Friday, April 8, 2022

JHSV Update

When the Spearhead class transports (Joint High Speed Vessel, JHSV; now referred to as Expeditionary Fast Transports, EPF) came into the Navy, ComNavOps severely criticized them for lacking any useful mission or purpose.  As you recall, the JHSV was intended to be a fast intra-theater transport and was to be operated by civilian crews under the Military Sealift Command.  Unfortunately, as reported by DOT&E, problems have plagued the class.[2]

 

Joint High Speed Vessel - No Mission, No Purpose, No Need


See the following posts for background information, issues, and concerns:

 

“JHSV”

 

“More JHSV”

 

“JHSV Update”

 

“Joint High Speed Vessel Missions”

 

DOT&E Report:  “Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) Report”

 

 

Now, some 10 years later, ComNavOps’ concerns about the lack of a mission have been validated. 

 

The twelve Spearhead Class Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs) currently in the battle fleet have enormous potential, but these small “theatre” transports have failed to capture the imagination of fleet sponsors. They’re not getting integrated into innovative day-to-day operations, and the Military Sealift Command hates the cost of maintaining these underutilized and poorly understood auxiliaries.[1]

 

Now, the Navy is quietly semi-retiring the vessels after less than ten years service.

 

Last year, two of the fast transports, the nine-year-old USNS Spearhead (T-EPF-1) and the seven-year-old USNS Fall River (T-EPF-4), were consigned effectively to the scrapyard, placed in an ignominious “Reduced Operating Status 45.” Reduced Operating Status 45—where the ship needs 45 days to get underway after an activation order—is the maximum amount of time a ship can be placed in reduced operating status and still remain “counted” as an active member of the battle fleet.

 

Rumors suggest that all the Spearhead Class Expeditionary Fast Transports outside of the yet-to-be-built medical variants may well be on the budget chopping block this year and consigned to storage status.[1]

 

This is, now, the third instance of the Navy [very] early retiring ships/classes that just a few years ago were claimed to be revolutionary and vital to the future of naval combat and dominance:

 

  • LCS
  • Mobile Landing Platform (MLP;  now referred to as Expeditionary Transfer Dock, ESD)
  • Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV; now referred to as Expeditionary Fast Transports, EPF)

 

How can multiple ships/classes be so vital and then so useless in just a matter of a few years?  It all goes back to the complete lack of a Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  None of these classes had a CONOPS, none had a mission, and now they’re being dumped due to the lack of a mission.

 

How many times do I have to say it?  You can’t build a successful ship design without first developing a detailed CONOPS.

 

How many times can the Navy make the same mistake before they start paying attention to CONOPS before design?

 

How many abject failures can the Navy have before Congress starts removing Navy leaders?

 

 

 

_________________________________

 

[1]Forbes website, “The 2023 Defense Budget May Sink More Navy Ships Than Pearl Harbor”, Craig Hooper, 22-Mar-2022,

https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2022/03/22/the-2023-defense-budget-may-sink-more-navy-ships-than-pearl-harbor/?sh=2318eab61fbe

 

[2]DOT&E, “Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) Report”, Sep-2015,

https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Science_and_Technology/16-F-0250_(REPORT)_Follow-On_Operational_Test_and_Evaluation_(FOT&E)_Report_on_the_Joint_High_Speed_Vessel_(JHSV).pdf


27 comments:

  1. The Forbes link is interesting. On the one hand it seems to take a realistic view that the Freedom class should be dead and the Navy is wasting time and money dragging out the saga. But than U turns on the EPFs

    "have enormous potential"

    What potential. They seem to not be able make their top speed in any but the most mild sea and even in moderate sea risk sea sickness to the crew. They have no defenses not even passive ones? They look like death traps in a war zone.

    But wait potential

    https://news.usni.org/2013/03/20/low-cost-ship-options-for-u-s-navys-drug-war

    Drug interdiction in the Gulf of Mexico...

    “However lower cost options like Swift and it’s predecessors, the $255 million Joint High Speed Vessel, could make U.S. naval involvement in SOUTHCOM more fiscally palatable. “ (note if all are built apparently they are closer to something in the 180-190 million range).

    But last I checked that is the job of the USCG. You know with say a Sentinel class cutter which costs ~unit $68 million. Now maybe I'm missing the new maths or something the latter seems cheaper than the former. Crew size is about the same. So I realize long term cost are different but I'm thinking 12 more sentinels in the gulf of Mexico is cheaper than the navy wasting money to proof its has not already wastied money. Also I suspect the Coast Guard ships do better in not perfect sea states.

    It also strikes me if the navy actually built a proper replacement for the Cyclone class than the USCG would not stationed in Bahrain doing the USNs job and than the USN would not have reason to throw expensive ships into a made drug interdiction role. I sometimes think the only reason the war on drugs exists is so the navy can build either bad small ships or good ones it hates (Cyclone for example.) and than say look look its a drug interdiction asset.

    ReplyDelete
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    1. "Drug interdiction in the Gulf of Mexico..."

      A better option might be repurposing some the yachts the russian oligarchs have recently donated to the cause. Some even have helo spots on them. How many crews Navy or CG would turn that down for sea duty?

      Delete
    2. Come now now we don't want to spoil the military, Moor them in say San Fran harbor and make them affordable housing. They look cool maybe the local NIMBY types won't bitch about them.

      Delete
  2. You misunderstood the quote, the "potential" for these problematic "hi-speed" ships is to FERRY drugs in the Gulf of Mexico, not to "interdict" drugs.

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    Replies
    1. Ahh so the Navy is offloading them to cartels, got it. Well at least that makes financial sense.

      Delete
  3. Westpac Express made sense. Marines going from Oki for the Fuji training package? No reason to spend millions in air trans for the vehicles, or tie up a gator. Put the gear on WE, the operators and a SNCO and O all ride along. Cheap and easy.

    Same same going to Korea and back. Army, Corps, simple unit equipment admin movies.

    Even Guam and Thailand for good weather. Get the gear there a little early, make a few trips. Handy and economical compared to the other options.

    So buying two to replace it wasn't a horrible idea. Particularly with Australia coming up as a major rotation.

    But did these mental midgets in charge at navy ship building think they were going to run admin movies in the Gulf? Threatened landings in South America in a light commercial ferry?

    ReplyDelete
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    1. West PAC express utility is minimal.
      1) they are very sea state limited to get to speed and the weather windows for use are too limited
      2) they get damaged in many sea states
      3) they have very limited life support so Marines stuck waiting for a sea state change are eating MREs, sleeping on the deck in sleeping bags, and Crappy go in MRE boxes lined with trash liners.
      The Navy is right to get them out of theater

      Delete
    2. I have personally loaded and rode on the WestPac Express numerous times when I was stationed at 1st MAW. That craft made Korean deployments possible. You could take an entire reinforced rifle battalion and all their toys to Pusan in less than 24 hours. Hell we loaded rotor wing assets on her numerous times. Without that asset, numerous off island exercises would never have been able to take place. It was nothing but an asset to the forces on Okinawa. It was even written into o-plans.

      Delete
  4. "it can only conduct vehicle transfers when conducted in sea states with significant wave heights of less than 0.1 meters (approximates a Sea State 1), which are normally found only in protected harbors."


    "To achieve its top speed, the ship has to be traveling in waters not exceeding sea state 3 (waves up to 1.25 m (4.1 ft) high). At sea state 4 it can travel up to 15 knots, travel only 5 knots in sea state 5, and has to hold position in any sea state higher."

    Essentially, this vessel has no real military use.

    Maybe turn them into a party boat or something, then see if rich guys want to buy some?
    It's fast and can hold pleny of booze, so hey.

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  5. If at least USN would get it and learn it's lessons from all these failures like LCS, FORD, F35C, MLP, JHSV,etc etc , you could say: "well, it's really expensive failures but now USN will get it right!" but we can't even say that!!!! We all know USN will just keep throwing good money after crappy projects!!!!

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    1. Quibble. I don't think I would call the F-35 a failure. Massively poorly implemented (and VSTOL version should have never been jammed into the air frame), But unlike say the LCS or the JHSV it does not seem to be on the same level of pointless epic blunder.

      Delete
    2. Is this really what our military acquisition has come to? Debating the degree of badness of our various programs? That's a sad commentary.

      Delete
    3. "Is this really what our military acquisition has come to? Debating the degree of badness of our various programs?"

      Well, now that you mentioned it...

      For example, the Constellation program involved major mistakes, BUT it wasn't as much of a disaster as the LSC program, so it looks kinda good in comparison.

      Delete
    4. "For example, the Constellation program involved major mistakes, BUT it wasn't as much of a disaster as the LSC program, so it looks kinda good in comparison." Except, the Constellation class is still on the drawing boards. So they are already making mistakes and there hasn't even been any steel cut yet. Not a good way to start.

      Delete
  6. The most expensive of these commercial ferries went for about $110M for the Spanish Built Incat-Crowther Eleanor Roosevelt at 123 meters, The cheapest Austal EPF without GFE was $130M. Incat's EPF offer was much closer to their commercial hull. If they could get one of these with a system that could offload at a beach this would be way smarter than what LAW is shaping up to be. Focusing on a missile ferry with seakeeping and stealth would also be cheap and good. The hospital ship is great to get emergency gear into a port. I'm much less confident it will be stable enough for treating casualties at sea. We need to get the Navy to take commercial hulls as is and just add gear.

    ReplyDelete
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    1. @Andy. Think there's only 2 options anymore:

      1. Ask USN to really go back to building warships with REAL MilStanard and get sticker shock but at least ships will be able to take a hit.

      2. Buy warships built to low civilian standards and hope for the best when a war comes.

      What USN is doing now is worse of both worlds: super expensive hulls with pretend MilStandard that can't take a hit and sinking the budget at the same time! It's just not sustainable in terms of money and production rates. We have to get serious about war hulls or just admit we can't or won't do it and build navy ships to civilian construction standards.

      Delete
    2. "We need to get the Navy to take commercial hulls as is and just add gear."

      Within some very strict limits, I'm with you. HOWEVER, there's a reason why military differs from civilian. Military use requires more modifications than just adding some extra equipment. For example, the very structure (strength and type/thickness of steel), degree of compartmentation for damage/flooding control, the extent of fire suppression, shock hardening, EMCON requirements, and so very many more things are not normally available in straight commercial vessels. For vessels that will never see combat, that's fine. For vessels that will see combat - like a small transport supporting Marines in forward bases - they need to be military vessels with military characteristics. Using a commercial offering as a basis and then modifying it to military standards can work IF DONE CAREFULLY AND THOUGHTFULLY, like Liberty ships in WWII or early attack transports.

      Delete
    3. "get sticker shock"

      NO, no, no! If done properly, there won't be sticker shock. I've posted on how to build a ship that is state of the art AND AFFORDABLE. It starts with NOT loading every feature and function anyone can think of on the design. If you want an AAW ship, take the Burke and remove the hangar, flight deck, helo, helo magazines, ASW gear, sonar, and so on. You cut the size by 2/3 and cost by 1/2. Now, you CAN afford to armor the ship and add whatever is need to make it a true WARship.

      Don't buy into the belief that a true WARship is unaffordable. That's false!

      Delete
    4. I think we are pretty aligned here. Some ships in civilian use are doing things the military would like to do. Get those ships and do them. When there is a need and no commercial solution take the old fashioned route. I'd even take a third tier and say, if we need something and an allies military already has a solution, use it. Put expertise on the gaps.

      Delete
    5. "Some ships in civilian use are doing things the military would like to do."

      Do you have any specific examples?

      Delete
    6. What the EPF was supposed to be able to do first off. Incat's base design was already built and in service in Japan before Austal's commercial hull was built upon which EPF was very loosely based. The EPF contest wreaks of politics.

      Delete
    7. "EMCON requirements" ever since the introduction of cell phones, there has not been a ship in the Navy able to pass an EMCON test.

      Delete
  7. The most innocent explanation for the state of our military is that it and its supporting industries are primarily jobs programs.

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  8. What would you actually use JHSVs for? I mean, in wartime?

    ReplyDelete
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    1. Well, which war?
      Scenario A) Korea gets hot, North Korean subs mine the approaches to Pusan and I Corps has no way to flow into theater. Landing in Japan and ferrying over to small ports on both sides of the Korean Peninsula is now possible.

      Scenario B) Suwalki Gap is closed with fires. JHSVs ferry Army forces north towards Estonia from small ports in Poland. Mission requires a fast escort (I think I just identified a role for the LCS)

      Scenario C) Northern Norway becomes a hot spot but the LLOCs are terrible and the northern ports are too shallow for large ships. JHSV ferry equipment and supplies towards the Russian front in a multimodal fashion. (Also require a fast escort).

      Delete
  9. Ask the UAE -- the Navy gave them the HSV-2 Swift to use "as a demo" in their invasion of Yemen in 2016. They tried to use it as a high-speed ammo and troop carrier. Here is how it worked:

    https://medium.com/war-is-boring/houthi-rebels-claim-they-blew-up-the-former-u-s-navy-ship-swift-4a9d658582d3

    ReplyDelete
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    1. Defenseless target. If it floats it should have SEWIP, NULKA, and a Searam. Its like a patient with multipple illnesses and exhibiting an endless number of systems. How to treat it takes a talented doctor. How many of these Admirals meet that standard?

      Delete

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