Speak Softly And Carry A Big Stick

Here in America, we take comfort from the presence of police with guns on their hips, secure in the knowledge that effective, forceful help is always at hand should we need it.

However, somewhere along the way, our military and civilian leaders have developed the misguided notion that we must, as a country, look peaceful and that the way to do that is to hide any visible display of force.  In other words, we must look weak in order to look peaceful.

This is absolute bilgewater.  The rest of the world does not want to see us looking peaceful, they want to see us looking strong and ready to step in at a moment’s notice to protect them just like the police officer on the corner of the street. 

You don’t look strong and ready by leaving your weapons in barracks or walking around with unloaded guns.  You look strong and ready by having all the guns and ammo with you that you might need.

Of course, there’s one other aspect to looking strong and ready and that is you have to occasionally demonstrate that you’re willing to use them.  You can’t surrender two boats, ten crew, and overwhelming weapon superiority to the Iranian equivalent of the Three Stooges.

Much (all) of our comfort and sense of security when we see police comes from the knowledge that they will, with absolute certainty, act when a crime is committed.  Of course, of late, this principle has been violated repeatedly and ordinary citizens are beginning to lose faith in the police and the police themselves are beginning to hesitate to do their duty due to, again, misguided efforts to create scapegoats out of the police – but that’s for some other blog to address.

In the 1983 Lebanon Marine barracks bombing, the sentries did not have magazines loaded in their weapons and could not respond to the suicide vehicle.

We failed to act when Iran seized our boats and crews and now Iran is engaged in more aggressive acts, not less.  A recent example is the incident involving four Iranian boats approaching an American destroyer at high speed before breaking off at 300 yds, well within rocket attack range (1).  Our previous failure to use force is creating more unsafe incidents.

Theodore Roosevelt is credited with the saying,

“Speak softly and carry a big stick.”

Hand in hand with that is the implication that the stick must be used now and then.

Of course, hand in hand with using the stick occasionally is the need for the usage to be meaningful.  Our recent retaliatory Tomahawk strikes on some isolated radar sites that no one appears to have claimed ownership of (if the sites even existed) is not a meaningful use of the stick.  It harmed no one to any appreciable extent and, therefore, meant nothing.  Conversely, the recent Tomahawk strike on the Libyan airbase associated with chemical weapons was somewhat more meaningful but even that stopped short of sending an unequivocal “don’t tread on me” message.

We are so afraid of collateral damage that we have relegated our big stick to a twig.

Other countries, in particular our potential enemies, understand this and are working to create their own big sticks and, when necessary, use them. 

From the recent Russian “National Security Strategy” document comes this,

“…the role of force as a factor in inter­national relations is not declining.” (2)

Russia and Putin understand that military force is the underlying foundation of political power.  Mao, too, understood it when he said,

“Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”

Those who abdicate their military power also abdicate their political power.  Such is the position the US finds itself in today.  We are speaking loudly but no one is listening because our stick has shrunk and we refuse to use it.  Contrast this with our enemies.

China is building a very big stick, is actively using it, and is speaking softly and being listened to by the Pacific Rim countries.  They have annexed the entire East and South China Seas and have, for all practical purposes, ejected the US from those waters and are in the process of solidifying their gains in the form of construction of military bases on artificial islands – a pretty impressive display of the use of the stick and the word.

Russia is rebuilding its stick and is using it actively and frequently – they seized Crimea and have invaded Ukraine.  Russian words are once again being heeded throughout Europe and Asia causing something of a panic among European militaries.

We need to rebuild our stick, stop talking uselessly, and start using our stick judiciously so that when we speak, someone will actually listen.  The stick makes the words effective.  We’ve lost that and we need to regain it.

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(1)USNI News website, “Video: Destroyer USS Nitze Harassed by Iranian Patrol Boats”, Sam LaGrone, 24-Aug-2016, 

https://news.usni.org/2016/08/24/video-destroyer-uss-nitze-harassed-iranian-patrol-boats

(2)Defense Intelligence Agency, “Russia Military Power”, 2017

Distributed Lethality - Leyte Gulf

A recent Anonymous comment suggested that the WWII radar picket lines around Okinawa were an example of distributed lethality.  That’s a fascinating example that I hadn’t thought of and it prompted this post.

The radar pickets weren’t exactly distributed lethality as envisioned by the Navy.  The ships were mutually supporting, to a degree, and had air cover although leakers were, obviously, commonplace.  Further, the ships were tied to a known, fixed location.  Finally, the picket mission was completely defensive in nature versus the offensive nature of distributed lethality.  Still, it’s an example of what happens when individual (distributed) ships are expected to survive in enemy waters under enemy air cover.  The ships accomplished their purpose but paid a very heavy price doing so.

Another, possibly more relevant, example of WWII distributed lethality is the Japanese actions at Leyte Gulf which actually were a combination of multiple battles.  I won’t bore you with the details of the actions – they’re readily available on-line.

Here’s the interpretation of what occurred from a distributed lethality perspective.

The US had established a large and powerful anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zone around the Philippine islands of Leyte, Samar, and Luzon in October of 1944.  The A2/AD defensive forces consisted of submarines, PT boats, fleet carrier task forces, battleships, and all manner of escorts along with total air supremacy.  Into this powerful A2/AD zone, the Japanese sent three independent (distributed) forces to search for and attack US forces.  The Japanese plan was complex, convoluted, and depended on a degree of command coordination (networking) that was simply unachievable (the self-imposed radio silence and the fog of war being the equivalent of attempting to operate in today’s electromagnetically challenged environment).  As a result, the three Japanese forces wound up operating independently and largely ineffectively.  The overall action resulted in heavy Japanese losses and the end of Japanese naval power.

Japanese Battleship Musashi Under Attack At Leyte

As you ponder that, now consider that the US Navy plans to send individual ships, or small groups of small ships, into China’s A2/AD zone (defined by the East/South China Seas and the first island chain) which is defended by overwhelming numbers of aircraft, submarines, missile boats, frigates, destroyers, land based anti-ship cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and all manner of sensors.  Is this beginning to sound a lot like Letye in reverse? 

The US forces will depend on complex, real time data sharing and command coordination to enable the distributed ships to conduct massed attacks on Chinese targets.  Does this sound a lot like the wishful command and control thinking that the Japanese planners depended on?

According to the Navy, this highly questionable concept will succeed because it will “complicate” the Chinese tactical picture.  The only complication for the Chinese will be deciding which of many assets should be given the honor of destroying which Navy ships. 

The historically inclined among you may note that the Japanese plan actually succeeded, to an extent, in that it did decoy the US fleet carriers away from the intended main action.  You may consider that a “complication” of the American tactical picture.  In the end, though, the lack of effective command and control and the operational stupidity embodied in the attempt to make inferior forces penetrate a heavily defended A2/AD zone led to the almost complete annihilation of the Japanese forces and any complications that arose were more than compensated by overwhelming A2/AD numbers and firepower.

Why we think our attempt at distributed lethality, using vessels that are far less powerful on a relative basis than the Japanese battleships and heavy cruisers, will be more successful is a mystery that no one has yet been able to explain to me.

Believing that distributed lethality will be successful because it will complicate the enemy tactical picture is tantamount to believing in victory because God is on our side.  It may be comforting but it is tactically and operationally lacking.

Tu-95 Intercept

In an otherwise yawner of a news story about Hornets from the USS Reagan, operating in the East China Sea, intercepting a couple of Russian Tu-95s which flew to within 80 miles of the carrier, there are two aspects worth questioning.

First, why were the Russian aircraft allowed to get within 80 miles unescorted when, presumably, we could see them hundreds of miles away?  I say “presumably” because I would also have presumed that we could navigate a Navy ship out of the way of a giant cargo ship and that turned out not to be the case - twice.  Did we not see them until they were that close?  Has the recently demonstrated ineptitude carried over to our combat detection capability?  It wouldn’t surprise me.

Second, why were aircraft “scrambled” as opposed to simply having the Combat Air Patrol (CAP), or whatever it’s called nowadays (probably something with the word “Joint” in it), make the intercept?  Do we no longer maintain a CAP over carriers?  Are we that unprepared for combat around China and North Korea?

Now, note that this is the farthest thing from a professional, accurate report so the language used may well be less than precise.  Still, it raises interesting questions.

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(1)Navy Times, “Report: Hornets scrambled to intercept Russian jets near carrier”, Staff, 1-Nov-2017,

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2017/11/01/report-hornets-scrambled-to-intercept-russian-jets-near-carrier/

Distributed Lethality in WWII

An Anonymous reader’s comment sparked a thought for me regarding distributed lethality.  Can you imagine, in WWII, sending out a bunch of individual destroyers, vital attack transports with a 5” gun or quintuple torpedo tube, or precious oilers with the same, to look for enemy ships and conduct distributed attacks?  What an idiotic idea.

Well, wait, you say, the technology has changed.  We now have long range sensors and long range weapons so the distributed ships don’t have to get as close to the enemy.  They’ll be able to safely stand off and attack!  You’re right, the technology has changed.  Unfortunately, it’s changed for the enemy, too.  They don’t need to get as close to our distributed ships to attack them.

There’s just no getting around it.  A lone ship is not a complication for the enemy’s tactical picture – it’s a floating target waiting to be sunk.  If an idea was bad in WWII, it’s bad today!  Apparently, the Navy no longer teaches military history.

The Stupid Is Growing!

We’ve discussed the utter stupidity of the Navy’s distributed lethality concept.  We’ve pointed out the idiocy behind risking high value amphibious or logistic support vessels in an attempt to mount 4 or 8 Harpoons and somehow “complicate” the enemy’s tactical situation.  We’ve pointed out that none of those ships have access to the long range targeting that distributed lethality would require.

Despite the obvious stupidity of distributed lethality, the Navy has decided to double down on “distributed” and is now proposing distributed mine countermeasures (MCM). (1)  Having recognized that their all-in bet on the LCS as the future of MCM has turned into a dismal failure, the Navy now proposes a piecemeal distribution of MCM components across the fleet. 

“…the Navy now wants at least some mine-hunting gear on a vessels ranging from modified oil tankers to catamarans to aircraft carriers.” (1)

It’s a grand vision, isn’t it?  A task force encounters a minefield and barely even hesitates as every ship unleashes remote MCM drones that clear the field in short order and the task force sails on, hardly even delayed.  Another enemy stratagem foiled!

Breaking Defense website at least sees part of the problem with this concept.

“The new plan could finally infuse mine warfare into the mainstream of the Navy — or diffuse responsibility to crews that see it as an unwelcome distraction from their ships’ main mission.” (1)

They’ve got it right.  A Burke, carrier, or other ship has a main purpose and many other side functions that already occupy all their time.  Adding yet another responsibility to an already overloaded crew is pointless – they won’t be any good at it.  Once a year (at best!) the ship will run through a quick, scripted MCM exercise to check off a training box and then promptly store the equipment out of the way and forget about it and the skills required to be competent at MCM.  Despite what the Navy would have us believe about the magical capabilities of remote, autonomous MCM UUVs, mine detection and identification still require a great deal of expertise from the human operators.  Do you think a Burke captain is going to spend his precious training time practicing MCM or AAW?  That’s right, when the time comes for real, the crew won’t even remember how to spell MCM let alone be able to competently execute it.

Do we really want to take a carrier or Burke or high-demand logistics ship away from their main mission and park it next to a minefield for weeks on end?

Do we really want to risk multi-billion dollar ships near a minefield?

Do we really want to tie high value warships to a fixed location for weeks on end, offering the enemy a perfect target that they can pick off at their leisure?

Breaking Defense website sums up the problem.

“Navy culture makes it all too easy for surface commanders to ignore mine warfare unless that is their vessel’s only mission. And hunting mines is a slow, laborious task that requires a ship to stay in one small area until it’s done.” (2)

As retired Navy commander Bryan Clark puts it,

“…adding MCM to the task list of ships that are already unable to stay proficient and certified in their current mission areas is not a good idea.” (2)

Our crews are overworked and unable to master basic seamanship and now we want to add another task to the list of things they’re not competent to do?

I give the Navy the tiniest bit of credit for recognizing that the LCS MCM concept has failed.  However, instead of doing the obvious and building a fleet of dedicated MCM vessels, ranging from small Avenger replacements to large MCM motherships, along with squadrons of MCM helos, the Navy has chosen the stupid option, as they always do.

Our Next Minesweeper!

By the way, does any of this sound vaguely familiar?  It should.  We built six Burkes that had organic MCM capability in the form of the WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System (RMS) which was to be housed and launched from a pocket built into the side of the Burke’s hangar.  That program failed and was cancelled – now we want to do it again and think it will work.  Does anyone recall the definition of insanity?

Burke With Minehunting Modification

Distributed lethality.  Distributed MCM.  I’m waiting for someone to come up with distributed aircraft carriers with every ship carrying one aircraft. 

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Every Ship A Minesweeper? Navy Looks Beyond LCS”, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 30-Oct-2017,

https://breakingdefense.com/2017/10/every-ship-a-minesweeper-navy-looks-beyond-lcs/

(2)Breaking Defense website, “Worries Surface On New Navy Mine Warfare Plan”, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 31-Oct-2017,

https://breakingdefense.com/2017/10/distributed-mine-warfare-or-diluted-concerns-on-new-navy-plan/

Connector Conundrum

The crux of the Marine’s amphibious assault capability is the connector – the vehicle, whether surface or air, that transports the Marines and their equipment from their ships to the shore.  As you know, doctrine calls for the assault ships and their escorts to remain 25-100 nm offshore due to fears of land based anti-ship missiles.  However, this creates a problem since there are no initial wave connectors that are capable of transporting Marines 25-100 nm to the shore.  Let’s see if we can sum up the state of affairs for the amphibious connectors.

Current

There are no surface connectors capable of transporting initial assault waves from 25-100 nm.  The Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) and its planned follow ons are limited to around 3-5 nm travel.  Beyond that, the troops will be incapacitated from seasickness due to the extended travel time.  The LCAC and LCU are doctrinally considered non-survivable in a contested environment and are reserved for follow on waves after the landing area has been secured.

“… Marines now want their connectors to drop amphibious vehicles off five miles from land. That keeps the connectors out of range of ground troops with anti-tank missiles, for one thing. In fact, the fastest current connector, the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) hovercraft, is so lightly protected the Navy refuses to land it on anydefended beach.” (1)

Aviation connectors (helos and MV-22s) have the range but are incapable of transporting tanks, artillery, and heavy vehicles.  They are also incapable of logistically sustaining an assault.  Additionally, their numbers are limited and attrition of helos and MV-22s will be significant, further weakening any resupply and support efforts.

We see, then, that the current state of affairs is unworkable.  That being the case, what does the Navy/Marine Corps envision as the future of amphibious assault connectors?

Future

The Marines vision for the moderately near future is for high speed (relative to the AAV) connectors such as the LCAC and LCU to transport AAVs to within 3-5 nm or so of the shore and drop them into the water for the final, short leg of the trip.  The thinking is that this will keep the non-survivable LCACs and LCUs safely out of range (they’re still going to be in range of a LOT of weapons!) while keeping the AAV travel time acceptable.  This will require modifying the LCAC and LCU ramp systems – not a particularly challenging engineering feat.

The major problem with both the LCAC and LCU as regards initial assault waves is that even limiting the approach to 3-5 miles exposes the craft to lots of weapons (artillery, Hellfire type small missiles, rockets, helos, drones, etc.) and if one of these connectors is sunk, they’ll take a lot of troops and equipment down with them as well as cripple the follow on waves.  That is the flip side of having high volume/capacity connectors – if you lose one, you lose a lot of people and materiel.  This makes the Navy’s move to smaller well decks which carry even fewer LCACs/LCUs even more inexplicable.  But, I digress …

Another option popular in the commentary world and that has received Marine Corps attention is the ultra heavy lift amphibious connector (UHLAC).  The full scale version would be 84 ft long with a capacity of three M1 tanks or 200 tons of cargo and a speed of 25 mph in the water although the prototype was only capable of around 5 mph.  How, exactly, the UHLAC, at the same size as an LCAC and much slower, would be any more survivable than an LCAC is a mystery.  It seems likely that this would be relegated to the same follow on role as the LCAC.

We see, then, that the future vision for connectors is still suspect and depends on cobbled together solutions that are highly dependent on the enemy cooperating by not sinking any of our LCACs or LCUs.  This seems like a plan based mostly on wishful thinking.  That being the case, what do we need to actually solve the problem?

Needed

What’s needed is a long range, high speed, small connector.  The Marines tried for many years to develop such a vehicle, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) and failed to reconcile the conflicting requirements of both a high water speed transport and a land based fighting vehicle.  The EFV was symptomatic of the military’s obsession with trying to make every platform a “do everything” asset.  What’s needed is a dedicated water-only landing craft – a Higgins boat with speed, in essence – that can transport troops, tanks, artillery, heavy vehicles, and supplies to the shore quickly, unload, and return to the amphibious ship for more loads.  The fighting vehicle – AAV, ACV, IFV, or whatever that might be – can then be a separate, dedicated, specialized vehicle optimized for land combat and transported ashore via one of these notional Higgins boats.

The need for speed is obvious.  Speed increases the distance that troops can be transported before succumbing to debilitating seasickness.  Speed minimizes the exposure time to enemy weapons.  Speed increases the delivery rate by increasing the number of trips per unit time.

Given the requirement to limit the troop’s time afloat to a maximum of one hour and a desire to stand 25 nm off shore, we get a notional speed requirement of around 25-30 kts.

What’s less obvious is the need to be small although we’ve already touched on the rationale.  The smaller the landing craft, the less we lose when one is destroyed.  Smaller also minimizes the targeting size of the landing craft.  Conceptually, we’d like a landing craft that is so small that it transports a single soldier.  Of course, we don’t have that technology and there is a marked lack of efficiency in such a system.  What’s needed is a balance between risk (loss) and efficiency.  The WWII Higgins boat hit that balance fairly well and had a capacity of around 30 troops.  I would suggest that a modern Higgins boat with a capacity of around two squads (24 or so troops) is about right. 

We also need the ability to transport tanks, artillery, and heavy equipment ashore in the initial assault wave.  Keeping in mind the requirement to remain small and minimize risk (loss), a landing craft with a capacity to transport one tank is needed.

The key to this is separation of the two functions:  transport of the initial assault wave and combat ashore.  The Marines have combined those functions and produced an AAV that is good at neither, and EFV that failed miserably at both, and a doctrine that is unexecutable.  Separating the functions allows for the design of an optimized connector and an optimized combat vehicle while keeping the costs of both down since neither will have any unnecessary functions added on.

Speaking of costs, the conceptual Higgins boat must be cheap.  They will be lost during an assault and cannot be so expensive that attrition will be a problem.  There is nothing wrong with wooden construction, for example.  We’re not building them to last 50 years!  These need to be cheap to the point of being free by modern acquisition standards. 

Model For The Future

We should also re-examine the well deck concept.  In WWII, Higgins boats were mounted externally about the ship’s decks and superstructure and lowered into the water.  A typical attack transport carried a couple dozen landing craft.  They occupied no internal ship’s volume.  The well deck, on the other hand, is a huge penalty in internal ship’s volume – volume that could be used for additional storage of troops and equipment (wouldn’t it be nice to not have to leave the tanks behind when the ship loads?) or to simply make the ship smaller and cheaper if additional storage is not needed.  Some thought would have to be given to how to load tanks, artillery, and heavy equipment into the landing craft, of course – perhaps a RO/RO type ramp at the waterline?

For too many decades we’ve leapt immediately to the far, complicated end of the technology spectrum for every solution and requirement.  The time has more than come to begin thinking of simpler, affordable solutions even they aren’t elegant.  I know the thought of a wooden landing craft would give a modern naval officer apoplexy but, in combat, the KISS principle reigns supreme and we would do well to remember that and begin applying it.  To paraphrase Sherlock Holmes, the simplest solution that meets the requirements is, invariably, the correct one.

“Away all boats!”

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(1)Breaking Defense, “Marines Seek New Tech To Get Ashore Vs. Missiles; Reinventing Amphib Assault”, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 16-Apr-2014,

https://breakingdefense.com/2014/04/marines-seek-new-tech-to-get-ashore-vs-missiles-reinventing-amphib-assault/3/

Northrop Pulls Out Of Unmanned Tanker Competition

Northrop has announced that it is pulling out of the competition to build the Navy’s MQ-25 unmanned tanker.  As you recall, there were four competitors: Northrop Grumman, General Atomics, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin.  Northrop’s explanation is cryptic, to say the least.  Here’s the statement from Northrop CEO Wes Bush.

“When we’re looking at one of these opportunities, let me be clear, our objective is not just to win.  …we really look hard at executability under the terms of [requests for proposals] that come out to make sure that we can execute.” (1)

So, something in the Request For Proposals (RFP) made Northrop believe that they couldn’t meet the requirements.  This is all the more odd given that the RFP was structured to have very few actual requirements.  In fact, the only requirement that has been revealed is the informal statement by Navy personnel that the tanker would deliver around 15,000 lbs of fuel at 500 miles.

Northrop was assumed to propose their X-47 as the basis for their tanker.  In fact, given that the X-47 was used in actual carrier landing and takeoff tests, Northrop was assumed to have a huge advantage in the competition.  That they would feel that advantage was insufficient makes their decision even harder to understand.  If Northrop’s actual carrier UAV operational experience isn’t adequate to meet the RFP, what does that say about the other competitor’s offerings and capabilities?

Another possibility is that the X-47 is simply incapable of meeting the fuel capacity and distance requirements.  The flying wing type of UAV may be simply unsuited for the task.  Perhaps the stealthy body size and shape does not allow sufficient fuel carriage?

It is also possible that Northrop felt that a stealthy flying wing would be inherently more expensive than a more conventional wing-fuselage-tail design and unable to compete on a cost basis.  If so, it’s worth noting that the General Atomics design, the only other design we’ve seen, is a conventional design and may hold a cost advantage.

Recall, also, that we’ve discussed the vulnerability of non-stealthy support aircraft so stealth may be an attractive feature in an aircraft that is expected to operate hundreds of miles from the carrier and within range of enemy aircraft and long range missiles.  The Chinese are developing a very long range air-to-air missile for the explicit purpose of attacking high value support aircraft like the E-2 Hawkeye, AWACS, P-8, tankers, etc.

The other interesting aspect of this is that this is the second occurrence of major defense firms pulling out of contract competition.  You’ll recall that the Navy’s competition for the over the horizon (OTH) anti-ship missile saw all but one of the competitors pull out after the RFP was released.  We discussed this at the time (see, “LRASM Drops Out Of OTH Competition”) and noted that it was a development with several negative consequences, not the least of which was that the lack of competition was an invitation to price gouging by the only remaining competitor.  At the time, I speculated that the Navy had pre-selected the company that they wanted to win the OTH competition and had written the RFP so as to ensure that only that company could meet the requirements.  Could this be a similar case?  Has the Navy already pre-selected a winner?  If more companies pull out of the tanker competition then this may be what’s happening.

X-47 - Out!

I would hate to think that pre-selecting competition winners, if that’s what’s happening, is the latest Navy trend given all the negatives associated with such a practice.  Had the OTH competition fiasco not just occurred, I wouldn’t give Northrop’s actions, in this case, much thought but now this looks suspiciously like a trend towards pre-selecting winners.

Of course, it’s also quite possible that this is just a business/investment/financial decision by Northrop, pure and simple, in which case there’s nothing to be seen here and we can all move on.

We’ll keep a close eye on this competition and see what develops.

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(1)USNI News website, “Northrop Grumman Drops Out of MQ-25A Stingray Competition”, Sam LaGrone, 25-Oct-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/10/25/northrop-grumman-drops-mq-25a-stingray-competition