Wednesday, January 29, 2020

SSBN and New START

This post is just a point of interest that I hadn’t been aware of.  I’m sure many of you knew about this but for those, like me, who were unaware, it’s just a bit of information.

The Navy’s Ohio class SSBN submarines were built with 24 missile tubes.  However, due to provisions of the New START treaty (effective 2011) with Russia, each sub has had 4 of its missile tubes permanently deactivated resulting in just 20 functional tubes/missiles.(1)  I was unaware of that.

As a brief reminder, 18 Ohio class SSBNs were built, however, the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review study resulted in a reduction in the requirement from 18 to 14.  The 4 subs that were deemed unnecessary were converted to guided missile subs (SSGN) each of which can carry 154 Tomahawk missiles.

START was conceived for a two-power scenario (US-Russia).  Is this still wise and viable given the rise of China as a global threat?  START constrains the US while China is unconstrained.  Is this wise?



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53 comments:

  1. We have 1,365 deployed nuclear weapons (over 6,000 total). The Chinese have ~290.

    I think we're ok.

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    1. Estimates of warheads varies wildly and all data seems to be ten years old or more. Warhead numbers vary from around 200 up to 1000 with old estimates stating that China has enough fissile material for up to 1000 warheads. Again, that's estimates from a decade ago.

      More importantly, the issue is less the number of warheads and more the number of effective delivery systems. Old estimates, again, credit China with 50-100 ICBM, including submarine SSBNs.

      China's Jin class SSBN has 4 active with 4 more building. Each carries 12 ballistic missiles.

      Finally, the issue is not whether we have a numerical advantage today, it's whether it's wise to allow ourselves to be constrained by a treaty that China is not party to.

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    2. The JL-2 SLBMs on the Jins only carry one nuclear warhead each. All of their current and projected Jins will carry less warheads than one of our Ohios, even with treaty restrictions.

      If they ever get close or pass us, we can reevaluate our treaty restrictions.

      And even if the Chinese someday have as many or more deployed warheads than we do, does that really matter? How many times over do we need to be able to destroy the entire world before we have "enough" nukes?


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    3. "If they ever get close or pass us, we can reevaluate our treaty restrictions."

      Fair enough for the time being.

      Notably, China has begun deploying DF-5B ICBMs with MIRV warheads. It's only a matter of time until the SSBNs also carry MIRV'ed missiles.

      If you (seem to?) believe that just a handful of nukes is 'enough', then what's the point of any nuclear treaty that merely tries to reduce the excessively huge number of weapons by just a small amount? Aren't we wasting time and just kidding ourselves, in that case?

      Do you have some realistic approach to nuclear disarmament that you think would produce a useful result? Do you have an approach in mind that you think China would participate in?

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    4. @anon2:

      "If they ever get close or pass us, we can reevaluate our treaty restrictions."

      Currently the strategic balance is interesting. I've seen some estimates that claim that China "only" has 40+ delivery platforms capable of striking the lower 48 states. Assuming perfect countervalue strike - all warheads hit, no failures, no interception, no dispersion of the population - you're looking at maybe what, 50 million US dead?

      To be sure, that's a heavy blow, but the US right now still has enough ICBMs to respond in kind and utterly destroy China, and a China that is firing nukes at American cities is a China that America will fire nukes back at in response. And there's a strong argument to be made that 50 million citizens is the cost of completely eliminating nuclear China as a threat forever.

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    5. China is also developing a new, supposedly stealthy, strategic bomber which could give them a nuclear triad, albietly, smaller than ours.

      At a top level, New Start allows us to field 700 deployed bombers and missiles, 1550 deployed warheads, and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers (missile tubes and bombers). When is China expected to reach or exceed the New Start levels? At present, they seem to be quite far from those achieving those levels. But, you raise a valid concern. And, though no longer in effect, the same concern applied to the INF Treaty, which constrained us against China as well.

      New Start focused on bombers, SLBMs, and ICBMs. Another potential strategic threat is air-launched ballistic missiles which would have capabilities similar to a sub-launched missile. And, if the threat is real, one could include hypersonic missiles into a new agreement as well.

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    6. "And, if the threat is real, one could include hypersonic missiles into a new agreement as well."

      Agreement with whom? China, Russia, or both? Given that China has opted out of participating in any nuclear limitation treaties, thus far, would you think it likely they'd participate in any new treaty? Also, given their blatant disregard for the treaties they've signed, like UNCLOS, would there be any point in even entering into an agreement with them?

      "hypersonic"

      I very much like your mention of hypersonics as a possible treaty-inclusion item. Again, though, all the same concerns about China's participation and adherence apply.

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    7. CNO said, "If you (seem to?) believe that just a handful of nukes is 'enough', then what's the point of any nuclear treaty that merely tries to reduce the excessively huge number of weapons by just a small amount? Aren't we wasting time and just kidding ourselves, in that case?

      Do you have some realistic approach to nuclear disarmament that you think would produce a useful result? Do you have an approach in mind that you think China would participate in?"

      1,300+ deployed nukes is a lot more than a "handful".

      Every nuke we bilaterally reduce is two nukes (one US, one Russian) that can't be stolen, sold to the highest bidder, accidentally/intentionally launched, or have an accident with. So yes, it is worthwhile to reduce the overall number of nukes even by small amounts.

      Plus, it's money we don't have to spend to operate, maintain and upgrade them.

      What is the goal of nuclear "disarmament"? Zero nukes? That doesn't seem realistic.

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    8. "1,300+ deployed nukes is a lot more than a "handful"."

      I was referring, as you seemed to, to China's couple hundred.

      "two nukes (one US, one Russian) that can't be stolen, sold to the highest bidder, accidentally/intentionally launched, or have an accident with. So yes, it is worthwhile to reduce the overall number of nukes even by small amounts."

      Good and fair point!

      "Plus, it's money we don't have to spend to operate, maintain and upgrade them."

      Also good point, although if you even have one nuke you have to have the entire bureaucracy to operate, support, secure, etc. them.

      "What is the goal of nuclear "disarmament"? Zero nukes? That doesn't seem realistic."

      So what, beyond the points you made, is the goal of nuclear disarmament, in your opinion? Or, are those points the only benefits?

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    9. "So what, beyond the points you made, is the goal of nuclear disarmament, in your opinion? Or, are those points the only benefits?"

      The goal, basically, should be to make the world a safer place.

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    10. "The goal, basically, should be to make the world a safer place."

      Laudable but not useful or practical. As you stated, between the Russians, Chinese, and US we have enough warheads to destroy the world many times over. How does eliminating a few more make the world a safer place?

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    11. "Agreement with whom? China, Russia, or both? Given that China has opted out of participating in any nuclear limitation treaties, thus far, would you think it likely they'd participate in any new treaty?"


      I was thinking a trilateral deal between China, Russia, and the US, but I'm not sure China's arsenal is at a level that requires a START-like treaty. Perhaps, we could start with a treaty limiting hypersonic and/or air-launched ballistic missiles first.

      And, Russia isn't exactly treaty follower either as the previous administration first accused Russia of breaking the INF treaty in 2014.

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    12. "Laudable but not useful or practical. As you stated, between the Russians, Chinese, and US we have enough warheads to destroy the world many times over. How does eliminating a few more make the world a safer place?"

      I've stated a few above. Some other notable reasons include,

      1) Honoring the second pillar of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty.
      2) Use of disarmament as a bargaining chip for other goals (military or otherwise).
      3) A continued trust/confidence-building measure between rival nations.
      4) More fuel for conventional reactors (we have or will burn up to 20,000 Russian nukes' worth of fuel as the result of arms reduction treaties).

      Whether all these add up to a convincing justification is a matter of opinion.

      Personally, I think there's still room for us to drop further, down, perhaps to 800-1,000 deployed "treaty" warheads. (e.g. 1 bomber = 1 warhead according to New START) Perhaps 3-400 single-warhead ICBMs, 50-100 nuke-capable bombers, the rest SLBMs.

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    13. "How many times over do we need to be able to destroy the entire world before we have "enough" nukes?"

      "Whether all these add up to a convincing justification is a matter of opinion."

      On the one hand, you seem to feel that anything beyond the ability to blow the world up once is a waste so I'd think you'd be unhappy with any nuclear arms reduction treaty that doesn't drop the world's stockpile below that threshold. On the other hand, you seem to think that relatively minor reductions are worthwhile despite leaving enough weapons untouched to still destroy the world many times over. That seems inconsistent logic.

      Now look, I'm not really trying to argue or debate this. I'm trying to point out that when it comes to nuclear issues, most people fall into irrationality and inconsistency with whatever approach they espouse. It's the main reason why I generally avoid doing nuclear posts. People just lose the ability to think objectively and rationally.

      So, based on your stated position about destroying the world many times over, wouldn't you view any treaty that leaves a thousand or more warheads for each country unaffected as completely pointless? Even the benefits you've put forth can be achieved unilaterally while still leaving us unconstrained and with enough weapons to destroy the world many times over.

      I get the surface allure of accomplishing something versus nothing but the insignificance of the something is stunning for the level of effort that has to go into it!

      Is there a better version of nuclear arms reduction treaty that you think would actually accomplish something worthwhile? Should we, perhaps, be focused less on numbers of warheads and more on other aspects such as delivery mechanism limitations or fissile fuel production limitations or some other aspect? In other words, is there some other aspect of this that would produce a greater benefit?

      Again, I'm not really disagreeing or arguing, just exploring the rationale behind all this and whether better options/approaches might exist. What do you think?

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    14. My problem is I don't have a good feel for what the "right" final number of warheads or deliver systems is for us. What is "enough"?

      I don't think it can be zero. I think the world will be a less stable and less safe place if we go to zero nukes, however attractive that may sound.

      I think "enough" is the number we need to have a robust deterrence, that cannot be knocked out in a first strike, is sustainable long-term with the least funding, and provides a flexible response short of full-scale launch (e.g. triad). Keeping more than that is a waste of resources and leaves the world modestly less safe (due to factors mentioned above).

      That number is likely larger than the number needed to cause massive damage to the planet and our species. I don't really see a way around this, unfortunately.

      I've given a number of reasons why incremental steps are valuable and not at all insignificant, even if they don't reach the "ideal" state. The level of effort to implement them does not outweigh the long-term costs of keeping those weapons.

      Yes, we should also be concerned with delivery mechanisms and fissile fuel production. It's not an either-or.

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    15. "I think "enough" is the number we need to have a robust deterrence, that cannot be knocked out in a first strike, is sustainable long-term with the least funding, and provides a flexible response short of full-scale launch (e.g. triad). Keeping more than that is a waste of resources and leaves the world modestly less safe (due to factors mentioned above)."

      A pretty reasonable answer!

      "I don't think it can be zero. I think the world will be a less stable and less safe place if we go to zero nukes, however attractive that may sound."

      That's an essential recognition of reality. Excellent!

      I'd nominate you for our nuclear arms treaty negotiating team! Good discussion of a very difficult subject.

      Related question: How, if at all, would you address China's supposed (pretty much confirmed, I guess) underground tunnel system? It has the effect of making remote monitoring almost impossible which, in turn, has the effect of making their smaller nuclear force effectively more potentially effective than it might otherwise be based strictly on numbers.

      One also can't help but wonder if the stated number of Chinese weapons might not be significantly greater than claimed. The tunnel system would make a great way to hide uncounted weapons. Perhaps China's inexplicably blasé attitude towards numbers of nuclear weapons is due to their having many more than we think? Pure, irresponsible speculation on my part, backed up by absolutely nothing!

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  2. Everything I've ever heard about China and nuke treaties is that they have zero interest in them...I'm guessing you would need something positive for them to get them to the table. What?

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  3. I recall it was brought recently when Trump got out of INF treaty with Russia and how we needed to work on a new 3 party nuke treaty....I think Chinese response was diplomatic "get lost"....

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  4. “START was conceived for a two-power scenario (US-Russia). Is this still wise and viable given the rise of China as a global threat? START constrains the US while China is unconstrained. Is this wise?”

    I am a fan of revisiting *every* treaty we have and discarding any that no longer benefit the U.S. taxpayer.

    Far too many people, especially those that follow Milblogs, advocate endless commitments of blood and treasure to causes that either no longer serve the USA, or never served the USA.

    This is how you end up with nineteen-year wars (Afghanistan) and trillions of dollars spent on causes that do not benefit the average citizen in Atlanta, or Boise…

    So yes, we need to reconsider START.

    And any future treaty needs to look at the full spectrum of U.S. security needs and do so in the context of changing global situation, and technology.

    GAB

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    1. In very general terms, what would you like to see as the main thrust of any future nuclear treaty?

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    2. Rather than just looking at the number of warheads, perhaps a better way to assess stockpiles or nuclear weapon capacity would be to put total limits on the megaton-age of nuclear weapons each nation can have. This would allow for these small-yield weapons and flexibility around the delivery platform, but still limit the destructive capability of everyone (to a notional level anyway).

      I think any new future treaty should also look at including hypersonics, due to their ability for quick and still devastating strikes, and that they may well be launched in a manner similar to an ICBM. Potentially worthy of debate would be directed energy weapons, but I'm not so sure about that. If mounted on a ship, not really relevant - but if there is potential for a satellite mounted weapon that can strike ground targets in the next 50 years, that may be a different scenario. Possibly I'm going too far with that however...

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    3. "put total limits on the megaton-age of nuclear weapons"

      You're aware that most modern nuclear weapons have variable yields? How would you address that?

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    4. To be honest I have no idea - base it on the maximum yield of any given weapon I suppose (best guess). You asked what the main thrust of a new treaty would be & I likened this idea to limiting the number of troops allowed in a standing army, or the specifications of ships.

      My best attempt at solving global problems anyway! What is your opinion of the hypersonics point?

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    5. "To be honest I have no idea"

      Fair enough. It's a very challenging problem and world leaders haven't yet come up with a solution, either!

      "What is your opinion of the hypersonics point?"

      First, I'm not sure there's a problem. I don't follow pure missile development all that closely but I'm not aware of any functional intercontinental hypersonic missile. Yes, there are ICBMs but I assume we're talking about air launched 'cruise' hypersonics, here. What's the longest range hypersonic supposedly in existence? A few hundred miles? A thousand+ miles? Those are still well short of intercontinental ranges. So, I'm not seeing a problem that's analogous to a nuclear ICBM.

      As far as shorter range hypersonics for use against mobile targets like carriers, no one has yet solved the targeting problem so, again, I'm not seeing a problem.

      At this point, then, hypersonics are like any other weapon: potentially quite destructive in the conventional role against relatively short range targets. We don't attempt to regulate conventional weapons to any great extent (yes, there have been bans on cluster munitions and the now-defunct INF treaty) but those are fairly isolated efforts.

      So, this is a long winded way of saying I'm not yet seeing a driving force for treaty regulation of hypersonics. Ultimately, I'm sure hypersonics will be like every other weapon - all sides will have them and if one side uses them, the other side will, too. Sort of MAD for conventional weapons.

      Am I missing something?

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    6. No, I'd say you're right at this stage about hypersonics, I was just curious as to your opinion, so thank you. If/ when that technology gets more mature that equation may change, but Ifs & Buts....

      Regarding yuor posts' topic, Id agree that START is a bit outdated these days, and not worth being restricted to if China isnt interested in it, which they dont appear to be. Scrap it, but try and find somethign to replace it that includes them.

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    7. "Scrap it, but try and find somethign to replace it that includes them."

      Any thought on what aspects might appeal to the Chinese and benefit both us and them?

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    8. Common ground for USA & China....
      Okay, well economic trade is top of that list, clearly.
      Technology transfer willingly probably isn't an option, but a series of economic incentives (I'm no economist, but maybe tariffs being removed) as milestones towards mutual goals are met might work.
      These goals could include similar principles to what USA/Russia had in the past regarding number of delivery platforms, types of missiles, ICBMs - perhaps there are lessons learnt from that process that would be updated.

      China seems to want to dominate long term through mostly economic means, or slow & stealthy growth. Long term, Russia might be able to realise this threatens them as well as the US (as noted in another reply here) - putting limits on Chinese influence or growth would provide reassurance to other major players - and conversely trigger points for actions against China.

      Second on that list of important priorities for China would be strength. They recognise and respect strength culturally, and as posted here many times, no-one is showing concrete strength against them. Is the answer a NATO-type arrangement against China, with USA siding with the likes of India, Australia, Japan, Sth Korea - heck, maybe even Russia one day when they realise that China is a real threat. Showing real, military strength around them may get them to show interest in a nuclear treaty.
      With or without that alliance, a show of strength will inevitably be needed to address the creeping influence; why not try and curtail it with a nuclear weapon agreement first?

      The first benefits China & the USA through economic growth, including having options for their belt & roads project. The second benefits USA more than China, but in a way that China can see will strengthen their opponents economically more, and more quickly that it will themselves.

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  5. I think from a nuclear weapons delivery platform stand point it is adequate with the current submarine fleet. Will it be okay with the Columbia SSBN having 16 tubes? Is it adequate for the SSGN to have only 16 tubes?

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    1. You've posed the question, now what do you think the answer is?

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    2. I think that so long that you're not carrying nuclear warheads, your SSGN could have as many tubes as practical.

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    3. Short answer, no. I don't think that the Columbia SSBN will be adequate for the nuclear delivery role because I don't see the production of the Columbia submarines keeping up with the retiring Ohio submarines. To have equivalent capability you need to produce 5 Columbia submarines for every 4 START Ohio submarines that you replace or 3 Columbia submarines to replace 2 original Ohio submarines. I don't think that China is any less a threat than Russia was during the Cold War so I would favor having similar capabilities. Additionally, I think the threat to submarines will be greater in the future than currently and we should increase the number of SSBNs to assure deterrence. I don't see the political will to maintain supremacy, so I worry the program will be cut short and we will have fewer, more vulnerable SSBNs.
      154 cruise missiles seem to be a good number for a peer conflict since you would likely need to expend all the missiles on the opening salvo to suppress enemy air defenses and to limit detection of the submarine. You will need more Columbia SSGNs to accomplish the same mission. It will take a tremendous number of missiles to suppress China's air defenses.

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  6. I think we're forgetting that China and Russia watch each other as closely as they watch us. Russia doesn't want out of a ballistic missile treaty to bomb American troops that aren't in Europe or European troops who don't have ammunition.

    Russia does have to watch its Eastern border, the 'Stans (where the belt and road is going) and even the Pacific.

    Both China and Russia are developing non-nuclear weapons that would violate the old restrictions.

    START should be abandoned unless it can be amended to include verified compliance by China. Otherwise it not only constrains us, it puts Russia in an intolerably weak position.

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    1. Interesting perspective. Why do you think China has shown zero interest in nuclear limitation treaties, so far? Being behind in numbers, you'd think they'd have the most to gain by reducing Russian and US numbers.

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    2. No one has asked them for one thing. There is too much prestige to be had in getting invited to that discussion for them to flat refuse. Our over confident war planners probably don't see a reason to do it, either, which is a shame.

      I think China sees their position as much weaker than we do. They are bordered by five nuclear powers and have engaged in small to medium scale fighting with Russia and India recently.

      For China I suspect they are desperate to protect their access to oil. But the use of island bases for land power and conventional ballistic missiles are the tactics of the weaker party (like Iraqi scuds or the Argentine air force before that).

      China's actions indicate that they know their vulnerabilities better than we do. A push for tri lateral negotiations might work for everyone (us included) and Europe has the economic might to tip the negotiations if they would get their thumbs out and use it...

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    3. "A push for tri lateral negotiations might work for everyone"

      Just to play a bit of Devil's Advocate, might China not be better off with unconstrained nuclear growth potential than by simply having Russia and the US give up a relative handful of nukes that still leave both countries with thousands?

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    4. "Interesting perspective. Why do you think China has shown zero interest in nuclear limitation treaties, so far? Being behind in numbers, you'd think they'd have the most to gain by reducing Russian and US numbers."


      The leadership of the USSR seemed to really believe and fear that the US would launch an unprovoked pre-emptive nuclear strike.

      China on the other hand doesn't seem to believe in that ever being a possibility. So for China any treaty restrictions would limit them more, the ball as they say is in their court.

      Though to be honest China doesn't seem particularly interested in nuclear weapons outside of having enough to be a deterrent at least compared to the build up of their conventional forces.

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  7. China doesnt seem to have an interest in a massive nuclear arsenal that rivals ours. They have the ability, but with the exception of producing more modern delivery systems, there doesnt appear to be any push for parity. So any attempt for a trilateral agreement would be veiwed by China as a modern parallel of the Washington Treaty, and they have no reason to artificially limit themselves to weak sister status, whether they seek parity or not...

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    1. They want parity - or superiority! - in every other aspect of financial and military might so why do you think they don't want nuclear parity? That seems incongruent with all their other behavior.

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    2. For nukes once you can kill everyone 3x, the rest is useless. Fewer American than Chinese, Chinese need fewer nukes, we need more. Plus we need enough for the Russians. Don't want to disappoint the preppers.

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    3. I think that once you are looking at a few dozen warheads getting through failures and any countermeasures to strike targets, thats a significant deterrent. Couple that with a reasonably solid assumption that the US isnt going to launch a first strike, and you have a reasonably cheap yet solid position for the Chinese. Now how their thoughts are in relation to the Russians, I imagine its not so comfortable. But as far as parity, I dont think the numbers and pure amount of potential destruction is necessary in order to be at the same deterrent level, and i think theyve realized that. The US and Russia are still living with legacy numbers from a much more heated arms race. Looking at the idea of MAD, it seems that they have enough to play at that level, and maybe they think so too...

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    4. I think they veiw nuclear weapons as everyone else does... Required to deter the other nuclear nations, but ideally never used. Conventional weapons on the other hand are much more useful and likely to be used, so thats where the focus and money is spent, now that they have enough nuclear capability to be a solid player in the MAD game...

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  8. China developed a retaliation nuclear capability. By not being able to launch enough missiles to first strike they wouldn't think of it. They saved a lot of money.

    But China may feel emboldened if under the Russian first strike capability to use tactical nukes (on non us territory like Okinawa).

    But if subs have to fire its already "all over red rover".

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    1. You lost me a bit there. Are you suggesting that China might entertain a first nuclear strike policy on non-continental US territory like Guam and Okinawa? Of course, Okinawa is Japanese territory and would trigger an immediate all out war with Japan.

      I may have misunderstood what you were saying?

      Would you also suggest that the US could entertain a non-continental Chinese territory first strike policy?

      I'll also throw, for your consideration, that merely targeting non-continental territory does not mean that the continental territory would be unaffected. Given wind patterns, radiation could/would spread to other areas, even far off. We've seen this with major volcanic eruptions that deposit ash around the world. For example, if we hit the Chinese illegal islands with nuclear weapons (probably wouldn't make any sense but it illustrates the concept) the radiation might well seriously impact mainland China (I don't know the prevailing weather patterns in that region).

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    2. What I mean is a co-ordinated Russia/China move. After the shooting starts if it goes bad for China they may drop a 2KT nuke on Okinawa (Japan is already in the war). An air burst would do little fallout. But it takes a large base out of the war and gives the US President a hell of a choice. Although there are options, escalate in kind (bye bye islands), escalate differently (precision, perhaps on electricity), ignore, decide to commit suicide and hope for the best.

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    3. If the war were going badly, taking out Okinawa would accomplish little. It is not a major base for the US although the circumstances of the war could, perhaps, make it one. At the moment, the US is sort of pulling out of Okinawa and relocating Marines from Okinawa to Guam due to local unrest.

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    4. FYI This is an article published today about Chinese nuclear restraint and how it's in their interest to participate in future arms control treaty. But also point out the Asian way of restraint (don't frighten your neighbours) v's Western ways (legal documents).

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    5. Here's the link https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-and-nuclear-restraint/

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    6. "Chinese nuclear restraint"

      Interesting article that utterly fails to account for China's complete lack of credibility when it comes to the concept of 'voluntary restraint' and the issuance of 'declaratory statements'. For example, China is a signatory to UNCLOS and yet totally ignored its treaty commitments when they didn't meet China's needs. Or another: China reassured the world that they wouldn't militarize the illegal islands they constructed (in violation of UNCLOS rules and international law and norms, by the way) and then went ahead and did exactly that. And finally, China assures the US that they value intellectual property rights and then proceed to illegally violate US patents at will.

      I can continue to list China's acts of duplicity but the point is that any acceptance of a 'voluntary restraint' or reassuring 'declaratory statements' has been completely negated by their deceitful actions which have proven that their word means nothing.

      With that background, the only acceptable method for arms control is the Euro-centric version with minutely defined requirements and intrusive and extensive verification. If this is not what China would want, they have only themselves to blame. Their actions are achieving their goals but at a price that they will eventually have to pay and, even now, are beginning to see the bills come due in the form of trade wars and increased surveillance.

      The article, while interesting, ignored China's actions and pattern of deceit which makes it impossible for the US to deal with China as a respected equal. Instead, China will be treated as the deceitful liars they are. The article's author completely ignored this aspect and came across as a pro-China apologist.

      So, an interesting but pointless and flawed writing.

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  9. As things went and going, China likely can reach its promise land (if IMF and WB are to be believed) in next 10-15 years without war, and its current minimal nuke deterrence (the number will be below what comes out of proposed trilateral START treaty) is sufficient to stay everyone's hand. So, I think this is a non-issue for them.

    Otoh, Russian sense of security has always been on quality & quantity of arms (especially its SSBN fleet, best security bang for their limited buck), the unintended consequence of scrapping nuke treaty might result in Russian over reaction.

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  10. China has a very small nuclear arsenal in comparison to Russia and the US.
    They do not have the ability for a first strike (a conscious choice made by them decades ago) unlike the US.
    They only have the minimum delivery platforms and nuclear warheads to maintain a plausible counterstrike threat to deter any chance they could be targeted by a first strike themselves.

    The premise of this logic exercise needs to factor that in.
    The reason China was never included in a START type treaty is because their nuclear arsenal and ability to deliver that arsenal is so small in comparison to the US and Russia.

    START was conceived decades ago in the middle of the Cold War, and has actually worked to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world, which is an admirable goal and outcome. It is perhaps out of date to some extent, though the goal of the treaty is still as relevant as ever.

    Meanwhile China has never really expanded her nuclear arsenal in the decades since. She has no strategic imperative to do so. She's never demonstrated any desire to build the kind of nuclear arsenal that would pose a legitimate threat of first strike optionality. Hence the lack of any political push for a START type treaty or any great investment in options for a greater nuclear delivery system on the US side.

    China is focused on modernising and expanding her conventional forces.

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  11. Russia uses nukes to make up the gap in conventional capacity. China doesn't have that problem and spends their money on reaching their policy goals leveraging the gray area. They measure nukes purely using deterrent math, not unlike France. I envy China's freedom to maneuver.

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  12. It did not pop up yet but arms reduction (nuclear arms reduction that is) is part of the bargain in the Nuclear non proliferation treaty. If the two leading owners of the vast majority of the world's nuclear weapons do not work actively toward some reductions thay sorta forfeit the other half of the deal to say for example Iran is violating it.

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