The US Department of Defense
has finally released its national military strategy document, the first such
since 2011. At last, we have a coherent,
viable strategy to guide us in the development of our force structure, force
size, and tactical and operational planning.
No longer will we flounder in a sea of haphazard acquisitions without
guidance. No longer will we pursue
technologies that may not lend themselves to the accomplishment of our national
and service-specific goals. No longer
will we dither trying to decide what course of action to take as we attempt to
balance needs against budgets. No longer
will we downsize forces on a random or, worse, equitable, basis.
I tell you, a bright new day
is dawning for the military, America , and the world!
Let’s dig into this new
strategy and see where it will be taking us.
As a reminder, a valid
strategy should define the problem, lay out the goals, and describe a path to
achieve those goals.
The National Military
Strategy of the United States , 2015, (NMS) begins by listing the problems. Specifically, it names Russia , Iran , North Korea , and terrorists (quaintly referred to in the
document as Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) ) as our potential enemies
and, ever so briefly, describes what they are doing that makes them potential
enemies. It also names China as a potential enemy though in a very backhanded,
passive way by describing our intentions to welcome them warmly to the world
stage while noting in passing that some of their actions may lead to tensions. That’s tiptoeing around the China issue but at least the DoD has finally named China so that’s a start.
Likewise, the failure to name the source of terrorism, Islamic
fundamentalism, dramatically weakens the rest of the document’s discussion on terrorism.
The document states that
none of the suspect state actors are seeking conflict with the US .
“None of these nations are believed to be seeking
direct military conflict with the United
States or our allies.”
Well, they may not be seeking
direct conflict but none of them are shying away from it, either. It would serve us well to recognize that our
previous, and current, policies of deterrence seem not to be working! The NMS ought to recognize this and factor it
in but fails to do so.
The NMS then proceeds to
define the military environment. That’s
not really part of a strategy and demonstrates that those writing the strategy
don’t really understand what a strategy is.
On the plus side, the document
notes that our previous decade of conflict has been exclusively against
terrorists and that we must now begin to pay attention to state actors. That’s a wise, if somewhat painfully obvious
and belated recognition.
The role of technology is
discussed as it pertains to terrorists.
“VEOs are taking advantage of emergent technologies
as well, using information tools to propagate destructive ideologies, recruit
and incite violence, and amplify the perceived power of their movements. …They
use improvised explosive devices (IED), suicide vests, and tailored cyber tools
to spread terror while seeking ever more sophisticated capabilities, including
WMD.”
The document fails to
understand the relationship between terrorists and technology. Terrorists are not seeking ever more
sophisticated capabilities. They are
seeking ever more explosive (literally) capabilities. If those capabilities require more capable
technology, the terrorists will embrace it but technology is not a prerequisite
for more explosive power. IEDs, for
example, represent an alternative approach to the employment of explosive
power, often relying on very primitive levels of technology. Beheadings with a sword require no great
leaps of technology. Failure to recognize
this principle will lead us to believe that the path to the defeat of terrorism
is paved with technology and nothing could be further from the truth. The path to the defeat of terrorism is paved
with intelligence, explosives, and, mainly, willpower (such as the willingness
to inflict larger amounts of collateral damage when necessary and the
willingness to engage wholeheatedly).
The NMS goes on to list some
National Security Interests derived by the military to support the Enduring
National Interests from the 2015 National Security Strategy.
·
The survival of
the Nation.
·
The prevention
of catastrophic attack against U.S. territory.
·
The security of
the global economic system.
·
The security,
confidence, and reliability of our allies.
·
The protection
of American citizens abroad.
·
The preservation
and extension of universal values.
That’s a nice list but is so
generic and high level as to be useless.
In any event, the NMS finally
lists three National Military Objectives – presumably the heart of the
strategy!
·
Deter, deny, and
defeat state adversaries.
·
Disrupt, degrade,
and defeat violent extremist organizations.
·
Strengthen our
global network of allies and partners.
What?!! Again, these are utterly useless. They are so broad as to be worthless in
providing any military guidance. Taken
at face value, the first objective, for example, would suggest that the
military take any action ranging from send an occasional patrol boat with a
strongly worded message to a misbehaving state, on up to a pre-emptive, all-out
attack to overwhelm and defeat the state.
The objective says nothing. It
doesn’t tell us whether we need a bigger Navy or a smaller one. It doesn’t tell us whether the LCS is the
right vessel for the task or not. It
doesn’t tell us whether the F-35 is appropriate for the situation. It tells us nothing.
OK, what would be an example
of an appropriate objective? Here’s one,
·
Contain China ’s expansionist activities and prevent any Chinese
territorial gains in the South and East China Seas
using military confrontation to augment diplomatic efforts.
Whether you happen to agree
with that example or not, it leaves no doubt about what the military is tasked
with doing and that is what a strategy should do.
In any event, the NMS goes on
to describe a host of generic military responsibilities which, while both obvious
and nice, relate in no specific way to any strategic objectives beyond the
generic “let’s be strong and protect the country” type of statements. You can’t argue with them but they are not
strategic objectives nor do they constitute a path to implementing the
strategy, such as it is.
As the document moves on, it
devotes a lengthy section to a discussion of personnel support needs,
leadership, and organizational culture.
Again, nice (not really – it’s worthless bureaucratic ass-covering), but
totally irrelevant to a military strategy document.
And, finally, the document
discusses innovation, global agility, quality, joint interoperability,
industrial business relationships, and resource informed planning (huh??). These sections are utterly divorced from any
strategic usefulness and simply represent bureaucratic buzzword bingo.
Again, to recap, the
characteristics of a strategy should include a problem definition, a goal(s),
and a path to achieve that goal(s).
The NMS offers an extremely
cursory definition of the problem although the mere fact that specific enemies
were named is a vast improvement over any previous document or discussion
(ignoring the kid glove treatment accorded the Chinese and Islamic terrorists). The three listed objectives are so broad and
generic as to be useless and have absolutely no specific relationship to the
defined problem. Finally, the document
is utterly devoid of a useful and specific path to achieving the objectives –
not surprising given the generic nature of the objectives.
Thus, as a military strategy,
this document fails completely to deliver an actual strategy. It is clear that the authors had no idea what
the definition of a strategy is. This is
a failure at the Strategy 101 level and is an embarrassment coming from our highest
professional military leadership. This
will leave our military floundering around, grasping at the next technological
marvel that captures their fancy in the hopes that it will prove useful when
some future conflict occurs.
The lack of a valid and viable
military strategy is exactly why we’re pursuing an F-35 that does not meet our
operational needs, why the Marines can’t seem to decide what kind of amphibious
assault vehicle they want, why we’re buying 52 LCSs that don’t seem to fit any
useful naval scenario, why we’re building ever bigger carriers while the air
wings continue to shrink, why there is no agreement about the characteristics
of the Navy’s UCLASS, and why, in general, our military seems so lost today.
This “strategy” was an
opportunity to right the military ship but is, instead, an opportunity
squandered.
The key structural failing is the lack of prioritization given the inevitable shortfall (delta) between resources and desired force structure.
ReplyDeleteThis is a result of the "every service gets its fair share" driven joint thinking in the Pentagon, but is both imprudent, and unsustainable in the long run.
GAB
There seems to be an unwillingness to get down to specifics and to define what actually needs to be done.
ReplyDeleteThen there is an unwillingness to discuss whether current actions align with long term national interest.
This doesn't seem to be an actual military strategy at all. It sounds like a document meant to look like a strategy, for people who are used to business strategy documents, which are usually collections of platitudes. The point of this is to convince the shareholders (who in this case are Congress) that the company management (the Pentagon) are doing their jobs, but it's all complicated stuff and should not be interfered with, because there'll be a dividend.
ReplyDeleteThe dividend in this case is defence contracts placed in the Congressional districts, plus the ability to say that "we're tough on defence" with pictures of jet fighters, tanks, and so on. US politics is largely about emotions these days, and elects politicians who can give the electorate the feelings they like.
Good comment. Depressing but good.
DeleteI am surprised that nobody is taking issue with my analysis. Does the US really feel that their government/military interface is so broken that it has to just be accepted and can't be fixed?
DeleteJohn, one of the main thrusts of this blog is that the Navy, and by extension the rest of the military, is badly broken. I suspect that most of the readers agree with your assessment to varying degrees (generally, a large degree!). You made a couple of good points but as far as sparking some kind of controversy, you're largely singing it to the choir with this group.
Delete"Resource Informed Planning" , also known to most people as "Budgeting".
ReplyDelete