There is an old adage that
governs the ultimate rationale for naval forces:
The seat of purpose is on the land.
Sooner or later, a naval
force must engage land forces. That
engagement can take the form of direct strikes from missiles or carrier aircraft
or can be amphibious assaults to get land forces ashore. Either way, it means that a naval force must,
eventually, approach land. This is where
the Navy/Marine’s idiotic doctrine of conducting an amphibious assault from 25-100+
miles at sea falls apart. If you won’t
approach land, you can’t influence events on land which is where ultimate
purpose resides.
Yes, there are other ways to
influence events on land. A blockade,
for example, can influence events on land.
For countries that have an alternate, land-only means of engaging an
enemy, the naval forces can get by with just playing a minor, supporting role
like a blockade. The Union Navy did this
during the American Civil War by imposing a blockade on the South. However, for a country that has no direct
land contact with an enemy, there is only one way to get troops to the enemy
and that is by sea. Yes, air transport
can move a few troops but only sealift can move the massive quantities of men,
weapons, ammunition, and supplies that are needed for sustained combat.
Acknowledging, then, the
necessity to eventually approach an enemy’s land, the naval force structure
planner must ask what forces, weapons, and tactics will allow a reasonable
chance of survival while conducting near-land operations. Assessing survival equipment needs starts by
identifying the major threats.
The biggest threats to naval
forces wishing to operate near land are,
- Mines
- Submarines
- Anti-ship missiles (ASM)
Ironic and troubling, isn’t
it, that the US Navy has no effective combat mine countermeasures capability,
no effective, dedicated surface ship anti-submarine (ASW) vessels, and limited
and non-survivable aerial ASW capability?
The Navy is ill-prepared to deal with two of the three major near-land
threats. At least the anti-ship missile
threat is manageable with our large fleet of Aegis equipped Burke class ships.
It’s further ironic and
baffling that the Navy’s stated reason for doctrinally refusing to approach
land is the threat of land based ASM’s, the one threat for which we are
prepared! Let’s set aside the mine and
submarine threats and examine the ASM threat a bit closer.
The Navy has spent billions
of dollars on its Aegis capability. The
system was designed and intended to counter saturation swarms of Soviet anti-ship
cruise missiles launched from entire regiments of long range bombers. Aegis is designed to handle large numbers of
targets simultaneously and can do so in a completely automatic mode – and, in
fact, is more efficient and effective in that mode.
With all that capability in
mind, one has to wonder why the threat of a relatively few isolated, land based
cruise missiles so terrifies the US Navy?
Either they know that Aegis is an utter failure or they’ve become so
risk averse that they can’t imagine actually standing and fighting and possibly
losing a ship. I tend to believe it’s
the latter. I’ve seen nothing to
indicate that Aegis is a failure but, to be fair, there is little actual data
to indicate that Aegis is a success!
Still, I’ll assume it’s capable until I see data indicating otherwise.
So, if Aegis is capable of
handling the ASM threat, then the Navy is just too scared and too risk averse
to stand in harm’s way and execute their function.
Let’s look at the arithmetic
of the situation. For a high subsonic
cruise missile, like the Chinese C-802, the missile speed is around 680 mile
per hour and it cruises at an altitude of 10-20 m which decreases to 3-5 m in
the terminal phase. The Navy is scared
to stand near shore and, apparently, feels that the extra 25-50 miles will
enable them to more effectively engage such an anti-ship cruise missile. Will it, though?
Here’s the raw reaction
times for various distances.
10
miles = 0.9 minutes
25
miles = 2.2 minutes
50
miles = 4.4 minutes
Unless an ASM is sited
nearly on the beach – in which case it would, presumably, have been spotted,
targeted, and destroyed as part of the assault preparations – the launch site
will likely be 10-100+ miles away from the assault location.
At the low end of that range,
10 miles, and assuming the defending ship is beached so that there is no extra
range added, 10 miles provides around 0.9 minutes of reaction/defense
time. In the world of computers and a
fully automatic Aegis system, 0.9 minutes is an eternity! Longer distances simply provide even longer
reaction/defense times.
 |
| Stand and Fight! |
In any realistic scenario,
say with the Navy ships about 5 miles offshore and the enemy anti-ship missile
launchers around 10-100+ miles away, the reaction time is more than adequate.
There’s no question that
longer distance translates to more time to defend. However, a couple of minutes is more than
enough time. If you can’t shoot down an
incoming missile in a couple of minutes of engagement time, a few more minutes
isn’t likely to produce a positive result.
Ultimately, the risk of
standing in close and fighting must be balanced against the accomplishment of
the mission. It does no good to remain
safe, far out at sea, but unable to accomplish the mission. If the mission is worthwhile, then the risk
is acceptable. The Navy’s defensive
systems were built for this. Trust them
to do their job. Stand and fight.
I agree with the premise you stated regarding being risk averse to losing a ship. The USN better get used to the idea of potentially losing ships on the scale of WW2. The near and true peer opponent (China) has no such qualms about the same thing. As a former minesweep sailor (USS Enhance MSO-437) I've always wondered why we as a service never got serious about mine operations. Especially seeing how effective and cheap it was to close down sea lanes.
ReplyDeleteBecause minesweeping isn't sexy. It doesn't pay massive amounts in jobs programs etc.
DeleteIts not the flash a admiral wants.
The (radio) horizon should be considered a huge threshold, for land artillery can overwhelm any warship with unguided munitions if it's in range and tracked.
ReplyDeleteOh good grief, try to be realistic. Sure, if we allow artillery battalions to leisurely target/fire at us and our ships cooperatively remain motionless and unresisting, then, yes, we'll have sunk ships. Do you really think that's what will happen?
DeleteThe reality is that enemy artillery will be located and targeted before any ship gets within range (you can't really hide an artillery battalion!). Artillery that was overlooked will have their radars destroyed by Growlers and HARM shooters when they begin searching because we aren't going to initiate an assault without air cover. Any artillery that still manages to fire will be engaged with counterbattery fire from ships (Aegis is capable of it but it's not currently practiced - that will change!) and/or missile fire. Air strikes will be called in, if available. In short, if we've done our job properly and planned accordingly, enemy artillery will have short lifespans.
It will hardly be the one sided affair you present. An assault will have the resources it needs to succeed or it won't be initiated.
Check your history. Ships have always operated within range of land based artillery and most survive. Some few are damaged or sunk but that's the nature of combat. The fact is that modern land based artillery has, historically, been fairly ineffective.
WWII conclusively proved that ships can operate within range of land based artillery with good success.
The real issue for land-based artillery, whether tube or missile, is targeting, and any active radar should be destroyed either by advance forces, or as soon as it begins to emit.
DeleteThere is of course the argument that MSA or AEW aircraft might dash into the AO and illuminate targets for shore-based batteries, but the probability of these aircraft surviving the air campaign, plus long-ranged missile strikes on airfields, and then making it through fighters is slim.
Where enemy artillery is an even larger threat is to the landing force. We cannot ensure that the enemy will not have buried voice and data lines to support dispersed and well hidden artillery units. Suspected landing beaches and approaches will be pre-plotted by any competent enemy – unmolested artillery can ruin an assault with the push of a button or a “fire target AB036…” call.
This is why the current infantry-centric USMC doctrine is no longer valid; it was really invalidated in WWI, as proved by the wastage in the WWII operations. OMFTS noted that defended beaches of the past with huge fortifications and static infantry in defense, are just that, history. A contemporary defense would consist of artillery, supported by a few observation posts (which could be fortified), and a belt of anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, shallow water mines, and perhaps deep-water mines. Further inshore, the enemy would have tank and mechanized infantry reserves. None of this is terribly expensive, but it is hugely effective.
Ironically the USMC understood this immediately post WWII and the 1949 armor board insisted that future amphibious assaults would require powerful tank and tracked engineering vehicles to land in the first wave and keep moving right onto their objectives (see Ken Estes excellent work: Marines Under Armor”). This doctrine was validated by the British and Canadians in Normandy with the wickedly effective tanks and engineering vehicles created by Major General Percy Hobbart, but since we Americans pay no head to foreign ideas… The Corps elected to go the route of vertical envelopment, even though helicopters have yet to be used in a large-scale, peer conflict between *competent* powers.
GAB
"A contemporary defense would consist of artillery, supported by a few observation posts (which could be fortified), and a belt of anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, shallow water mines, and perhaps deep-water mines. Further inshore, the enemy would have tank and mechanized infantry reserves."
DeleteYou're describing a layered defense in depth. Additional layers would include cruise missiles located hundreds of miles from the landing site and ballistic missiles located hundreds-thousands of miles away.
"future amphibious assaults would require powerful tank and tracked engineering vehicles to land in the first wave and keep moving right onto their objectives"
The challenge with this blitzkrieg type assault is how to get the heavy armor ashore in the initial wave. No one has yet come up with an answer to that.
The closest thing to an answer is the LST but that is a lot to risk in the initial wave given the large, slow, non-stealthy nature of the LST. Conceptually, what is needed is a moderate speed (highest reasonable speed) landing craft that can carry a single tank. That disperses the risk. Conceptually, a Higgins boat for a tank!
"WWII conclusively proved that ships can operate within range of land based artillery with good success."
DeleteSecond world war vessels were heavily armoured and carried large gun batteries.
"The reality is that enemy artillery will be located and targeted before any ship gets within range (you can't really hide an artillery battalion!)."
You could hide six guns though no problem, add in forward observers and even unguided shells will cause a nightmare, a couple of 105's hitting a troop ship will kill a regiment.
Im not sure I'd bet on a burke against a concealed Abrams.
All that said, artillery is a manageable threat, the landing beach will be thoroughly cleared by SEALy types long before an LST tries to disgorge its cargo.
"The challenge with this blitzkrieg type assault is how to get the heavy armor ashore in the initial wave. No one has yet come up with an answer to that. "
An armoured brigade combat team has 90 abrams, 90 bradley and 112 113s
200 LCMs should be able to drop the entire teeth brigade in one wave, with logistics and support a couple of hours later.
"Conceptually, what is needed is a moderate speed (highest reasonable speed) landing craft that can carry a single tank. That disperses the risk. Conceptually, a Higgins boat for a tank!"
Lots and lots of them
"200 LCMs should be able to drop the entire teeth brigade in one wave"
DeleteIt would have to be a new, larger design LCM since the current version cannot carry an M1. The LCM has a capacity of around 50 tons and current M1's are around 75 tons.
200 is quite a bit more than we have available today but in a major war I guess we'd build what we need.
How would these LCMs get to the assault site?
"You could hide six guns though no problem, add in forward observers and even unguided shells will cause a nightmare,"
DeleteNo. If you're talking about truly unguided artillery without radar fire control (meaning, just visual spotters) their accuracy will be horrifically bad against a moving ship. Against that will be the ship with radar controlled counterbattery fire. That would be a very short lived duel for the artillery!
If you're talking about using radar for artillery fire control then you're right back to the radar being targeted by anti-radiation missiles and, again, a very short life for the radar and the artillery will, again, be back to visual spotting.
Come on, WW2 examples don't matter any more.
DeleteRegarding counterfires; they're utterly ineffective against shoot & scoot unless you have GMTI/SAR capability in the air to track the scooters. Even then it's most dubious once the enemy adapted.
Coastal arty does not fully depend on radars. Infrared sensor triangulation would suffice.
Time of flight is roughly 20 seconds to the horizon, a warship would need to manoeuvre all the time to dodge that. Those manoeuvres would drop its sustained top speed to about 20 kts, and the arty would merely be challenged to cover a large area per salvo to guarantee hits.
The odds of the ship getting hit by arty may be tolerable against unitary HE fired with a delay of 1 minute or longer, but at 30 seconds delay the ship is practically doomed against a divisional arty equivalent. It would be hit (directly) within 10...15 minutes by a 152...155 mm HE. And then the hits would keep coming, especially if the ship is slowed down. Ad to this the indirect hits, which could very well penetrate the hull under water.
Ships that have a navigational bias (such as passing a strait) instead of randomised evasive manoeuvres have much worse odds. Ships that don't do much evasive manoeuvres can be hit by a first salvo reliably.
"Come on, WW2 examples don't matter any more."
DeleteThose who will not learn from history, ...
"Regarding counterfires; they're utterly ineffective against shoot & scoot "
Depending on circumstances, counterbattery fire can be initiated before the incoming rounds land. Very few systems can shoot and relocate in that time frame. Plus, if you're limiting yourself to, literally, a single shot at a time you're not going to be combat effective.
"a warship would need to manoeuvre all the time to dodge that."
You understand that ships constantly move, right? They don't pull up to an enemy shore and anchor!
You seem not to understand how an assault would work. Ships are not going to sit, immobile, off an enemy shore, absorbing enemy fire until they're sunk. I've already explained this in other comments so I refer you to them. You need to reevaluate your idea of naval warfare! Artillery is simply not a significant threat in the context of an assault, as described in the post. Far too many attacking resources would make short work of any artillery, most of it before ships even appeared! Consider how an assault would be conducted and all the elements at play - artillery is not a threat to ships.
"Regarding counterfires; they're utterly ineffective against shoot & scoot unless you have GMTI/SAR capability in the air to track the scooters."
DeleteThe presence of loitering munitions and possibly friendly aircraft overhead make artillery and their C4ISR nets quite vulnerable. And no one considers the effects of offensive EW.
The only real counter is to use buried fiber optics, copper voice and data lines are also subject to EW exploitation, but then you mobile artillery is essentially immobilized.
GAB
You could have burried fiber optice
WW2 examples don't matter because WW2 fire control was completely different.
Delete"You understand that ships constantly move, right?"
I actually did quick OR on how much they can move into which directions, what area they might cover during a certain delay between triangulation and impact. I furthermore took into account that the forward 100 m of the ship need not be hit, which reduces their movement in that period by 100 m.
In the end, the odds of being directly hit by 155 mm became utterly unacceptable against modern arty fire control systems.
You can forget about your nonsense idea that I don't know that ships move. It's not exactly shining good light on you if you think that people like me are total idiots.
And you really, really don't seem to respect the survivability of land forces. That dominance that you describe - in which forces on land would be wiped out - applies only if the naval forces are overwhelmingly powerful. And even then the idea that most would be wiped out before the ships arrive is ludicrous unless those land forces were stationary.
A naval task force may dominate land forces up close at the Strait of Hormuz or when assaulting an isolated island. It would rather not be true in general, and your article wasn't specifically about the most favourable scenarios.
Last but not least; you insisted that history should be respected. You should look up how typically ineffective naval fires and even air attacks were against coastal defences. Even extreme firepower regularly disappointed. Smoke was essential top protect amphibious assaults from coastal defences because naval and air power was not reliable against them.
"people like me are total idiots."
DeleteYour words, not mine! Your ideas about naval combat are, um ... unorthodox. I don't mind that. It gives readers a nice range of ideas and something to compare reality against.
"dominance that you describe - in which forces on land would be wiped out - applies only if the naval forces are overwhelmingly powerful."
And your failure to understand that this is the only condition under which a naval/amphibious force would attack kind of sums up your inability to grasp the basics of naval/amphibious warfare. A naval force isn't even going to attempt an assault unless they have overwhelming force. To do otherwise would be operational stupidity.
An assault would target and destroy all known artillery before any ships approached. The few that survived would be targeted and destroyed as they made themselves known.
Without radar fire control, artillery would be shooting by visual spotting - hardly accurate! With radar fire control they'd be immediately targeted by anti-radiation missiles and counterbattery fire and destroyed. Not a lot of good options for the artillery!
Study the WWII Normandy assault and Pacific campaign and you'll get a good feel for how amphibious assaults are conducted and how ineffective land artillery is against ships.
"typically ineffective naval fires and even air attacks were against coastal defences. Even extreme firepower regularly disappointed."
DeleteTrue to some extent. For example, at Normandy, the US refused to conduct extensive pre-assault bombardment and paid the price for it. As the Pacific campaign went on and naval forces learned, pre-assault bombardments became quite effective, eventually driving the Japanese to concede the landings and retreat into interior, mountainous, and underground fortifications.
Still, the remarkable ability of defending forces to survive what would seem 100% lethal applications of firepower was always evident and strongly argued for heavier firepower (battleship as opposed to 5" guns) but that's a topic for another time.
The fire Plan for Normandy correctly emphasized neutralization over destruction for most targets.
DeleteIn general terms, for a given "weight of fire", my preference would be to maximize the number of shells hitting the target area in the shortest unit of time, over maximizing the caliber of the firing guns.
In other words, given the option of one 16" shell, I would strongly prefer ten (10) 8" shells, or twenty six (26) 155mm shells, impacting the target area at the same instant.
This is the Time on Target artillery mission, or the very descriptive British term "terror concentration," where sometimes dozens of batteries opened fire on a single target.
Cluster and submunitions can produce a similar effect.
There are many good reason why armies world-wide largely standardized on 152/155mm weapons for their artillery.
GAB
Also important to note that even troops under heavy fortifications could be neutralized us
"this is the only condition under which a naval/amphibious force would attack"
DeleteAmerican TF maybe. historically, there have been VASTLY more daring amphibious ops - and some of them were successful. The Germans, Soviets and Japanese were quite aggressive in particular, and the British didn't insist on total local dominance several times during WW2 either.
Furthermore, I interpreted your topic as covering the passage of narrow straits as well.
"An assault would target and destroy all known artillery before any ships approached."
That kind of trivialises your whole topic. What's noteworthy about going close to land with a naval TF if the precondition is to wipe out all resistance from well behind the horizon? I doubt any navy would refuse to close with land if it's only about mopping up lightly armed troops.
"Without radar fire control, artillery would be shooting by visual spotting - hardly accurate!"
You keep pretending that. Why don't you take notice of the long-mentioned option of triangulation with thermal vision? Even the mere visual observation is not terribly inaccurate nor slow if it makes use of triangulation. In fact, the accuracy could easily be better than the accuracy of the artillery.
"Study the WWII Normandy assault and Pacific campaign and you'll get a good feel for how amphibious assaults are conducted and how ineffective land artillery is against ships."
I did long ago, and as mentioned - the fire control at the time was nothing like today's. You don't seem to feel bound by the NGFS failures against coastal artillery of WW2 either.
"American TF maybe. historically, there have been VASTLY more daring amphibious ops"
DeleteIf other countries want to be idiots, that's their perogative. The wise commander only engages when he has localized superiority. This is elementary strategy that you need to grasp.
"Furthermore, I interpreted your topic as covering the passage of narrow straits as well."
If you did, you missed the mark completely as the post was about the US Navy's doctrinal policy of standing 25-50+ miles off shore during an amphibious assault. It was pretty clear. Read slower next time and comprehend more.
"What's noteworthy about going close to land with a naval TF if the precondition is to wipe out all resistance from well behind the horizon?"
Contrary to what you're trying to make the discussion about, the post was NOT about ships dueling with artillery. It was about being willing to move close enough to shore to accomplish the mission - amphibious assault in the case of this post topic. The post was about accepting reasonable risk. The artillery threat cannot be 100% eliminated and will be part of the threat but not a major hindrance because the wise naval commander will have already greatly reduced the artillery threat.
"long-mentioned option of triangulation with thermal vision? "
Never heard of that being used for artillery fire control. Cite me a reference.
"The wise commander only engages when he has localized superiority. This is elementary strategy that you need to grasp."
DeleteNope, that's the thinking of the resources-rich side.
Those not superior in resources may still have to put up a fight, and they could and would not limit themselves to the American way of war.
"Contrary to what you're trying to make the discussion about, the post was NOT about ships dueling with artillery."
You interpret way too much (and especially too much wrong) into what I write. I certainly did not write about ship duels.
Moreover, the basic point remains: Your article here is trivial if it's only about closing with land masses where all capable opposition has been destroyed or is being dominated by air power and indirect fires.
Of course it should be considered acceptable risk to close with a near-disarmed hostile force. The non-trivial questions are entirely different ones:
- how do you know their original strength?
- how do you know their current strength?
- why trust your judgment about strengths?
- what losses would be incurred by what hostile strength?
- what losses is the objective worth?
And the real problem is that very likely nobody really knows an answer to any of these questions, and those who think otherwise almost certainly fool themselves.
"Never heard of that being used for artillery fire control. Cite me a reference."
It's the adaptation of flash spotting, in use with passive artillery reconnaissance in several countries. The Russians introduced a brand new such system a few years ago.
It's technically simple, 1910's-ish. Could be improvised by a single electrical engineer.
It's also part of naval CEC multi-platform sensor fusion.
"Those not superior in resources may still have to put up a fight, and they could and would not limit themselves to the American way of war."
DeleteYou get that this is a US Navy blog, right?
"The Russians introduced a brand new such system a few years ago."
DeleteI get the distinct impression that this is a non-existent system that you're imagining. If there's a real system, give me a reference. Otherwise, I'm assuming that this is an imaginary system.
"Your article here is trivial if it's only about closing with land masses where all capable opposition has been destroyed or is being dominated by air power and indirect fires."
DeleteAs I've observed on several previous occasions, your views are unorthodox to the point that it is not worth my time to discuss.
The post has been offered. You are free to learn something from it or not. Moving on.
"The (radio) horizon should be considered a huge threshold, for land artillery can overwhelm any warship with unguided munitions if it's in range and tracked"
ReplyDeleteLand artillery isn't the issue, CNO has dealt with this.
The radar horizon however is a large threshold. If you are far enough offshore that you are below the radar horizon you are operating in the "fog of war", able to send your forces in when and where you choose. The enemy will know you're there, but can't directly target you without using another sensor, be it aerial or on water. I believe the adopted plan is to keep all of the assets that are too valuable to risk (large ships) in the relative safety of the fog over the horizon, and risk others getting in closer that are deployed from these large ships.
As CNO has pointed out in the past this makes everything many times more difficult when you are trying to get a significantly sized force ashore as the connectors have to travel large distances every trip, and can't carry significant defensive systems due to their smaller size. If you want to land an assault force of a size worth bothering to do, you'll need to fight your way in, clear the defensive measures and then defend your forces as they land. Sitting over the radar horizon isn't going to achieve that.
I'm not advocating just charging in all guns blazing without a care, but being willing to take the risk of getting close, so that you can actually properly defend your landing forces.
I should add that the risk involved in doing this goes up tremendously if you don't have the means of dealing with the threats within the radar horizon such as mines and shallow water submarines. Oh... bugger...
Delete"Sitting over the radar horizon isn't going to achieve that."
DeleteTechnically, you are correct but on a practical basis I don't think sitting over the radar horizon is going to afford any significant degree of protection. Consider the reverse situation - China is mounting an assault and is putting forces ashore so, obviously, we know they're there and have a pretty good idea where there ships are, at least generally. Would we sit back and allow them to conduct whatever operations they want, comfortably protected by the radar horizon? Of course not! We have many resources to use to pinpoint them. We have satellites, AWACS, various electronic warfare and signals aircraft for passive detection and triangulation, submarines, UAVs, maritime patrol aircraft, our own ships that would move to the area to find and engage, stealth aircraft to move to the area and find the ships, etc. So, if we can and would bring all that detection power to bear why would we think that China would simply allow us to sit comfortably over the radar horizon and go about our business? They wouldn't! Hence, my statement that the radar horizon will offer no significant benefit.
As you noted, we either show up with enough force to deal with the expected threats or don't show up at all and we have to go where we need to be to accomplish the mission or not even attempt it. There's no point keeping the Navy's ships "safely" out of range if it means that the Marines can't get ashore or, if they do, can't get any naval gunfire support (not that we have any effective guns!).
You're correctly identified the heart of any assault and that is the connectors. The current situation is untenable. Do you have any thoughts about connectors? Any thoughts about how to get armor, tanks, and artillery ashore in the first wave so that they can do some good?
You need to get enough firepower close to the shore to actually defend the connectors and suppress the enemy. That means "big things", that can have significant, sustained kinetic effects on enemy attempts to influence our connectors. The connectors aren't the issue per se, it's how can we support the connectors to be able to do their jobs with a reasonable amount of risk. A forced amphibious assault is going to be a messy affair. Prevailing in such a situation will require large amounts of defensive firepower covering our forces as they push in. This will always be a combination of guns, missiles, etc, that can provide counter battery fire, and or intercept incoming enemy fire. This may be from ships, aircraft etc, but it'll need to be there in quantity to have any chance of being effective.
DeleteI understand your point about the practicality of the difference between 5 miles and 25 miles offshore, but I still maintain that it is harder to target ships which are over the radar horizon as targeting quality localization will be harder to achieve. Yes there are plenty of assets that can be used to achieve that, but they are not as simple, and we would definitely target those systems to as much as possible prevent the enemy achieving a target lock.
My overall point is that we shouldn't be thinking like that though, we need to be prepared to push in and defend ourselves from the inevitable enemy response, and considerably overmatch it.
LSTs are the answer, and need no fragile connectors, or as this guy calls them LSAs.
Deletehttp://www.g2mil.com/Landing%20Ship%20Assault.htm
They can take hits and keep on ticking.
"we would definitely target those systems to as much as possible prevent the enemy achieving a target lock."
DeleteAbsolutely correct and, yes, over the radar horizon is "safer" than not but I don't think it confers enough safety to justify jeopardizing the mission. I think we're saying the same thing.
"we need to be prepared to push in and defend ourselves"
You've summed it up quite nicely and I agree wholeheartedly!
The one open question is still how to get armor, tanks, and artillery ashore in the first wave. We don't have connectors that can do that. Any thoughts?
"LSTs are the answer"
DeleteDo you envision using LSTs in the initial wave, when the threat is the greatest? Historically, during WWII assaults, LSTs were not part of the initial wave due to the risk. If you lose an LST you lose a LOT of firepower and LSTs are big, slow, non-stealthy targets for modern anti-ship missiles.
If you think LSTs are a good idea in the initial wave, how do you reconcile that with the WWII refusal to use them in the initial wave? In other words, if you think they're survivable enough to risk in the initial wave, today, what has changed over WWII doctrine?
CNO,
DeleteBuild fast, small and expendable (relative term) LSTs.
GAB
GAB, describe your concept of a fast, small and expendable LST. What would it be sized to carry? Would it be armored? To what degree? What speed? Armed? To what degree? Bow ramp?
DeleteHow would the LST be deployed? Self-transporting or on/in a large amphib?
What about one-way landing craft, sized to carry 1-4 tanks and/or combat dozers? They beach themselves, offload, and secure themselves to the beach with piles. Follow-on landing craft or lighterage can offload over them via a stern ramp. Perhaps they carry a C-RAM system or two to protect the beach.
Delete"Perhaps they carry a C-RAM system or two to protect the beach."
DeleteThat's an interesting idea although every capability added to a landing craft increases its cost and size - both things you don't want in an initial wave landing craft.
Still, the concept of incorporating the landing craft into the beach defenses is very interesting.
There's also the issue of balancing one-way/one-use craft with reusability. Given the size of a 1-4 tank landing craft, how will we transport enough to conduct an effective landing without reusing them?
Interesting thought. Good comment.
"There's also the issue of balancing one-way/one-use craft with reusability. Given the size of a 1-4 tank landing craft, how will we transport enough to conduct an effective landing without reusing them?"
DeleteAn expeditionary transfer dock could carry quite a few. A general purpose naval flo-flo vessel even more. The army will also probably need a way to get its LCU 2000s into the fight, and we'll need to way to repair and transport mine and torpedo-damaged vessels. Of course a small handful of self-propelled, large auxiliary floating drydocks built to commercials standards isn't sexy and makes too much sense for the navy to procure, despite their usefulness. I'm uneasy about relying on chartered vessels.
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/military-vehicle-news/the-massive-floating-dry-docks-of-the-pacific-fleet-that-could-carry-battleships-and-aircraft-carriers-you-never-heard-about.html
"An expeditionary transfer dock could carry quite a few."
DeleteAn LCAC can carry one tank at a time, if I recall correctly. A landing craft that could carry 1-4 would be the size of an LCAC or larger, presumably. An MLP/ESD can carry, perhaps, three LCAC.
A flo-flo vessel, I have no idea. You might want to do a quick size calc and estimate how many a flo-flo could carry.
LCACs do not need a well deck or other submergence to operate!
DeleteIn fact, the USN used to launch large landing craft like LCTs directly from the decks of gators like LSTs by ballasting the ship so it leaned to one side and simply pushing them over the side.
At one point, the USN had designs to launch landing craft using a stern ramp like an amusement park sawmill log flume ride.
Use the capability of the LCAC and just say no to expensive and design compromising well decks!
GAB
I lack the imagination to think up new tech but, the navy doesn't seem to support amphibious assault. If not, then the salient question is: should we be spending money/time/resources on an activity that will never be used? But, to answer your question, how can it be done, I would offer this suggestion.
ReplyDeleteI favor the heavy cruiser for NGFS. The 8" gun is very effective. Armored decks over Citadel areas to prevent plunging fire from shore batteries would prevent serious damage. Sixty four VLS and ~10,000 ton would cost ~$2B. I can't see the navy going this route. Even with robust air defense the navy will not want to risk putting a $2B ship 10 miles off shore, or spend the money to acquire 20 cruisers. "Why not battleships", to many resources required and the navy doesn't want the competition to it's CVN's.
Maybe they can be convinced to build a Destroyer Escort (DE) size ship. About 300 ft by 36 ft and 1300-1400 tons with 2 5"/62s, a 21 cell SeaRam and diesel power plant. An AN/SPY 1 and fire control radars and directors for both air and surface targets. The navy is conducting tests on Volcano shells for the 5" gun which could enhance missile defense and extend the range of the guns. A magazine capacity of ~500 guided and unguided would provide 1000 shells per ship. The 5" gun overheats pretty quickly but, having dozens of guns available can make up for this shortcoming. The small size would be difficult to hit by shore batteries, the small cost would allow enough ships to be built for rotation out of the firing line after taking damage or depleting missiles/magazines.
After hours or days of TLAM, air attacks and shore bombardment, the LPHs will stay ~35 miles offshore, other amphib ships along with DDs should close to ~10 miles of the shore and start landing operations. DEs would continue to provide close gun support while the DDs protect the amphibs from missile attack.
Obviously this doesn't solve the mine issue or improve connectors but it does provide NGFS and avoids trying to launch an assault from over the horizon. Artillery and heavy equipment will have to transported in a LST ship that is beached for offload.
The concept is the important point, not the exact size or cost of a DE.
On a side note, the same DE hulls with 8 deck mounted NSM and 24 Longbow Hellfare in a surface mounted pod would make a good boat and small ship killer. They would also be useful as a radar picket for the CVNs if they were 150-200 miles in front of the fleet separated by 35 miles. Using active radar they would encourage a missile launch at themselves, depleting the missiles that could be launched at DDs and CVNs.
Thank-you for being a voice of reason.
KH, I don't recognize your name from previous comments so, if this is your first, welcome!
DeleteYour comment is exactly the kind of comment I look for and encourage. It's well thought out, it's complete, and it moves the discussion forward. Excellent!
"heavy cruiser for NGFS. The 8" gun ... Sixty four VLS and ~10,000 ton would cost ~$2B."
Interesting. My question is do you think a cruiser would have to cost $2B? Could we build one cheaper by staying more focused and single-function? For instance, does a cruiser intended for NGFS need VLS or can we build a gun only cruiser? Alternatively, if we build a cruiser with guns and some VLS but nothing else (no hangar, no flight deck, no ASW, no BMD, etc.) could we do so for less than $2B?
"Destroyer Escort (DE) ... 2 5"/62s,"
Is this sufficient for effective NGFS? The 5" is useful but not generally considered sufficient by itself for the role, based on WWII experience. Also, WWII destroyers had around 5x 5" guns. If you want to build a DD/DE for NGFS, should you consider increasing the number of guns?
"other amphib ships ... close to ~10 miles of the shore"
Just a note, the AAVs are considered to have an effective range of 2-5 miles (2 miles is preferred). Beyond that, the result is delivering seasick, incapacitated Marines due to the time in the water. Just something to factor into your thinking.
We could also build a competent short ranged artillery capability based on 120mm mortars in 20-35 meter boats, and augmented with 203mm, 122, or 160mmm rockets fired from cheap converted merchant hulls.
DeleteGAB
You're describing variants of the LSM(R) which I love! The firepower a WWII LSM(R) could deliver was stunning. We've forgotten what we were once capable of.
DeleteModern military "analysts" would say that type of unguided firepower is obsolete and unneeded with today's precision weapons. I say, with the kind of blanketing area firepower we used to have, precision guidance is a waste of time! Most targets won't be readily visible/targetable anyway.
For me this is the point, if you can pummel the enemy with overwhelming firepower continuously the connectors have a better chance of getting ashore. It isn't so much a new way of supporting an amphibious assault, it's about remembering what it actually takes to do an opposed landing. It will be messy, but with enough firepower applied for long enough it can be achieved.
DeleteTo get a tank on the beach probably needs the smallest craft that can carry 1 tank from the big ship to the beach. Some kind of C-RAM capability on the craft would be nice, but it may well make the craft too big. The key is that these are craft that will be damaged, we have to accept that, in fulfilling their mission of getting a tank onto the beach. They can't be too gucci, a bow ramp is probably needed, but it's a floating steel box, that holds a tank, that's it's purpose.
The overwhelming firepower needed to suppress and then eliminate the opposing forces should be on the big ships which are close to shore expending their vast magazines all over the enemy. I didn't know of the LSM(R), I really like them, that'd be the kind of firepower to support the landing of tanks
"I didn't know of the LSM(R)"
DeleteI did a post on these. Check it out in the link below.
LSM(R)
A heavy cruiser dedicated to NGFS could be cheaper than $2B. My thought was 2 8" guns for shore fire and VLS for ESSM for fleet defense while assembling forces and while closing in to shore. A 10,000 ton ship with 2 guns has a LOT of extra space below deck, hence the added VLS. Eliminating VLS would save nearly $500M plus the cost of loading the cells. As a NGFS ship, the superstructure is as small as practical, definitely no helicopter facilities. Paint a circle on the aft deck for a helo landing pad and call it good. Everything above the deck must be either armored, or expendable to include the superstructure. Decks over the citadel need ~150 mm of cold rolled armor. That area only extends 60 ft forward and aft of the superstructure, to cover the magazines. The superstructure needs armor but, due to the angles of shell impact involved there is no easy calculation that I can do to determine proper thickness. It must stop most 155 mm artillery AP hits between 10 miles and 25 miles. Increasing range increases penetration on a horizontal surface, and decreases penetration on a vertical surface. Decreasing range has the opposite effect. Newer armor such as steelfoam may be possible and much lighter in weight making it useful for the superstructure. Seventy six mm armor on the belt is a little bit excessive, until you need to stop a missile body. With a layered system, most missile bodies can be stopped before they do any real damage. Even with plain old cold rolled armor, the armor will add ~1,000 tons to the ship, a small percentage compared to WW2. All of the guns should have armor, 150 mm in front and on top of the 8' guns with 100 mm on the sides and back. This will defeat the 155 mm and all naval guns in current use. Seventy six mm guns need only 30 mm of armor, enough to require a direct hit to be disabled. Magazines need additional armor to prevent chain ignition from missile hits.
DeleteEight inch guns have more than 6 times the recoil of 5" guns. Ships need a certain amount of mass to slow the recoil impulse and reduce shock to electronics. The USS Hull was 4,000 tons and not designed for a 8" gun. It was nearly beaten to death by the gunfire. The Navy did everything they could to make the sure the Mk 71 failed. Never-the-less, 8,000 tons could support 2 8" guns, ~9,000 + for 3 8" guns plus 2 76 mm rapid fire guns for missile defense. Forty two SeaRam for primary air defense with the 76 mm backing up the missiles. Sabot 155 mm artillery shells for extended range and increased accuracy. The Army is getting 50 km range from their 155 artillery! A longer barrel from an 8" 62 with the increased powder charge should get a lot more than 50 km. Magazines should be 1000 shells each gun, since we don't have to leave room for VLS. Three thousand 8" rounds weigh ~540 tons! Seventy six mm magazines of 525 shells should be adequate. Eight inch guns have a barrel liner life of about 720 rounds so the ships will need access and opportunity to change liners away from the firing line. This would also be a good time to re-arm the magazines, if needed.
I'll try not to be so damn long winded!
DeleteAre 5" guns effective for GNFS? No, and they never have been. Having said that, 5" is better than the current nothing. Small, CHEAP, and quickly built ships that are available soon is preferable to battleships available too late. Ideally, we will have both, a big gun ship and a small, expendable gun ship. I think keeping the number of guns to 2 will keep the ship as small as practical. I see your point about increasing the size to accommodate 3 guns, the cost increasing only 35% for a 50% increase in performance. My only concern would be that the Navy might want to add additional systems to increase performance and eventually you've got another FFG(X) program.
As a strictly NGFS ship, 3 guns are better than 2. The ship is still a small target at ~1600 tons, and bombardment will not begin at 5 miles off shore, it will start at 25 miles and incrementally get shorter as known targets are hit. Exactly how close an approach is needed will depend on the variables of the assault.
WW2 ships having 5 5" guns. Ships were sized around the guns. Increasing the number of guns to 5 on a current design would inevitably lead to a 2500 ton ship, the same size as the Fletchers. Building a lot of small, inexpensive ships quickly will cost more in the long run, but might fill a necessary short term need. Given the Navy's historic ship building times, no new designs will be available for many years. Do you think we have the time to wait?
Cruiser - The Des Moines class was pretty much the epitome of gun cruiser design. I'd be inclined to take that as the starting point for a new design, including the three triple turrets. By removing the AA guns and most of the 5" guns we could probably free up enough space for some VLS. That aside, your cruiser concept is pretty solid and has a lot going for it.
DeleteYou might be interested to read the Mk71 write up on the NavWeaps website. As I recall, it pretty well refutes the belief that the recoil damaged the Hull.
I recall one of the ideas behind the Flight 0 Americas not having a well deck was that they'd go heavy on Ospreys and Super Stallions, stay beyond the radar horizon, and use the Ospreys and Super Stallions move the embarked Marines onto the shore, since helos fly faster than LCACs sail. The Problem with that is you've dropped a battalion of infantry on a beach with very little in the way of support. Not exactly a winning idea. :/
ReplyDeleteStaying out a hundred miles just isn't going to work if you're doing an amphibious assault. There's only so much your helos can move. Sending marines on landing craft to make a 4-hour journey gets you seasick marines in no condition to fight once they hit the beach. The only real option is to accept the risks and go in close, and get the landing force on the beach as fast as possible.
What irks me is people complaining LCS can't contribute in srsface blue water battle, while ignoring that LCS can contribute by providing MCM and ASW support to an amphibious landing.
"Ospreys and Super Stallions"
DeleteAlso, helos have, historically, an abysmal track record of survival over the battlefield. Of course, we can always route the helos well away from any enemy presence but then we're dropping troops well away from anything of importance!
"LCS can contribute by providing MCM and ASW support"
Not in any effective way. You know that we're only going to have 6-12 MCM LCS vessels, depending on whether you consider some of the training vessels to be combat deployable. Same for the ASW version. That's nowhere near enough to clear/protect an assault force.
Consider Normandy (D-Day). They used 300(? - I don't have the exact number in front of me) minesweepers in order to clear the approaches in a timely manner. Using 6-12 LCS would require months to clear approaches! The sad truth is that we have no effective combat MCM. The situation is similar for ASW. 6-12 marginally effective ASW LCS aren't going to contribute any effective force.
This is why I keep pushing for small, cheap, single-function MCM and ASW vessels and lots of them.
Well, yes, we're going to be short on MCM and ASW LCS, but that's because the 50-ship buy got cut so much. Anyway, my point was that there's a place for MCM and ASW corvettes in a big ticket war, but plenty of people have ignored that to focus on the blue water ASuW fight and complain that MCM and ASW ships can't contribute to that - I'm talking about people dismissing the concept.
DeleteThere's part of me which thinks that having an amphibious assault capability is a good and useful thing, but then when one considers that the last amphibious landing was Korea... I dunno. Does US doctrine really need to do amphibious landings? That's a question that needs serious assessment.
Japan, sure - they're an island nation with plenty of outlying islands that any aggressor may capture: they'll need a marine corps to dislodge invaders and recapture their territory. But the US? It's questionable, IMO.
And the US definitely needs more MCM ships - there are only 14 Avenger minesweepers and at most 12 MCM LCS boats.
This ignores, btw, what I call "troll mining": International law and conventions on warfare state that the mining party has to declare the size and boundary of his minefield, but not that the party has to actually fully mine that minefield. So an adversary may well declare that he's mined a certain stretch of waterway, and put in just enough mines to be a nuisance without needing to fully mine that minefield - but for the MCM crews, they're still going to have to treat that declared stretch of water as fully mined. It's an easy way to tie up effort and resources.
"we're going to be short on MCM and ASW LCS, but that's because the 50-ship buy got cut so much."
DeleteNo, that's not even remotely correct. The very first, original buy was for 55 LCS and 60 (was it 62??) modules. I don't recall the exact breakdown but around 1/3 of the modules would have been MCM. That means we could have had a maximum of 20 MCM-configured LCS versus he 6-12 currently. That's hardly enough of a difference to make any significant impact on our MCM needs.
Why am I belaboring this seemingly minor point? It's because you need to recognize that the Navy's woefully inadequate MCM is NOT the result of some outside, Congressionally mandated reduction in ships which robbed the Navy of a viable MCM force. No, the Navy's problem is that they NEVER PLANNED FOR AN ADEQUATE MCM FORCE!!!! The lack of MCM is entirely the Navy's fault. Do not buy into the Navy's complaints about ship numbers or budget. It's all about priorities and MCM has simply not been a Navy priority since WWII.
I strive, in this blog, for accurate understandings of the roots of our current issues.
"Does US doctrine really need to do amphibious landings? That's a question that needs serious assessment."
DeleteThis has been addressed in various specific posts. You need to thoroughly peruse the archives!
"there are only 14 Avenger minesweepers"
DeleteNo. There are 11 Avenger MCM vessels. The original build was 14 but two have been decomissioned and one grounded and was destroyed.
We all need to recognize just how few MCM assets we have. Do you know how many MCM helos we have? If not, do a quick search. You'll be shocked. Again, I've posted on this.
"This has been addressed in various specific posts. You need to thoroughly peruse the archives!"
DeleteIt was a rhethorical flourish. I meant serious assessment in the Pentagon's halls. :P Otoh the Marines will fight tooth and nail to keep the amphibious assault mission because it's the only thing that makes them special enough to not be folded into the army. :V
I was counting MCM and ASW modules together, actually, so that skewed things in my mind somewhat. Otoh i'd been under the impression that it wasn't an exact 1:1:1 order of ASuW, ASW and MCM modules, but chasing down the exact figures isn't something i'm inclined to do right now.
Anyway what I was getting at is basically that 1) ASW and MCM corvettes are not bad ideas, 2) the US needs more MCM ships anyhow, 3) plenty of people in the USN and the blogosphere and social media ignore MCM to focus on big ticket srsface war - note all the people complaining about how a lone LCS can't manfight the Chinese navy.
But then MCM just isn't a priority for the USN, not like it is for the JMSDF - a recent CNO of theirs came up from the MCM community. Meanwhile, when was the last time you heard of a minesweeper admiral in the USN?
"It was a rhethorical flourish. I meant serious assessment in the Pentagon's halls."
DeleteFair enough and true enough. I've posted that I see no reasonable scenario involving an amphibious assault in a high end combat, peer war. At the opposite end of the spectrum there can be many reasons for "assaults" in low end, peacetime combat but those, by definition, won't be opposed assaults and don't require high end LHx large deck amphibs. The net conclusion is that there is no need for a 30+ ship amphib fleet.
I believe you're absolutely correct that the Marines will fight to the death to keep amphib assault because it justifies their existence. The Navy will willingly go along with it because it gets them more shipbuilding budget. So, we have two services conspiring to maintain a capability that is not needed just for budget reasons. Very disappointing.
"Threats: Mines, subs and AShMs"
ReplyDeleteHem: http://www.military-today.com/artillery/m1989.htm
Also, no radar-guided missile will ever have more than a 10% hit ratio, and the Standard is no exception.
So, with that assumption in mind, consider a Burke class DDG. Load it entirely with Standards. As a Mk.41 VLS can accompdate 4 of them, that gives you 96×4 = 384 missiles. Assuming a 10% hit ratio (and I'm being generous here), that gives you only 38 hits. That's NOT effective.
Now, take a Sidewinder, give it folding fins and an extra rocket stage to boost its range. Since the Sidewinder is only 127mm in diameter, you MIGHT be able to squeeze 9 in a single VLS cell. So you get 96×9 = 864 missiles by Burke. The Sidewinder has demonstrated a 25% hit ratio back in Vietnam, so the end result is theoretically 864×0.25 = 216 hits.
Now THAT is what I call air defense.
Add to that the fact that the Sidewinder is vastly cheaper, that its passive guidance doesn't alert the enemy, and that the removal of the AEGIS sustem would save a TON of money.
Sure, it doesn't give you "long range air defense", but in all likelihood, neither does AEGIS. If you need long range intercept, what you need is a fighter, not a missile.
"The Sidewinder has demonstrated a 25% hit ratio back in Vietnam"
DeleteYou bring up an interesting point but you're overlooking one very key point and key distinction between Standards and Sidewinders. The historical data for the Sidewinders was collected from air-to-air engagements where the aircraft/pilot maneuvered for, and launched from, the rear aspect (6 o'clock) which is the heart of the IR (heat seeking) missile engagement envelope. In a ship based surface-to-air (SAM) role that you're envisioning, the Sidewinders will be launched head on at the approaching missiles which is the worst part of the IR engagement envelope. The expected hit rates would drop dramatically.
Now, modern IR missiles are claimed to be head-on capable but that's still not as good as rear aspect. Plus, modern anti-ship missiles have better ECM and maneuverability than the old Vietnam era planes that the Sidewinders were used against. So, modern IR missiles are better but modern anti-ship missiles are also better - probably a net wash.
Does that make sense to you and does that modify your thinking at all?
Who said I was talking about intercepting anti-ship missiles ?
DeleteAgainst those -especially sea skimmers as they fly so low and fast-, only AA guns will likely be successful.
The main targets of a Sidewinder SAM would be attack aircrafts closing in for the kill, cruise missiles, suicide planes, etc...
Remember the Falklands: despite all the hype surrounding the Exocet, most lost british ships were sunk by Skyhawks carrying dumb bombs. And just try to imagine what a salvo of 30mm rounds fired from a GAU-8 Avenger would do to a modern, unarmored warship.
As for the Sidewinder performance in Vietnam, I only picked it because that's the only time enough were fired to actually determine its Pk ratio. Since then, threats have improved, but the Sidewinder has improved too.
Also, remember that the heat signature doesn't only come from the engines, but also from the electronics as well. I remember reading a few years back about the F-35's heat issues due to the unholy amount of 1990s electronics packed into it. Hell, just google "F-35 heat issues"...
The Argentines had 5 Exocets, they scored 4 hits, 2 of the 3 ships hit were lost
DeleteThey simply didnt have many, and wasted the few they had on the radar pickets.
50 missiles, we would have been in a whole heap of trouble
None of the ships had any armor, and 2 Exocets failed to explode (including the one that struck HMS Sheffield).
DeleteAlso, the Exocet has only a 165kg warhead - no significant threat for an armored warship.
Furthermore, the british had ship-towed decoys which could MAYBE have foiled the missiles - but they wasted them by carrying them by helicopters.
??? Never heard about the helicopter/decoy thing in the Falklands context.
DeleteThe Israelis used helicopters to lure Styx missiles away from their FACs just nine years earlier, but a helo needs no extra decoy for this. It can fly low and simply climb to safety once the missile is locked on it (as the missile would stay low - anti ship missiles usually have a mere 2D radar).
This was one of their soft kill efforts that defeated the Styx salvo.
"Who said I was talking about intercepting anti-ship missiles ?
DeleteAgainst those -especially sea skimmers as they fly so low and fast-, only AA guns will likely be successful."
Where does this come from at all? AAA of all kinds have a dubious reputation against incoming missiles.
RIM-116 missiles on the other hand have a stellar reputation against sea skimmers (about 95% hits in tests with early version missiles), and some other missiles (the new ones such as ESSM, MICA, Aster 15) are held in very high regard against sea skimmers.
"RIM-116 missiles on the other hand have a stellar reputation against sea skimmers (about 95% hits in tests with early version missiles), and some other missiles (the new ones such as ESSM, MICA, Aster 15) are held in very high regard against sea skimmers."
DeleteTo the best of my knowledge, you're talking strictly about manufacturer's claims and staged tests. Claims will, of course, be so wonderful as to be magical. Staged tests prove nothing. I can cite all manner of staged Navy tests that have been proven to be utterly false when the system was actually used under realistic or combat conditions. Sparrow missiles, Sidewinders, the Zumwalt AGS, the Mk110 gun, the 5"/54 on the Vincennes, and on and on.
In fact, the very limited combat data suggests that defensive missiles perform quite poorly, especially compared to their pre-combat claims. The British missile experience in the Falklands is probably the outstanding example of such.
"held in very high regard"
By who? The LCS is held in very high regard by Navy leadership but no one else.
Every SAM system ever built was claimed to be fantastically lethal and every one has proven to be marginal. This is not opinion, this is just the data.
To ascribe "stellar" performance to untried missiles is to simply believe unfounded claims.
I heard of the Falklands decoy in a briefing prepared by Pierre Sprey, "Combat Lessons From Lebanon And The Falklands", available here :
Deletehttp://dnipogo.org/labyrinth/
I don't have anymore info on the subject, unfortunately...
Also, have you noted that the RIM-116 RAM is an infrared guided, 127mm diameter missile ? Kinda puts my earlier comments on the Sidewinder in a new light.
As for AA guns, remember that warships have much less of them that they used to, thereby reducing their effectiveness.
By the way, are you Sven Ortmann from Defence and Freedom ? Love that blog !
Oops, I actually meant the ESSM instead of the Standard...
DeleteCNO, look - I pointed out a weakness of the RIM-116 myself on my blog, scratching a bit on its reputation. It's nevertheless the likely best-performing SAM among all SAMs in the typical test formats. I have little doubt about its ability to intercept an incoming missile of up to M2.0 under most combat conditions.
DeleteGuns are much more dubious against AShMs. Some 76 mm shell fuses aren't even claimed to be able to deal with M2+ threats! Gatling-style CIWS have a hard time stopping a M2+ missile even if they hit it repeatedly. The fragments and/or missile explosion might still firepower kill the targeted ship.
"Every SAM system ever built was claimed to be fantastically lethal and every one has proven to be marginal. This is not opinion, this is just the data."
HAWK or IHAWK appears to have been satisfactory in Israeli use. Stinger wasn't as great as claimed, but still a major influence in Afghanistan (pushing Su-25s upwards into less accurate attack profiles). Sea Wolf was quite OK in Falklands. SA-6 needed a lot of munitions for sustained ops, but was doing its job of pulling aircraft down to 23 mm envelopes in Yom Kippur War.
@Tanguy; yes.
@Tanguy; better don't believe that aluminium alloy-hating in that document. The rest appears to be about correct, though not exactly matching some later published data.
DeleteThere's actually a book on air defence that might interest you, James D. Crabtree "On Air Defense". It's dated, but still worthwhile.
"been satisfactory"
DeleteThis blog is about data. Here's the data for the British Sea Dart and Sea Wolf in the Falklands.
At least 26 Sea Dart missiles were launched. Wikipedia reports that of 5 missiles launched against helicopters or high flying, relatively slow aircraft, 4 hits were achieved. By contrast, there were only 2 hits out of 19 launches against low flying aircraft. The Falklands totals for the Sea Dart, then, were 6 hits out of 26 launches (23% success). The Sea Wolf missile, designed for use against low level targets, achieved 2 kills in 8 launches for a 25% success rate.
Here's the little data I could quickly find on Wiki on the Hawk: October 1973, Yom Kippur War: 75 Israeli missiles fired downing between 12 and 24 aircraft. That makes it between 16% and 32% kill. You can be pretty sure that the lower number of 12 is still too high. Israel habitually vastly overclaims its success rates.
If you have any additional combat data, please share it. Otherwise, the conclusion is that SAM systems are what they have always been: marginally effective.
Pk and statistics can vary crazily based on how many misiles fired - for example, USAF pk with Sidewinder in Nam was a lot lower than USN pk, because USAF trend was to ripple-fire as soon as they heard the lock on tone. USN pilots would instead maneuver to place themselves within missile engagement envelope, and then fire from the most advantageous position they could get. So the USAF brings down the average. :P ;)
DeleteAs another example of what I mean, USN practice with RAM is shoot-shoot-look-shoot, meaning that no matter what, they will always fire at least two RIM-116s at an incoming missile, so at the best case that's going to give us a pk of 50% (2/1), and on the lower case a pk of 33% (3/1). *shrug* It's something to be aware of.
As the saying goes, there are lies, damned lies, and statistics! :p
pK is what it is. Have you considered why doctrine is shoot-shoot-look or some variation thereof? If the claims of 95% pK's are to be believed, there's no need for multi-shoot engagement sequences. The fact that multi-shoot engagements are used is tacit recognition that the claims are not accurate. If it requires two missiles to ensure a single hit then the probability of a hit is 50%.
DeleteBy the way, the shoot-shoot-look was the old Standard missile engagement sequence. I've tried to find out what the current sequences are and I've been unable to find any documented information. Do you have a reference for any current engagement sequences or are you making assumptions based on past practices? Again, the blog is based on actual data so, please, share it with me if you have it or be sure to label speculation as such.
" If it requires two missiles to ensure a single hit then the probability of a hit is 50%."
DeleteActually, with pk 50% the chance to kill the target is merely 75% with two missiles.
"This blog is about data. Here's the data for the British Sea Dart and Sea Wolf in the Falklands.
DeleteAt least 26 Sea Dart missiles were launched (...)"
I wrote "Sea Wolf", not "Sea Dart".
Sea Wolf had its fire control disrupted by ships in the LOS and targets breaking LOS by escaping behind land features (Sea Wolf was meant to protect mostly against incoming targets). There were launch failures, but the kills were actually OK.
Eight launches isn't statistically significant.
Two kills is certainly incorrect. It was a minimum of 3 kills, with the 3rd being a manoeuvre kill. The probable kill count is four or five.
http://www.naval-history.net/F64-Falklands-Argentine_aircraft_lost.htm
I think that's at the very least OK. The only missile type with a better pk in that conflict was the AIM-9L.
"Actually, with pk 50% the chance to kill the target is merely 75% with two missiles."
DeleteI didn't say each missile was 50%. Read what was written and stop looking for nitpicking arguments.
"I think that's at the very least OK."
DeleteYou started off by making sweeping statements about the wondrous performance of ship-launched defensive missiles using phrases like "stellar reputation" and "very high regard" without any supporting data, whatsoever. Confronted with what little combat data is available, you've now reduced to "OK" but seem determined to try to "win" the point. That's not productive and does not further the discussion.
This blog is based on facts and data. Unsupported statements are simply not going to stand. This is a higher standard and probably a change from blogs you're used to. As a reader/commenter, you need to adjust.
You're clearly looking for a arguments rather than discussions. I encourage you to discuss the major premises of the posts rather than try to win nitpicking arguments. I also encourage you to fact check yourself and assess your statements before making them.
"I think that's at the very least OK."
DeleteThat's, potentially, a very interesting statement. One could make a very good case for 20%-50% pH (prob. of hit) as being acceptable but, to do so, requires a rethinking of defensive philosophies and ship design concepts. For example, if we acknowledge that pH will be 20%-50% (likely the lower end of that range!), then we ought to consider adding more missiles/launchers, better ECM, more/better decoys, more short range missiles, more CIWS, etc. to compensate. That would make a great comment discussion point. That's the kind of thing I'd like to see you pursue in your comments rather than arguments about trivial points.
"Do you have a reference for any current engagement sequences or are you making assumptions based on past practices?"
DeleteNothing formal, although I'm sure there's probably a NATOPS manual for RAM floating about. My source is my carrier sailor acquaintance; he was a Sea Sparrow guy relating what the RAM guys who he worked with told him. *shrug*
It is interesting to note that HMS Glamorgan lacked any missile defences, Sea Slug at best being capable of engaging high altitude bombers, and it survived via careful maneuver.
DeleteIt is also important to note that, although its nice to shoot down enemy bombers, the primary aim is to defend the ship.
The UKs defences in the Falklands were primarily designed to defend against highish altitude bombing attacks, exactly the sort the Argentines trained for.
To survive, they were forced in to extreme low level attacks, for which they were not trained or equipped
To a certain degree wrangling about pH and pK is pointless. No one in the world is going to take a chance with a warship by launching only a single weapon/round to defeat an incoming single enemy weapon. No weapon system is 100% reliable, especially in combat, and so no one is going to take a chance firing off a single defense missile at a high speed incoming target. You're going to shoot two, fire a third if there's time, and then fire off enough chaff/flares/AA to fill the sky while turning for all you're worth.
DeleteAnd pH and pK don't take into consideration weapon and mount failures/misfires/accidents, which will be more common under high intensity combat operations as weapons and the technicians who serve them are pushed to their limits.
"To a certain degree wrangling about pH and pK is pointless."
DeleteTo a certain degree, you're quite right. If you review this thread, though, you'll note that what triggered it was a claim that defensive missiles would be "95%" effective and were "stellar" and held in "very high regard". Those kinds of claims are simply untrue and cannot be allowed to stand because they readers might believe them if they are left unchallenged.
Whether the true pH/pK is 10% or 20% or whatever, is nearly irrelevant as long as the reader/commenter correctly understands that the combat performance will be poor and that we need to adjust other systems, such as ECM, decoys, CIWS, etc., to compensate.
That's why the wrangling is necessary. The alternative is that I simply delete comments with inaccurate claims but, instead, I attempt to educate the commenters.
CNO, you seem to focus too much on confrontation, not paying attention to the precise wording used.
DeleteHere's an example
"You started off by making sweeping statements about the wondrous performance of ship-launched defensive missiles using phrases like "stellar reputation" and "very high regard" without any supporting data, whatsoever. Confronted with what little combat data is available, you've now reduced to "OK""
So that "stellar" was about reputation, not pk. It was backed up by .95 pk from tests right away. Furthermore, it was about the RIM-116.
The "OK" on the other hand was about Sea Wolf, and introduced in this comment thread by me with the line
"Sea Wolf was quite OK in Falklands."
So instead of downgrading the statement to "OK" I moved from "quite OK" to "actually OK". That difference isn't substantial.
There was no moving of goalposts at all. You just display a very confrontational approach (I think even more confrontational than I'm in my own blog's comments), without keeping track of the statements made in the comment thread.
Maybe a bit more caution would help.
"(...)what triggered it was a claim that defensive missiles would be "95%" effective and were "stellar"(...)"
Well, nobody claimed this here. The "95%" was about test results all the way and "stellar" was about reputation all the way.
Repeat, for evidence:
"RIM-116 missiles on the other hand have a stellar reputation against sea skimmers (about 95% hits in tests with early version missiles)(...)"
The only inaccuracy in there is that one might misunderstand and think that all those tests were against sea skimmers, which would be wrong. The 95+% hits were against exercise targets in general. But that vulnerability to critique wasn't what you jumped on.
You're using too much of your fantasy here, and then argue against a fantasy opponent.
You're repeating yourself trying to "win" a point. Move on.
DeleteYou are quite correct that the "95%" implication needed to be challenged. I should have been more precise in saying that even at 95% you are still going to launch two missiles against an inbound AShM.
DeleteAnd I fully agree with your point that you create a defensive system with ECM, decoys, CIWS, etc. so that the enemy doesn't have an obvious and easy way to design counter weapons. The enemy never cooperates with your plan or doctrine.
Also, the B-17 had a "stellar reputation" going into WWII but it failed to defend the Philippines or defeat Germany in 1943. The B-17 as an excellent aircraft, but it's actual performance was far removed from the original claims made for it and it's pre-war reputation as a "war winner".
I would add sworms of drones from the air and sea to the list of threats ships face operating close to shore, either during an amphibious assault or in an attack against land targets.
ReplyDeleteImagine hundreds of small aircraft and small boats, essentially fast-moving mobile mines, maneuvering to intercept an incoming wave of assault vehicles and landing craft. I wouldn't expect them to stop an assault, but they could get a few shots in and slow down an assault allowing a defender to organize their defenses.
"...historically, there have been VASTLY more daring amphibious ops - and some of them were successful. The Germans, Soviets and Japanese were quite aggressive in particular, and the British didn't insist on total local dominance several times during WW2 either."
ReplyDeleteBougainville and Guadalcanal were conducted under far more challenging enemy air and naval resistance than anything faced in Europe.
The Japanese were certainly the real deal, but horse hockey on German and Russian amphibious operations.
Germany tucked tail at the thought of crossing the English Channel even though she had the ability to impose air supremacy at will, and the defending British army was largely bereft of tanks, artillery, and other equipment. Crete was impressive, but so costly Germany never attempted another large scale vertical envelopment. Norway and Denmark were sneak attacks against greatly inferior armies.
The Soviet landings in the Black sea were more like big river crossings - supporting Russian army artillery batteries fired from the opposite shores of the Taman Peninsula onto the landing beaches!
The British and Canadians certainly adopted more deliberate methods after Dieppe.
GAB
Did you know of the German amphibious ops in the Aegean Sea '43, and against Crete '41?
DeleteThe Guadalcanal op wasn't more daring than that.
The actual Guadalcanal landing wasn't really the daring part, rather it was the larger plan to take and hold the island that was daring. The US had almost no plans on how to build up the beachhead as an airbase, or even how to resupply it in the face of enemy opposition. Some would say it was not just daring, but reckless.
Delete@SO
ReplyDeleteYou dodged the issue of why Germany failed to invade England – a huge error that the HEER itself failed to address.
Further, I specifically mentioned Crete, and no, the German operations in the Dodecanese islands were not particularly daring. They were minor affairs (~8,000 combatants on both sides), and launched and supported from close by land bases in Crete and the Balkans (one day sailing distance), and the British possessed only meager airpower in the defense, and little artillery. The whole affair was over in 48 hours.
In contrast, Bougainville and Guadalcanal were major campaigns involving ~150,000 and 100,000 combatants respectively, and were executed within direct striking distance of very powerful Japanese air *and* sea forces. These campaigns were conducted at the end of American supply lines requiring week+ long voyages.
I note that the US Army argued for a 1943 invasion of France and were overruled by the British.
GAB
"I note that the US Army argued for a 1943 invasion of France and were overruled by the British."
DeleteFascinating! I had never heard that. Where and how were they suggesting it be done?
The U.S. viewed the whole Med as a side show. From the get go Marshall wanted to build up in England and hit France in 1943. I suggest the book "American Warlords" by Jonathon Jordan. Netflix also has a good doc called 1942 Hitler's underbelly (or something to that effect). Both mention this and were time well spent.
Delete"You dodged the issue of why Germany failed to invade England – a huge error that the HEER itself failed to address."
DeleteBecause they couldn't, simply.
The Allies spent years building Mulberry Harbour, PLUTO, and a fleet of landing ships.
SEALION planned on using open topped canal barges, with no toilet or kitchen facilities, with a max speed of 4knots.
Even if the boats some how made it across, and there is no guarantee they would have survived the sea, the 5 hours of brutal sea sickness would have rendered the soldiers inside incapable of fighting.
Add to that, the luftwaffe would need to keep the RN out of the area for 10 hours, a two way trip for the the boats, and do it again for reinforcements.
The Luftwaffe couldnt keep the RN out of Crete, or Dunkirk for that matter. Does anyone really believe the RN would have allowed a German Invasion of the fucking home islands to go unchallenged because they might have taken a few hits in the process?
1942/43 as a plan, was more Soviet urging than anything serious, we tend to forget just how perilous their situation was at the time, but we simply lacked the ability to do anything sooner.
As late as 44, there was still a side argueing that the Normandy invasion should be abandoned, and France invaded from the south, Dragoon was effectively that plan.
But logistically, the only way to fight the war was to seize the channel ports and flood northern France with Men and Material from the UK, shipping them from the UK around Spain to Marseilles.
Although the Americans were very in favour of Landing 40 Divisions in France in 1942, they only actually had three of their own to take part....
"Fascinating! I had never heard that. Where and how were they suggesting it be done?"
Warships steam in to port, dock at the wharves, soldiers leap off the deck on to the dock, seize the port, that sort of nonsense.
"The U.S. viewed the whole Med as a side show. From the get go Marshall wanted to build up in England and hit France in 1943."
"Netflix also has a good doc called 1942 Hitler's underbelly (or something to that effect)"
The war could only be won by knocking Germany out, and that could only be done by storming the channel, but storming the beaches couldn't be until 44.
North Africa and the Med allowed Germany to be engaged on favourable terms, and allowed the inexperienced American army to gain experience.
@CNO
Delete“"I note that the US Army argued for a 1943 invasion of France and were overruled by the British."
Fascinating! I had never heard that. Where and how were they suggesting it be done?”
Badly!
Secretary Stimpson, Marshal, and Eisenhower argued for a direct assault on France as early as possible in 1943 sailing from directly from southern English bases to distributed landings (stupid) between Le Harve and Cherburg. They assumed massive air support (no strategic bombing campaign???), with warships essentially isolating the beaches and securing shipping.
A good synopsis can be found in the ‘Gators of Neptune’ by Christopher Yung.
GAB
"‘Gators of Neptune’ by Christopher Yung."
DeleteThanks, I'll check it out!
Operation Roundup was the 1943 invasion plan. Operation Sledgehammer was the 1942 "Keep Russia in the War At All Costs" plan. Marshall pushed hard for Roundup and felt FDR caved into Churchill's "soft underbelly" strategy. Plus the USAAF wanted to hold off on an invasion to give them time to let strategic bombing "win the war". And of course King wanted the resources to be used in the Pacific which is why he pushed the Guadalcanal operation against strong opposition in the US JCS. The 1942 and 1943 strategic discussions are fascinating history.
Delete"The 1942 and 1943 strategic discussions are fascinating history."
DeleteIndeed! They also illustrate the fact that once America entered the war, the result was a foregone conclusion due to its isolation and industrial might.
Any number of strategies would have produced the same ultimate result - victory. The only question was which strategy(s) would do so with the least casualties and in the quickest time frame.
@TrT
ReplyDeleteApples to oranges: invading England in 1940 following the fall of France was a completely different proposition than invading German occupied France in 1943.
England in 1940 was wide open for invasion. The RAF was savaged by campaign in France, The British army left most of its tanks, artillery and vehicles at Dunkirk when it was chased off the beaches of France. More importantly, and little discussed, the British army of 1940 was badly shaken having suffered a huge and humiliating defeat in France. As Churchill noted: “Wars are not won by evacuations." Churchill privately questioned army leadership, moral, and fighting ability compared to Germany. And there were no serious fortifications organized. People joke about the French army, but the French army resistance made the evacuation of the BEF from Dunkirk possible, and actually stiffened thereafter, even though the war was lost for them.
In contrast, the spirit of the German Army of 1943, prior to Kursk was unbeaten, and remained in good moral until after the collapse of the Falaise pocket in the summer of 1944. Moreover, the Luftwaffe was still in very good order to contest allied air power. Finally, the Germans began fortifying the Coasts of Europe.
GAB