrying some extra CIWS and maybe jamming and other countermeasures. (Decoys, chaff etc) They'll hopefully stop the missiles, but if that fails then perhaps the missile will be distracted and hit the LCS instead of the carrier.
I think some Western missiles have terminal IR homing that can distinguish between different ships, but I'm not sure if China has those. I don't think radar-guided missiles can tell the difference.
And/or maybe carrying extra helicopters for ASW duty, with the helicopters being directed by one of the Burkes.
" I don't think radar-guided missiles can tell the difference."
DeleteYes, radar can tell the difference between an LCS and a carrier. The 'size/strength' of the radar return would clearly distinguish a small LCS from a giant carrier. Further, modern radars have sufficient resolution to assemble an actual image of the target, again clearly distinguishing an LCS from a carrier.
Navies have myriad floating reflectors and emitters which serve the purpose of a 'sponge'. Combined with decoys and active EW, they should provide a significant degree of protection although this has not been tested in any realistic way to prove the validity of that assumption.
The LCS can carry one - possibly two - ASW helos. The large flight decks are semi-useless as they are structurally weak and limited. This was an early cost-savings measure when it became apparent that the LCS cost was going to balloon.
While China may be the peer threat, we are a global navy, and I don't believe 2nd tier threats like Iran are getting enough attention. China and Russia are more than happy to use Iran and other nations as a proxy to avoid direct conflict. The Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean are different theaters than the Big Pacific threat of China. Yet we are becoming as laser focused on China as we used to be on the Middle east.
ReplyDeleteUnfortunately the old attempt to focus on littorals like the Gulf led to the abomination of the LCS, and now we are just focusing on billion dollar vessels for the China fight partly do to its abject failure. With Iran becoming a major player in Drone warfare, the more confined and shallower Gulf, etc. to me seems to require a different mix of vessels. Vessels that would also do well in areas like around the Philippines so they wouldn't go to waste in a war against China either.
So that was my rant. If there is any agreement from ComNavOps, then I would love to see a few good long looks at ships for the Gulf and similiar environs. There is already a good look or two on this site at patrol boats, but i would also be interested in looking at other possible solutions like corvettes, smaller regional carriers, missile boats, and other more focused (and less expensive) options.
Wouldn't mind seeing a post about ME navies and Iran navy counterpart.
Delete" love to see a few good long looks at ships for the Gulf "
DeleteWhy don't you start it off?!
What would be the major requirements for such a vessel(s)? What would be some examples of existing vessels, around the world, that you feel come close to the requirements?
Finally, how would such a [presumably] small and lightly armed vessel be of use around the Philippines in a war with China?
I look forward to your thoughts!
To me its the MUSV hull, manned. FSV already working in the Gulf of Mexico and Persian Gulf. Could tow a Captas-4 VDS. Could deploy RHIBS for Patrol VBSS. Cold build a light deck for Vertrep and better UAV deployment. Could carry 16 strike length VLS in container launchers. Could carry 40 tactical length cells in the new ADL launchers to be used on carriers and LH ships for ESSM Blk II. Fast ship, long legs, exceedingly maneuverable at sea or near shore.
Delete"To me its the MUSV hull, manned."
DeleteYou've lost me a little. Are you suggesting a MUSV with any of the individual uses you list, as opposed to believing they could all fit on a single MUSV?
Assuming you're suggesting single uses, is that sufficient justification for the vessel?
What do you think will happen to the cost of the vessel once accommodations are made for a crew with the attendant berthing, potable water storage, food storage, freezers, a galley, heads, waste disposal, laundry, a crew video game lounge (which everyone but me seems to think is mandatory), air conditioning, wifi/internet facilities, etc.? Will there be room for even a single function?
"Wouldn't mind seeing a post about ME navies and Iran navy counterpart."
DeleteI'm not quite getting what you're asking for. Give me a little more information or examples of what you're interested in.
These ships were built with berthing for 16-18 and to haul between 50-100 people out to the rig. Interior volume for the inhabited area of the ship is very close to the area used on an FRC. It can be done.
Delete"These ships were built with berthing for 16-18 and to haul between 50-100 people"
DeleteEven the tiny Cyclone class had a crew of 28 so, for any reasonable combat crew size, we'd need to add a good deal extra berthing and all the attendant support facilities, as I noted. The ability to haul 10-100 passengers is just a cargo exercise (a place to sit, essentially) and would offer no permanent berthing.
The larger issue is whether a very small capability (a handful of missiles or a sonar or whatever) is worth the expense? In other words, for how we expect to fight, is there a useful degree of combat value in such a vessel.
Just for fun, why don't you describe one specific version of such a ship, including the crew size, endurance, etc. and how you envision it fitting into a high end combat scenario? That would be fascinating to examine.
As with Hughes work, the concept of small vessels is appealing but the practicalities always rule it out. Perhaps you can devise a CONOPS and configuration that would produce sufficient combat value. Give it a try!
Let's just go with a version of MUSV that was just sitting on Gibbs & Cox table of ship models in Australia or Lockheed's earlier model of the OUSV-3 at SNA 2022. My understanding is the actual OUSV-3 being built by Austal will be the 205' version of the 194' MUSV prototype that Mariner and Ranger are also based. I'd prefer that for the manned ship to get the extra tankage / deadweaight. The mission would basically be do what the Marines are doing except on water. 4 Mk 70 launchers for 16 Mk 41 cells with Tomahawk and/or SM-6 along with 2 modular SEWIP packages. I'd mildly enhance the package with decoy launchers built into those SEWIP modules. I'd place 2 XM914 30mm RWS on the bow and behind the pilot house for self defense. Keep the water cannons. Add LRAD. The ship would stay low profile in the littoral and await targeting from other assets.
DeleteAgain, similar space for crew to that of an FRC is already there to be used, so let's up the berthing to 28, same as FRC.
Speed and endurance - Let's say what is can do, greater than 3800@24 knots. Both ships out there in the current exercise have made stretches over 5000nm at average speeds of 7-8 knots so we are talking endurance somewhere from 3 weeks to 30 days.
When its out it sprints back to a container ship with cranes or container port to reload in minutes.
https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/indo-pacific-2023/2023/11/video-day-1-at-indo-pacific-2023/
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/01/lockheed-martins-optionally-unmanned-surface-vessel-ousv/
Futur of the DDG(X) program
ReplyDelete(core of the US Fleet, 2030s-2080s ?).....
- direct energy weapons
ReplyDelete- drone swarms at sea
- anti satellite weapons in a near peer engagement
- what officer promotion would look like in an extended near peer war (ie combat officers vs bureaucratic officers)
If you're suggesting these as post topics, I've done a post on lasers, one on rail guns, and frequently discussed satellites in a major war. Check the archives!
DeleteAs far as officer promotions in war, it would play out exactly as it did in WWII. Peacetime officers would quickly be replaced by combat-minded officers.
"drone swarms at sea"
DeleteThere cannot be drone swarms at sea due to the limited range of the drones and their comm links. A swarm could occur in close proximity to land but only if we stupidly allow it by failing to conduct robust surveillance. I just don't see drone swarms as anything more than a media fantasy.
I remember in the 60’s & 70’s, commentary on Soviet missile ships, that they had substantial firepower, but they were essentially limited to one shot , not able to reload at sea and most likely rendered combat ineffective due to NATO assets targeting them. Also, crew accommodations were bare-bones, not suited for lengthy deployments.
ReplyDeleteWas this NATO naval leaders just having a dismissive view, or was it a legitimate take on it, given the CONOPS of that era?
It seems to me, and I might be misunderstanding, but a modern equivalent, (with improvements in damage control , possibly reloading at sea); would this concept be along the lines of what ComNavOp’s has suggested as a modern, effective US Navy warship?
ACES&EIGHTS
Deploy these hypothetical, modern U.S. NAVY ships in an effective, surface action group, no dedicated air assets nor every ship with a hello-pad. Addition of fast oiler, fast support ships. Possibly spice up the task force with a few fast, guns-only cruisers. Armed with 8” guns similar to the USS Salem’s. The gun cruisers could prosecute targets that weren’t worthy of 4-million dollar plus missiles.
DeleteSuggesting these posts as possible topics.
ACES&EIGHTS
" they were essentially limited to one shot"
DeleteThe Soviets believed that there ships would only get one shot before being sunk so they loaded up the firepower to maximize their one and only chance to sink a US carrier (that was their goal). With that operating concept in mind, there was no need or point to reloads. They didn't expect to survive long enough to need reloads.
"Suggesting these posts as possible topics."
DeleteIf you're suggesting posts on the Soviet navy and Soviet ship design philosophy, I've touched on it many times and did a post on the Kirov which discusses the Soviet design rationale. Have a look:
Kirov
You’ve discussed how marine missile shooters won’t really cover much ground, but what about the ~70 8” self propelled guns the Taiwanese have? If the Chinese lack decent naval guns and Taiwan’s air defenses slow down China’s aircraft, could they make some noise and cause some problems?
ReplyDelete"could they make some noise and cause some problems?"
DeleteIF (and this is a big IF) they can stay alive long enough and IF they can obtain targeting somehow then, yes, any large caliber gun can do some damage whether to ships at sea or troops on shore.
The difference between the Marine missile shooters and the Taiwan defense is that ships don't need (and have no motivation) to approach a suspect island. They can maintain their distance and avoid problems. In contrast, a Chinese invasion fleet MUST approach shore thereby offering the opportunity for any Taiwan defense to engage. The enemy must come to Taiwan. The enemy doesn't need to come to the Marines.
How bout something on the entire reserve fleet, and logically what could be kept in a minimum manned configuration for use alongside say fully "outfitted" ships and what logically would constitute manning (mix of active/reserve sailors)? This is warships, not the MARAD or such. So Tarawa class, maybe the LA subs not yet ripped to shreds internally, Tico's, hell the Kennedy. Could an older ship with some older systems take advantage of being paired with one that is fully up to date, example a Tarawa paired with an America class. Basically how to make the Naval reserve a warfighting force with real ships ready to say go with 30 days notice.
ReplyDeleteIf you haven't seen it, check out, "What Reserve Fleet"
DeleteThere is no reserve fleet!
Your thought of pairing reserve assets with current ones is perfectly fine ... if we had any. There is not the slightest doubt about the value of a robust reserve fleet and yet the Navy has no interest in maintaining a reserve fleet. 'Maintaining' is, of course, the problem. The Navy doesn't want to spend a penny on maintaining reserve units, preferring, instead, to direct all budget funds to new construction - a most unwise philosophy. Of course, unwise decisions are nothing new to the Navy!
Tarawa is being stripped for parts as we speak. There are still 10ish steam ships left in the Navy (6 LHD, 2 LCC, 2 Hospital ships). Bon Homme Rishard is currently at the breakers being stripped. The James River "ghost fleet" is a ghost. There are no ships, none that would be worth a damn, on the river any longer.
DeleteHi there ComNavOps! I've got a suggestion for you if you don't mind.
ReplyDeleteIs there any chance you could do an analysis of a video series called "Battleship Myths Debunked" on YouTube? It's a long one at 9 videos long, but the videos are essentially PowerPoint presentations in video format, so you can read through them at your leisure instead of having to listen to lengthy narrations.
The video series addresses some commonly-held misconceptions about battleships (most especially the Iowa-class ones) and I'd like to see what you think about it. Everything from the proven survivability of battleships to the true capabilities of their large-caliber guns to what they could still accomplish today is covered, and I think it's something you'd enjoy watching.
I'll take a look at it. Was there one or two aspects in the series that jumped out at you?
DeleteMy incredibly cursory, first impression is that someone took all the ideas we've discussed on this blog and put them into a video series. I did not find anything new, just all the points we've covered here.
DeleteWas there a point(s) you particularly wanted to call attention to?
Surface combatant design for the High North,i.e. ice-hardened bows.
ReplyDeleteIf you're suggesting a post on the design of a cold weather combatant, the first issue is that I see no compelling military or strategic interest in the Arctic region. Do you see a reason to be there?
DeleteThere's a concept in economics called "Baumhols cost disease." Have you heard of it? The basic idea is that the inflation rate is different for different types of things. As economies get more advanced, it becomes easier to produce manufactured goods, but more expensive to hire labor. Especially the sort of mass, unskilled labor that you can get very cheaply in a poor country becomes much more expensive over time.
ReplyDeleteI've usually heard this to explain why things like education and urban construction have become so much more expensive over time. But I was thinking, this might explain a lot about navy construction costs, too. Back in WW2 it was easy to find a lot of poor, unemployed laborers who would move to the coast and do basic welding on the hulls. But now, you have to pay a whole lot more to find someone for that kind of work, especially if you expect them to move across the country and take on a new job.
Thoughts on this? If that's true, there's just no escape from the massive cost inflation of navy ships (short of wrecking the economy). On the plus side, peer adversaries like China will have the same problem as their economies develop.
https://cimsec.org/designing-maritime-campaigns-with-unmanned-systems-overcoming-the-innovation-paradox/
ReplyDeleteDoubts about unmanned vessels
"Navy officers are still expressing reservations about the impact of drones in the maritime domain, especially in the western Pacific.2 They note, for instance, that the Navy is already stretched to the breaking point by the effort to maintain and supply its existing manned surface fleet and that it cannot create the infrastructure needed to support hundreds of medium sized and large autonomous surface vessels in the relatively short time envisioned by current shipbuilding plans. Others suggest that the weapons payload carried by most drones is too small to create more than a nuisance. Instead of a five-pound warhead, a one-thousand-pound warhead would be more appropriate when it comes to disabling a major surface combatant. Unmanned systems also need a range of thousands, not hundreds, of miles to operate in the Pacific. Drones may have requirements that make them more of a liability than an asset in a contested Pacific, such as drones with limited battery life, or that have to be transported and deployed within reach of sophisticated adversary systems, or drones that require weeks of lead time to be moved into operational areas, or that create windows of vulnerability when they need to be retrieved or serviced in the battlespace. "
1) It appears that some naval officers have doubts about using these systems with valid reasons
2) This article goes on to state that they are not wrong but that the proponents are not wrong either.
My take : Our navy has many issues to sort out like ship building infrastructure, repair ships/systems/ (aircraft availability ) and to use CONOPS when designing a platform. Submarine procurement and sustainment has been subpar. After reading prior posts here it seems like fixing current issues should be a priority over unmanned systems development. ( Drones can be useful. )
"seems like fixing current issues should be a priority over unmanned systems development."
DeleteSpot on!
"Doubts about unmanned vessels"
DeleteJust like diversity was never discussed and analyzed - we just jumped over that and straight on to implementation, 'unmanned' was never discussed or analyzed - we just jumped over that and straight on to implementation. There is no rigorous, fundamental foundation for unmanned assets or operations. That doesn't mean the concept is invalid; it just means that it is unfounded ... which generally means it's a bad idea!
@ComNavOps, In the above article, (cimsec.org) there is mention of Sea Hunter, where the author presents some uses for potential fleet integration. Not sure if this unmanned vessel even has a CONOPS.
ReplyDeleteDarpa designed it to trail submarines to keep tabs on them with less resource intensive means. There was or is a sonar bulb on a keel below the ship. No idea how they would manage this with a passive sonar near the surface.
Delete"Darpa designed it to trail submarines"
DeleteAs I keep pointing out, does it really seem plausible that an unmanned vessel with a small, low power sonar and no human analysis or tactical expertise can successfully trail a sub when our very best, high power sonars with extensive computer assistance and human interpretation and tactics routinely fail to do so in exercises? This is just Navy PR garbage.
It was DARPAs baby. We really don't know much about how the Navy has been using it since taking it off their hands.
DeleteIf Sea Hunter's tiny, unattended sonar could actually trail subs, wouldn't you think the Navy would be currently embarked on a crash program to replace the large, powerful, complex, manpower intensive sonars in the Burkes with tiny Sea Hunter sonars? That they haven't done so tells me everything I need to know about the true capabilities of the Sea Hunter sonar.
DeleteNew technologies are not problems, but failed planning and R&D are. People should not against new technologies but need to question why military R&D keep failing.
ReplyDeleteTechnologies need maturity before entering the fleet. I agree with you. R&D is fine ,keep it going but understand what our priorities our !
DeleteCompanion article(s) to the Fleet structure tab that would lay out the CONOPS for each of the ship types
ReplyDeleteMLW
That's a great idea but it would be a massive undertaking to do it right! A true CONOPS would describe the specific role of the ship in various scenarios, the interrelationships between the ship and the rest of the military's assets, logistical support, basing support, weapon and sensor effects relative to its role, manning, maintenance, and on and on. When you appreciate what goes into a real CONOPS, you quickly realize just how bereft of analytical rigor the Navy's approach to ship design is.
DeleteI will give some thought as to how I might present a [greatly!] reduced CONOPS without losing so much that it becomes just a meaningless, generic statement.
Thanks for the thought!
CNO,
ReplyDeleteIf you had to develop a high level purchasing plan for ships, aircraft, sensors, weapons, and sailor training, what systems and training doctrine would you prioritize funding and manpower for?
You mentioned keeping ships in port and conducting drills there, to reduce wear and tear on engines and equipment, as well as sailor attrition from repeated lengthy deployments. I think this is a great example of something that could be done, to both reduce cost and permit more flexibility in the training schedule, but seldom is done.
Air wings conduct workups / training phases on land, prior to going to sea, which is viewed as execution of what we've already proven we know how to do during training. I see no reason why there shouldn't be an equivalent for sailors aboard ships.
Shorter deployments would help with attrition, to a point. Having a clearer idea of what we intended to accomplish would help even more. Beyond that, expecting to field and retain the world's finest fighting men, when they're not allowed to do any actual fighting, is more than a little asinine.
What would the next decade's spending and time management priorities look like (broad strokes) to correct what you view as the most glaring deficiencies in either practical ship characteristics or combat capabilities or training, to shore up our weak points?
We didn't arrive here overnight, so I gather that we couldn't correct all of our present problems quickly or easily, but assuming the Navy retained its FY23 budget, with an increase in funding to account for inflation... Will 10 years provide enough time and funding to at least get back on track, or would this be an even longer term project?
What would some achievement milestones look like?
What sort of short term trades are you willing to make for long term / lasting improvements?
kbd512
You pretty much summed up the approach in your comment! We need to develop geopolitical strategies from which are derived military strategies from which are derived operational planning from which are derived CONOPS for individual platforms and assets. Having obtained those platforms and assets, we then stay home and train and maintain to exhaustion in preparation for executing the operational plans when war comes.
DeleteAre there specific aspects you'd like me to comment on in more detail?
Rant:
ReplyDeleteI'm tired of the navy and military pursuing projects that I will charitably call "long range", like unmanned ships and planes, and ignoring the here and now.
The world is a dangerous place, and seems to be getting more so every month.
Do any of us really believe that the US military is really as prepared as it could be, or should be, to fight a peer or near peer fight?
We're screwing up, and the military leaders still seem focused on fantasy weapons for the future that seem much more designed to pad the bottom line of defense contractors than to provide security to the US and our allies.
Lutefisk
Ship losses and damage in combat. One thing that sticks out looking at WW2, WW1 information is the absolute number of ships that are damaged or destroyed in combat. what size navy is needed to maintain operations when ships routinely get damaged in combat
ReplyDeleteYou might be interested in this post: "Battle Damage - Savo Island"
DeleteThe WWII US Navy had 6000 ships of all types. Our current fleet has around 280.
CNO
ReplyDeleteI recently re-read your 2020 post about Virginia Class Cruisers.
In it you said, "the Navy was on its way to assembling entire nuclear powered carrier strike groups. This would have offered some significant operational and tactical advantages."
Contrast with your recent 'Worst Developments Ever' post: "Surface Ship Nuclear Power – offers no overall tactical or operational benefits".
Can I ask what has changed your mind on nuclear power?
My thoughts have not changed in the slightest. You missed the key difference between the two situations. A completely nuclear task force does, indeed, offer advantages because NONE of the ships are tethered to, or restricted by, the need to refuel.
DeleteIn contrast, the limited application of nuclear power (carriers only) means that the task force gains none of the advantages while suffering all the disadvantages (cost, damage control risk, disposal, mid-life refueling costs and unavailability, etc.).
That should clear up the issue for you.
Any thoughts on this article?
ReplyDeletehttps://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/11/rand-what-the-u-s-navy-really-needs-by-dr-scott-savitz/
Yes, I have thoughts. The article is garbage sprinkled with fantasy and wishful thinking while ignoring most points of reality.
DeleteWhat's your thought?
That it contrast greatly with a similar report. Same organisation, same parameters, very different response.
DeleteI suspect you'll approve much more of the second.
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/11/rand-what-the-u-s-navy-really-needs-by-dr-bradley-martin/#:~:text=Related%20to%20the%20issue%20of,one%20time%20in%20ample%20supply.
Hello CNO. Make a post about naval washdown systems for surface warships, their function, role and possibilities. Is this system able to reduce the range of detection from radar and infrared search systems? Does she contribute stealth abilities?
ReplyDeleteThat's an excellent topic suggestion. Unfortunately, there's almost no public information available on the subject.
DeleteIt is generally recognized that a wash down system will reduce the infrared signature - to what degree is completely unknown. I've long considered it to be a vital component of ship defense.
As far as impact beyond IR signature, I don't really know of any. I can't imagine that washdown would have any impact on radar returns. Do you have some specific things wash down might affect, for better or worse?
Possible future weapon, just want to know your thoughts on this idea.
ReplyDeleteTake something similar to a V1 Doodlebug. Basically entirely disposable and manufacture it in three varieties.
1/ Very basic gyro guidance, simply released in swarms to drop the payload. The payload is three (?) 200kg mines that due to direction, gyro navigation and run time will be dropped in shallow water. First mine is active immediately, second has a 1 week delay, third has a 2 week delay, all self destruct after 3 months.
2/ Empty or EW payload. To be fired in swarms at a possible invasion fleet.
3/ Actual anti ship missile with a basic IR or EO seeker. Obviously this version will cost a bit more.
Cost of v1&2 should be about $30,000 based on WW2 figures. The mine laying version would relieve the need to deploy B52, C17s or other aircraft to lay mine fields, and if they get shot down, no big deal. You can lose a lot of these for the cost of a single aircraft, plus the SAMs cost more and are more difficult to produce. The idea would be to loose an enormous swarm in the general direction of an enemy port at the beginning of hostilities.
Version 2 causes wastage of SAMs to defend the fleet while V3 will likely get hacked out of the air with ease but the similarities between V2 and V3 presents a threat that has to be taken seriously. In both cases, they're really just to minimise the enemy defensive magazine before real anti-ship missiles are deployed, or to present so many targets as to make accurate distinction of legitimate anti-ship missiles difficult.
Developers would need to find a way to launch them that doesn't involve the catapult of the original V1, maybe a small RATO type set up.
A more powerful engine (should be able to manage that after 70 years of development) should produce higher speeds making gunnery on low flying targets difficult.
Viable? Stupid? Useful? Thoughts?