The
new Marine Littoral Regiment will be comprised of roughly 1,800 to 2,000
Marines and sailors, but the final design of the new unit is still under
consideration, according to MCCDC [Marine Corps Combat Development Command]. In
comparison 3rd Marine Regiment is roughly 3,400 Marines and sailors. (1)
The LRCT is intended to operate inside enemy territory and
enemy controlled waters.
The
littoral regiment combat team is “designed to provide the basis for employing
multiple platoon-reinforced-size expeditionary advance base sites that can host
and enable a variety of missions such as long-range anti-ship fires, forward
arming and refueling of aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance of key maritime terrain, and air-defense and early warning,”
MCCDC said in an emailed statement. (1)
This statement also indicates what size the small, secret
sea control units will be: ‘platoon-reinforced-size’. That’s right, Marine platoons will establish
control of the seas. No need for the
Navy or large, powerful ships with crews of hundreds or thousands – a platoon with
a few missiles can do the job.
This also suggests that the LRCT will have no function,
itself, other than to provide the detachments for the platoon size sea control
units. It seems unlikely (to be fair,
the Commandant’s entire scheme seems unlikely and yet …) that an entire
regiment would be formed whose only purpose is to be broken up to provide penny
packets of small units. Will we see some
further assignment of responsibility for the LRCT in the future?
Where did the idea of the LRCT come from?
The
term came up in a panel discussion at the Surface Navy Association annual
symposium in Arlington, Virginia, on Jan. 15, when Wise [Maj. Gen. Mark Wise,
deputy commanding general of Marine Corps Combat Development Command] was
answering questions about how the Corps would go about building new formations
to fight better alongside the Navy. (2)
Is this the end of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
which has been the cornerstone of the Marines for decades?
In
October 2019, Brig. Gen. Benjamin Watson said that the Corps was “no longer
going to stick or take an uncompromising position on the sanctity of the
MAGTF,” while speaking at the National Defense Industrial Association’s
Expeditionary Warfare Conference in Annapolis, Maryland.
“If
what is needed is a piece of the Marine Corps that is not organized like a
MAGTF or a capability the Marine Corps can bring that is not a MAGTF, then we
are not too proud to provide that,” he said. (2)
So, not only are the Marines dumping tanks, artillery, and
mortars but also the MAGTF organization although the MAGTFs may hang on for a
while as the transition to LRCTs occurs.
Just thinking out loud, here, but if all you need is a
handful of platoon size units, how do you justify a Marine Corps of 180,000
plus all its equipment? How many of
these LRCTs do you need? It seems like
you can get quite a few platoons from just one LRCT. There seems to be a real disconnect with this
Commandant. His stated vision is that a
handful of platoons can win a war with China and yet he seems to want to keep a
nearly full size Marine Corps. Which is
it, Commandant, a handful of platoons or a full Corps? Are there still more secret plans coming? And, if you want to maintain a full Corps,
what responsibilities will the rest of the Corps have given that they have no
tanks and little artillery? It seems
they’ll be limited to minor raids and very low end combat. Again, it would be hard to justify a 180,000
man Corps with these kinds of limited missions.
A Chinese agent couldn’t inflict the damage to the Corps
that this Commandant is doing.
At some point, we’re going to see Marines start to vote with
their feet and leave the Corps. We’re
going to wind up with a Marine Corps consisting of new recruits who have no
clue and a handful of old-timers just riding out the last few years until
retirement.
(1)Marine Corps Times website, “New Marine Littoral
Regiment, designed to fight in contested maritime environment, coming to Hawaii”,
Shawn Snow, 14-May-2020,
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2020/05/14/new-marine-littoral-regiment-designed-to-fight-in-contested-maritime-environment-coming-to-hawaii/
(2)Marine Corps Times website, “New Corps formation: Marine
littoral regiment may be how the Corps fights future battles”, Todd South,
29-Jan-2020,
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2020/01/29/new-corps-formation-marine-littoral-regiment-may-be-how-the-corps-fights-future-battles/
I don't think this is bad development, save for the name which associates it with LCS nonsense. This can be seen as return to the roots - a shipborne, self sufficient skirmish force that supports deep-water navy in its (navy) mission. This means securing ports, boarding ships, raiding enemy ports etc should be naval infantry mission. Tanks, airforce, and god forbid cyber warfare should be left to other services.
ReplyDeleteYou can see that general Berger gets it from his words:
Berger said that took a look back to the past 35 years of the Navy-Marine Corps relationship. For the past 20 of those years, the two didn’t actually need each other much.
“We were in the Middle East doing one thing and the Navy was doing another,” he said.
"This means securing ports, boarding ships, raiding enemy ports etc should be naval infantry mission. Tanks, airforce, and god forbid cyber warfare should be left to other services."
DeleteAs with Berger, himself, I partially agree and partially disagree. The port seizure mission requires some pretty heavy firepower. The enemy isn't going to just give up ports for free. With the Marines dropping tanks and artillery, that just leaves light infantry and they are incapable of port seizure.
For the other, lightweight missions we don't need a heavy firepower force but we also don't need a 180,000 man Corps complete with its own air force. If Berger wants to commit to being a light infantry raiding force than he needs to drastically scale down the size of the Corps and pretty much drop the aviation element (at least the fixed wing portion).
The Marines should never have been committed to the Middle East.
And especially not the mountains of Afghanistan.
Delete@CNO "The port seizure mission requires some pretty heavy firepower. The enemy isn't going to just give up ports for free."
DeleteLook at the furious fight the Germans put up to control the Scheldt (the Port of Antwerp).
GAB
I couldn't see anything in the article to clarify how many of these regiments might be formed. Is it possible that there will be only 1 or 2 and the MAGTF remains for the rest? I agree that the new 'super-LCU' is a disaster waiting to happen and I can't see a role for penny-packet marine forces. In a war with China, the Marines are better off coming in from India or Afghanistan than the sea! Perhaps the Marines need to be tasked with boarding Chinese merchant ships to stop raw materials getting through rather than beach assault. Looks like the LHDs in particular are doomed.
ReplyDeleteWhy would you board merchant ships? you just have subs sink them.
DeleteSet an exclusion outside of China's air cover with a 'you sail here we sink you' notice and every merchant ship will be somewhere else.
Of course, the best blockade is implemented at the originating port, not in the open ocean. I would assume we'd make every effort to prevent merchant ships from even sailing.
DeleteIt's cheaper to board the ships and why use up limited stocks of torpedoes? Subs need to be in the real battle against warships and using their Tomahawks against hard targets. I certainly agree that Marines should be helping to take out all those overseas Chinese ports/bases but a lot of the traffic is going to come from neutral or even friendly countries and blockading those may have unwanted consequences.
Delete"It's cheaper to board the ships"
Delete?? Unless you intend to put a prize crew on board and take the vessel, boarding doesn't accomplish anything. Boarding is a peacetime inspection/legal process. In war, you sink the ship so that the enemy can never use it again.
Stopping shipments at the originating port doesn't necessarily require seizing or destroying the port. We know where the major oil or [fill in the blank] originating ports are. We simply monitor ship loadings and prevent those that aren't going to friendly countries. Of course, the Chinese would probably try to prevent that so you might have to fight for control of a port.
" a lot of the traffic is going to come from neutral or even friendly countries and blockading those may have unwanted consequences."
?? You don't blockade a friendly/neutral port because they don't ship to the enemy. If they do, then they aren't your ally or they've violated their neutrality and you can attack/seize them.
The opposite of blockading at the originating port(s) is blockading at the destination area which would be the chokepoints around the first island chain. The advantage to this approach is that while there are many originating ports (maybe too many to cover?) there are relatively few approach points at the destination (China). All the shipments eventually have to congregate and pass through a limited number of chokepoints. Of course, China will attempt to defend those points so, again, you'll have to fight to control the points - I guess that's why it's called a war!
Likely, we'd do both: attempt to control originating ports for the larger, more critical products (oil, for example) and attempt to cut off the shipping at the destination chokepoints.
In a war Chinese peace time economy (probably ours too) is shot anyway so the ME oil (for sustaining Chinese economy) is of 2ndary issue. In war time, China will go back to it domestic oil production (which is the level of US wartime production during 1944). China is not fighting a WW2 2-front oil consuming war. Also, China can double that with Russian oil import. Remember, China's border is about 70% land connected. It's size of lower-48 w/ ample resources. And, if it stays back, retains air & surface superiority at the 1st island chain & sends out its subs to hunt ours nearby, our littoral allies will give up & settle (with China) long before China can be tamed. Lastly, how long are we prepared to play this offshore containment tap dance which basically doesn't degrade PLA, 10 years? 20 years? 50 years? (if we can't manage Afgh-Iraq war, we wanna take on China-then-Russia combined in a half measure non-war?)
Delete"ME oil (for sustaining Chinese economy) is of 2ndary issue."
DeleteReally, really excellent and astute comment! A war with China is not going to be like WWII with Japan where we could easily cut off the influx of raw materials and resources. You've nailed the issue!
Now, the implication of this is that a blockade war with the goal of a return to status quo will not succeed. We need a radically different victory criteria and strategy. I've outlined what my conception of victory is in previous posts. Until we manage to grasp this essential concept, we're wasting our time and resources planning for the wrong type of war.
Seriously, one of the best comments I've seen on this blog!
Your criteria from previous posts are from a 'good vs. evil' pov, which has nothing to do with realpolitik of now. Given, from your blogs and others, the gap between USN/USMC and PLA is narrowing relatively, and USN/USMC regressing in absolute terms, all the while shoehorning that immovable goals of either ASB or offshore Containment with current situation is disconnecting to me.
DeleteWar in the end is geo-politic. If one can't conclude or at least have a grasp of its possible outcome- why get into one?
"Your criteria from previous posts are from a 'good vs. evil' pov, which has nothing to do with realpolitik of now."
DeleteIn my view, the inevitable clash between China and the US IS good vs. evil. As a general statement, what you call 'realpolitik' is simply a way for westerners of weak moral fortitude to justify inaction and appeasement. Ultimately, there is not accommodation one can make with evil other than to eradicate it.
This isn't a philosophy blog so I'll leave it at that.
My 'realpolik' is: 'muscle/craft/$$' leveraged thru 'distance/time/geopolitics'. In fact, 99% of your blog is about muscle & $$, and to a lesser degree, craft. And here you're pinning your entire thesis of why (war on China) on ideology.
DeleteStill, I believe if we get into a containment stalemate, it's going to be a 2-3-generations affair if we don't stray into critical mass right away.
If by 'critical mass' you mean war, that isn't going to happen by 'straying' into it. One of two things will occur: one, China will make the calculation that the time has come and it can gain enough to make the war worthwhile or, two, China will take a calculated gamble too far and commit an act that the US just can't ignore, thereby triggering war. There will be nothing accidental about a war.
DeleteI mean the nuke kind (cuz, I'm assuming offshore containment already lit the war fuse, and will quickly or gradually destabilizing into hot shooting, and inevitably the nuke endgame.) You see, you already put it in a good-vs-evil (or either they die or we die) uncompromisable situation. In your scenario, war will be persecuted to the end, devoid of the possibility of both sides standing. If that's the forecast, then nothing will stop China from stocking MAD arsenal here on out. When both won't stand to lose in the end, the only outcome is both die if there is war.
DeleteOil is still a problem for China, sure, not in the King Tiger guzzling 2 front war of maneuver, but planes and ships run on it. All of China's production facilities are within 100k of the coast. A couple of dozen tomahawks and China has no useable air force and a severely limited navy. It will also literally starve.
Delete"A couple of dozen tomahawks and China has no useable air force and a severely limited navy. It will also literally starve."
DeleteYour vision of the ease with which a war with China will be won is breathtakingly naïve!
Also, you're not even remotely correct about the oil production facility locations. Here's a map showing various locations: Oil Locations
You're absolutely correct and that should have been 1000k, which is also well within the range of the Tomahawk.
DeleteIt's not a matter of naivete, anything we can do to them they can do to us. Oh, wait, no they can't, we closed almost all of our refineries decades ago and have to import virtually all of our oil, so that's Australia out of the war before it even begins.
Oil refineries are big juicy targets, but between cyberwarfare, a bit of espionage and some cruise missiles a lot of very real, and very difficult to overcome problems can be inflicted upon an enemy.
" cyberwarfare, ... very difficult to overcome problems can be inflicted upon an enemy."
DeleteYou indirectly bring up a great point. China has been engaged in a vigorous program of cyberwarfare against the US for some time now. Presumably, they're well aware of the potential for cyberwarfare against infrastructure. That being the case, I wonder if they're also cyber-hardening their own infrastructure for the day when we finally acknowledge that we're at war and begin cyber attacks against them. We may be surprised to find that our cyberattacks inflict relatively little damage? I'm just speculating. I have no information on China's cyber preparedness.
I suspect they're much like the rest of us. US Intelligence famously wrote that Japanese pilots were physiologically incapable of flying high performance aircraft despite Chennault's dealings with the Zero and that Pearl Harbor was too shallow to be effectively torpedo bombed. WW2 certainly delivered some nasty shocks.
DeleteProbably to both sides in the case of hardcore cyberwarfare.
"No need for the Navy or large, powerful ships with crews of hundreds or thousands – a platoon with a few missiles can do the job."
ReplyDeleteBerger seems to love this idea, but it doesn't make an iota of sense.
Against China, a few dozen Marines can do some kind of covert ops at best (use subs in that case), but definitely NOT establish sea control.
He's not that stupid (I think), so what's going on there?
He appears to be either delusional or he's budget grabbing using any justification he can think of whether it has any combat use or not. You'll recall that the Navy did the exact same thing when it came up with 'littoral' in response to threats to decrease the Navy's budget as part of the Cold War 'peace dividend'. That gave us the useless LCS but, from the Navy's perspective, it assured the continuation of the shipbuilding budget line.
DeleteThe problem for Berger is, if he sticks with the 'all it takes is a few platoons' story, he'll be unable to justify maintaining a 180,000 man Corps. He's painting himself into a corner.
"The problem for Berger is, if he sticks with the 'all it takes is a few platoons' story, he'll be unable to justify maintaining a 180,000 man Corps. He's painting himself into a corner."
DeleteThat's another mystery, too.
We're all used to bizarre concepts (LCS), weird political schemes (F-35 being manufactured in all states) and whatnot pushed forward with no regard for actual military effectiveness, but those were done with the purpose of getting a bigger slice of the pie, not a smaller one!
What does Berger think this talk will enable him to ask for, a few more anti-ship missiles?
At this point, he might as well suggest that USMC needs nuclear subs.
The concept of the Littoral Regiment Combat Teams (LRCT) reminds me of two of my favorite books, Starship Troopers by Heinlein and The Forever War by Joe Haldeman. Both deal with small units of troops, largely operating on their own, across the vastness of space. Starship Troopers is based on Heinlein's observations of the Korean War and Haldeman's book is based on his personal experience as a combat engineer in Vietnam and his adjustment to civilian life. Both were well recieved and earned the top awards awards for Science Fiction writing.
ReplyDeleteIn literature, it is easy to ignore the smaller details because the writer is focused on the bigger themes of their book. But, there are lots of details missing here. How long/how far are these units deployed? How are these units resupplied? How do they get targeting data? How are casualties cared for? Ecetera, ecetera, ecetera.
In short, there seems to be a concept of operations missing here. And, I'm sure that one is being worked on which should shape the form that these regiments take and the amphibious ships needed to make the concept work. And, it should describe how these new regiments interact with other Navy and Marines units and at the Division and Fleet Marine Force-levels as well. But, time will tell.
Small unit behind enemy lines will be killed when discovered. Only way to operate behind enemy line is recon and if suitable terrain, ambushes. However the pacific island are not that. They will be able to fire ones then the pos will be know and the unit killed.
DeleteSmall units providing intelligence to the navy or theater commander _could_ work but nothing more. Just look at WW2 and all the Jap units stranded on all the island and those units were quite large.
It feels like the commander is setting the Corps up for disbandment or incorporation into the Army, "naval infantry" and would become 1 div of specialized infantry like airborne or mountain.
Its a sad way to go, I think it started with the MAGTF.
/W
"Just look at WW2 and all the Jap units stranded on all the island and those units were quite large."
DeleteThat's an excellent reminder and analogy. All those Japanese units on islands and yet they exerted no regional sea control. To be fair, they didn't have anti-ship missiles with hundred+ mile range but the comparison is still apt.
"I think it started with the MAGTF"
DeleteThis is a great observation and one I might have to shamelessly poach for a post! The MAGTF began the process of transitioning from a specific mission to an attempt to be everything and do everything which is how we would up with Marines in the mountains and totally forgetting how to do amphibious assaults.
Great, great comment!
"Just look at WW2 and all the Jap units"
DeleteOr the Australian M & Z forces. Coastwatchers were good but it would be a shame for the USMC to devolve to that.
I appreciate your comment CNO.
ReplyDeleteTo add to my comments about missiles.
To be able to affect the target a salvo of 10+ missile need to be launched, depending of escort and capabilities of those, while the salvo need to hit simultaneously from different directions and so on.
A small unit will not have enough missiles to launch more then one salvo and with re-supply being between zero and none, the unit would then be spent. As the germans would say "Himmelfahrtskommando"
It would the be better to spend the money and time on more subs.
/W
I guess the 450,000 man, 6 division, 87,000 casualty suffering USMC of WWII had it all wrong.
ReplyDeleteIf only they had realized that platoon sized elements could defeat a peer Pacific Theater military competitor...
Marine Raiders writ large. Without CONOPS... or viable logistical means to deliver, support, reinforce, or withdraw. Got it.
This stripped down Amphib Light Infantry model is what you get a decade or so down the road from the last major combined arms fights the USMC engaged in (2003 Iraq Invasion, Battles of Fallujah, etc.). The staff officers that mis-managed those campaigns have now matriculated into the general officer stratosphere. With their minds more recently clouded by years of engagements against light infantry guerrilla forces.
An environment where the USMC has never had to function without uncontested dominance of the air power, fires, communications, logistics, transport, reinforcement/evacuation, and battlefield intelligence arenas. Something that has clouded all experience and sense of future expectations. They actually believe all that over-match is normal.
You can see the entire "less is better" mindset percolating through the force, top to bottom, based exclusively upon fighting lesser opponents... while ignoring the inevitable existence of greater ones.
So we wind up with a nebulous construct of unsurvivable platoons, delivered to unsurvivable environments (conveniently never identified on maps) by unsurvivable vessels, to accomplish unsurvivable penny packet holding actions, with unsurvivable munitions loads, and with unsurvivable means of resupply, fire support, or means of reinforcement or relief.
Platoon & company sized raids/sallies are for reinforcing diplomatic NEO (Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations). Or for retrieving downed air crew behind enemy lines. Or for boarding vessels, docks, marinas, small ports, or minor choke points ashore...for purely temporary tactical advantage.
The maritime equivalent of employing small airborne forces for similar actions.
Those forces typically get risked as cats paws in advance of main forces effecting linkup and relief. The idea being to gamble in real time for a near-future win, not to conduct Forlorn Hope staging missions resulting in inevitable unit suicide.
I can almost get the hard-hearted equation that sees an anti-shipping/anti aircraft missile equipped platoon or three, hidden on some SW Pacific island chain, as an equitable trade for a billion dollar PLAN surface combatant and some escorts.
But the Chinese can read maps and plot over-the-horizon anti-shipping fires as well as we can. They have an ever increasing sized Marine force of their own. Numerous and well supported by copious numbers of littoral surface craft, major surface combatants, air assets, artillery, armor, and ISR. All employable at relatively short distances from their backyard (in comparison to us).
Sounds like the commandant wants to emulate the Imperial Japanese model, but without the years of professionally engineered survivability defenses that the Japanese excelled at.
Any terrain remote enough to ensure temporary hiding of USMC light infantry formations (forced to abandon their ship/aircraft killing batteries), will get swept by advancing Chinese forces outnumbering our guys 10-1. Those platoons (or company sized "Teams") will get mowed over like a riding lawn mower cutting grass.
I'm just a dumb former SOF grunt with 35 years in service. Probably too stupid to see the big picture. But I'm pretty sure of one thing...
They must serve heaping bowls of dumb-ass for breakfast over at USMC HQ, the Pentagon.
Im not a vet, nor a military expert, nor an american; only a history buff. But it seems to me that the Powers That Be are more interested in budgetary games, pin the tail on the purpose, or leaving some sort of mark to show their passing through a management position. They dont seem to be worried about their plans potentially spending the lives of their men & women in a way that gives them no value, and that makes me both sad & worried.
Delete"history buff"
DeleteOne of the best things a person can be!
I wonder if they are considering of using these on some of the tiny islets in the SCS owned by Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines.
DeleteConsider Southwest Cay, owned by Vietnam. It probably couldn't hold much more than a company-sized element, along with host nation forces.
https://amti.csis.org/southwest-cay/
7.45 acres of reclaimed land. About the size of my cul-de-sac.
If you could do that on, say, a half to a dozen or so islets in the area, they could provide a modest degree of overlapping anti-ship fires. If one islet was attacked, assuming it could communicate, some of the others could respond.
Of course magazine depths for any individual unit may be small. Medium and high-altitude air defenses would require something smaller and less expensive than a full Patriot battery. Or rely on land-based fighters coming from... somewhere.
Given time and money, one could construct bunkers and hardened munitions storage. Heck, on such small islets, maybe a handful of concrete silo'd VLS cells holding ESSM and SM-2/6 might be an interesting idea. Would require a near direct hit on a silo, which wouldn't be all that easy.
Could base missile-armed patrol boats at some of these, perhaps with a support/refueling barge.
All of this assumes we have strong political and military (defense treaty?) relationships with these countries, which we don't have right now.
And the end result would still result in some pretty exposed locations for penny packets of Marines, so better have a solid evacuation plan when they've gone Winchester.
Here are some other Vietnamese islets that could be candidates,
https://amti.csis.org/vietnams-island-building/
All are tiny. No Okinawa-level forces need to take or occupy them.
" considering of using these on some of the tiny islets"
DeleteYou've skipped right over the same issue that the Marines routinely skip over which is how you establish the bases in the first place? Do you see China obligingly allowing us to set up these bases?
Step 1. Negotiate defense treaty with Vietnam.
DeleteStep 2. Gather task force to oversee deployment.
Step 3. Land forces on Vietnamese-owned islets.
Step 4. Reinforce as appropriate.
The Chinese might whine a lot, but I doubt they'd start something. They'd prefer to wait and squeeze these sites over time, after we get bored and tired of being there.
Of course, the Chinese would know exactly where our small forces are stationed and, presumably, would eliminate them in hour-1 of a war.
DeleteI also do not share your confidence that the Chinese would passively allow bases to be set up given that they've already demonstrated a willingness to forcefully 'invade' Vietnamese fishing grounds and territorial waters.
With suitable hardening, we could make it difficult for them to assuredly eliminate them early in a war without using a significant number of expensive PGMs.
DeleteHas anyone ever seen Commandant Berger and MLB Commission Rob Manfred together in a room at the same time?
ReplyDeleteBecause I'm pretty sure they are the same person.
Has Berger every heard the term "Defeat in Detail"?
ReplyDeleteThis PDF should give you some more details: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11281
ReplyDeleteThanks for the link
DeleteIf this really becomes reality, this has disaster written all over it....
ReplyDeleteI see two possible explanations:
ReplyDelete1) The people running the USMC are all idiots, or
2) Their decisions are constrained by unreasonable and nonsensical limitations.
I think it’s more the latter.
I see the LHAs/LHDs driving this. The size of the LRCT (1800 Marines) is about what an LHA/LHD can carry. They are getting rid of tanks and artillery because there is no reliable connector to get them to the beach from the LHA/LHD. They are unable to conduct legitimate amphibious operations from the platforms that the Navy is providing, with available ship-to-shore connectors, so they have to find something that can be done with what they have. We are down to hauling Marines around on the LHA/LHD, and sending in 2-3 helos with a platoon-sized unit, with no armor or artillery. The Navy and Marines keep saying the LHA/LHD represents so much combat power, but the CONOPS renders all that combat power useless.
Here is what I'd do:
Call it LRCT or MEU or whatever you want, but have it composed as follows:
1) infantry battalion with 1200 Marines
2) tank company with 400 Marines and 14 tanks
3) artillery company with 400 Marines, 6-8 self-propelled 155mm howitzers, and 6-9 rocket launchers
4) amphibious armor company with 400 Marines and 30 AAV’s, including amphibious tanks like the Chinese
5) air detachment with 400 Marines, 10 AV-8/F-35, 10 V-22, and 20+ helos
6) special forces/commando detachment with 100 Marines
7) headquarters/supply company with 300 Marines
That’s 3200 Marines. Particularly supported by a battleship with 16-inch guns and a cruiser or two with 8-inch guns to provide NGFS, that organization can bring significant firepower to bear on an objective, unlike the proposed light infantry/heavy police department model. Send them in, secure the beach or port, and then bring in the numbers. Unfortunately, that organization cannot be deployed from the Navy’s current amphibious fleet.
I would propose the following amphibious squadron (PhibRon) to haul it:
1) smaller LHA/LHD, like SP Juan Carlos, 913 Marines, 10 AV-8/F-35, 10 V-22 ($1.5B)
2) LPH with a dock, like FR Mistral, 450 Marines, 14 tanks, 26 vehicles, 18 helos ($600MM)
3) LPD/LSD like RN Albion, 405 Marines, 67 vehicles, 2 helos ($500MM)
4) LST like AU Kanimbla but with LST bow, 450 Marines, 30 AAV’s, 4 helos ($450MM)
5) LPA/LKA like Charleston/Paul Revere, 900 Marines, 2 heavy cargo holds, 8 helos ($350MM)
6) NGFS frigate, with 3 5-inch guns and rocket launchers, 100 Marines, helo pad and RHIB launcher ($400MM)
As these ships come into the fleet, convert existing LHAs/LHDs to small carriers by adding sponsons, angled decks, and waist cats, and the San Antonio class to ABM/BMD ships (the HII model).
All ships would carry several SeaRAM and Phalanx, and be built to Navy damage control standards. With some spreading around to spread risk, the air det, HQ/supply company, and part of the infantry battalion ride on the LHA/LHD. The tank company rides on the LPH. The artillery company rides on the LPD/LSD. The amphibious armor company rides on the LST. The infantry battalion rides mostly on the LPA/LKA. The special forces/commando det rides on the frigate, which can insert them by boat or helo.
This PhibRon costs about $3.8 billion, or what a current LHA/LHD costs, and several smaller ships spread the risk better than one LHA/LHD. A big part of the cost savings is living with an 18 knot SOA (instead of 20+ knots), which also allows a real LST that can beach with a dry ramp. I would trade 2 knots for a PhibRon that can get in close enough to do an actual amphibious assault. The LHA/LHD would probably operate 25-50 miles offshore, in order to conduct flight ops, with the rest of the ships going in close to conduct the assault. This force could do an amphibious assault or any of the other missions being envisioned by the Marines.
Then train, train, train realistically with this force, to perfect it.
You're really hung up on the whole accounting aspect rather than the strategy. Where, in any realistic China war scenario/strategy, do you see any use for an amphibious assault? There simply isn't one. That being the case, none of the rest of the accounting manipulations of the fleet structure matter.
DeleteA MEU is far too small for any war operation. Review the WWII island assaults. They were all many times larger than what you're discussing. There is simply no use for a MEU sized force in war.
The Commandant has one aspect correct: there is no use for tanks in the Pacific under any reasonable scenario. I disagree with what he then decides to do with them (drop them) but that's another matter.
I need to get you to think realistically-operationally. Do that first, then focus on accounting!
My conception of the utility of having a marine corps is to consider them as part of the overall ground warfare budget.
DeleteYou would have:
Light infantry (army)
Airmobile infantry (army)
Airborne infantry (army)
Mechanized infantry (army)
Rangers and special forces (army)
Amphibious light infantry (marine corps)
Amphibious mechanized infantry (marine corps)
The marine corps units can fight alongside the army units in the same way that airborne infantry can be used as light infantry.
Of course the question of how much of the navy's resources you want to allocate to this capability is a real concern.
But I think that it might be necessary at some point to perform an amphibious landing in some place like South Korea, or the Philippines, or Okinawa (or Kuwait).
Even the threat of an amphibious landing can tie down a disproportionate number of enemy troops to defend a potential amphibious landing location.
Oh, I forgot to add armor units (army) in the list of ground forces.
DeleteWell, I am a CPA so yes, I do pay attention to the numbers. But not the only thing, and that’s not driving my thinking. Personally, I think we need a military capability that could beat the entire rest of the world—and never use it, because nobody dares pick on us and we don’t go around picking on them.
DeleteI don’t see any scenario in which we would conduct an opposed amphibious assault on the Chinese mainland. But I also don’t see that as a viable reason not to maintain a significant amphibious lift capability. Number one, I don’t think peer war with China is the only eventuality that we have to prepare for. Number two, I can see littoral and amphibious operations being important in several ways in the first island chain, and I think that is where we need to contest China. China obviously seems to think that building a substantial amphibious force is critical to whatever it wants to do. So maybe we need a comparable or preferably stronger amphib force.
You say I should be thinking realistically-operationally, so what do you see as a realistic operational concept to prosecute a peer war with China?
Part of me thinks that in a true peer war with China, the only naval assets of much use would be SSBNs and SSGNs. Those are probably the only assets with which we could make any kind of strike deep into internal China. But those aren’t of much use in any other scenario.
Your proposed fleet has a lot of carriers, 27 IIRC. Are you contemplating carrier strikes against the Chinese mainland? Given their A2/AD capabilities, that seems a pretty risky endeavor. I have a lot of carriers too, 24. What I see them doing initially is 1) denying China use of the seas beyond the first island chain, and 2) providing air cover for cruise missile and other land attack platforms to get close enough to strike. When China’a A2/AD is significantly disabled, I could see moving carriers closer for air strike missions. That is, if we have to fight. But if I can win without fighting, I’d rather do it that way.
Since I’ve asked you for your vision, here is mine. I don’t think there would be anything but losers in a peer war with China. At some point, somebody is losing badly, so they press the nuke button, and that will not end well for anyone.
What I’d rather do is beat China like we beat Russia. Bribe up an alliance around the first island chain, focus on holding that chain against Chinese aggression, and basically let their economy eat itself. Get as much manufacturing as we can out of China. Bring critical stuff home, and use cheap consumer manufacturing as a bribe to build that alliance. It’s more a geopolitical strategy than a military strategy. And if we are going to contest at the first island chain, I can see lots of uses for littoral and amphibious forces there. It’s not a, “contain them outside the first island chain,” strategy, it’s a, “stop them short of the first island chain,” strategy. If China sails an amphib force toward somewhere as a demonstration, we sail an ARG to the same place, just to let them know we are there.
We obviously need a military to back up any geopolitical strategy. Until China comes somewhere close to us in carrier and submarine quality and numbers, they aren’t really going to be a legitimate peer-on-peer threat. While we have the advantage, let’s rewrite the rules a bit in that part of the world. Have a CSG and an ARG operate regularly in the China Sea. I’m not talking about stupid FONOPS, I’m talking about regular operations. Do training assaults with local forces on first island chain islands. Make regular port calls in Cam Rahn, Da Nang, Singapore, Sepanggar, Subic Bay, and, yes, Kaohsiung. And once we are firmly established make it very clear to China that if they misbehave, we cut off their oil and pretty much close down their supply chains past the first island chain.
We are already in Cold War II, and the enemy is China. If we can win it like we did Cold War I, let’s do it. Be ready in case we can’t, but do it if we can.
"I think that it might be necessary at some point to perform an amphibious landing in some place"
DeleteThis is the 'what if' argument and, by definition, it can't be countered. Since anything is theoretically possible, we ought to maintain an infinite sized military because, hey, what if …?
The reality is that we have to make some judgements based on LIKELY scenarios and size our forces accordingly. When you begin to consider likely scenarios, there are none that call for amphibious assaults. I've posted on this. If you can come up with a likely amphib scenario, I'd love to hear it.
"What I’d rather do is beat China like we beat Russia."
DeleteNo one would dispute that! I'm all for it. The problem is that outcome seems highly unlikely. China bears only limited resemblance to the Soviet Union.
"If China sails an amphib force toward somewhere as a demonstration, we sail an ARG to the same place, just to let them know we are there."
This is where you lose me. An ARG (or carrier group or our entire military) won't do any good if we aren't willing to use them. We already have ships sailing around the South China Sea and it hasn't slowed China's territorial expansion activities one bit. China has eagerly sought to confront us while we, on the other hand, have meekly backed down every time. So, you just sailed your ARG into the area. Now what? Are you advocating actually invading an island before a war is declared? If not, you've accomplished nothing and you lost me.
"make it very clear to China that if they misbehave, we cut off their oil"
You're willing to impose a blockade backed by military battles during peacetime? Cause, if you aren't, your blockade is worthless. Chinese shipping isn't going to stop just because you say so. They'll keep going and, if need be, escort their tankers. Now what? Are you going to sink them? If not, you're just drawing fake lines in the sand.
So I guess my question is what do you see as LIKELY scenarios and what kind of force do we need to prepare for that?
DeleteHow would you see a peer war with China going, and what do we need to do to prepare for that?
What other contingencies do you see as likely, and how should we prepare for them?
CDR Chip, do you recognize what you're doing? You're crafting responses that you think will thwart China BASED ON WHAT YOUR, REASONABLE, RESPONSE WOULD BE! A reasonable person, such as yourself, would throttle back if confronted with an ARG. China does not respond that way. They see your 'show of force' as the bluff that it is since they know you're unwilling to actually use it during peacetime.
DeleteAll of your plans and responses are completely reasonable - IF YOU WERE DEALING WITH SOMEONE WHO REASONED THE WAY YOU (THE WEST) DO. But … you're not. China is not reasonable by our standards. Therefore, you need to come up with new approaches/responses that will actually work. So far, the only actions that China responds to are ACTUAL applications of force (financial force, military force, diplomatic force, etc.).
Do you understand this fundamental concept? If you do, then you can stop crafting your peacetime, 'for show' ARGs or whatever because they're ineffective. You might want an ARG for war (I see no need for one) but that's another matter and, likely, a completely different force structure and level.
Okay, with that out of the way ...
"How would you see a peer war with China going"
DeleteHmm … should I use a second paragraph to describe the entire course of a war with China or can I sum it up in just a single paragraph? :)
The answer has been presented throughout this blog. I've described victory conditions (it's not containment!), how to achieve them, the force structure we need, etc.
Is there a specific aspect you'd like me to address?
"What other contingencies do you see as likely, and how should we prepare for them?"
DeleteThat's a very good question and the simple answer is that all other scenarios are subsets of a major war with China. If we're prepared for a war with China then, by definition, we're prepared for all other scenarios. That's why I keep focusing on major war.
In contrast, you have a tendency to focus on the subsets with the implied hope that your subset-crafted forces will be able to combine into an effective major war force. That's unlikely to be true. You'll be doing exactly what the Navy does: cobbling together odds and ends (though better odds and ends than the Navy, I'll give you that!) and hoping they meet the major war needs. Hope is a poor force structure!
Design a major war military and then you won't have any trouble cobbling together a subset force for some lesser contingency.
Don't let the tail (subset contingencies) wag the dog (a major war).
Now you understand my focus on major war.
"If we're prepared for a war with China then, by definition, we're prepared for all other scenarios."
DeleteI don't think that's necessarily true. On a smaller scale, the Brits were totally focused on their role fighting WWIII against the Soviets (ASW in the GIUK gap), and that left them almost totally unprepared for the Falklands. They won on grit and professionalism, but it was a nearly run thing. On more our scale, if we are really aiming for a peer war with China, we need to put everything we have into SSBNs and SSGNs (more of the latter) because those are the only things that are apt to be useful in an all-out peer war. But they have almost no utility in other scenarios.
There are several points where I think we agree:
1) If you don't train for a major war, then it doesn't really matter what you have, it won't work when the balloon goes up.
2) The Navy has gone stark raving bonkers over shiny technology, when they should be focusing more on what would work in a war.
3) Fighting wars that we don’t intend to win are colossal wastes of lives, limbs, time, and money.
4) The USMC concepts being advanced by the Commandant make no sense.
Where we may differ is what to do about it. My idea is that we should have the strongest military—including Navy, obviously—in the world, strong enough to take on all the rest of the world and defeat them, and never have to use is because nobody dares pick on us and we don’t go around picking on them.
What threat are we going to have to meet? The one we don’t prepare for. Because our enemies know what we are prepared for (they have intel too) and they are going to hit where we are not ready.
"China does not respond that way. They see your 'show of force' as the bluff that it is since they know you're unwilling to actually use it during peacetime."
DeleteAnd I think we need take steps to disabuse them of that notion.
"All of your plans and responses are completely reasonable - IF YOU WERE DEALING WITH SOMEONE WHO REASONED THE WAY YOU (THE WEST) DO. But … you're not."
The east and the west think differently. In a military context, they believe that they can win by outlasting us, no matter about body counts and territorial occupation, and all of the things that we foolishly have worried about in Vietnam and Afghanistan and Iraq. If we don't have the wherewithal to outlast them, then live to fight another day on a different hill. We are wearing ourselves out in places that don't mean anything to us, and where whoever wins is not going to be our ally.
I take a more geopolitical view. China can be a formidable foe, but they have some weaknesses. They have serious internal fights. They are trying to impose a communist totalitarian state on people who don’t like each other. The warlike north around Beijing doesn’t get along well with commercially-oriented Shanghai and the Yangtze valley, and the south around Hong Kong and other good harbors is more focused on international trade than national unity. They are keeping it together now by exporting large volumes cheap consumer goods and “investing” the cash flow in domestic projects that have no economic viability (like the empty cities) but which they hope will keep the people too busy to have time to revolt. Give them enough bread and circuses to keep them happy. The whole thing falls apart if they can’t get oil and they can’t export stuff.
If we control the first island chain, we threaten both of those essentials. And if we control the sea beyond the first island chain, we can pretty much strangle them if we want or need to. So my geopolitical strategy for winning Cold War II, just as we won Cold War I, is to bribe up an alliance throughout the first island chain. Containment says let them have the first island chain and contest them beyond that. If that’s our approach, then soon it’s going to be the second island chain, and then Hawaii, and then the west coast. I’m saying get in their face at the first island chain now, and put a stop to it. And if we are going to fight at any point along the first island chain, it’s going to be a littoral/amphibious affair.
Yes, their A2/AD is a problem, particularly as we get closer to the Chinese coast. That’s why I am very skeptical about any scenario to attack the mainland. But other than Taiwan, the first island chain is kind of at the outer reaches of their A2/AD umbrella.
If we put a CSG and an ARG, with proper escorts, in the China Sea on an ongoing basis, then we actually have more naval force there than China has to oppose us. It’s like keeping troops in western Europe.
"the Brits were totally focused on their role fighting WWIII against the Soviets (ASW in the GIUK gap), "
DeleteExactly my point. They were NOT prepared for a major war. Because of their limited size/budget, they were only prepared for a small segment of a major war and, hence, were unprepared for the Falklands subset. We are not the UK. We are (or should be) prepared for a total, major war.
"we need to put everything we have into SSBNs and SSGNs"
Not even close! While we do need to build up our sub forces, we also need to be able to escort convoys, provide ASW prosecution, provide local air superiority (carriers), defend against ballistic missile attacks, patrol peripheral areas, etc., none of which subs can do, at least not effectively or desirably.
"You're willing to impose a blockade backed by military battles during peacetime? Cause, if you aren't, your blockade is worthless. Chinese shipping isn't going to stop just because you say so. They'll keep going and, if need be, escort their tankers. Now what? Are you going to sink them? If not, you're just drawing fake lines in the sand."
DeleteNo, but what I am willing to do is to make it abundantly clear that we can and will do that in wartime. And we can do it in places where there really isn't anything China can do to stop us. We don't actually stop or sink them in peacetime, but we make sure they understand that we would do that in a heartbeat in wartime. And we can do that totally outside their A2/AD umbrella, so we can strangle them without having to go in harm's way.
If we control the first island chain (through alliances with Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam), then we have the ability to cut off their oil flow through the Straits of Malacca or anywhere through the Indonesian archipelago. That’s on the outer reaches of their A2/AD capability.
If we pull out of the Mideast, their oil flow is threatened at the Straits of Hormuz, and they really can't do much about that. And getting it around India is always going to be a problem too. That's why they have built all those ports in the Indian Ocean. Those would be the bases for PLAN to use to protect their oil flow. So guess what, one idea for amphibious assaults would be to seize those ports and deny them to China.
If they have to convoy tankers, they run out of ships in a hurry. If they have to pick them up at the Straits of Hormuz and escort them around India and the long way around Australia (another ally) they simply can’t do it, particularly if we have control of the seas in the Pacific, which is another part of my approach.
In that case, they pretty much have one alternative--invade Siberia. IIRC, that's Clancy's scenario in one of his books. I think we can make a lot of hay triangulating Russia against China.
Maintaining control of the first island chain is inherently a littoral strategy, and would almost certainly require a large amphibious component. I can easily see putting Marines ashore to protect and island from Chinese assault, or even to retake an island that China had captured.
Another use of amphibious assaults might be assaults against those artificial "islands" that they have built in the SCS. An assault against China itself makes no sense because 3,000 Marines can't beat hundreds of thousands of PLA soldiers. But they don't have hundreds of thousands on their artificial islands, because there isn't room for them there. That brings us into range of their A2/AD, so we might want to disable or impair that first, but doing that could be a cruise missile objective.
I'm trying to beat China without having to risk major units against their A2/AD in the China Sea, because I don't think that's a winning strategy. Since they are dependent on things from areas that they can't control, we have ways to do that
I guess my bottom line is that I’m trying to come up with a strategy that would work, and then prepare to execute it. I still don’t quite understand what is your workable strategy for beating China, or how you plan to execute it.
PLAN isn't really building a navy that can fight us. They are building a navy that can overwhelm Vietnam or the Philippines or Malaysia or Singapore or Indonesia. If we put a big enough force in there on a regular basis, and make it clear that we would oppose any move against any of the above, then China's problem gets very complicated in a hurry.
Delete"And I think we need take steps to disabuse them of that notion."
DeleteSo you're willing to start shooting, on occasion? If so, I agree completely. If not, you're bluffing.
"they have some weaknesses."
Of course they do. As do we. However, whether those weaknesses will ultimately destroy them is a highly debatable question and the amount of territory they can annex and the amount of damage they can cause before they implode is, potentially, staggering. Also, why would they not think we would implode under our weaknesses before they do? We're seeing urban versus rural fights, cities run amok, deep political divides, morals and ethics being tossed aside, and so on. They likely think we'll implode!
Feel free to hope that they'll implode but hope is a poor strategy. I prefer a rock solid military option WHILE WE APPLY ALL THE GEOPOLITICAL PRESSURES YOU DESCRIBE. Hey, maybe we'll get lucky and they'll implode and we won't need my military approach but at least we'll have the option!
"If we control the first island chain,"
You keep saying this but the reality is that we don't control it and most of it is either leaning Chinese or under direct threat from the Chinese. I'm all for attempting to reverse some of those Chinese gains, the reality is we've already lost that fight although it will take some time for it to finalize. The Philippines, for example, are already lost (Chinese emigration and resultant civil and financial domination at the local levels has already assured the long term result). Vietnam is already lost with China steadily encroaching further on their territorial waters and fishing grounds. And so on.
"If we put a CSG and an ARG, with proper escorts, in the China Sea on an ongoing basis, then we actually have more naval force there than China has to oppose us."
???? Have you checked the Chinese fleet numbers and land based air power? They'd outnumber us a hundred or a thousand to one.
"invade Siberia."
DeleteYou need to acquaint yourself with the Russian-Chinese pipeline projects. In a war, China will have an assured, steady flow of oil from Russia and, with some careful use/rationing, would be near energy independent - certainly enough to wage war for many years, at least.
Of course, we could always attack the Russian pipelines but that would bring Russia into the war against us!
"and make it clear that we would oppose any move against any of the above, then China's problem gets very complicated in a hurry."
DeleteHow would we possibly convey that threat in a believable way? China has already seen that we're taking a hands off approach to their incursions into Vietnamese territorial waters, a hands off approach to their annexation of Philippine territorial waters and islands, a decidedly non-committal approach to supporting Taiwan, and absolutely ignoring their annexation of contested islands. Why would they possibly believe we would commit military force to protect some minor island nation?
"Exactly my point. They were NOT prepared for a major war. Because of their limited size/budget, they were only prepared for a small segment of a major war and, hence, were unprepared for the Falklands subset. We are not the UK. We are (or should be) prepared for a total, major war."
DeleteBut if our preparation did not include a significant amphibious capability, we would not be any more ready than the Brits were for that kind of engagement.
"Not even close! While we do need to build up our sub forces, we also need to be able to escort convoys, provide ASW prosecution, provide local air superiority (carriers), defend against ballistic missile attacks, patrol peripheral areas, etc., none of which subs can do, at least not effectively or desirably."
Subs actually can do ASW. They are probably the most effective ASW platforms we have. We don't want boomers chasing subs, but SSGNs--at least VPM Virginias--certainly can.
But my larger question is this. How long do you expect a war with China to last? Some of those things really only come into play in a prolonged conflict, and I would expect any war with China to be over pretty quickly.
One thing that gets overlooked is how much of a military effort they have to make to keep their country together. If we put that under pressure, then they have a really hard time mounting a war effort.
"So you're willing to start shooting, on occasion?"
DeleteYep. But first make it absolutely certain that we would be willing to start shooting. Sending two destroyers to pass 10 miles offshore from a Chinese "island" as a FONOPS exercise is bluffing. Having a CSG with proper escorts operate routinely in the area says, "This just got real." Sending that CSG through the Straits of Formosa says, "Don’t mess with us."
I wonder about one idea. Since we like to send unmanned vehicles through the area, and since they like to pick them up, why not send through a USV stuffed with high explosives? PLAN destroyer picks it up, then it explodes. One less Chinese destroyer. And it would be hard to blame us.
"However, whether those weaknesses will ultimately destroy them is a highly debatable question and the amount of territory they can annex and the amount of damage they can cause before they implode is, potentially, staggering."
Potential means they haven’t done it yet.
First thing is to stop them expanding further. Truman didn’t turn the Soviets around, but he bribed up an alliance that kept them from going further.
Reagan didn't hope the Soviets would implode, but he applied the proper pressure to make it happen. I think it’s pretty obvious what would kind of pressure would dismantle their whole system. So do it, or at least be prepared to do it.
“You keep saying this but the reality is that we don't control it and most of it is either leaning Chinese or under direct threat from the Chinese.”
While we have had our heads buried in the sands of the Mideast, China has severely outflanked us on several fronts. But I don’t think it’s irreversible. And I see CV-19 as giving us a huge opportunity. There is now considerable pressure to get manufacturing out of China. Bring the essential stuff home, so we can control it. But the cheap consumer goods would be a huge bribe to get people onboard. Europe probably leaned as hard toward the Soviets in 1945, so we bribed them up with entry into our markets. We can offer a similar deal to the first island chain countries, and that could mean 10-15% GDP growth for some of them.
Vietnam and the Philippines are the furthest gone for now. But they aren’t really essential, particularly to an oil-denial strategy. If we get Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, and Australia onboard, that’s all we need to cut off their oil. If Vietnam and the Philippines see the economic boom in those countries, they’ll be ready to come along. And they are all plenty angry over China’s occupation of “islands” in the SCS.
Right now, China can bully them. If we make it clear that they would have to deal with us, the bullying stops. It's like the kids who picked on you in school until one day your big brother showed up.
"Have you checked the Chinese fleet numbers and land based air power? They'd outnumber us a hundred or a thousand to one.”
Yes, in the upper part of the SCS. But down around the Straits of Malacca is some pretty long sortie times and distances for land-based air. If we build alliances with Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, we can oppose them with our land-based air. They’ve got 2 small carriers, 12 SSNs, 60 SSKs, 46 destroyers, 49 frigates, 71 corvettes, and 109 missile boats, and the latter two probably have to stay close to home. If they sent that whole navy against a CSG, yes, they might win. But that’s not really doable, because doing that exposes them in the north. Half that navy against a CSG with proper escorts, and we probably win. The submarines would be the biggest problem, particularly given the way we have let our ASW skills atrophy. But you and I are both in agreement that we need to up our ASW game significantly. And again, like with Russia, there is a real question how many of those can actually get underway and fight.
I don’t have any doubt that we need to be prepared to beat China militarily in a peer war. But I also think it makes a lot of sense to have options to prevent that.
"You need to acquaint yourself with the Russian-Chinese pipeline projects. In a war, China will have an assured, steady flow of oil from Russia and, with some careful use/rationing, would be near energy independent - certainly enough to wage war for many years, at least.
DeleteOf course, we could always attack the Russian pipelines but that would bring Russia into the war against us!"
China produces about 5mmBbl of oil per day (and that number has been declining), and consumes about 13mmBbl (and that number has been rising rapidly), meaning they must import 8mmBbl from somewhere. Last I saw they were getting about 2mmBbl a day from Russia. With the new Russian pipeline that number could double. That still leaves 4mmBbl a day to come from somewhere, mostly the Mideast. Taking a 30% cut requires a lot more than careful rationing, particularly when they would be trying to prosecute a war, and when they basically have to bribe peace in their own country.
One thing I don't know is how much more oil they can actually get from Russia. I worked on some Siberian oil and gas deals back in the 1990s, and at that time all the Russians really wanted was the natural gas for the Trans-Siberia Pipeline, so the US partners were free to take the oil and sell it on the world market (mostly to Japan) to get their profits out of the deal in a useful currency.
No way would I attack Russia. I'd be more inclined to try to triangulate Russia against China.
"How would we possibly convey that threat in a believable way? China has already seen that we're taking a hands off approach to their incursions into Vietnamese territorial waters, a hands off approach to their annexation of Philippine territorial waters and islands, a decidedly non-committal approach to supporting Taiwan, and absolutely ignoring their annexation of contested islands. Why would they possibly believe we would commit military force to protect some minor island nation?"
Simple. Stop taking a hands-off, non-committal approach. Get in their face a bit. We don't have to shoot them and start a war, but we can make it pretty clear that we would be willing to do so. Apple would probably have a heart attack, but so what? It's US foreign policy, not Apple foreign policy.
"I would expect any war with China to be over pretty quickly."
DeleteJapan and Germany required several years to defeat. I expect a China war to last at least as long or longer. Both sides have fairly large initial capabilities which will gradually dwindle but, at the same time, both sides will be gearing up their industrial capacity for war and continually feeding more units into the war. It will last a LONG time.
"We don't have to shoot them and start a war, but we can make it pretty clear that we would be willing to do so."
DeleteActually, you DO have to shoot them. Until you prove you'll shoot, it's just bluff. As the Fonz once said about intimidation, 'at some point you have to have hit someone'.
Once you've shot them, THEN you can threaten and be believed. Until you shoot once, ...
"Japan and Germany required several years to defeat. I expect a China war to last at least as long or longer. Both sides have fairly large initial capabilities which will gradually dwindle but, at the same time, both sides will be gearing up their industrial capacity for war and continually feeding more units into the war. It will last a LONG time."
DeleteWell, if it lasts a long time, then that is long enough for cutting off oil and exports to bring them to their knees. What happened with the Soviets is that we made noises for years but never really looked like backing them up with action. Then Reagan upped the ante, and Gorbachov realized at some point that he couldn't compete, so he had to back down.
We need to play some Truman (bribe up an alliance to contain them) and then play some Reagan (let them know in no uncertain terms that we will shoot if we have to, and that we've got the bigger guns by far).
"Actually, you DO have to shoot them. Until you prove you'll shoot, it's just bluff. As the Fonz once said about intimidation, 'at some point you have to have hit someone'.
Once you've shot them, THEN you can threaten and be believed. Until you shoot once, ..."
Obviously, if the objective is to convince them that you will shoot, then at a certain point you have to shoot or lose all credibility. My objectives would be 1) to convince them that we will shoot before it gets to that point, and 2) if it gets to that point, don't miss. Our problem is that we back down way before it ever gets to that point, so we have zero credibility. Get in their face and stay in their face, and my guess is that they will chicken first.
Right now, we can still beat them in any war. While we have the advantage, mark our territory and don't give in, give up, or give out.
" My objectives would be 1) to convince them that we will shoot before it gets to that point,"
DeleteMy objective is to win the jackpot lottery five times in one year. Offhand, I'd say I have a much better chance of that than you do of convincing China that you're serious about shooting. If we didn't shoot when they seized our EP-3, seized our UUV, annexed islands illegally, seized the entire South China Sea, [you're not going to make me go through the entire litany of things we backed down from, are you?] then there's absolutely nothing you can do to convince them that we'll shoot, other than by actually shooting. The sooner you admit that to yourself, the sooner you can begin making realistic plans.
So, having acknowledged that you have to shoot first, it only remains to create a situation in which you can do so under semi-controlled conditions. In other words, you need to manufacture an incident that gives you at least the pretext of righteous shooting.
" my guess is that they will chicken first."
Because you've seen them do so … when? It's ALWAYS been us who blinked first. Your confidence in being able to intimidate the Chinese is impressive given the total absence of any supporting evidence! :)
"if it lasts a long time, then that is long enough for cutting off oil and exports to bring them to their knees."
Even at the end of WWII, Germany and Japan both continued to produce enough oil to operate their economies and militaries (admittedly in weakened conditions). Those countries were a fraction of the size and resources of China. China, with careful rationing, vastly increased oil imports from Russia (yeah, I'm pretty sure Russia will happily increase oil exports to China to help them in a war), and much larger domestic oil production can last almost indefinitely - certainly several times longer than tiny Germany and Japan.
China's increased oil consumption is largely fueled by consumer 'luxury' (cars, for example). That consumption would be drastically curtailed in a war both by government decree and by the fact that huge numbers of the consuming civilians will be conscripted into the military. They won't be driving their cars if they're marching towards the Americans!
I'm sorry but I don't see any great oil weakness of the level you believe. Russia, in particular, is going to hugely bolster China's oil supply in a war, just to spite the West.
I wonder if we really could still take on China. All US military war games are classified and the civil think tank ones aren't exactly optimistic. I think we have passed the point where we could "safely" win, at this point, we still might be prevail, maybe, if everything still goes our way....that's not a good recipe for success. By 2025 at the latest, in my book, we lose everytime.
DeleteIf we not ready for war with China and definitely not an all out slug match, what are the other options? Hope to keep Hawaii? Learn Chinese?
ComNavOps, what I'm proposing is a major change in how we approach things. We STOP backing down. Let them know first and then do it.
DeleteThis is Cold War II, and this time China is the enemy. We need to adopt that viewpoint now, and act accordingly. One huge problem we have in attracting allies in that part of the world right now is almost certainly a perception that we won't be there when needed but will back down. Tell them right now that Taiwan is out of bounds for them, and we will fight over it.
As far as the oil, I think it will have a bigger impact than you do. The oil-driven economy is one reason why Beijing doesn't have to deal with open revolt from Shanghai south. Those folks don't like each other, not to mention the Muslims and Tibet in the west. As long as they can be bought, Beijing is okay. Start curtailing their ability to do that, and they may not be able to maintain domestic control. These are not people who are going to be wiling to cut back consumption for the good of Beijing.
As far as Russia stepping up to fill the gap, I think one place we are missing a major opportunity is not trying to triangulate Russia against China. They've always had some pretty significant differences. If we can somehow assure Putin that he is not facing a major invasion from the west, I think he will play ball with us.
NICO, I think we can for now. But if the Navy stays with its ridiculous "building" program and China keeps going with theirs, by 2030 we will probably not be able to take them on and win in the SCS. But they still don't have a lot of blue water capability. Their carriers are no match for ours, plus they don't have enough. They have some nice looking frigates and destroyers, but does everything on them really work? A lot of their naval shipbuilding has been in the amphibious area (75 ships). They are not taking an amphibious task force across the Pacific to invade California, or even Hawaii, any time soon. Their forces are being built not so much to fight us, but to intimidate the minnows around them. Right now, I'd guess their primary objective is Taiwan (hence the large amphib capability). I think we have to get in their face on Taiwan.
But first, I think we have to get out of the Mideast. We are killing ourselves fighting wars that we don't intend to win, and in some cases that we don't even want anybody involved to win. We need to quit wearing out those forces so they would be available to respond to China if needed. Getting out of the Mideast has one other huge advantage. If we aren't guaranteeing safe passage through the Straits of Hormuz, then they have to do it themselves. That's probably a tall order for PLAN as it exists today. It will certainly force them to divert a lot of resources for a considerable period of time.
@CDR Chip. I think we can agree on getting out of ME or at least getting away for awhile would be a nice start. Let China be ME policeman for awhile and divert resources and deal with that mess.
DeleteOne other thing we might agree on: let's make it harder on China, not just military but other "softer" fronts. China is putting a ton of money in Africa, I've only been there twice but I didn't get the feeling Africans were so hot on Chinese investing and generally their products. This is where US soft power and some money could go a long way, we should be trying to get all the little "minnows" like you said to be on our side and present some sort of common front, let's not make it easier on China by USA pissing everybody off, let's make it harder! We need a fully coordinated State Dept and DoD working together with some kind of vision of where we want to go and how to get there. Maybe then we can have "show the flag" by USN that actually mean something and really exercises with the little "minnows" that actually show the Chinese that it won't be a cake walk....
Taiwan is next, right after China finishes with Hong Kong, maybe a few more months, 1 year tops and Hong Kong as we used to know it is gone. That's just around the corner, maybe 2 or 3 years, what is USA doing to do and consequently USN doing to do about Taiwan invasion? I think it's China's next move, I don't think much of this China-India skirmish. Taiwan is more important and is next on China agenda for sure IMO.
NICO, absolutely. We have to realize that we are in Cold War II and China is the new enemy. I don't think we are anywhere close to that mindset now.
DeleteI don't think we can do anything about HK. It's gone. I am so glad I got back with my son to visit one more time, for 2017 HK 7s rugby, before everything cratered.
I don't know whether we can save Taiwan or not. If we don't start immediately, I doubt we can. China is obviously building a huge amphib fleet (75 units as of now, from large to small) for some kind of assault, and Taiwan is the obvious target.
I don't think anybody is all that excited about Chinese investment, but they've pumped money in when nobody else did. If we had spent the money that we've wasted in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria in the last 18 years and spent that outbidding China in South Asia and Africa, we'd be in a far stronger position today.
"The reality is that we have to make some judgements based on LIKELY scenarios and size our forces accordingly. When you begin to consider likely scenarios, there are none that call for amphibious assaults. I've posted on this. If you can come up with a likely amphib scenario, I'd love to hear it."
DeleteOK, I'll give you a couple, particularly if you go with my hold-the-first-island-chain-and-choke-them-to-death strategy. One, land Marines either to hold an island against a Chinese invasion, or to retake an island that the Chinese have taken. Two, take out some of the Chinese "artificial island" bases.
Neither of those touches mainland China. I agree that if you sent 3,000 Marines against hundreds of thousands of Chinese, that's a suicide mission. But they aren't apt to have hundreds of thousands on one island in the chain, and certainly not on one of their artificial islands. There just isn't room for them. 3,000 Marines with proper armor and artillery, and with proper air and NGFS support, could easily win the day in those cases.
Air superiority could be a problem, particularly as you get closer to mainland China, and operating under their A2/AD umbrella could be extremely difficult. But both of those are strained to their limits at the far south end of the China Sea, and that's where you can really hurt them, because that's where you cut off a) their oil and b) their exports to South Asia, Africa, and Europe. Obviously, keeping Vietnam on our side to prevent Chinese bases down closer to there is another significant consideration.
Yes, they have hundreds and thousands of aircraft to send against us. But if we are talking about Java or the Straits of Malacca, those aircraft have to come from a long way away, which means a long transit time and not a lot of fuel to hang around over the target, and we should be able to greet them in rather unfriendly fashion.
If the first island chain is gone, then we have to craft a different approach. But it's not gone yet, and we have considerable ability to prevent its going. We just need to recognize that we are in Cold War II against China, and react accordingly.
Two other points.
DeleteOne, if they send a massive air attack against us way down south, that pretty much leaves the back door wide open. We could attack the mainland from the north relatively easy if they send everything down south. So even with thousands of aircraft, the number they are going to have available to engage us down south is much smaller.
Two, no we are not going to land on territory of other sovereign nations. But if China is bearing down on the Philippines, my guess is that the Filipinos would welcome US forces to join with theirs to defend their islands. We just need to pull our heads out of our rear ends and realize that the real threat to our interests is in the South China Sea, not the Mideast. And getting out of the latter actually complicates China's problem significantly.
"land Marines either to hold an island against a Chinese invasion, or to retake an island that the Chinese have taken. Two, take out some of the Chinese "artificial island" bases."
DeleteThe first is not a specific example. It's a generic 'land on an island'. What island? Strategically, what island does China have or would it likely seize that we would want to occupy? I don't see any.
The second, involving the tiny artificial islands, does not warrant occupying the islands. You just drop a handful of cruise missiles on them and they no longer exist. If we occupied them, China would do the same to us. So, again, no assault needed.
"My conception of the utility of having a marine corps is to consider them as part of the overall ground warfare budget.
DeleteYou would have:
Light infantry (army)
Airmobile infantry (army)
Airborne infantry (army)
Mechanized infantry (army)
Rangers and special forces (army)
Amphibious light infantry (marine corps)
Amphibious mechanized infantry (marine corps)
The marine corps units can fight alongside the army units in the same way that airborne infantry can be used as light infantry.
…
But I think that it might be necessary at some point to perform an amphibious landing in some place like South Korea, or the Philippines, or Okinawa (or Kuwait).
…
Oh, I forgot to add armor units (army) in the list of ground forces."
Anon, my problem with this approach is that the Marines lose any distinctive characteristics and might as well just be part of the Army. This is analogous to the way they have been used in Iraq and Afghanistan, and frankly in Vietnam. Why Westmoreland assigned the Marines to the mountainous I Corps and gave the Army the riverine Mekong Delta still baffles me, except that Westmoreland pretty much got everything else wrong in that war too. If anything, I think the Marines have moved too far in that direction, and that is one of their problems.
I still think a lot of their problem is that they are struggling to find a viable mission that can be performed off the LHA/LHD platform, and there simply isn’t one. The LHA/LHD was one of those “great” ideas that nobody really thought through.
The Marines need something distinctive to justify their existence. I see two things:
1) They have combined arms--infantry, artillery, armor, airmobile, mechanized, and air--at a very small unit level with integrated command. This gives them the ability to punch well above their weight.
2) They are specialists in littoral and amphibious operations.
I can also imagine a third. Like the Royal Marines, they could put a heavy focus on irregular/commando/special operations. Not intending this as political commentary, but one of the few places where I agree with Senator Schumer is that we need a much larger special ops capability. It seems to me that should be right up the Marines' alley. Having small Marine units on destroyers, frigates, and submarines that could deploy ashore on raids and other covert ops seems like a no-brainer. And an ARG could include a spec ops unit that does the kinds of things that the “junglies” did for the Brits in the Falklands. Of course, SEALs do some of that now, but it is a capability that I think could stand to be increased significantly, and having the Marines augment it seems like a no-brainer.
I could see a USMC of 140,000 active—90,000 rotating 1/3 at a time into ten ARGs of 3,000 each, 30,000 in a commando/special operations capacity, and 20,000 administrative and training.
The Navy is going to have to support these missions with an amphibious fleet and NGFS ships that can permit them to do their job. That means adding battleships with 16-inch guns and cruisers with 8-inch guns, and moving the amphibious force away from LHAs/LHDs to more conventional ships that can operate within 3-5 miles of shore in order to conduct legitimate amphibious assaults.
I can see a CONOPS where Marines secure beaches and ports and could conceivably operate up to 50-100 miles inland to seize key objectives (such as an airport to bring in troops and equipment by air). Once Marines have secured them, then Army and Air Force come in and carry the conflict further inland. I see no role for Marines to occupy territory and perform policing duties as they have done in Afghanistan and inland Iraq. In addition to the places you list, I can see a need for amphibious assaults in a war with China—anywhere around the first island chain, and against the “artificial island” bases.
Consistent with that CONOPS, smaller units of Marines could also conduct raids and commando/special operations from the sea. In and out, git ‘er done, and be gone, basically.
"The first is not a specific example. It's a generic 'land on an island'. What island? Strategically, what island does China have or would it likely seize that we would want to occupy? I don't see any."
DeleteUntil China takes--or tries to take--an island, I don't know which one. There are literally thousands of islands in the chain, and it could be any one of them.
But China is building a huge amphibious force (2 LHD, 8 LPD, 32 LST, and 33 LSM, 75 total) with the obvious intent to conduct an assault, or at least threaten one or more, somewhere. Seems to me we need to have some ability to counter that.
Obviously, we can just say we will sink them all if they make the attempt, and they could say the same for our phib force. But I just think we need to have more options in mind than that.
"The second, involving the tiny artificial islands, does not warrant occupying the islands. You just drop a handful of cruise missiles on them and they no longer exist. If we occupied them, China would do the same to us. So, again, no assault needed."
Possibly, but again, I think we need to have more options in mind than just that.
"There are literally thousands of islands in the chain, and it could be any one of them."
DeleteNo, not really. Only islands that are military value would be under consideration. That means an island with an air base, essentially. How many of those are there? Not that many. How many of those do we have rights to ? None. How many would China seize that we might want to retake? Again, not many, if any. That brings us back to the tiny artificial islands. Sure, we could seize one or build our own but they'd be destroyed by a handful of cruise missiles, as I noted.
The only islands that China might seize that we would want to retake would be Taiwan, which I doubt we'd even attempt given our half-hearted support, currently, or the Philippines which would probably welcome China, given the current Philippine govt, and that would put us in the position of being a foreign invader on the global stage.
Sure China might seize an island from Malaysia or Indonesia or some such but we would have no basis to even attempt to retake such an island unless invited by the appropriate govt and that doesn't look likely.
As I've said, no one can argue against the 'what if' case (nor can it be supported) but maintaining an entire Marine Corps for the unlikely 'what if' is fiscally unsustainable and unwise.
"Until China takes--or tries to take--an island, I don't know which one."
I can't fault you for this statement because you're not a professional warrior. However, this is EXACTLY the kind of war planning that our professional warriors should be doing - anticipating what moves China would make. I do it on my individual scale and even I can see that the number of strategic moves that would make sense for China, given their stated and implied goals, is pretty limited. It's just the US War Plan Orange. We knew pretty much everything Japan would do and what we would do in response. Pleading that there are too many possibilities is the sign of an incompetent commander (again, that's not you because it's not your job).
I encourage you, to the degree you're interested, to consider China's goals and then study a map and try to anticipate what their military moves might be. They're really fairly limited and predictable and none involve us needing to seize and island, as far as I can tell.
Having unlimited options is, theoretically, great. However, with real world budget limitations that's not doable. You have to pick the most likely scenarios and build your military for those.
And, of course, if you believe the Commandant, we can reduce the Marines to a couple dozen platoons and call it a day! :)
ComNavOps,
Delete"However, this is EXACTLY the kind of war planning that our professional warriors should be doing - anticipating what moves China would make."
But I would argue that my ideas for the USMC make more sense than what those professional warriors are coming up with. So either they are idiots or they are working with constraints that limit their options unreasonably. I think it's the latter, and I think the constraint is the LHA/LHD. Basically you can't get anything ashore from them other than airborne light infantry, so they become a light infantry force. The problem is that then they have to look around for viable missions, and there just aren't any.
Since as you note I am not privy to the information available to those professional warriors, the other possibility may be that they may know something that makes it all make sense, but I don't see how.
As far as anticipating China's moves, I think their first move is against Taiwan. Whether we should or should not oppose that is moot, because right now we have no ability to do so.
Number one, we need to get out of the Mideast. That does two things. One, it frees us up from a commitment that is tying down way too many of our troops and assets for what it is worth at this point. That gives us way more forces to apply to the SCS if needed. Two, it complicates China's problem, because now they have to look at the possibility of having to convoy oil tankers through the Straits of Hormuz and all the way home. If they have to do that, that uses up a lot of PLAN as currently constituted.
But suppose we do concede Taiwan. What next? Going after Japan or South Korea would seem to be an awfully expensive proposition for not a lot of strategic gain. Going south against Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and perhaps ultimately Singapore and ultimately India, seems a lot more logical, particularly since that addresses their oil supply chain and their trade routes with South Asia, Africa, and Europe.
DeleteI think the real problem is that we have a threat but no realistic strategy to deal with it. As I see it, we are already in Cold War II, and the enemy is China. So how do we win? Number one, China has a same problem that the Soviets did. They are a land power with very little in the way of naval expertise or tradition. They can build nice looking ships, but whether they really know how to fight them is another matter, as is whether they can support them with adequate logistics. I don't think we can beat them on the ground, at least not without great expense. But we have the advantage at sea, particularly if we can build up an alliance like we did in western Europe. Number two, like the Soviet Union, China is an amalgam of people who don't have much in common and don't like each other very much. The warlike Han around Beijing have little in common with the commercial Shanghai and the Yangtze Valley, and neither really has much in common with the south around Hong Kong, which is more focused internationally than domestically. And that doesn't even consider the Muslims and Tibet in the west. China is always going to have to expend considerable energy internally in order to hold itself together. Number three, China has a much stronger economy than Russia did, but it still has feet of clay. Their MO right now is to export cheap consumer products and use the cash flow to invest in make-work projects that make no economic sense, in order to keep the public too busy to revolt. I know you don't think oil is that big a problem for them, but you take away imported oil and exported consumer goods, and their whole economic model falls apart. And without that, they can't keep the peasants in line. Yes, they could impose a 30% cut in war time. But they can't keep Shanghai and Hong Kong and the Muslims and Tibet in line if they do that.
The Chinese military, and in particularly PLAN, is not being built to take on the USA. It is being built to intimidate its neighbors. Why have such a large amphib force, unless your mission is to threaten neighbors with invasion? You're not going to invade the US. With satellite intel, an amphib force moving at 15 knots wouldn't make it halfway before being destroyed. So as far as anticipating what kind of moves China would make, I see them going after Taiwan and then moving south to take over the southern elements of the first island chain, at least to the point that they can secure passage from home through the Straits of Malacca.
So I think we do like Truman and bribe up an alliance to contain them. And then we do like Reagan and put their economy under pressure to break them. The problem I see with bribing up that alliance is that unless and until we have a standing face (CVBG and ARG/MEU at minimum) operating there all the time, they're not going to believe they can count on us. And right now, without that, they pretty much have no choice but to give in to China and hope that China goes no further. But you and I both know that China has every intention of going further, unless and until we get in their face and say "no mas." And yes, I see a role for my kind of USMC in that effort. I also see a role for conventional as well as nuclear carriers, battleships, cruisers, ASW frigates, real amphibs (to carry and land those Marines and their equipment), SSGNs, SSNs, SSKs, and true littoral combatants (corvettes, patrol ships, and mine warfare ships) in that effort. What I don't see is a role for Zumwalts, or the Navy's version of Littoral Combat Ships (which basically aren't built for the littorals), or money in the budget for Fords, or amphib "assaults" conducted off LHAs/LHDs.
DeleteThe problem I have with the "we can build them if and when we need them" approach to amphib ships is that we may not have time, and if we don't build them and train with them we will not know how.
My geopolitical strategy is this. One, hold on to the first island chain (and I would include Taiwan and I'd be willing to shoot to do that). Two, deny China free use of the seas (or threaten that use massively) beyond the first island chain. Three, put enough pressure on their economy to sink it. That's basically the Cold War I game plan, part deux. It worked once, I think it would work again.
"One thing I don't know is how much more oil they can actually get from Russia."
DeleteCheck out this series of white papers on China's strategic oil vulnerability.
https://leadingedgeairpower.com/2015/10/13/the-strategic-interdiction-trilogy/
"Check out this series of white papers on China's strategic oil vulnerability."
DeleteThe section on oil is interesting but has two problems:
1. It's significantly out of date. It was written prior to 2015. Since then, the Russia-China oil pipeline has doubled overland import capacity. Further expansions are planned, as I understand it.
2. It assumes unchanged demand and usage during war. Neither assumption would be true. Strict rationing would be implemented and domestic consumption would, presumably, plummet as 'luxury' consumption came to a near-halt. It also makes no attempt to predict the degree to which Russia would increase oil shipments to support China. It does note a 25% or so overcapacity in refining which means increased oil shipments could be accommodated.
Regardless, it's an interesting article. Thanks for the link.
1. Pipelines are easy targets, assuming we are willing to strike the Chinese mainland. And if we knock out the refining capacity, it doesn't matter how much crude they import.
Delete2. Interdiction strategies only work if you can reduce capacity below a critical threshold of consumption. So yes, if they ration, they might be able to stay above that threshold.
Let’s take a look at China’s oil situation in more depth.
DeleteChina’s domestic oil production has been steadily declining, from a high of almost 5 mmBbl/day to currently about 3.8 mmBbl/day (https://tradingeconomics.com/china/crude-oil-production).
China’s oil consumption has been increasing rapidly and was 13.8 mmBbl/day in 2018 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_oil_consumption, per International Energy Agency) and has been on a steady rising trend since 1970. Of that consumption, per https://leadingedgeairpower.com/strategy/reinventing-the-cartwheel-a-strategic-interdiction-campaign-in-the-pacific/, the breakdown was roughly as follows in 2011 (latest year available, would not expect major change since then):
Industry (including electricity generation) 39.7%
Transport 35.3%
Construction 5.6%
Agriculture 3.2%
Retail 1.1%
Other 6.3%
Non-production 8.8%
There’s just not a lot there that can be cut without severe negative impact. Perhaps some discretionary transport can be cut, but a substantial portion of that is going to be industrial/commercial that conceivably would be needed, or even increase, to support a war effort. There just isn’t a lot of discretionary transportation. By comparison, transportation is roughly 65% of our oil usage, so they obviously don’t have anything even remotely approaching our discretionary transportation.
That leaves China needing to import roughly 9.7 mmBbl/day. Below are the top 15 countries that supplied 90.1% of the crude oil imported into China during 2019 (source http://www.worldstopexports.com/top-15-crude-oil-suppliers-to-china/):
1. Saudi Arabia: US$40.1 billion (16.8% of China’s total imported crude oil)
2. Russia: $36.5 billion (15.3%)
3. Iraq: $23.7 billion (9.9%)
4. Angola: $22.7 billion (9.5%)
5. Brazil: $18.5 billion (7.8%)
6. Oman: $16.4 billion (6.9%)
7. Kuwait: $10.8 billion (4.5%)
8. United Arab Emirates: $7.3 billion (3.1%)
9. Iran: $7.1 billion (3%)
10. United Kingdom: $6.3 (2.7%)
11. Congo: $5.54 billion (2.3%)
12. Malaysia: $5.5 billion (2.3%)
13. Colombia: $5.4 billion (2.3%)
14. Libya: $4.8 billion (2%)
15. Venezuela: $4.4 billion (1.9%)
These amounts are in dollars, not mmBbl/day, but at 15% we can determine that Russia was supplying about 1.5 mmBbl/day, and the Mideast is supplying about 44.7% or 4.5 mmBbl/day. Assume with the new pipeline that doubles to 3 mmBbl/day. Assume further that in a wartime scenario China could cut find some way to cut its energy demand by 30% (although that seems pretty unrealistic given the usage pattern above), or to roughly 10 mmBbl/day. Assume it gets 3.8 mmBbl/day from domestic production, and 3 mmBbl/day from Russia. That leaves 3.2 mmBbl/day that has to come form somewhere else. China does have a Strategic Petroleum Reserve with about 204 mmBbl (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum_industry_in_China), or about 65 days of imported oil at that rate. Russia might be able to step up a bit, but that's going to be limited. And I think the 30% consumption cut is a very optimistic number given the relatively small discretionary consumption. But that’s it.
In any kind of protracted war, China runs out of oil pretty quickly without sea-borne imports. If we could triangulate Russia and get it into a more friendly position (and we have some chips to offer Putin), then they could be in a world of hurt in a hurry.
So, yes, I think oil interdiction is a valid wartime strategy. And I think threatening that oil supply chain is a valid peacetime strategy.
You're ignoring an awful lot of history. Every country that goes to war implements substantial rationing of … well … just about everything. Consider our own example in WWII where almost everything was severely rationed.
DeleteConsider the example of Germany and Japan who managed to maintain oil supplies for their military right up to the very end (admittedly reduced as time went on) despite overwhelming blockades and attacks on their supplies and factories/refineries.
You're making zero allowance for any wartime adjustments in consumption behavior and that's totally unrealistic as demonstrated by history.
"You're making zero allowance for any wartime adjustments in consumption behavior and that's totally unrealistic as demonstrated by history."
DeleteNo, I'm actually making fairly significant adjustments. I was assuming a 30% reduction in an economy where there is very little discretionary energy usage. 35% of their oil usage is transportation. In the USA that number is 65%. We have way, way more discretionary transport (that can be cut as it was in WWII) than they do. We could cut 30% of our oil usage easily. I'm not sure they can, not an prosecute a war effort at the same time.
Plus, there is a demographic issue. China is composed of a bunch of people who don't like each other at all. The warlike north doesn't get along with the more commercial Shanghai and the Yangtze Valley, and Hong Kong and the south are a totally different world focused more on external trade than internal cooperation. And that is not to mention the Muslims in the west or Tibet in the southwest. Add to that a dictatorial regime and you have the seeds for a lot of discontent. Right now China holds it all together by exporting cheap consumer goods in large volume, and using the cash to finance make-work projects to keep the dissidents too busy to revolt. Take that away, and it's going to take a major effort just to keep internal turmoil down to a tolerable level. And the folks doing that aren't available to serve in the army or navy. It all comes unglued pretty quickly if they can't keep their economy going.
"They are getting rid of tanks and artillery because there is no reliable connector to get them to the beach from the LHA/LHD."
ReplyDeleteThis would be a legitimate objection, normally, but Usual Military Procedure for such issues is just to ask for a few cool billions for something called like Future Networked Connector Project that won't work but ensure plenty of funding for a decade or three.
"This would be a legitimate objection, normally, but Usual Military Procedure for such issues is just to ask for a few cool billions for something called like Future Networked Connector Project that won't work but ensure plenty of funding for a decade or three."
DeleteBut ensuring plenty of funding for a decade or three (or at least until I retire) is what constitutes "working" in the Pentagon these days.
Anyone else struck by the sheer irony of reducing operational USMC F-35s by 37%?
ReplyDeleteA multi-service platform whose compromise air frame design was damn near dictated by the USMC's demand for VTOL capability? Forcing aerodynamic, performance, range, and payload penalties on the other versions.
Absent that massive engineering constraint, imagine what the F-35 could have looked like. How very much better it might be.
I'm actually all for the ability to operate VTOL/STOVL aircraft from pocket carrier flight decks. But it's mind-boggling that they're now cutting away the very caboose that was allowed to drive the original design/procurement train. Yeah, I know that budgetary issues and available flight deck concerns are driving this. But...
I have to wonder what could have been had the USMC F-35 tail not been allowed to wag the USAF/USN F-35 dog.
Wonder no more; it would have been a much cheaper & longer-legged aircraft available to operational squadrons years sooner than it was.
DeleteAnd I don't know if it's really any better for the USMC's needs than the AV-8 Harrier.
DeleteNo F-35 might have driven Italy and Britain down the cats and traps route with Rafale or F-18 but it would have driven Australia, Japan, Spain, Korea etc permanently down the helicopter route thus weakening allies in key regions and placing more burden on the USA.
DeleteThe way I see it, the Navy needed three different airplanes:
ReplyDelete1) An interceptor/fighter with long-range detection capability and weapons, plus maneuverability and visibility in case it did get caught in a dogfight.
2) An attack aircraft with long legs, stealth, and a heavy bomb load.
3) A "Marine A-10" for close air support that could operate off carriers and short or unproved airships and could carry a big bomb load.
F-35 doesn't have the maneuverability or visibly for the interceptor fighter. It doesn't have the legs or the bomb load for the attack aircraft. And all things considered, the AV-8 is probably a better "Marine A-10" than the F-35.
I would go a different direction. Focus on two primary aircraft,
Delete1. A long-range, multi-role, stealthy, air superiority aircraft. (e.g. F/A-22, FB-22)
2. A long-range, multi-role, stealthy, drone wingman that can keep up with 1.
There are limited spots on a carrier, having the most flexibility is important.
Drones and the fighters work together. A group of drones managed by one or more fighters. Due to the this workload, a two-seat fighter might be preferable.
" drone wingman"
DeleteIf you're talking about a non-existent, far future drone, sure, you can imagine anything … a Terminator in the air.
If you're talking about anything we can actually achieve in the next thirty years, what would this drone wingman do? We don't have the AI to actually be a stand alone combat aircraft - you even acknowledge this by referring to a managing aircraft. So what is this drone going to do and how is any pilot going to fly his own aircraft in a life and death aerial battle AND manage a fleet drones?
You've potentially got some major league hand-waving away of problems going on here.
There is current work on air-to-air AI. I really don't think that much AI is needed for the actual engagement. Intelligence is needed to set up the engagement, but that's what the manned fighters are for.
DeleteEven if they aren't that smart to begin with, they can still be used for a variety of roles. And you still have a high-end manned fighter backing them up.
The drones extend the eyes and reach of the manned fighter out past enemy missile engagement ranges. In a future where it's stealth v stealth, IRST may become a primary means of detection. But that probably also shrinks the range of detection down to the far more mutually deadly WVR zone. Letting drones take the brunt of casualties in this situation therefore makes sense.
With two crew per manned aircraft, the back-seater becomes the drone manager, while the front-seater flies and fights the aircraft.
"There is current work on air-to-air AI."
DeleteJust to put this in perspective, we've failed utterly to develop even a 'simple' logistics program (ALIS) for the F-35 despite many years of effort. Developing a combat AI is in the realm of fantasy.
Consider the incredible number of variables that a pilot has to take into account. A one-on-one would be hard enough but aerial combat is inevitably a swirling chaos of multiple aircraft, multiple threats, a hundred choices per second, shifting priorities, etc. Not possible.
" Letting drones take the brunt of casualties in this situation therefore makes sense."
Not even a little bit. Consider the logic of the situation. If you're proposing a drone aircraft that has any hope of flying and fighting on par with a manned aircraft, the drone has to be just as good as the manned aircraft. Just as fast. Just as maneuverable. Just as stealthy. Just as big. In other words, it has to be a duplicate of the manned aircraft in every respect except a pilot's seat. What do you think that will cost?
We're building $100M F-35s and China is building their equivalent. If you want an unmanned drone that can match that performance, the drone is going to cost the same $100M. That kind of a drone IS NOT EXPENDABLE.
You, and a lot of military people, need to really think the whole drone wingman concept through.
Now, a really basic, non-lethal drone that is just a flying sensor to do some scouting is a possibility but even that is going to be very expensive. If the simple sensor drone has to keep up with combat aircraft then it has to be a pretty high performance aircraft in its own right.
Have you thought about the communications aspect of all this? How are the drones going to communicate to send sensor data and receive commands? The bandwidth required to transmit real time sensor data from multiple drones is staggering!
What happens when the enemy applies jamming and you can't communicate with the drones? Line of sight doesn't work when both the drone and controller are radically maneuvering to stay alive.
Seriously, think this through!
"There is current work on air-to-air AI."
DeleteThis is not directed at you, Anon2, but I swear that our military thinkers get their ideas from Star Wars movies rather than engineering principles. Their grasp of reality is tenuous, at best.
We do have partially self-driving cars now, as well as programs that can beat grand masters at chess and Go.
DeleteAI has come a long way.
I think you over estimate the complexity of air combat.
You also over estimate the level of performance needed. Recent air combat has shown that supersonic speeds and
high-G maneuvering isn't really required anymore. Drones just have to get within a favorable weapon geometry and let the missiles do the work.
"I think you over estimate the complexity of air combat. "
DeleteIf you're equating a simple game of Chess/Go or driving a car with air combat then I think you hugely underestimate the complexity of air combat.
As we've seen throughout the history of air combat, you can teach anyone to fly a plane and not crash but only a very, very few pilots can actually become effective combat pilots.
"high-G maneuvering isn't really required anymore."
Wow! That is some staggeringly optimistic belief. You would have been right at home with all the military 'thinkers' who declared dogfighting over - and, of course, we know how that turned out.
Wow!
In your example, you also have shown how ineffective development and testing AI has to be done and still get such abysmal results. Partially self-driving cars that you are referring I would assume is the Tesla ones and i would address it as such. You have to understand the humongous amount of information for such a unit to function, it has been developed to use satellite images, self-driving information from test driving cars and sensors that it brought with itself. It also has thousands of hours of simulation being done for every single possible scenarios. Imagine such luxury is afforded to any combat vehicles? In real warfare, satellite connection will be jammed, information from other combat units will be loss and sensors will be damaged. I will admit technology are not meant to be perfect but this type of mistakes are a lot more complicated to solve than you would assume. And your example about beating grand-masters at chess and Go? If you have the time, there are several blogs detailing how this result was achieved, but i will shorten it for you. Firstly, this is a new type of AI (deep-learning AI) which requires it to monitor several information and the corresponding action for situations, the more developed it is, it will had more information about the previous prerequisites that i would doubt the military could have such a luxury to develop counter to everything to be able to utilize such AI effectively. Secondly, the AI has analyzed billions of hours of chess game to came out with that results and i will remind you that it's a game with rules and fixed enemies, and lastly in record-able information. Real war is fought with a lot of guesswork and even mind-games to deceive the enemy. I would say that i don't know the best about air combat but according to what you say, what stopping us (or the enemy) to just mass produce simple planes equipped (presumably next-gen) air to air missiles that can destroy the enemy just by flying into the favorable weapon geometry. I don't get by what "recent air combat" you are referring to but if you remember the F-4 Phantom, it also have the same presumptions that it will led the missiles to do the work and remove the guns. This ended up proven to be false where the NVA planes simply outrunned (or outmaneuvered) those missiles, leaving the F-4 defenseless (the same trap we are walking into with the F-35C and B variant).
Delete"I don't get by what "recent air combat" you are referring to but if you remember the F-4 Phantom, it also have the same presumptions that it will led the missiles to do the work and remove the guns. This ended up proven to be false where the NVA planes simply outrunned (or outmaneuvered) those missiles, leaving the F-4 defenseless (the same trap we are walking into with the F-35C and B variant)."
DeleteThat F-4 "lesson" was 50 years ago, at this point.
The last air-to-air gun kill I'm aware of was a Venezuelan F-16 vs an AT-27 Tucano in 1992 - 28 years ago.
Virtually every kill in the past 40 years has been via BVR or WVR missiles.
Even back as far as ODS, very few air-to-air engagements involved any ACM at all. US aircraft never exceeded 650kts.
We have the luxury of being able to train AI against itself and against top flight human pilots as many times as is necessary. Note, in my model, AI still has a human managing the battle. It doesn't have to be THAT smart. It isn't flying a fully autonomous mission. It needs to be smart enough to take the workload of flying the drone, maintaining formation, and the details of employing weapons out of the hands of the human. The human guides the drones with high-level commands and maintains overall control.
Similarly, Telsa's self-driving modes still require human monitoring and intervention, but they do reasonably well under many circumstances. Self driving is a MUCH harder problem for AI than flying or even employing A2A weapons. The driving environment is at least an order of magnitude more complex. Being a few feet off in any direction can be deadly.
And in my model, if the A2A aspects of the drone takes longer to mature, we still have a capable, manned A2A fighter and a drone that can be used for less demanding missions.
While I'm sure that this is not the reason Berger is doing this, perhaps there is a role for these regiments. Let's assume a conflict with China occurs in the South China Sea and the USA smashes the PLA Navy and wipes out the PLAAF - what then? The USA can't occupy China, it won't exterminate the population, it probably can't even kill off the Communist party, so what does it do? How does it stop China becoming a threat again?
ReplyDeleteWith air superiority established, perhaps small units can be transported by a glorified LCU safely and be based around key Chinese mainland ports to lob in missiles every time they start to build something new or just to keep an eye on things around the coast or on key rivers. Anything inland would have to be looked after by the air force.
There seems to be a lack of thought about what happens after the CVBGs go in.