You Had One Job

In a little publicized event, Hezbollah forces downed an Israeli early warning aerostat.  The $230M aerostat radar system, called Sky Dew, was designed to provide stand off early warning of drones and aircraft with a claimed detection range of 250 km.  The aerostat was located around 21 miles from the Lebanon border and a Hezbollah drone penetrated Israeli airspace undetected and, in some fashion, suicided on the aerostat, downing it.[1]
 

Israeli Sky Dew Aerostat

Aerostats are a frequent suggestion from commenters on this blog who believe it can provide nearly unlimited detection of all enemy assets in the global hemisphere.  Okay, a touch of hyperbole there but not much.  Proponents ascribe nearly miraculous characteristics to these glorified blimps.
 
The incident illustrates a couple of noteworthy points:
 

• No technology works as advertised.  The aerostat had one job:  detect drones … and it failed completely.  The claimed detection range is 250 km.  Apparently, the actual detection range is about a foot.  The reality is that all technology is overhyped and will perform poorly in combat.  This emphasizes the necessity for realistic testing … which the Navy steadfastly refuses to do.
• Many people believe radar is a miracle of detection.  It is not.  It is useful, to be sure, but suffers spectacular detection failures on a regular basis.  It is not God’s all-seeing eye as so many believe.
• Aerostats are non-stealthy, non-maneuverable, and utterly defenseless.  They are a target waiting to be destroyed unless one provides a robust, layered, defensive support scheme.

 
By the way, just to illustrate that everyone publishes propaganda, here’s Israel’s statement about the impact of the aerostat downing. 

“Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, Israel’s military spokesman, confirmed that a Hezbollah drone had scored a direct hit on Sky Dew but added there were no casualties and that it “had no impact to the IDF's aerial situational awareness capability in the area”.[1]

Okay … so if the loss of the aerostat ‘had no impact’ then why did you spend $230M on it since, according to you, admiral, its presence, or absence, has no impact?
 
Clearly, the Israeli admiral was just putting out pure propaganda.  Hey, Ukraine does it.  Russia does it.  The US does it.  China does it.  Everyone puts out propaganda.  One of the reasons this blog exists is to analyze these things and separate the propaganda from the facts.
 
Aerostat … you had one job and you failed miserably.
 
 
 
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[1]The National website, “Hezbollah 'blinds' Israeli defences with drone strike on Sky Dew airship”,Thomas Harding and Nada Homsi, 5/20/2024,
https://www.msn.com/en-ae/news/middleeast/hezbollah-blinds-israeli-defences-with-drone-strike-on-sky-dew-airship/ar-BB1mz3UT?ocid=BingNewsSerp

Memorial Day

 
For the American readers on this Memorial Day, I wish you all a prayerful and thoughtful remembrance of family and friends you may have lost in service.  I’m remembering a friend of the family who lost a son in Vietnam.
 
Best wishes!

Zumwalt Hypersonic Missile Perspective

As you know, the Zumwalt’s main weapon, the Advanced Gun System (AGS) was terminated some time ago in a major embarrassment for the Navy.  Now, seeking to recover some degree of usefulness for the class, the Navy has opted to convert the Zumwalt, itself, to a hypersonic missile shooter.  The conversion work has begun and the forward AGS gun has reportedly been removed.  Naval News website has a nice, short summary of the changes involved in the hypersonic missile conversion.[1]
 
The main change, of course, is the addition of four Multiple All-Up Round Canisters (MACs) housing three Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) missiles each, for a total of twelve hypersonic missiles.  Presumably, additional missiles could be added in the space currently occupied by the after AGS gun, however, no such plans have been announced.  Even if that were to occur, that would, presumably, only raise the total hypersonic missile count to 24 assuming there was sufficient room.
 
The question is, are 12 (or even 24) hypersonic missiles a worthwhile use for a cruiser size ship that cost around $14B+ (with costs continuing to rise!)?  The answer would seem to be an emphatic, no.
 
Of course, if the Zumwalt conversion is actually a testbed prototype limited to just the Zumwalt and just the forward missile cluster, then the effort might be worthwhile.  ComNavOps has long been in favor of prototyping and, let’s face it, there is no better use for the hugely expensive Zumwalts.
 
As an actual combat vessel, the Zumwalt with hypersonic missiles offers very little value.  Even if the missiles were unstoppable and 100% accurate and effective (Russian experience in Ukraine suggests hypersonic missiles can be stopped and are not all that effective), 12 (or 24) missiles simply don’t constitute a serious threat.
 
In the Navy’s mind, is the Zumwalt an actual combat vessel or just a testbed?  Time will tell.
 
 
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Related side note:  In a scenario eerily reminiscent of the Zumwalt, LCS, and Ford failures to develop non-existent equipment, the hypersonic missiles do not yet exist in an operational form and are being developed concurrently with the Zumwalt’s conversion.  Concurrency, as we know all too well, has not been a successful practice.

 
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[1]Naval News website, “US Navy Removes First 155mm AGS From USS Zumwalt At Ingalls Shipbuilding”, Carter Johnston, 14-May-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/05/us-navy-removes-first-155mm-ags-from-uss-zumwalt-at-ingalls-shipbuilding/

One At A Time

We’ve seen reports and videos of small drones dropping a hand grenade on a hapless soldier.  We’ve heard reports of small suicide drones.  Breaking Defense website has a story about a small drone, Rogue 1, being evaluated by Special Ops forces.[1]
 

According to a company statement, Rogue 1 is a “next-generation, rapidly deployed and optionally-lethal VTOL small unmanned aerial system that enables warfighters to conduct precision strikes against moving and stationary armored targets, soft-skinned vehicles and dismounted threats.”
 
The Rogue 1 allows users to abort and recover the system if needed, and is able to operate in day or night conditions. The company also hyped up its modular nature with multiple payloads. The system has a maximum endurance of 30 minutes and range of 10km and has capacity to fly at a top speed of 113kph, including through GPS-denied areas of operation. Navigation can be enabled by GNSS, visual or thermal recognition. Communications are AES 256 encrypted.
 
The air frame is controlled by a single operator using a 2.3kg fire control unit. The LMS can also carry a laser range finder and LADAR sensor to calculate height of burst for proximity fire missions. A company official said Rogue 1 could be hand-launched, tube-launched as well as fired from a multi-canister launcher which could be integrated on board a tactical ground vehicle or surface vessel for example.
 
SOCOM’s pursuit of the 0A requirement comes at a time when one-way attack drones and small, weaponized UAS are proliferating the modern battlefield, particularly in Ukraine where both sides are using a wide range of technologies to target dismounted and mounted personnel.[1] [emphasis added]

 
This is, essentially, a one-at-a-time robotic assassin.  Is this a good idea or bad?  I’m not talking about the ethical aspects (it’s war, you kill the enemy any way you can) but, rather, the combat efficiency aspect.
 
How do you win wars?  This is not a trick question.  You win wars by killing the enemy in large quantities as fast as possible (along with destroying their industry and logistics, of course).  This drone is the epitome of the painfully slow, woefully inefficient, one-at-a-time approach to combat.  This is a peacetime system that would be useful for going after a lone terrorist, for example, but is woefully inefficient on a conventional battlefield.  In a real war, you want to eliminate grid squares in an instant, wipe out convoys with a single artillery barrage, eliminate armored battalions with a single air strike, kill an entire front of infantry with cluster bombs or fuel-air explosives, and so forth.  Killing the enemy occasionally, one at a time is not how you win.
 
Unfortunately, this is the mindset our military is afflicted with.  We’ve forgotten what real war is and what it takes to win a real war.
 
Admittedly, the referenced article is about special ops so maybe they have a legitimate use for a one-at-a-time drone but the sad reality is that much of our current drone thinking is predicated on exactly this type of one-at-a-time approach, likely spurred on by videos from Ukraine which even our military leaders seem to think is how war is fought.
 
I guarantee you that when the war with China comes, we’re going to see human wave attacks and massive attrition not one-at-a-time drones.
 
How do you win a war - Blitzkrieg or a guy with a toy drone?
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Teledyne FLIR’s ‘new’ Rogue 1 loitering munition has been under SOCOM contract for two years”, Andrew White, 17-May-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/05/teledyne-flirs-new-rogue-1-loitering-munition-has-been-under-socom-contract-for-two-years/

New Chinese Corvette

Naval News website reports that a new Chinese corvette has begun sea trials.[1]  The vessel has an extreme (think Visby) stealth design, what appears to be some sort of water jet propulsion, and a Zumwalt-type stealth mounting for the forward gun.  The ship is likely a one-off prototype.
 

 

This is what a modern ship should look like.  I’d reduce the superstructure significantly but what’s there is clearly designed for maximum stealth.  There are almost no protruding objects to cause an increase in the ship’s radar (and visible) stealth signature.  This is easily up there with the Visby as regards stealth.  Compare this design to our newest ships, the Constellation and Burke Flt III.  Both are radar beacons compared to this.  We’re so locked into obsolete designs that, for all practical purposes, we’re giving future naval victories to the Chinese.
 

 

The other noteworthy aspect of this is China’s willingness to construct one-off prototypes to explore new designs.  Compare this to our recent new ship designs such as the LCS where we committed to 55 ships before the first was even designed or the Constellation where we committed to 20 ships before the first was even designed or the Burke where we’re committed to a never ending number of ships because we so terrified of a new design failure (with good reason but infinite stupidity!).
 
China is doing its naval buildup correctly and quickly.  In comparison, we are decommissioning ships at a faster rate than we build new ones and are shrinking the fleet. 
 
China is screaming warnings at us and we’re flat out ignoring them.
 
Nothing good will come of this.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Chinese Experimental Corvette Starts Sea Trials”, Alex Luck, 17-May-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/05/chinese-experimental-corvette-starts-sea-trials/

The Carrier Ascendant

WWII saw the twilight of the battleship and the ascendency of the carrier as the primary source of naval strike firepower.  Why?  What characteristics made carrier power superior?  No, this isn’t a trick question.  The answer is the simple and obvious one.  Carriers were able to deliver significant firepower but so could any surface ship so that’s not the answer.  What made the carrier so effective was that it could deliver that firepower
 

• from a great distance and,
• cheaply

 
Carriers could strike from well beyond the horizon and, possibly more importantly, it could do so cheaply in the sense that the firepower delivery unit, the individual aircraft, cold be easily and affordably replaced to mitigate the inevitable attrition.  Trained pilots, of course, were a separate issue.
 
Consider the import of the cost aspect.  Previously, in a clash of surface ships, the firepower delivery unit was the ship itself and multi-billion dollar ships (expressed in terms of today’s relative costs) were routinely lost in combat.  It took years and enormous costs to replace a lost ship.  Carriers, however, did not risk themselves in the delivery of their firepower – they just risked their aircraft and each aircraft represented only around 1/90^th (an air wing of 90 aircraft) of the carrier’s combat effectiveness.  Further, losing an aircraft was a nearly insignificant event (the pilots would, of course, vehemently disagree!) and the aircraft could be readily replaced.  In fact, carriers routinely carried spare aircraft, ‘boxed’ and ready to assemble.  Replacement aircraft were free, on a relative basis.
 

SBD Dauntless - Rise of the Carrier

 

Yes, carriers were at risk during the overall strike operations.  If a carrier was in range to strike, it was also in range to be struck.  We’re talking about the act of striking, not the overall operation.
 
So much for belaboring the obvious.  How is this relevant to us, now?
 
Consider the cruise missile.  What are its outstanding characteristics compared to the current primary strike unit of the Navy which is, of course, the carrier and its aircraft?  Cruise missiles have two major characteristics that distinguish them from aircraft:
 

• Greater range
• Much lower cost (nearly free on a relative basis compared to aircraft)

 
Does this sound familiar?  Are these not the exact characteristics which led to the ascent of the carrier over the battleship?
 
The cruise missile is now ascendant over the carrier for strike operations.  Indeed, ComNavOps has repeatedly stated that the carrier is in its twilight as a strike platform.  It is, of course, still dominant in the air superiority role.
 
We need to remember what led to the demise of the battleship and rise of the carrier and be wise enough to recognize those same characteristics in the cruise missile relative to the carrier.
 

LRASM - Demise of the Carrier

 

We also need to recognize that one of the characteristics that led to the rise of the carrier and now the cruise missile is affordability.  We need to keep that characteristic firmly in mind.  If the missile becomes too expensive, which is the path we’re on now, then it loses its ascendency.  Cruise missiles have tripled in price over the last decade or two as we add ever more sophisticated and complex functionality which serves no real combat purpose.  We need to keep the missiles as simple as possible which will keep them affordable and rapidly producible.
 
During WWII, we built an average of 80 F6F Hellcats per week.  Today, we’re doing well if we can build 80 missiles per year.  We’ve got to bring the missile cost and complexity down so that we can produce them at useful war rates.
 
Strike has moved on from the carrier and we need to adjust our fleet composition and air wings accordingly.

Software

We’ve noted many times that software has become the major obstacle in weapon system development, driving costs up and causing schedule delays.  For example, the F-35’s ALIS (logistics and maintenance) and Block 4 (full combat capability) software packages are years overdue and much of the Block 4 capabilities have been either abandoned or put off until some nebulous future date which means it will never happen.
 
Weapon and sensor systems are being delivered only partially functional due to software development issues.  In fact, it’s gotten so bad that systems are now actually being planned to deliver with only partial functionality and missing capabilities are planned (hoped) to be delivered in increments which sounds good on paper but rarely materializes.
 
What can we do?  Without software, we’re just building obscenely expensive paperweights.
 
As with almost everything combat related, the K.I.S.S. (Keep It Simple, Stupid) principle applies.  In our arrogance and laziness, we’ve allowed software to take the place of effective recon, good planning, and good tactics by asking/expecting the software to be and do everything for us.  If the software is good enough, our utterly incompetent military leadership can keep their jobs without having to do any actual work or take any actual responsibility. 
 
We’ve crammed every function we can think of into every weapon/sensor system, blowing the K.I.S.S. principle into tiny bits.
 
What happens when a system ignores the K.I.S.S. principle?  You get runaway costs, hugely delayed schedules, unreliability, unrepairability, complexity beyond the scope of the average user, chronically degraded systems, and a failure of the user to understand the capabilities of the system.
 
So, to repeat, what can we do?
 
We need to embrace K.I.S.S. and reinsert its guiding principles back into software development.  Below are some examples:  Note that I’m not going to discuss actual coding practices and coding documentation.  Those requirements go without saying and are irrelevant to the overall thrust of the post.
 
 
Simplification – We need to abandon the do-everything mentality.  That missile doesn’t need to be able to accept mid-course guidance and certainly not from a Boy Scout in Oklahoma who was handed the control from a submarine under the polar ice pack who received it from a plane operating out of a secret base in the jungle.  That missile doesn’t need an image library.  Any hit on any enemy asset will do useful damage.  Who cares which ship and what rivet it focused on?  None of this stuff will actually be used in combat.  That ship’s navigation system just needs to be able to implement a course and speed.  All the other functions are garbage.
 
Program Management – We need to treat software as the major component that it is instead of an afterthought as if we’ll just pull some extra software off the warehouse shelf.  Software needs its own program focus.  It needs to become a milestone event equal to physical construction/development.  Failure to achieve specified goals must be a ‘stop’ sign for program development just as it [theoretically] is for physical development.  We need to insist on prototype software deliveries in order to advance a project.  Just as we build demonstrators/prototypes of new aircraft, we need the same for software.
 
 
Conclusion
 
We need to acknowledge that software is the major obstacle and start making plans that realistically factor that in.  We need to recognize that software is generally more important than hardware and make the state of the software the go/no-go determining factor for the overall project instead of hardware.  The F-35 Block and Refresh efforts are a good example.  All the hardware updates in the world mean nothing without code to run on the hardware.  The F-35 is struggling with the hardware Refresh effort but vastly more important and detrimental is that the accompanying Block 4 software is years behind schedule and many of the features have been abandoned.  So, while the hardware is an issue, it’s the software that is the major problem.