The Marines have
always had a love-hate relationship with armor and its close cousin, firepower
– embracing it when combat occurred and then rejecting it when combat was
over. Recently, over the last couple of
decades, the Marines have been engaged in a steady movement away from heavy
combat power and toward “lightness”. The
number of tanks in inventory has been reduced as two of the four tank battalions
in the 2nd Tank Battalion have been dropped in the last few years
(1, 2) and MEUs have recently deployed without any tanks. The 120 mm mortar was dropped. The number of 81 mm mortars was reduced.
Artillery has also been
reduced. From Col. Clifford Weinstein,
Commanding Officer, 10th Marine Regiment,
“You have to look back
first, because Marine Corps artillery has always been in a state of flux. There
have been times when we’ve had an awful lot of artillery, and there have been
times when we’ve had almost none. The point we’re at now with the budget
constraints, as well as coming off of several contingencies throughout the
world, is we’ve reduced the amount of artillery, to a degree.” (3)
Disturbingly, Col.
Weinstein also had this to say about artillery,
“… we have moved
artillery out of the “area-fire” fires category.” (3)
The abandonment of
area fire is disturbing enough but the mentality it reveals, that combat can be
made into a neat, tidy, precision fire event is even more disturbing.
Not only has heavy
combat firepower been reduced but lightness has been promoted. The Marines are aggressively pursuing drones,
information “warfare”, public relations, light “jeep” vehicles, tiny squad
level quadcopters, etc.
Let’s take a look back
in history and see whence this came.
Prior to WWII, the
Marines had considered the amphibious assault and concluded that they only
needed a light “tankette”.
“The Corps’ unique
pursuit of a tankette of minimal size and capability in the 1930s stemmed from
the limited view of beach defenses and the restricted capacity that ships and
craft of the period displayed. In effect,
the Marine Corps only needed enough of a tank to land and knock out the
opposing machine guns, and then accompany the infantry inland to support a
short-term operation. One discerns the
beginnings of “lightness” as a Marine Corps dogma …” (4)
Thus, the Marines
began WWII with little armor and even less interest in it. Guadalcanal reinforced this perception as the
terrain limited effective tank employment and, in the event, few tanks were
landed with the troops and those that were, were used as mobile artillery and
reserve firepower and, in the view of Corps leadership, did not materially
impact the outcome of the battle.
The turning point in
the Marine’s attitude towards armor came at Tarawa .
“But the brutal fight
for Tarawa caused a major turning point in armored vehicle use by the Marine
Corps, as in practically every other aspect of the amphibious landing art. … The
larger medium tank now became essential, along with a flamethrower tank, and
the Marine Corps pressed the amtrac into service as an armored personnel
carrier, at least as far as the water’s edge.
The armored amphibian, already under development, now became an
essential component of the assault formation.” (4)
 |
| Marine M4A2 Tank at Tarawa |
The terrain of
Vietnam, during that war, and the infantry and aviation centric nature of the
warfare worked against the employment of armor and a generation of Marine
officers came to believe that armor was not needed and, often, was a burden.
As the first Gulf War
became imminent, the Marines, once again recognizing the need for armor,
upgraded one and a half tank battalions from the old M60 series to the new M1
Abrams from excess Army stocks.
Unfortunately, this did not translate into doctrinal or tactical
acceptance of armor.
In fact, during the
period of time around the first Gulf War, the Corps adopted a defensive view of
armor rather than offensive.
“In the late 1990’s
many officers continued to believe that the antitank missile would kill all the
tanks, hence removing any need for tanks in the Corps. USMC doctrine never provided for the tank as
the basis of offensive power, as leaders learned and acknowledged frequently in
the Great Pacific War, but instead continued to treat it as a key antiarmor
weapon system.” (4)
“The Corps leadership
perhaps lost its sense of need for modern armor. The Commandant retiring in 1999, Gen. Charles
C. Krulak, stated that he “would eliminate the tank fleet found in the Marine
Corps today if I could.” (4)
A look at the Corps’
main battle tank inventory over the period from 1985-1999 is revealing. In 1985, the Corps had 716 main battle
tanks. By 1999, the number had dropped
to 403. (4)
Even today, Marine
usage of armor is limited and focused on small units.
“The continuing Marine
Corps tendency to use armored vehicles in small numbers, another version of
“lightness” in practice, probably had its origin in the Korean War.” (4)
“… the long term
association of tank platoons with infanty battalions as a normal assignment,
reinforced by peacetime deployments of BLT and MEU-type units, caused an
institutional rejection of mass as a principle of armored fighting vehicle
employment.” (4)
This last point is
key. Tanks are best employed en masse,
on the offensive whereas the Marines traditionally deploy tanks in small units
as almost squad level defensive support.
We see, then, that the
Marine’s reluctance to embrace armored warfare has long, historical roots. Contrarily, these roots are invariably
recognized as flawed when serious combat arises. The Marine’s institutional ability to forget
the lessons of combat so quickly after its cessation and, once again, reject
armor is actually quite amazing.
Worse, the pendulum
has now swung so far to the lightness side that the Marines have effectively
removed themselves from consideration as a middle to high end combat force,
leaving only low end combat and humanitarian missions as being within their
capability. Of course, this leads to
questioning why we need a 30+ large deck amphibious fleet but that’s an issue
for another time.
As we close, we need
to acknowledge one of the driving forces in the Marine’s reluctance to embrace
armor and that is the issue of transportability. While the Army can emphasize heaviness
(recent ‘lightness’ and ‘mobility’ trends not withstanding) because it transports
its armor via cargo ships to functional ports (a potential weakness in our
thinking and planning because we may not always have friendly, functional ports
available and we have no port seizure capability), the Marines must depend on
transport via landing craft, over the beach.
However, while this transportability issue must be acknowledged and
addressed, it does not preclude or excuse abandonment of armor and
firepower. Instead, it simply mandates
alternative thinking about the transport issue and the form that the armor and
firepower should take – again, a topic for another post.
 |
| LVT(A)-5 Amphibious 'Tank' at Iwo Jima |
The closing thought on
the transportability issue is that while the issue is real, Marines have always
found a way around it in the past when combat occurred so it is clearly not an
inherently limiting factor. The real
limiting factor is the Corps’ institutional mindset favoring lightness – a
mindset completely unsupported by real world combat experience.
_____________________________________
(4)”Marines Under
Armor”, Kenneth W. Estes, Naval Institute Press, 2000
The solution to the problem, I think is two fold. First and perhaps most importantly, is one of doctrine. If history has taught us that armor is a necessity in Marine operations, and is best used en mass, leadership should be constantly pushing it, and it shouldn't just be a portion of Marine assets, but be fundamental component to Marine unit organization and tactics.
ReplyDeleteThat being said, there are couple of ways to go about it, light or heavy, each with their own benefits and downsides, even when possibly getting a mix of the two.
On the light side of the argument, mobility is key. Some say we need either light or medium tanks that can be transported easily from ship to shore in large numbers very quickly. Some of the best ideas I have heard of is a medium tank design that is possibly amphibious to simplify transport, all while having the heaviest of firepower and skimping on armor to satisfy the requirement.
Then there is the heavy argument, more heavy tanks. In this I may bend from the mold and say that although commonality with the Army to a certain extent is good, I've felt the M1 wasn't always the best choice for the USMC.
I've always thought the Marines would be best served by a tank similar to the Israeli Merkava. Something which was designed from the outset to be able to work closely with infantry, being able to carry and disembark a small amount of troops in conjunction with the LAVs and AAVs would seem like a big benefit. As well as the fact that it carries a vast amount of reloads so will need resupply less often.
Granted, it is a very heavy design, but not much more so than an M1A1, and is lighter than the M1A2. Politics being what they are, the idea of it being specifically adopted is nothing short of fantasy, but I feel as though the concept and philosophy of this tank could and should be at least seriously considered by HQMC.
Of course, even if this is the correct option or if more M1s are the proper course, this still brings us back to the point you bring up about properly transporting all of this to shore. Which is another whole conversation worth having, which I believe has been brought up on this blog before.
Although I agree with much of your commentary regarding the light versus heavy argument, I don't thing the Marine Corp should be replicating the US Army. The Marines should be invested in light to medium amphibious armor along the lines of the PLAN ZBD-2000 or the potential Russian equivalent. Unfortunately are largest enemies in this are defense contractors.
Delete"UralVagonZavod claims the weapon system can fire a variety of point- and proximity-detonating rounds that can engage vehicles and troops on the ground, unmanned vehicles and low-flying helicopters in the air, and even small watercraft near the shore. It is also able to shoot a gun-fired guided anti-tank missile, reportedly able to strike targets more than nine miles away."
http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/20798/this-high-speed-amphibious-armored-vehicle-could-race-russias-naval-infantry-ashore
Yes, I don't think the Marines should fully replicate the Army either. I am of the opinion that if we think armor is needed for the USMC, it should be fully embraced and done in the most effective manner possible, and en mass if that is the case. The question is just a matter of how and with what so as to remain a more mobile quick strike force.
DeleteBut yes, you bring up an excellent example of the the current threats and we need to scale our options to best meet the threat while being logistically sound. As well as being mindful of all the problems with the military industrial complex, current procurement models/procedures, and problems with defense contractors themselves (which ComNavOps has brought up too).
Oh, and thanks for the insightful response!
"The solution to the problem"
DeleteVery nice comment. Regarding the doctrine, the Marines have a history of leadership that pushes lightness. So, their leadership is being consistent and consistently pushing their desired objective. Unfortunately, it's the wrong objective! The book, "Marines Under Armor" is an excellent history of the Marines and armor and clearly lays out the origins of the lightness mindset prevalent in the Corps today. If you can find it, you might want to take a look at it.
As far as the Merkava-ish tank. That's an interesting suggestion, especially the aspect of limited troop transport. My question, though, is what is the purpose of a tank for the Marines? The Merkava was designed for its type of fighting. What should a Marine tank be designed to do?
One obvious answer is to provide survivable firepower support for the infantry during initial assault efforts. Note that this is radically different from tank-on-tank battles. Such a support tank would be heavily armored to be survivable and have firepower to reduce fortifications and kill infantry and light vehicles. Would this be a Merkava-ish tank? Or, something else?
"Marines should be invested in light to medium amphibious armor "
DeleteBy definition, this limits the Marines to the low to medium end of the combat spectrum. Is this acceptable? Will this allow the Marines to prevail in their mission set?
What about the match between anti-tank weapon'ed infantry (TOW, RPG, etc.) and light to medium armor? Is that a mismatch? How do we send light/med armor against that and win?
I'm not disagreeing with your proposition, just raising questions that need answers before we can commit to light/med armor. Any thoughts?
Thanks for the reply.
DeleteYes, Ideally leadership should be sitting down and figuring out the nitty-gritty details of what option suits us best.
Admittedly, I bring up the Merkava as a bit of an off the cuff example of a tank that was designed/developed with consideration for closely integrated infantry operations. The thought of which, only seemed like an afterthought for the M1 series of tanks that we currently have. Merkava seemed like a more practical option for the Marines' combat effectiveness, as well as putting firepower and protection as top priorities of the tank triangle.
In a perfect world, we should have a team of people in leadership looking at what the requirements are for a Marine tank, and how it will be operationally used, then determine how to fulfill it. If it is either a purpose-built Marine tank, dedicated Marine variant of an existing tank, or if there is in fact is an existing platform that fills their needs, budget, and requirements (and getting the "not invented here" thinking to go the way of the dodo in order to get it).
"Marine tank, and how it will be operationally used, then determine how to fulfill it."
DeleteIf you're not already familiar with it, you should check out the WWII LVT(A) 'amphibious tank'. It met the Marine's need for initial assault wave firepower though at the expense of significant armor. It was very effective but the survival rates were not good. Still, they were cheap and got the job done. Maybe we need a modern LVT(A)?
See the post, LVT(A)
Great response CNO.
DeleteI note that in spite of the conventional wisdom that “tanks fight tanks” or “the best anti-tank system is a tank”- the reality is that most tanks were actually employed tactically with the original WWI intent of destroying fortified positions (infantry in earthworks, anti-tank guns in gun pits, and so forth).
From its inception in WWI through WWII, Korea, Gulf War, and 2003 Iraq, most tank munitions have been expended at non AFV targets, and the biggest “killers” of tanks in WWII were anti-tank guns, land mines (even mobility kills blunted armed offensives and set up disabled vehicles for destruction by other weapons like artillery); and even in the case of AFVs, self-propelled guns killed more tanks than tanks themselves.
If you doubt this look at the ammunition expenditure reports – tanks tended to use many more HE shells compared to AP shells, and an appalling amount of MG ammunition.
Where does this leave us WRT to the Corps? I would argue that the USMC needs its tanks and AFVs to punch through enemy defenses (mostly mine fields in the 21st century), and immediately turn the flanks of said defenses, followed immediately by a drive to operational objectives inland.
The ideal tank is certainly lighter and longer ranged than the typical western MBT, and *might* trade some frontal arc armor for active protection/EW/advanced armor; be equipped with a more modest gun (90-105mm are still capable of killing MBTs outside of the protected frontal arc); have 4-8 heavy ATGMs like the Compact Kinetic Energy Missile (CKEM) or a vertical launch AGM-114, Spike ER; and *possibly* have a mortar. I am not a fan of the RWS fad.
The reality of economics and production is that the army is going to design and build whatever tanks the USMC gets. Even in WWII, the Corps could not force the USA to keep diesel powered M4s in production.
That said, the Corps should be able to field specific engineering attachments, and possibly modify turrets, perhaps along the lines of the BMPT 72, or the M728 CEV as required to achieve its mission objectives.
GAB
Actually the Merkava idea has some precedent. The Marines kept their M103 Heavy tanks for almost a decade after the Army phased theirs out.
DeleteAnon,
DeleteColonel Ken Estes book cited in this article explains (at length) why USMC ground vehicle procurement is driven by the USA, there are exceptions , but the corpse is going to pretty much buy what the army buys with some nods to waterproofing.
There is little room in the budget for a major weapon system acquisition, particularly one that largely duplicates another weapon system.
GAB
Just a thought
ReplyDeleteA. The army does not have a port taking capability
B. The Marines are trained to land from the sea.
Now if only they could work together.
You're touching on a profound topic. Because of logistics, I just can't see an over-the-beach assault being practical. That only leaves seizing a developed port - something which the Marines have never practiced and the Army has never even thought about. We lack the specialized equipment and doctrine to do port seizure and yet I see this as the Marines main mission!
DeleteNow, how do you think the Marines and Army should work together on this?
We would need port facility repair equipment, cranes, C-RAM to defend the port while being repaired and in use, channel clearing vessels, etc. - none of which we have in a ready to use military form. How do we assemble/acquire all this? How do we transport it? How do we provide cruise/ballistic missile protection for the port? And so on.
What are your thoughts?
Good comment!
It strikes me that it would be simpler/cheaper to make our own ports over a beach with said protections ala Mulberries. Preposition equipment sets, and keep reservist battalions trained on their employment... And I hate to ad, to clear existing debris filled ports, use contractors.
DeleteMy thoughts as a non military person so don't laugh to loud is there are 3 ways to capture a port.
Delete1/ By air (parachute) which would need to be very fast due to lack of heavy kit and require a large amount of man power. an Army Job?
2/ To beach land near by and "drive there". This would require heavy armour as at least some of the element of surprise would have gone. This I would assume is marine lead landing with Army "heavys" landing with / just behind. i.e. Joint operation? with the Army taking the lead on the second half of the operation?
3/ Straight into the port which would mainly be a marine operation? the Army "heavys" would need to be close behind tho' to increase the bridgehead / protect the port asap.
There is a 4th option which is elements of two or all Three above.
What does strike me tho' is the Army and marines/Navy will need to work closely together so should joint exercised be more common? If they are working together do the marines require tanks!!! if the army tanks are integrated into beach landings etc. The army proved (D Day) they can do beach assault. However if you start to go down that route you end up with No Marines and a bigger army!
I don't pretend to have an answer, however it would seem sensible to me for your Department of Defence to have a list of "missions" the country might require, e.g. capture a working port, and then assign the job to the most relevant part of the military, knocking heads together where required, to make it work.
I'm sorry if this is a bit rambling.
PS keep blogging really like your site, Shame can not find a similar one this side of the pond.
The Marine Corps is trying to simultaneously acknowledge that Large Scale Amphibious Landings aren’t a viable exercise, while also marketing itself as an Expeditionary Force that’s not just another one of the Army’s Light Infantry Divisons.
ReplyDeleteYou may well be right but, if true, how can they be expeditionary without assaulting? They seem to have an inherent contradiction on their hands!
DeletePerhaps this also explains their attempt to become America's third air force?
Artillery - May be a future possibility for Marines to up their fire power capability with 155mm gun for a longer range.
ReplyDeleteThe Army “in direct response to operational needs in the Pacific and Europe” is testing an air-mobile, extended-range cannon prototype that could be retrofitted onto an existing howitzer to serve as an interim capability for Stryker and infantry brigade combat teams.
Presuming they are looking at Picatinny Arsenal who are experimenting in stages with a modified 155mm M777A2 Extended Range howitzer with a 55 caliber cannon which adds six feet to the tube while limiting the increase weight to less than 1,000 pounds, with an ultimate range goal of 70 KM.
M777 with its 39 caliber howitzer tube currently use the Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS), zone two to five propelling charge, with 55 caliber tube a MACS zone 6 was fired from the M777.
To achieve 70 KM mention made of increased chamber volume to take a super charge (question is it compatible with the NATO standard/MACS charges) and mention made of an ERCA designed new rocket assisted shell (the trade off for extra range is a reduction in explosive payload of shell, also question of accuracy at longer range). Picatinny testing to see if the M777ER platform can take the force from the new super charge and with ERCA shell as going from a 7 KM increase in range to a 40 KM increase in range.
The mobility trails successfully demonstrated that an M777ER howitzer could be towed behind its current prime mover with little modifications.
I don't think there's a justification for the United States Marketing Corps' existence, but assuming there was:
ReplyDeleteThe primary driver should be efficiency in making use of the amphibious ships. A HMMWV is no good vehicle if you can have a 15 ton truck instead of two HMMWVs. A light tank is no good choice if you can transport a MBT instead, and have the landing craft to move it ashore.
The choice of vehicles, the choice of munitions and the definition of doctrine should be driven by optimization of the use of the amphibious ships' capacity.
The USMC has only two excuses for its very existence in parallel to the army: #1 Expertise in assault on defended beaches and as extension of this #2: Expertise in doing about the same across rivers and lakes.
The classic onboard warship "marine" has become unnecessary more than hundred years ago when navies ceased to use civilians as sailors and keep them disciplined with professional marines.
All other navies know very well how to train a couple sailors to do boarding actions and sailors were also used as makeshift infantry on raids on islands during WWI (and as colonial security troops in general).
@Nick; 155 mm L/39 can have about 70 km range right away with military off the shelf products such as Leonardo's VULCANO round. Close to zero development expenses, not invented here, U.S. armed services focus hard to ignore it.
http://www.leonardocompany.com/en/-/vulcano-155mm
A mere tube extension and chamber volume increase won't bring simple RAP shells anywhere close to 70 km - that will still require some really expensive glide round (late Excalibur batches, for example).
The whole M777 concept is bollocks, though. Its traverse and displacement times are atrocities that justify firing every single officer who ever attempted to justify that system.
"By definition, this limits the Marines to the low to medium end of the combat spectrum. Is this acceptable? Will this allow the Marines to prevail in their mission set?
ReplyDeleteWhat about the match between anti-tank weapon'ed infantry (TOW, RPG, etc.) and light to medium armor? Is that a mismatch? How do we send light/med armor against that and win?
I'm not disagreeing with your proposition, just raising questions that need answers before we can commit to light/med armor. Any thoughts?"
Commander,
Pushing back somewhat, light and medium armor in the Marine mission context does not necessarily demote them to lower end combat spectrum. Like legacy battleships the armor problem going forward will not be solved by adding more and more armored weight.
Already it is to the point the M1 series MBT is over the top pushing 70 tons and Merkava is in the same ball park. Which would impede them operationally on soft sandy beach or water obstacles without preparation.
In the modern era I would propose the Marine Corps procure a ZBD-2000 style vehicle and modernized versions of the Cadillac Gage Stingray light tank. When I say "modernized" it would entail applique armor packages say to defeat 30MM-57MM along the frontal arc, Trophy active and/or reactive armor tiles and an up gun to lightened XM360 120MM main gun. There is a current proposal out right now for the competition phase of this concept for the US Army. The Marines could buy from this program and reduce costs.
With the ability to land more forces on the contested beach under armor it preserves the role of "blowing open a hole" for the regular Army to pour through if needed. Or if a sole Marine operation the ability to engage larger opfor main battle tanks is preserved with reliable killing power from main gun or guided missiles.
https://breakingdefense.com/2016/10/general-dynamics-griffin-dont-call-it-a-tank-its-totally-a-tank/
https://www.defensenews.com/land/2017/11/22/armys-new-light-tank-competition-kicks-off/
https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/01/01/new-in-2018-army-looks-to-add-a-light-tank-to-its-formations/
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/stingray-lt.htm
"light and medium armor in the Marine mission context does not necessarily demote them to lower end combat spectrum."
DeleteIt kind of does. For example, a light/med Marine unit attacking a beach defended by an actual armored unit would be a significant mismatch. Admittedly, I'm constructing a specific, unwinnable scenario but, more generally, the Marines very concept is that we will be attacking an enemy's prepared defenses - how well prepared and how heavy the defenses are is always an open question. However, light/med can only successfully assault a light/med defense. In fact, if you believe the age old adage of 3:1 superiority being required to successfully attack, that kind of translates to med can only successfully attack light and light can't successfully attack anything/anyone!
Now, the light/med shortcomings could be compensated for, as in WWII, with heavy naval gun support which, in a sense, transforms light/med Marines into heavy Marines in that they have heavy firepower on call. Of course, we have no naval gun support so ...
With proper naval gun support, your light/med vehicle concept is perfectly viable and, given landing challenges for heavier vehicles, quite logical and reasonable.
"Light and medium armor"
DeletePoland has a well designed 30 ton medium tank with a 120mm main gun. I'm not suggesting we should by this tank, just using it as an example of an impressive medium tank. I know it won't stand up to anti-tank weapons as well as a bigger tank, but getting a 30 ton tank onshore has to be easier than moving 70 ton tanks. Also, as so many people have said, the primary use of armor on a beach head is against fortified positions. A medium tank is well suited to this, followed by Heavy armor as soon as practical.
If the Marines acquired a medium tank they would need fewer MBT's, which seems to be their goal, without losing the effectiveness of a dedicated tank.
Financially, lighter armor is less expensive than Heavy armor, easier to move, and quicker to replace when lost/ killed.
"A medium tank is well suited to this, followed by Heavy armor as soon as practical."
DeleteExcellent. You have a good grasp of the situation.
So many people want a light/med tank because ... well, just because ... without consideration of how it would/should be used. Sooner or later, the light/med tank will run up against anti-tank weapons, heavy artillery, and heavy tanks and then will be at a severe disadvantage. In contrast, you've thought it out and grasped the need for a specific use followed by "replacement" with a heavy tank.
Well done. Good comment.
Vehicle mobility is determined by many factors: weight and "ground pressure” is amongst the least accurate predictors of actual vehicle cross country mobility.
DeleteThe 45-ton panther tank had considerably better mobility in snow, mud, and better climbing mobility than the much lighter M4 Sherman tank – mobility isn’t just about weight or tracks versus wheels.
Instead Mean Maximum Pressure, chassis overhang, track width, vehicle length and other factors are far better predictors of x-country performance.
You can argue many things about Russian tanks, but the T-80s and T-90s have incredible automotive capability.
A 60-70-ton western MBT with 1200+ HP can drive through forests by simply bulldozing trees that would hang up smaller tracked and wheeled vehicles.
SO has (or had) several excellent videos on his site demonstrating these points. Richard M.Ogorkiewicz’s book Technology of Tanks (Vols 1-2) is a good source. Rolf Hilmes book Kampfpanzer heute und morgen is another good reference (it is mostly written in German).
GAB
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2015/12/mechanised-forces-and-flat-woodland.html
Deletehttps://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/08/mean-maximum-pressure-paper.html
The main automotive deficiency in Russian tanks is that they aren't really meant to use reverse gear in battle. This largely eliminates the extremely effective individual tank manoeuvres that drive delaying actions and safe fire support by sniping tanks.
Ericke3, the simplest solution is, would be to take the turret off the M2A3 and mate that to a new, amphibious hull. There's currently several plans and proposals to exchange the 25mm for 30/40/50mm autocannons, with I do believe have eliminated the dual feed system for a single HEDP (High explosive, dual purpose) round. The BGM-71 TOW2 system can be replaced by a Javelin system, which I think the Army is currently evaluating.
ReplyDeleteThe 120mm, while a decent gun, is ill suited to a light, amphibious tank due to excessive recoil, as the 105mm Stryker's has illustrated. Furthermore, if it had a 120mm, there would be the temptation to use it as a proper tank, something for which it would be at a disadvantage for due to its inherent lightness in armor and fuel capacity.
Personally, I don't feel it should have any internal troop capacity and should be single purpose in function.
Sir,
DeleteYour idea has merit observing the failure rate of the Stryker platform turret ring and afterthought of mounting a high velocity 105MM main gun. Which was never meant for it and a half baked program anyway.
What I propose is a two tiered light/medium armored force. Light being a "Cockerill style 30MM-50MM main gun with the ability to amphibiously carry Marine infantry and a dedicated light tank (20-30 ton) with XM360 turret that is 8 tons lighter than the Abrams turret with same 120MM rifle and electronics/sighting systems to reduce training and logistics.
For some odd reason the Russians seem to be able to mount large guns on compact combat vehicles just fine. Like the "Sprut SD" with a 125MM rifle. It can be done if we choose to do it properly with discipline.
"The Sprut-SD is designed to defeat tanks, hard-skinned material and enemy manpower by airborne and amphibious landing forces, as well as by specially designated units of ground forces. Its main armament, the Sprut anti-tank gun, is capable of firing APFSDS, HE-Frag, HEAT and ATGM ammunition.[4] This allows the 2S25 to be as powerful as a main battle tank and as maneuverable and amphibious as airborne infantry combat vehicles. The 2S25 can be used by units of ground forces and naval infantry as a light amphibious tank. Currently, the only operators of the 2S25 are the Russian airborne troops with 24 of these vehicles in service.[2] The Republic of Korea and the Indian military have expressed interest in acquiring the 2S25 Sprut-SD.[5]"
"The main armament of the 2S25 is a 125 mm smoothbore 2A75 tank gun which is a derivative of the 125 mm 2A46 tank gun installed on other Russian main battle tanks.[12] The angles of elevation and depression for the anti-tank gun are +15° and −5° respectively. When aimed towards the stern of the vehicle, the elevation and depression of the gun changes to +17° and −3° respectively.[4] Given the need to install a gun to a substantially lighter chassis, designers created a new recoil device with a new ejector and thermal insulation jacket; it lacks a muzzle brake. The ammunition of the 2A75 includes laser guided missiles like the 9M119 Svir; providing a maximum range of 4 km for defeating armored targets. Reloading the main gun is completed by means of a horizontal autoloader mounted behind the turret. It can carry a total of 40 rounds for the main armament with 22 ready to use in the autoloader. In case the autoloader is no longer intact, manual loading is possible at the cost of a substantially longer reload time.[10] A coaxial 7.62 mm PKT machine gun mounted to the left side of the main armament serves as the secondary armament of the 2S25; equipped with one tape of 2000 rounds.[11]"
"While driving, the 2S25 can reach a top speed of 71 kilometres per hour (44 mph) on an even road; the average speed being 45−50 km/h when driving off-road. The vehicle exerts a ground pressure of 0.36 to 0.53 kg/cm² depending on the type of tracks.[6] It can overcome vertical obstacles as tall as 0.8 metres (2.6 ft) and cross 2.8 metres (9.2 ft) trenches. Like many other Russian armored fighting vehicles, the Sprut-SD is completely amphibious and moves with the help of two water jets that allow it to reach a speed of 8–10 km/h depending on the state of the currents. To increase the buoyancy, wheels are with airtight chambers and powerful water pumps; extracting water from the lower chassis. The vehicle is sea worthy and can cross water obstacles without preparation in a sea state of up to 3. While waterborne, the 2S25 retains the capability of firing the gun within a ±35° sector towards the front of the chassis.[5]"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2S25_Sprut-SD
"the simplest solution is, would be to take the turret off the M2A3 and mate that to a new, amphibious hull."
DeleteInteresting.
"The terrain of Vietnam, during that war, and the infantry and aviation centric nature of the warfare worked against the employment of armor and a generation of Marine officers came to believe that armor was not needed and, often, was a burden."
ReplyDeleteRead "Tank Sergeant" by Ralph Zumbro. Tanks were supremely effective in Vietnam !
Effective when they could be employed. Regardless, good recommendation. I'll give it a read.
DeleteThe war movie image of Vietnam is an image of a land of jungles. It's a land of rice fields instead, especially post-1967.
DeleteGenerally flooded.
DeleteThe more pertinent point is that the main method of combat was patrol and helo assault - neither of which were suited to tank warfare.
Tanks and AFVs were effective in Vietnam pretty much regardless of terrain.
DeleteThe "tanks don't work in jungles" (tropical rain forest) refrain is ludicrous - tanks work better in jungles than trucks.
Not tanks but the Battle of Long Tan Documentary is worth - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8gUSq7pxux4
"Tanks and AFVs were effective in Vietnam pretty much regardless of terrain."
DeleteIf they were so effective why weren't they used extensively? It's not just a refrain.
Inflexible mindset from the same strategic thinking that failed to prosecute a vigorous strategic air and ground offensive in northern Vietnam.
DeleteI am no fan of the Vietnam war, it was massively wasteful and ineffective, but once we made the decision to send over 1/2 million U.S. troops to fight, and to we should have sought a decisive conclusion to the war!
GAB
Can't argue with that!
Delete@GAB; that's awfully close to the sunk costs fallacy.
Delete@SO,
DeleteMy argument has nothing to do with sunk costs; I instead point out that when Lyndon B. Johnson became President and decided to commit combat forces, he should have done so decisively, even though I believe that it stupid to fight “proxy wars,” in support of unstable regimes, and to do so with your own troops.
Instead LBJ completely unfocused the war by failing to direct combat operations against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, particularly decisive ground combat operations. Instead he ordered almost a quarter of a million troops in South Vietnam, and ordered intensive, but largely ineffective air campaign in Laos and North Vietnam.
LBJ has no excuses: the Southeast Asia Resolution (aka the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution), Pub.L. 88–408, 78 Stat. 384, enacted on August 10, 1964, gave LBJ carte blanche authorization to wage war as he saw fit in Southeast Asia. You can look up the details, but only two legislators (both Senators) opposed the Resolution – even FDR had one dissenting voter following Pearl Harbor.
GAB
LBJ was not stupid enough to replay the Korean War. An invasion of North Vietnam would have dragged the PRC into the war, and there would have been no winning against additional millions of troops in such terrain.
DeleteIt was wise to keep PRC and North Vietnam almost hostile instead of forcing them into a brothers-in-arms relationship.
The only thing that the Vietnam War could achieve was to buy time for Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Burma and Philippines to toughen up against the seeming red wave. It would thus have been sensible to pay more attention to them.
"LBJ was not stupid enough to replay the Korean War. An invasion of North Vietnam would have dragged the PRC into the war"
DeleteThis is pure speculation, at best.
So many Western military observers are consumed with fear over the imagined consequences of US actions while utterly failing to consider the reverse case.
According to DoD and as cited in Wiki, the US suffered 34,000 battle deaths in Korea while China suffered 400,000 killed and 486,000 wounded. China, not surprisingly, quotes different numbers but still acknowledges a 4:1 or 5:1 loss rate compared to the US along with 340,000 wounded. If anything, this suggests that it's China that would have been stupid to attempt to replay the Korean War in Vietnam.
From the Chinese perspective, Korea was the very definition of a Pyrrhic Victory, if they even consider a victory.
We, in the West, need to get over this paralyzing fear of imagined consequences.
"LBJ"
DeleteLBJ was the very definition of a man parlyzed by fear and it cost so many Americans their lives to no good end.
Not to mention the damage to U.S. social and political fabric; and let's not forget the countless Vietnamese casualties...
DeleteGAB
@SO,
Delete“LBJ was not stupid enough to replay the Korean War. “
Vietnam is not Korea! Sino – Vietnamese relations predate European nation states going back over two thousand years, and is littered with conflict and transgressions that still resonate in those cultures.
Even as VP, LBJ was not meaningfully part of the JFK administration foreign policy team! LBJ’s war was ill conceived, poorly organized, and tragic in implementation – no strategic thought there.
You might want to watch the documentary “Fog of War”, particularly the bit where Robert strange McNamara recounts his post war interactions with senior DRV officials and officers.
GAB
Well , at least the army "gets it". https://www.stripes.com/news/army-to-transition-two-brigades-to-add-heavy-firepower-as-it-prepares-for-near-peer-conflict-1.548522
ReplyDeleteOf all the services, the Army comes the closest to understanding that it has strayed from its mission and needs to reorient and rebuild. They're working on electronic warfare and, to an extent, armor and firepower. Unfortunately, they're diluting that effort by venturing into areas that aren't their responsibility like deep strike.
DeleteHell maybe its time the US changes the whole system. Go full on mobile infantry and fleet.
ReplyDeletePoint 1.
ReplyDeleteI would replace the current marine structure with something resembling the armoured BCT.
Just feel that needs to be made clear first.
Secondly
"Tanks are best employed en masse, on the offensive"
Its often repeated, but there are a surprisingly small number of successful massive employments of tanks, the logistical constraints are so massive that the enemy has plenty of warning when and where you are coming.
HETs to move the tanks, masses of fuel tankers to keep them going ect.
The famous German tank attacks in France used a surprisingly small number of tanks, the big French and British counter attacks, using lot of tanks, were generally too slow.
The massive tank battles in the east generally achieved nothing, beyond lots of destroyed tanks on both sides, until Germany was worn down.
More to follow tomorrow
What about North Africa in ww2?
Delete"there are a surprisingly small number of successful massive employments of tanks,"
DeleteTwo points:
1. Mass is a relative term. Four tanks, working together to spearhead a drive are an example of massing as opposed to those same four tanks spread out along some defensive line and acting as artillery. It doesn't have to be a massing of thousands of tanks!
2. You need to brush up on your history. WWII was full of tanks being used en masse, on the offensive. For example, the Germans were highly effective using tanks to spearhead the counterattack that lead to the Battle of the Bulge. The entire European campaign was a series of tank/armored division advances with infantry flowing along behind to fill in the territory.
The invasion of France May have used less tanks on the German side but they were used properly together en masses to punch through the lines. The French dispersed theirs which meant they could be overwhelmed individually We did this on a largely to the Germans overwhelming their superior tanks with craploads of Sherman’s whose guns and armor were lighter.
DeleteModern light tank designs, including wheeled ones like the Italian Centauro have guns as big as the Abrams. If the Marine Corps wanted to replace a battalion of M-1’s with say 4 or 5 battalions of light tanks so they could form a large fast phalanx on to penatrate quickly that would be similar to what the Germans did in France and would work against targets whose armor was dispersed in defense or caught unawares due to a rapid movement by the marines.
"Sherman’s whose guns and armor were lighter.
DeleteModern light tank designs, including wheeled ones like the Italian Centauro have guns as big as the Abrams."
There seems to be one key aspect you may be overlooking. The Sherman was lightly armored only on a relative basis. It was built with 1"-4" of armor, depending on location, and later versions used add-on armor to achieve up to 7+ inches. The armor was rated effective against all early war tank and anti-tank weapons and was partially effective against late war weapons depending on impact angle.
The Centauro, by comparison, is apparently only armored against machine gun fire up to 20 mm - 30 mm. This would appear to be far less armor than the Sherman on a relative basis.
The impression I get is that the Centauro would be, essentially, unarmored on the modern battlefield against modern tank and anti-tank weapons whereas the Sherman was at least moderately armored.
Thus, the concept of replacing heavy tanks with greater numbers of Centauros (or similar) and thinking it is akin to the Sherman concept seems fundamentally wrong.
So many people trot out the Sherman analogy without realizing just how heavily armored the Sherman actually was.
All of this is not to say that the basic concept of light Centauros (or similar) can't be a workable concept but the casualties would be quite high. Are we prepared for that?
Note that I am not a ground combat expert and even less knowledgeable about the Centauro so I may be off base here. If so, kindly (and gently!) correct me.
What do you think?
(1/2)
DeleteCalling 20mm and 30mm "machineguns" isn't giving them enough credit: autocannon rounds are a fair step up from simple MG rounds, being big enough for one to do creative things with them, such as HE, SAPHEI, API and sabot rounds.
Now, you're correct that a Centauro or equivalent light tank in its bracket is going to be vulnerable to 30mm autocannons (note Russian 2A42, British RARDEN, American Bushmaster II or the Rheinmetall 35mm guns - 20mm has gone away because most IFVs now have built in or addon armor schemes to protect against 30mm autocannons at standard combat ranges, generally assumed to be > 1000 meters). That's indeed a weakness. That said, autocannons aren't like machineguns: you can't just setup one behind a sandbagged fighting position, because these are heavy weapons with heavy ammo (and in many cases, electrically fired weapons needing power sources) that aren't man-portable in the slightest. On the battlefield, to get a 30mm autocannon into play, that means an IFV of your own.
You mentioned AT weapons: The thing about all IFVs, Centauro included, is that vs infantry they provide a higher percentage threat. They're generally armored enough to tank HMG fire and grenade launchers, and most are protected against RPGs, so to deal with IFVs, infantry on their own have to break out the srsface antitank weapons - which means ATGMs like Spike, Kornet, Metis, TOW, Javelin. The problem for most nations is that ATGMs are at best platoon assets, and usually company assets. Meanwhile, the US Army hands out Javelin ATGMs on the _squad_ level. Not to say that they're not vulnerable, but as a practical matter, versus infantry, an IFV isn't that much vulnerable compared to an MBT: not if both are protected against RPG, and require serious ATGM to kill, which are in limited supply.
So, saying the Centauro is essentially unarmored on the modern battlefield is not entirely correct. As with other IFVs in its league, it's armored _enough_ against the expected percentage threats of infantry RPG, HMG, IFV autocannon, and artillery fires (and IFVs with addon ERA and NERA blocks are further protected against ATGMs, so ATGM isn't a sure thing against IFVs).
That said, in a straight up fight with tanks, your modern tank destroyers - whether wheeled TDs like Centauro 120 or tracked TDs like Sprut-SD or K21-105 - are definitely going to to die, because they don't have the armor to eat 120mm sabots head on. Now, that can be mitigated by doing a lot of WW2 turreted tank destroyer things (ambush fighting, being dug in, hull down memes, chokepoint camping), but it's war, and both sides get a vote.
(2/2)
DeleteIf the idea is to use a light tank platform as an assault gun to support Marines hitting the beaches and punching through hastily-assembled beach defenses, there is some merit to that idea: as I've said above, an IFV-class vehicle, whether armed with a 105mm/120mm gun or 30mm+ATGM combo, is going to be pretty hard for defending infantry to suppress (the soldier manning an MG in a pillbox doesn't suppress the IFV, the IFV suppresses him). So you hit the beach in wheeled APCs (i.e. Terrex, ACV) with your wheeled TDs (Centauro) acting as assault guns and you punch through the defenses, hit the roads, and then you've got better mobility than the opposition's tanks (Terrex can hit up to 68 miles per hour, vs Abrams road speed of 45 mph).
But for that to work, you need to be able to misdirect the opposition as to which beach you're landing on, and you need to hit the beach before the enemy can fortify the fuck out of it and cover it with mines, infantry AT squads, artillery, mortars, and tanks of his own. If they slow you down, welp, you're screwed.
And I'm not entirely sure you get that much of a smaller footprint with Centauro vs Abrams. In terms of footprint, Centauro is 25 ft 9 in long and 9 ft 8 in wide, that's 248 square feet. An Abrams' footprint is 312 square feet (both are about the same length hull-wise, the Abrams is a bit wider). If you can't squeeze in 3 Centauro for every 2 Abrams, that's an argument to eat the footprint and space penalties, and use an MBT that has a better chance of withstanding the firepower from a fortified beach and surviving long enough to punch through.
Having done the math, purely on square feet area, you can ship 5 Centauro in the same footprint as 4 Abrams. I think I might rather have the 4 Abrams than going to 5 Centauro; you get one extra gun with Centauro and higher mobility, but on the other hand IMO 4 Abrams give you more options because they can tank more fire.
Delete"it's armored _enough_ against the expected percentage threats of infantry RPG, HMG, IFV autocannon, and artillery fires"
DeleteIf Wiki is to be believed, you're significantly stretching the level of protection for the Centauro. From Wiki,
"in the baseline configuration is designed to withstand 14.5 mm bullets and shell fragments with protection against 25 mm munition on the frontal section. The addition of bolt-on appliqué armour increases protection against 30 mm rounds."
That does not sound like RPG, anti-tank missile, or artillery level protection.
As regards armor, you're also lumping Centauro in with IFVs. Typically, IFVs do tend to have more armor. Centauro and the like seem to be another category that's a step below IFVs in terms of protection.
Centauro, specifically, seems to be a very light (as regards armor) tank bordering on unarmored as regards the modern battlefield.
The Italians have an IFV variant of the Centauro, the Freccia, so they do seem to be at least somewhat confident of its survivability in the IFV role. :V
DeleteAlso, that the baseline level of protection that Wikipedia quotes for Centauro is equivalent to the early models of the Bradley, which were rated for 14.5mm and artillery splinter protection (shell fragments = artillery splinters). Apart from the applique, you can further easily uparmor against RPGs by using an RPG cage, like what Army Strykers and Abrams did in Iraq (Stryker's hull isn't strong enough to support ERA blocks so they use cage allround, while the Abrams uses a mix of ERA on the front sides and cage over the rear sides). And I did literally say that IFVs that can mount ERA or NERA are further protected against ATGMs. (I should also note that there exist an addon ERA package for Centauro, ROMOR-A, and there seems to be a fair degree of confidence of it's effectiveness vs RPG, but I'm skeptical of its protection vs ATGM or tank HEAT, compared to Russian and American ERA.)
(Something I forgot to mention - Speaking for IFVs generally, ERA gives a further margin of survivability vs tanks. Doctrinally tanks are taught to shoot HEAT at IFVs, because a sabot fired at an IFV will generally go through and through with a lower chance of hitting something important; an IFV has a lot more empty volume and less packed in flammables compared to a tank, where a sabot that penetrates the armor breaches the fighting compartment. HEAT meanwhile will blow things up or light them on fire, and newer HEAT shells like the US MPAT round have a frag liner to send fragments cutting into the troop compartment's passengers.)
I don't really have a dog in this debate. Centauro makes some sense if you want to quickly get an off-the-shelf vehicle into the USMC. On the other hand, there's also the noises the Army has been making about a light tank design, but they've been making those noises for the last 20 years with nothing to show for it: if you thought Navy procurement was bad, the Army's procurement programs have been a neverending stream of programs that shot for the moon and were cancelled. Hell, the army's failed at least four tries to find a new service rifle, and blew money trying to develop new rifle magazines that are actually worse than the USGI mags being issued since Nam. Meanwhile the USMC just went and bought the HK416 and Gen 3 Pmags from Magpul and called it a day.
If a light tank for the USMC is really considered necessary, IMO it makes some sense to get in on the Army's light tank program (well, if it actually happens). I've always thought it a pity the XM8 Buford lost the Mobile Gun System competition to the Stryker MGS (aka the American not!Centauro with issues), because aside from component commonality with the larger Stryker fleet, the XM8 was the superior vehicle.
General Dynamics' Thunderbolt design (updated XM8) looks quite promising to me, in the role of a light tank for forcing a beach landing. It's easier for you to armor a tracked chassis as opposed to a wheeled chassis; you could more plant ERA blocks allround on it, like on the BUSK Bradleys, and tracks handle the recoil of the gun better than wheels, while having superior offroad ability - not a bad thing to have, when you're trying to get off a beach.
"you can further easily uparmor"
DeleteYou can up-armor all the way to an actual tank. The point of this thread was a very light tank that could be easily transported from ship to shore early on. After up-armoring to tank levels, we may as well just use tanks.
Centauro-like vehicles offer heavy firepower at the expense of survivability. For Marine assault use, that may be a desirable trade off - or maybe not.
An up-armored Centauro is the worst of both worlds. It lacks the light and easy transportability of a very light tank and it lacks the survivability of an actual tank. It needs to either be used in its base, light form or not at all.
This 'up-armoring' thought process is symptomatic of one of the military's major failings which is trying to make every asset a war-winner by itself.
"1. Mass is a relative term. Four tanks, working together to spearhead a drive are an example of massing as opposed to those same four tanks spread out along some defensive line and acting as artillery. It doesn't have to be a massing of thousands of tanks!"
DeleteAbsolutely
The problem with "medium" is its the worst of all worlds.
You get most of the logistical constraints, but few of the suitability benefits.
A 60t tank can shrug off pretty much any fire, except direct hits from other tanks, artillery, or heavy missiles.
A "Standard", British Army Armoured Infantry Battalion has 12 ATGM launchers.
A 30t tank is protected against small arms and shell shrapnel, that same battalion has 65 vehicle mounted cannon all of which can mission kill a 30t "protected gun", and with sustained fire destroy it. Also have half a dozen 81mm mortar, not exactly anti tank weapons, but a 30t "tank" isnt exactly a tank either
The difference ends up being.
4 Abrams land on the beach and race inland, the defenders immobile ATGM teams engage but are ineffective, suppression and line of sight problems. A few IFVs engage but their cannon fire is ineffective, the survivors retreat under fire and await air support or their own armour. The following infantry seize the town and dig in, awaiting the follow on forces.
6 Centauros land on the beach and race inland, the ATGMs engage but are ineffective, suppression and line of sight issues.
The IFVs engage, the Centuros significantly outgunning them inflict losses, but frontal hits destroy the drive gear immobilizing them and side shots are kill shots.
Their fire support destroyed, the landing stalls, surrounded on 3 sides and suffering losses from air bursting cannon fire, the landing force is forced to surrender, they're eventually ransomed as part of a humiliating treaty.
I want to point out here that I'm not actually advocating for using the Centauro to force beach assaults. But you yourself admit that you are not an expert in ground combat. All I'm doing is giving some extra nuance and perspective on the Centauro.
DeleteWay I see it, given the space and weight footprint, it's a tradeoff. You get 5 Centauros for the space of 4 Abrams, but at 24 tons vs 57 tons for an M1A1, weight-wise an LCAC can put 2 Centauros ashore for 1 Abrams. It all depends on doctrine and how one intends to use it.
The root problem, I think, is that the USMC doesn't really have a solid doctrine for amphibious assaults in the present era.
"You can up-armor all the way to an actual tank. The point of this thread was a very light tank that could be easily transported from ship to shore early on. After up-armoring to tank levels, we may as well just use tanks."
Please reread what I wrote in full. I said: "You can further easily uparmor against RPGs." I'm only talking about RPG protection. The RPG cage is a steel cage installed around the hull of a vehicle. As far as weight is concerned, it doesn't add that much weight, and it's much lighter than ERA blocks. Strykers equipped with RPG cages proved their survivability in Iraq against RPGs. That's all I was saying.
Also, you can't really uparmor an IFV to tank levels, it's not physically possible. Wheeled vics like Centauro won't be able to handle the weight, and even tracked IFVs have limits to how much they can be uparmored. But even then, they'll still be lighter than full on MBTs - at max load, the Bradley is 33 tons versus the M1A1 Abrams' 65 tons, that's still half the weight, so an LCAC could drop 2 Brads on a beach instead of a single Abrams.
At the end of the day, the way i see it is so long as the marines travel by ship and bring their kit with them, space in the transport ships and weight limits of the landing craft are what's going to choke them. The simplest attempt to solve that problem would be for a new class of transport ship dedicated to carrying more landing craft and vehicles, but that's obviously a poor utilisation of resources and so it's a nonstarter. :P
"Centauro-like vehicles offer heavy firepower at the expense of survivability. For Marine assault use, that may be a desirable trade off - or maybe not.
"An up-armored Centauro is the worst of both worlds. It lacks the light and easy transportability of a very light tank and it lacks the survivability of an actual tank. It needs to either be used in its base, light form or not at all."
To be fair to Centauro B1 and Stryker MGS, the real role is meant to be an assault gun supporting the other IFV/APCs in the unit; the idea is that the base vehicle is protected enough against the expected enemy infantry threats and weapons, and so you have an assault gun firing 105mm HE into bunkers and strongpoints that are too dug in for autocannon and GPMG to suppress.
Also, the Centauro is already 24 tons to start with, so how "light" it really is... well, that's debatable. 25-ish tons, give or take a few, seems to be the ballpark for these sorts of vehicles (for example, the ZTD-05 is 27 tons). That's still half the weight of an Abrams; you're putting two Centauros ashore for every Abrams.
I'd also argue that the combat utility of very light tanks can be questionable, because of how much protection they sacrifice to gain lightness. Consider the British Scorpion, or the American Sheridan. Very light tanks, yes - you can drive a Scorpion over soft ground where a man would sink in, and the Sheridan was air-droppable. But on the other hand... well, 7.62mm NATO will penetrate the Scorpion's "armor." Sheridan could tank HMG fire, but RPGs would eat it alive.
"This 'up-armoring' thought process is symptomatic of one of the military's major failings which is trying to make every asset a war-winner by itself."
DeleteI don't know about you, but if I'm a soldier riding in a Stryker taking regular RPG fire, damn straight I'd want an RPG cage on my vic! Every little bit of protection helps. And it's not like uparmoring is a new thing - look at all the improvised armor schemes Sherman tankers did in Europe in WW2, with varying levels of dubious effectiveness. At least the RPG cage works.
"I don't know about you, but if I'm a soldier riding in a Stryker taking regular RPG fire, damn straight I'd want an RPG cage on my vic! "
DeleteIf you in a Stryker taking regular RPG fire something has gone catastrophically wrong.
"if I'm a soldier riding in a Stryker taking regular RPG fire, damn straight I'd want an RPG cage on my vic! "
DeleteOf course you would. And if you were a sailor on a patrol boat taking fire you'd want battleship armor and 16" guns. But you're not responsible for paying for an entire military. We simply can't afford to make every platform a single-handed, war-winning asset. Sometimes a patrol boat is just a patrol boat.
@Domo: well, ot would seems regularly went wrong in Iraq and Afghanistan then, given that every Stryker there had an RPG cage installed. Do you really think enemy infantry squads aren't going to be carrying as many RPGs as they can? The RPG-7 isn't a big heavy weapon; one man can carry the launcher and multiple reloads. A 12-man squad, each person carrying just 3 reloads for the squad RPG gunner, is 36 RPGs.
DeleteI mean, the Russians tried running IFVs in Grozny and got chewed up alot by RPG, so now we see them going to ERA packages ror thenBMP-3M and the armor scheme on the T-15 heavy IFV...
@CmNavOps: Have you looked up pictures of Strykers with RPG cages? It's not an expensive protection measure. It's literally a steel cage. The idea is that it gives an extra margin of protection against RPGs, so the opposition either has to bring in heavier AT weapons or get tanks to deal with you (and if their tanks are fightong your APCs and IFVs, they're not fighting your tanks, so......)
The point isnt to turn the Stryker into a war winner by itself - it's a wheeled APC with a 50. cal. The point is to provide a further margin of protection against the organic weapons of enemy infantry so as to further complicate theor defensive efforts, and more crucially, reduce the risk of casualties to your troops, because you need infantry to take and hold ground, and you can't do that if your APCs and IFVs are getting shot up by RPG on their way to the objective.
also your comparison to a patrol boat is spurious, given that the purpose a patrol boat fulfils is not the same as an APC carrying troops. A patrol boat doesn,t take and hold ground.
Note that even the Russians, who nobody ever claimed to be loss-adverse, are putting uparmor kits on their IFVs, and building the T-15, a hesvy OFV built on a tankmhull which they claim will stand up to tank fire.
DeleteAnd then there's the psychology of things. Look at WW2 in europe. American tankers made all sorts of improvised armor schemes for their Shermans to counter heavier German guns. Even Sherman Jumbos, which had as much fromtal armor as a Tiger, were getting all sorts of jury rigged armor schemes. Most if not all methods were ineffective, but they served as confidence boosters to the crews, who would fight more aggressively than if they were using stock tanks.
Viewed in that lense, an RPG cage is nothing, it's a fairly cheap way of giving a confidence boost to your troops, with a further benefit of it actually works against RPGs. Your troops arrive on the objective unscathed with good morale, ready to fight (because they weren,t takong injuries and shrapnel from RPGs hitting the hull and blowing through and seeing their buddies get killed and maimed in front of them).
i mean, troops wear body armor to protect against frag and bullets. Maybe they shouldn't be wearing that, it's tryong to turn them into a single-handed war winning asset. :V
DeleteI feel I should make it clear that my last post is exaggerating for rhethorical effect.
Delete@WG
DeleteYes
Things regularly went wrong in Iraq and Afghanistan, basically everything we did there was fundamentally flawed.
The Stryker was designed to provide rapid transport and protection from small arms, light shell fragments and CBRN protection to an embarked squad.
It wasnt designed to patrol enemy territory.
If you are using it to patrol enemy territory, you are using it wrong.
The Stryker isn't supposed to drive in to combat, it should be dropping troops outside RPG range.
"I mean, the Russians tried running IFVs in Grozny and got chewed up alot by RPG, "
Indeed they did, their ifvs werent supposed to fight in cities either.
And after their first failure, they sat back and shelled the city in to submission.
"i mean, troops wear body armor to protect against frag and bullets. Maybe they shouldn't be wearing that,"
There is a significant body if research that shows anything more than a decent helmet is counter productive, the added weight limits mobility.
Things have a purpose
Using them incorrectly and making hasty modifications is a bad idea.
"if I'm a soldier riding in a Stryker taking regular RPG fire, damn straight I'd want an RPG cage on my vic!"
DeleteThis comment and the ensuing discussion is an example of the trivial, argumentative type of comment that does nothing to further the discussion. The genesis of this thread was the suggestion to use a light vehicle (Centauro-ish) as a means to get firepower ashore in the initial ground assault wave. To sidetrack the discussion to an utterly trivial and meaningless argument about side racks is completely unproductive and unrelated to the thread.
I keep repeating this - and I've about reached the limit of patience - offer something productive or don't comment. If you can't refrain from unproductive comments then I'll solve the problem for you. As I state in the Comment Policy page, I'd rather have one good comment than 10 poor ones.
Summing up all that discussion above and coming back to the point:
DeleteUsing a light vic (25~ tons) to get firepower ashore is not an inherently bad idea - the PLAN Marine Corps have been using light tanks since the 60s, afterall, and the Russians have the BMD series of light IFVs to support their paratroopers. What makes or breaks a vehicle's employment is doctrine. If you assume you can hit the beaches before heavy forces can arrive, where the only defenders are dismounted infantry, light tanks can be pretty viable: it doesn't matter if your light vic, whether it be an assault gun, IFV or a light tank, isn't armored against tank fire, if it's armored enough* against the organic weapons the enemy infantry are carrying. I'm reminded of an account where a Special Forces base was overrun by NVA PT-76s during the vietnam War: the PT-76 was undoubtedly underarmored with with no hope of surviving the battlefield, but they rolled over the defenders becase they didn't have heavy AT weapons; the PT-76s were armored enough to be proof against what weapons the base had. The enemy doesn't care that a light tank doesn't have as much armor as an Abrams if none of their weapons can defeat the light tank.
(This is less of an issue for a US Army squad on the defensive because the US Army issues the Javelin ATGM on the squad level; ATGM is typically a platoon or even company-level asset in other armies.)
So using light tanks lets you drop more firepower on the beach, and theoretically lets you roll up infantry defenders faster. The problem with that doctrine is that if the light tanks run into anything heavier than infantry and IFVs, they're going to have problems. For this doctrine to work, it assumes that the attacker is going to be able to find an beach that's not that heavily protected, and is far enough away that reinforcements will not arrive in time to lock down the beach from breakout.
(The other issue I see is that the USMC is repeating the problem of the US Army post D-Day. The US Army spent so much thought and effort on the problem of hitting the beaches on Normandy and getting past the beaches... but hadn't really thought much about what to do afterwards. I kinda see a similar monofocus in the USMC.)
*Or you could make like the Chinese and forgo armor beyond HMG and artillery protection**, like the ZTD-05 series does (even then, it's still being armored *enough* to handle the expected percentage threats). It all comes down to the cost-benefit analysis and how loss-adverse your doctrine is; the US is, on the whole, a fairly loss-adverse nation (the cake IMO is taken by Israel, where they build APCs out of tank hulls).
**Protection against HMG and artillery splinters was the basic protection level stipulated for the Bradley IFV in the 80s; most modern APC designs now achieve this, and the line between modern APC and IFV designs nowadays is rather blurred; generally IFVs are tracked and armed with autocannon, APCs are wheeled and armed with machinegun and maybe a grenade launcher.
Also something that might be worth keeping an eye out: General Dynamics Land Systems unveiled their Griffin IFV/tech demonstrator at AUSA 2018. The hull is the ASCOD hull, which is a known quantity - what's interesting about the Griffin is the turret, which houses a 50mm gun capable of +80 degrees and -20 degrees elevation. Speculation is that Griffin is being positioned to serve as a short ranged organic AA asset within the US Army that can also do IFV things.
DeletePotentially, this might possibly fit what @ComNavOps has talked about previously: a mobile AA vic capable of intercepting artillery fires to cover the marines as they travel inland (because towed 105mm guns just aren't going to cut it for artillery duels and shoot and scoot).
Unless they use the embared Zulu Cobras and F-35Bs to hunt the enemy artillery, I suppose; Artillery is the red-headed stepchild of the US military because the US uses tactical aircraft as its artillery.
"Using a light vic (25~ tons) to get firepower ashore is not an inherently bad idea"
DeleteA decent comment. However, you've only addressed half the issue, and the lesser half at that! Even if we could build an invulnerable, laser plasma cannon armed, warp powered light tank that only weighs 10 tons, if wouldn't help in the least unless we have a means to get it ashore in the first assault wave. Currently, we do not. AAVs are the only 1st-wave landing craft we have and they can't carry anything but troops. We lack a tank landing craft. Doctrinally, LCACs and LCUs are deemed non-survivable and have been relegated to the follow on waves after the beach has been secured - when the tanks and heavy equipment are no longer needed! Yes, there's still the second phase push inland but that's a different subject.
So, the glaring capability gap is the ability to land a tank of any size or weight.
We need either:
1. a small, individual tank landing craft
2. a large heavy vehicle landing vessel that we're willing to lose (along with its entire load!) in the initial assault wave (like an LST)
3. an amphibious "tank" along the lines of the WWII LVT(A)
All of these options have problems.
The small, individual tank landing craft and the amphibious tank both need to be launched near shore (2-5 miles) to avoid the debilitating effects of too much time in the water.
The LST requires a long, slow approach to the shore and is a large, non-stealthy, slow, non-maneuverable target. Few would make it to shore in a peer contested environment.
Failing all of the above, we have to reconcile ourselves that our assault capability is extremely limited - limited to almost permissive scenarios such as you described.
So, you've addressed half the issue but skipped over the other, more important, half. Any thoughts on the transport half of the issue?
To be fair, if you could make a light tank that was 10 tons, you could attempt to sling lift it ashore with Super Stallions - that would be a lot more viable than sending in an LCAC,although a heavylift helo is still a rather large and unsubtle target, though there are measures one can take to mitigate those risks (but there's only so low you can fly with a sling load under the helo).
DeleteUltimately, with the way technology exists at the moment, neither the US nor China is going to solve the transport issue. Transports are the weak link between the amphibs and the shore. Tom Clancy and Larry Bond's trick of packing a mechanised battalion into a ro-ro and unloading at a port isn't going to work in the real world. :V (Well, for an opposed landing, anyway. The Japanese plan on using chartered ro-ros and ferries to move their tanks and wheeled TDs around to reinforce their islands, but that's domestic transport within their own waters.)
Current thinking in the US military seems to be using F-35Bs to act as spotters for Tomahawk fires from escort DDGs and sterilising the shore, with Zulu Cobras going after "lesser" threats. The thinking seems to be that DDGs will service fixed defenses with TLAM, F-35Bs will go inshore to take out SSMs and artillery, and Zulu Cobras will cover the first heliborne landing of troops and suppress enemy infantry & armor. Like the light tank idea i mentioned above, this assumes that you're going to be landing on a beach where the opposition isn't that high because you can get there before the enemy can bring in heavy forces to lock it down. I'm not convinced that's always going to happen.
On the other hand as NORPAC 82 showed, it's possible for a CSG to operate in striking range of strategic assets for days and not be detected, so it's theoretically possible to sneak an amphib group through China's sensor coverage of their shores if deception measures are used, but, well, that just solves the problem of getting on the beach, and not the next a question of "What do you do once you've gotten off the beach?"
@ Wild Goose - why are H-53s, or any other helicopter more viable than LCACs?
DeleteWhat is the logistic throughput (capability) of a ship-to-shore helicopter force to sustain ground forces in high intensity peer combat?
Final observation: Tom Clancy based his "trick" on the MSC Ready reserve force - a real capability with real assets that were exercised during the cold war.
GAB
A comment was deleted as absurd and argumentative.
Delete"@ Wild Goose - why are H-53s, or any other helicopter more viable than LCACs?"
DeleteThe viability comes from speed of deployment, assuming you could build a 10 ton light tank that's sufficiently protected against expected infantry weapons. While a heavylift helo carrying a sling lift load isn't going to be able to travel at maximum speed, it's still going to be faster heading to the shore than an LCAC, and can put the pedal to the metal for the return trip to the amphib to collect the next vehicle.
This, however, is a hypothetical capability for the hypothetical discussion of a sufficiently protected light tank weighing 10 tons or less.
"Final observation: Tom Clancy based his "trick" on the MSC Ready reserve force - a real capability with real assets that were exercised during the cold war."
Note that MSC does not expect to do a combat deployment into enemy ports to seize them and offload vehicles while under fire. The "trick" in Red Storm Rising worked because 1) nobody expected them, and 2) it was a Death or Glory kind of plan, as we say in Warhammer 40k tabletop, and 3) it was gamed out, and the dice rolled in favor of the Russians. And even then, let's not forget that they very nearly failed: it was a pretty close call.
MSC's meta has always been offloading of vehicles at a friendly port, in a permissive environment. If an amphib built to military spec is unsurvivable close to shore, what more a ro-ro built to civvie spec.
I think I have to be more unsublte here: Can you unload an armored division off ro-ros at a port? Absolultely, if it's a port you control, if it's a permissive environment.
DeleteCan you unload an armored division at a hostile port belonging to your opposition, in a hostile, non-permissive environment? Nope, not happening.
" If an amphib built to military spec is unsurvivable close to shore, what more a ro-ro built to civvie spec."
DeleteDo you think anyone is suggesting that we're doing to conduct an invasion/assault by sailing cargo ships into enemy ports and unloading?
Assuming that you do not then we can dispense with that bit of idiocy.
We've previously disproven the notion of aviation assault for anything for than an unopposed raid/rescue.
We've previously disproven the notion of an over-the-beach assault for anything but a very small, very lightly opposed action.
That only leaves entry via a port which leads us to my oft-repeated statement that port seizure should be THE core mission of the today's Marine Corps. That, in turn, ought to lead to a serious re-examination of the Marine Corps force structure and equipment list since the Marines have very little of what is needed.
I believe that was implicit in my wording. Note what I said: you can unload ro-ros at a port you control in a permissive environment.
DeleteGAB and I were discussing the Soviet trick from Red Storm Rising, where they loaded a ro-ro with troops and vics, did their best to sail undeteced to Iceland, and then charged the docks once they were blown. No troops or amphibous landings involved: that was the amphibious assault.
No one studies logistics in the MIL blogs…
DeleteNeither the H-53 or LCAC/SSC (as presently configured) are viable as delivery platforms in high intensity conflict, but there are obvious improvements possible for surface effect ships and air cushion vehicles, while the helicopter is close to a technological dead end.
H-53s sling-loading AFVs ashore are speed limited and are not going to be measurably faster than LCACs as a force. LCAC/SSCs will absolutely dominate helicopter forces on throughput (number of vehicles/mass of supplies delivered per given period). Worse, the H-53s cost more (~3-4 times), and are less survivable. There are at least three (3) RAND studies that have hammered this topic to death.
Lighter armor does not eliminate the requirement for ammunition – even with reduced fuel requirements, how are you going to move the HEMTT/LSVs needed for sustainment ashore? To lift a notional reinforced AFV company at one stroke will require the equivalent of an aviation battalion, or roughly 20 H-53s. That is
Finally, and not to be flip, but there are many instances where commercial shipbuilding standards (e.g. MARAD, or ABS) are superior to USN specs. As an example, commercial shipbuilders were installing fire suppression systems (mist/fog, foam, etc.) far more advanced than anything the USN even knew was possible, and doing it decades in advance of the Navy. The Navy remains far behind in personal protective gear for sailors to use in combating fires compared to civilian fire departments.
GAB
On point as always!
Delete@GAB: To be honest, I think helo lift of AFVs onto the shore is a pipe dream. It ain't gonna happen, not in our lifetimes, not until people make heavy VTOLs like what we see in Halo or various sci-fi verses/video games - and that's going to be a long way off.
Delete"Finally, and not to be flip, but there are many instances where commercial shipbuilding standards (e.g. MARAD, or ABS) are superior to USN specs."
Delete@GAB: TBH I was being a little flip there myself. One gets a bit tired of hearing the refrain of "Perry/LCS arent survivable because they're built to civilian standards!" :/
"To be honest, I think helo lift of AFVs onto the shore is a pipe dream."
DeleteThen why did you waste time arguing for helo lift of vehicles in an assault? That's the kind of argumentative, pointless discussion I discourage. Please don't do this in the future or, alternatively, understand when I summarily delete it.
"One gets a bit tired of hearing the refrain of "Perry/LCS arent survivable because they're built to civilian standards!"
DeleteGAB made the point that there are 'instances' of commercial standards being superior to USN specs. He did not make any statement suggesting that an entire ship built to commercial specs was superior. The LCS was built to a mix of commercial and naval/mil specs with many combat and survivability naval/mil specs and practices being deleted such as shock hardening, all steel construction, EMCON capability, NBC resistance, naval stability requirements, etc. So, yes, the LCS is less survivable due to the incorporation of commercial specs and deletion of naval/mil specs and practices. You may be tired of hearing it but that doesn't make it any less true.
"Then why did you waste time arguing for helo lift of vehicles in an assault? That's the kind of argumentative, pointless discussion I discourage. Please don't do this in the future or, alternatively, understand when I summarily delete it."
DeleteI was discussing a potential hypothetical, because sooner or later somebody would have suggested "hey what if, hypothetically, you could use air lift to move your vehicles to the shore?" I just chose to get the conversation started.
"I was discussing a potential hypothetical,"
DeleteNo, you discussed a ridiculous hypothetical that you later stated was a "pipe dream". That's a waste of everyone's time. You were looking to argue for the sake of arguing. Put that energy into semi-realistic concept discussions, drop the arguing for its own sake, and you'll be a productive commenter.
To be fair, you've made progress since your original comments on this blog but you have a ways to go. This blog is not interested in trivial arguments but, rather, in substantive discussions.
And I dunno about you, but I think we got some useful discussion out of that idea.
DeleteLook, the point was to discuss one approach to solve the issue of transport to shore, and see where promising avenues for the future might lead - and I mean, you did kinda start this with the 10 ton light tank, i'm just piggybacking off of that.
DeleteUltimately the last several conversations on this blog about the issues with transporting equipment to the shore have led me to conclude that if sea transport is too slow, if LCACs are unsurvivable and if LHDs, LPDs and LSDs need to remain beyond 100 km of the shore to have a measure of safety, then the only way you're solving the issue of transport transit time is with air transport. That requires several things: 1) the vehicles be light and small enough for air transport, 2) the aircraft be large enough to carry those vehicles in an enclosed cargo bay, 3) the aircraft needs to fit on an LPD and LHD and 4) we're going to need to rethink how we load vehicles when the flight deck is topside and the storage bay is below the flight deck.
When I say airlifting AFVs onto the beach is a pipe dream and science fiction, I'm acknowledging the fact that right now, this capability does not exist. Which is not the same as dismissing it as a future avenue of development.
"then the only way you're solving the issue of transport transit time is with air transport."
DeleteYou're wrong but that's irrelevant to me. If you think this is a potential, viable route then do the research, do the calcs, and prove/disprove the notion.
What weight vehicle can the various aircraft lift?
What is the range of the aircraft with sling loaded, massive weights?
What is the survivability of stationary, hovering, aircraft while they are delivering their loads?
What is the throughput of aviation delivery?
Where does the fuel, munitions, parts, etc. come from to support the vehicles?
What is a reasonable survival rate for slow, low, sling-loaded aircraft over an opposed landing site?
What are the historical precedents, if any? If there are none, why not?
How does the historical, abysmal availability of helos impact the ability to sustain delivery?
Answer these and related questions and then you'll know whether aviation delivery of vehicles is viable and you won't have to engage in unsupported speculation. This is the 'do your homework' part of blog participation.
Do a good enough job and you can write a post about it.
I feel doing a writeup would be somewhat pointless, because it is
Deletenot possible with today's aircraft. Note the requirements in my earlier post. This would basically boil down to hypotheticals and speculation. What I am saying is that it is not possible today, but it may be possible in the future with further development of VTOL transports, but this is something that is unproven and theoretical in nature.
Also, sling loading's not going to work - note that I mention an enclosed cargo bay as point 2 - if you have an enclosed cargo bay you get to fly as fast as you can without the drag and safety issues from sling loading a vehicle, and then you land, drop the ramp, and your vehicle drives out.
Basicaly we'd need to invent VTOL transports with a C-130-sized cargo bay, or the Pelicans from Halo; the way the fuselage and mag clamp sustem is designed, when a Pelican lifts a vehicle, the vehicle is inside the Pelican's air stream, so you don't get as much of the drag issues as with sling loading. But then, Halo's a vdeogame set in the future. :V
"the last several conversations on this blog about the issues with transporting equipment to the shore have led me to conclude that if sea transport is too slow, if LCACs are unsurvivable and if LHDs, LPDs and LSDs need to remain beyond 100 km of the shore to have a measure of safety"
DeleteSo, if there's no viable means of conducting an opposed ship to shore landing, one should be asking, why do we bother maintaining a 30+ fleet of multi-billion dollar amphibious ships? That's a hideously expensive way to provide light infantry for unopposed, very low end threats. We already have Army/AF light infantry that can be quickly deployed anywhere in the world at a moment's notice as opposed to a deployed MEU which can only be used in one, very localized spot. This is the theme (well, one of) I've been hammering on.
I favor air transport over sea transport for FUTURE notional amphibious assault assets, because it's a lot easier to go faster in air than it is to go faster on sea. :V
DeleteThe problem IMO with army light infantry is that you've got global reach with C-5s and C-17s, but you're limited in what airports can service your aircraft (for if you're carrying leg infantry), and airborne drops are even more limited in what they can bring than an MEU.
Then there's also a sentiment within the US Army that paratroopers are as limited in full combat ops as an MEU's marines are. Big Army's perspective to the 82nd is that it's a bunch of infantry brigade combat teams with a funny way of deploying to the AO; once they land they turn into normal Army infantry. The airborne hasn't done a real opposed drop in decades.
You may well be right that flying infantry in stategic transports or chartered passenger planes lets you deploy troops more easily (and more of them to boot) vs an MEU; on the other hand the tradeoff with that is that the MEU has organic air support, helos and indirect fires of its own, while the infantry just have their small arms and the mortars and ATGMs in the weapons squads. *shrug* It's all tradeoffs.
Ultimately I think the best one can expect from the airborne and an MEU in a hot war is to act as a force in being that restrains the actions of the adversary: for example, the threat of an amphibious landing forces the adversary to keep forces to defend his coasts, which dilutes his concentration of force (for example, Saddam splitting his forces to cover against a Marine invasion that never happened).
Regarding defence
ReplyDeleteChinas coastline extends to approximately 14,500km, a WW2 battalion was expected to defend something like 2km
China doesnt have 7,250 battalions
Better long range fires and total motorization extend the limits the battalion can defend. A single Cobra/Viper can can cause utter devastation if it finds a clump of vehicles racing to the scene, even in armoured vehicles, they will have to move individually and carefully, hellfires and 20mm cannon fire to the top/side/rear isnt survivable in light or medium APCs.
So, much of the coast will be defended very very lightly, a platoon, or accounting for rest times, even just a single Squad+APC.
Key points will be far more heavily defended, but the more that is moved to key points, the more is removed from the general line.
Regarding Offence
Heavy Tanks cant easily be stopped, most of us would agree that it takes a tank to stop a tank, sure artillery can, and ATGMs can, but they cant if they are being shot at by ships artillery themselves.
4, 8, 12, 16 tanks should have a very good chance to punch through anything not an equal number of tanks.
Medium Tanks can be stopped by a whole host of things, walls, boulders, rocket fire, cannon fire, and light tanks can be stopped by a firmly thrown rock.
Although you could land a 10t tankette by heavy lift helicopter, why?
Super useful if you are sneak attacking OBLs compound, less so if theres a Chinese Armoured Division over the hill.
Thats not to say light tanks are useless, theres a great argument in my mind for landing 50 of them after the first wave to sweep/sanitize as big an area as possible.
"1. a small, individual tank landing craft
2. a large heavy vehicle landing vessel that we're willing to lose (along with its entire load!) in the initial assault wave (like an LST)
3. an amphibious "tank" along the lines of the WWII LVT(A)"
Or possibly a combination, fast survivor, that races 50-5km and slower less survivable transporter/swimming tank for the final 5k.
"On the other hand as NORPAC 82 showed, it's possible for a CSG to operate in striking range of strategic assets for days and not be detected, so it's theoretically possible to sneak an amphib group through China's sensor coverage of their shores if deception measures are used, but, well, that just solves the problem of getting on the beach, and not the next a question of "What do you do once you've gotten off the beach?""
Well, it does and it doesnt.
The "Hidden" battle group was hidden primarily because the Soviets didnt know to look for it, they did find its partner, had they attacked its partner, they would quickly have cottoned on to the fact that the second was there.
Impressive, but very different from sneaking in an amphibious invasion
"What is the logistic throughput (capability) of a ship-to-shore helicopter force to sustain ground forces in high intensity peer combat?"
Effectively nil
A Divison needs 4,000tons of supplies per day
4,000,000 kilograms
A CH53k can carry 15,000kg, 250+ flights, per day, every day
Any sort of sustained fighting would require some sort of usable port/dock infrastructure or dozens of LCACs to act as interconnectors between the beach and the stores ships.
Civilian standards are quite different, not necessarily better
ReplyDeleteCS has automated fire suppression systems, but they those systems aren't designed to function after a missile attack.
Not much is!
DeleteThe statement was that there are instances of superior civilian standards, not an across the board statement of superiority. There's nothing to argue about here.