The Strikefighter Myth

We have to build multi-role aircraft today.  Our budgets are too limited to allow the luxury of dedicated fighters and separate, dedicated strike aircraft.  Plus, the flexibility of multi-role aircraft gives us a huge advantage in that we can switch seamlessly between roles and “mass” aircraft for any given task.  A carrier air wing of 40 Hornets can be 40 strike aircraft or 40 fighters or any combination thereof.

In fact, the next generation of aircraft is even more multi-role than just strike and fighter.  The F-35 can be a strike, fighter, electronic warfare, surveillance, intel, UAV controller, and many other roles.  Yes, the future of naval aviation is in good hands and clearly headed down the right path.

Okay, then, let’s all give ourselves a pat on the back and call it a day.  This is just a short, feel-good post, I guess.

Well, come on, now, you’ve been following ComNavOps long enough to know that this isn’t the end of the post.

Let’s look closer at the multi-role aircraft issue.

Let’s start with the easiest aspect which is budget.  We have more than enough money for whatever we want as long as we spend it wisely – which we aren’t doing.  So, budget is not a real justification for multi-role aircraft.  We could build dedicated fighters and dedicated strike aircraft (we’ve done it in the past and we can do it again) if we wanted to and if we would follow the common sense approach that we’ve laid out in previous posts.  We covered this before so I won’t go over it again.  If you’re unsure of how we do this, go back through the archives.

Now, let’s look at the self-escorting myth.  When multi-role strikefighters began appearing, the scenario was put forth that the aircraft would be self-escorting, able to switch from air-to-ground (A2G) to air-to-air (A2A), efficiently dispatch enemy fighters, switch back to A2G, strike their targets, switch back to A2A, and return home triumphantly, probably having bagged a few more enemy fighters on the way home.  Unfortunately, unless we’re fighting an enemy whose air force is barely flight worthy, let alone combat capable, this is simply not true. 

To illustrate the exception clause, a Navy flight of Hornets did exactly this during Desert Storm.  Two F/A-18Cs from VFA-81 on the Saratoga were on a strike mission when they were intercepted by two MiG-21s.  The Hornets shot down the two MiGs and continued on their strike mission.  So, why were they able to accomplish this?  Because the Iraqi aircraft and pilots were hugely overmatched.  The MiG-21 is a 1950’s era aircraft and the Iraqi pilots were found to be exceptionally poor with no understanding of modern jet combat tactics.  The American pilots and aircraft had every conceivable advantage. 

That’s the exception.  Now, let’s look at the peer combat case.  What if the MiG-21s had been, say, MiG-29s flown by pilots as good as ours?  In that case, the Hornets would have been badly outgunned, overloaded with bombs, unable to maneuver, and, basically, sitting ducks.  Of course, they could and would have jettisoned the bombs to regain their air to air maneuverability.  However, jettisoning the bombs means a mission kill for the strike mission and a failure as a self-escorting strikefighter.  Even then, they would be at a disadvantage because they would have only a minimal A2A loadout since most of their hardpoints would have been bombs and fuel tanks.  So, the Hornets would not only be a mission kill but, likely, an actual kill.

Self-escort is a myth.  If you load up on strike weapons you can’t carry A2A weapons.  If you’re up against a competent enemy you’ll have to jettison your bomb load to maneuver – a mission kill at the very least.  Self-escort sounds good on paper but is a myth.

Let’s move on and look at the multi-role myth.  In previous posts, we’ve noted that a multi-role platform can’t be as good as a corresponding single role platform because the multi-role platform isn’t optimized for any single role.  In a head to head match, a multi-role strike fighter will lose to a single role aircraft every time.  Multi-role strikefighters are jacks of all trades and masters of none.  Look at the F-35’s anemic A2A performance – at best, it’s as good as an F-16.  How will an F-35 fare against Russian or Chinese stealth fighters?  Not well.  Or, let’s keep it in house for illustrative purposes.  How would an F-35 fare against an F-22?  No one knows but, presumably, not well.

Okay, so the F-35 is a second rate fighter but what about as a strike aircraft?  Again, it’s a poor fit as a pure strike aircraft, having a very small internal weapons capacity and limited range.

How about the multi-role F/A-18 Hornet?  In A2A mode, it compares poorly to the Su-27, MiG-29, or any of the more modern Russian and Chinese stealth fighters.  The Hornet is a nice peacetime aircraft but would perform poorly in peer combat against even its own generation of aircraft.

As we’ve previously discussed, multi-role is fine for non-combat applications but is a disaster waiting to happen in combat.

Let’s look at other roles within the multi-role spectrum. 

Surveillance is supposed to be one of the F-35’s strong suits.  However, the F-35 radar is miniscule compared to, say, the E-2 Hawkeye or P-8 Poseidon.  It just can’t see very far with any usable resolution.  It even fares poorly in surveillance when compared to a MQ-4C Triton Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) unmanned aircraft just due to the Triton’s vastly superior endurance and, hence, area coverage even though the Triton would not have a superior radar.

Let’s consider electronic signal intercepts and analysis (ELINT/ESM).  The F-35 is supposed to provide ELINT data back to other platforms.  However, the F-35 would be hard pressed to even match the long since retired ES-3A Shadows of the early 1990’s.  There’s simply a limit on how much equipment you can pack into a single airframe.

Even the most cursory evaluation makes it readily apparent that multi-role combat aircraft are a waste of resources in war.  So many people want to compare the F-35 to legacy MiG-29s or Su-27s when they should really be comparing the F-35 to the Sukhoi PAK-FA and Chinese J-20/31.  These are the opponents against whom the F-35 will be matched and will justify its price tag, if it can, and it is these opponents against whom the mediocrity of a multi-role aircraft will become apparent.  Let’s also be honest about enemy aircraft.  I don’t know the performance characteristics of the PAK-FA, J-20, or J-31 nor am I even sure what their intended roles are.  Perhaps they are being designed as compromised, multi-role aircraft, too.  In that case, it will be an even match.  However, from what I’ve read, my sense is that these enemy aircraft are much more focused on aerial superiority as opposed to our do-everything designs.

One closing note …  My denigration of multi-role combat aircraft and preference for single function aircraft does not mean that a single function aircraft cannot have a secondary function.  The F-14 Tomcat was built as a pure fleet interceptor but was able to be converted into a decent attack plane.  The P-47 was built as a pure fighter but was able to adapt to the low level attack role.  The F-22 was built as a pure air superiority fighter but may be adapted to an attack role as time goes on.  The point is that an aircraft should designed, built, and optimized for one role and one only.  Other roles, if they can occur, are a fortuitous benefit but should, in no way, drive the design.

Strikefighters are a failed myth.

Damaged LCS Damaged Again

This could only happen to the poor LCS program.  The USS Montgomery (LCS-8), already in port in Mayport for repairs after suffering two engineering casualties in 24 hours in mid-September, took a “knock” from a tug as it was putting to sea ahead of an expected hurricane and suffered a 1 ft x 1/4 inch crack along a weld seam as well as some bent stringers (horizontal hull structural beams) (1)

My issue with this incident is the physical weakness demonstrated by the ship as a result of what appears to have been a fairly mild contact with a tug.  What does this say about the LCS’ ability to absorb actual battle damage?  The Navy has stated that the LCS was only designed to stay afloat long enough after a hit to allow the crew to escape.  Of course, I’m ignoring the fact that the Navy has also claimed that the LCS was built to Level 1+ (Level 2 except for one or two minor requirements) standards which means that the ship should be able to take a hit and keep fighting so there’s an inherent contradiction but, I digress …

This lightness of construction is not limited to the LCS.  We’ve seen that the Aegis cruiser, Port Royal, was severely or permanently damaged by nosing gently aground.

The Burkes were found to have been too lightly built and have had to have reinforcing plates added to the hull.

I’ve commented on the Navy’s tendency over the last few decades to build ships far too weak, physically.  I won’t belabor the point.  This is just more evidence that the Navy has forgotten how to build warships.

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(1)Navy Times website, “Tug Collides With LCS Montgomery, Cracks The Hull”, David B. Larter, 6-Oct-2016,

https://www.navytimes.com/articles/tug-collides-with-lcs-montgomery-cracks-the-hull

CNO Richardson Disappoints

Long time readers know that ComNavOps was not a fan of recently retired CNO Greenert.  In fact, it’s fair to say that ComNavOps viewed him as the worst CNO in a long, long time.  Thus, it was with cautious optimism that ComNavOps greeted incoming CNO Richardson.  The optimism had less to do with any knowledge of Richardson’s accomplishments or abilities and more to do with the belief that a tree stump would do a better job leading the Navy and Richardson could only be an improvement, no matter how bad he might be.

Alas, those giddy, hopeful days have slowly given way to disbelief – disbelief that anyone else could rival Greenert’s incompetence and yet we seem to have a contender in the making. 

Consider all the problems facing the Navy and all the issues that the CNO could have chosen to take on and fix.  I won’t even list the problems.  You know the litany as well as I do.  So, what has CNO Richardson chosen to focus on?

His latest focus and apparent best use of his time is to ban the acronym “A2/AD” (anti-access/area denial). 

“We’re going to scale down the mention of A2AD,” Adm. John Richardson said Monday, referring to the acronym for anti-access area denial, a warfighting approach with, he said, a variety of definitions. 

“It’s a term bandied about pretty freely and lacks the precise definition it probably would benefit from, and that ambiguity sends a variety of signals,” Richardson said. “Specifics matter.” (1)

The term does not have a variety of definitions.  In fact, as military acronyms go, it’s one of the most specific and well understood ones!  Richardson may not understand it but the rest of us do.  Recognize, though, that my complaint and derision stem not from the fact that he’s banned the acronym but that he considers that to be a priority issue over all the other challenges the Navy faces.  Is this the best use of his time?

What else has he accomplished in his short tenure?  Well, he appears to have prioritized the long standing system of Navy ratings as more important than warfighting, training, maintenance, etc.   His solution to the non-existent problem is to eliminate the time honored and specific rating system in favor of a generic rank label (2).  I’m not going to debate the merits of this but, rather, point out that if this is the best use of the CNO’s time and the most pressing issue he believes he faces then we truly have a contender for Greenert’s position of worst CNO in recent history.

Richardson also seems to have inherited his predecessor’s naïve views regarding China.  He has met with his Chinese counterpart five times already and, apparently, sees a rosy future in our relations with China.

“Despite rising tensions in the South China Sea, the US Navy’s top admiral says his Chinese counterparts “by and large” behave professionally, not provocatively, when the two nations meet at sea. And precisely because of those ensions, Adm. John Richardson said, it’s all the more important to emphasize cooperating with China, not confronting it.”

How’s that cooperation working out, there, Adm. Richardson?  We’ve ceded the entire South China Sea, gotten nothing in return, and are now watching the Chinese preparing to expand their territory still further, including annexing the disputed Scarborough Shoal which is also claimed by the Philippines.

“In March, U.S. Navy chief Admiral John Richardson said the United States had observed “survey type activity” around Scarborough that could be a precursor to reclamation. A month later, South China Morning Post added fuel to the fire by citing an anonymous source “close to the PLA Navy” as saying that China would carry out reclamation work at Scarborough “within this year.” (3)

Again, the point is not whether China ultimately will or will not seize the reef (they will) but, instead, the complete absence of a grasp on reality being demonstrated by Richardson.  China has already proven that they will use any means, including illegal acts, to further their expansionist agenda.  Richardson’s attempts at appeasement paint a picture of a man with no grasp of geopolitical or strategic reality or, indeed, any remembrance of very recent Chinese actions.

In addition to what Richardson has done (and disappointed in the doing) consider what he hasn't done.  He hasn't killed the LCS, he hasn't killed the Ford class, he hasn't laid out a solid F-35 CONOPS and acquisition strategy, he hasn't developed a viable amphibious assault doctrine in conjunction with the Marines, he hasn't prioritized warfighting, maintenance, training, and tactics.

Whether you look at what he's done or what he hasn't done, it's all the same: disappointing.

My cautious, feeble hopes for Richardson are gone.  The only hope I have left is that he proves to be only the second worst CNO I’ve seen rather than supplanting Greenert as the absolute worst.

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(1)Defense News website, “CNO Bans ‘A2/AD’ As Jargon”, Christopher P. Cavas, 3-Oct-2016,

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/cno-bans-a2ad-as-jargon

(2)USNI News website, “Navy Eliminating 241-Year-Old Rating System in New Enlisted Rank Overhaul”, Sam LaGrone, 29-Sep-2016,

https://news.usni.org/2016/09/29/navy-eliminating-241-year-old-rating-system-new-enlisted-rank-overhaul

(3)The Diplomat website, “China Building on Scarborough Shoal? Don't Hold Your Breath.”, Shannon Tiezzi, 9-Sep-2016,

http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/china-building-on-scarborough-shoal-dont-hold-your-breath/

Forgotten LCS Capabilities - The LCS Air Group

The LCS program garners much criticism which makes it easy to forget that that the class possesses potentially useful inherent capabilities.  We are honored today to have guest author Steven Wills (aka Lazarus) to remind us of one of those capabilities and offer some much needed balance to the LCS discussion.  Please enjoy this post and give it your serious consideration.  Check out Mr. Will's bio at the end of the post.

Regarding comments, LCS discussions too often degenerate into positive and negative platitudes and this will not be allowed.  Comments must be specific and supported with facts and logic.  As always, politeness and respect are mandatory.

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Forgotten LCS Capabilities

The LCS Air Group

One of the significant capabilities of the littoral combat ship (LCS) that is often overlooked in discussion is the ship’s extensive aviation facilities. Both LCS variants have large flight decks and helicopter hangars. Their modular spaces also support the storage of ordnance and aviation maintenance gear in support of extended rotary wing operations. The three ship deployed LCS squadron can theoretically support six MH 60R helicopters and Firescout unmanned rotary-wing vehicles (1), or a combination of those assets. The LCS air group can perform a number of warfare and surveillance roles in support of a naval component commander’s campaign effort.

Both LCS variants boast the most expansive helicopter operating limits in terms of wind speeds due to their expansive flight decks. At 7300 square feet in size (2), the LCS-2 (Independence) variant has the largest flight deck of any surface combatant in the fleet. The LCS-1 (Freedom) variant has a smaller flight deck at 5200 square feet, but can land a helicopter in the face of 45 knot relative winds (3). The LCS sea frames also carry more aviation fuel (JP-5) (75-80 metric tons (4)) than the preceding Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates (64 metric tons (5)). While neither LCS variant has the traditional RAST (Recovery, Assist, Secure, Traverse (6)) system to aid in landing and deck movement, helicopter operations are supported by the British-made MacTaggart Scott Trigon (7) cable recovery and traversing system. The Trigon system has not been used in past U.S. ship classes, but has been a staple of Commonwealth navies (8) for the last 40 years. It was pioneered by the British Royal Navy for use with small flight decks and smaller deck crews than larger ships. It uses a system of deck-mounted cables to secure a helicopter to a ship’s flight deck and move it to/from the vessel’s helicopter hangar (9).

USS Freedom and FireScout UAV

The MH-60R helicopter (10) is capable of a wide range of missions to include reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare and surface warfare. It can mount up to 3 MK54 lightweight antisubmarine (ASW) torpedoes or 4 AGM 114 Hellfire air to surface missiles. The MQ-8B Firescout unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (11) also carries the Hellfire missile as well as the small (1 kg) GBU 144 Viper Strike laser guided bomb (LGB). The MK54 is the standard U.S. ASW torpedo while the Hellfire has an air to surface range of 4.5 nautical miles. The AGM 119 Penguin antiship missile with a range of 18 nautical miles might also be carried on LCS-based MH-60R’s.

Trigon Helo Handling System

An LCS air wing of multiple assets operating in conjunction with other weapons and capabilities based on the LCS sea frames such as the Harpoon and Naval Strike missiles constitutes a significant surface warfare capability. Operating in a distributive configuration but linked using air and surface equipment, an LCS squadron might launch coordinated strikes from air and surface assets. The high speed of the LCS sea frames allows them to rapidly re-position away from aircraft launch and recovery sites (12), thus increasing an opponent’s area of uncertainty in planning a counter-strike. The distributive employment of LCS at maximum distance forces an opponent to contemplate a much wider battle space in locating and striking at LCS sea frames. Unlike one or two conventional frigates that might support 12-16 antiship cruise missiles, the loss of one LCS only degrades the formation’s strike capacity rather than halving or entirely losing it.

The LCS’ sea frame capabilities are available today and do not need an associative mission module to contribute to the surface and subsurface battle. Potential LCS aviation assets provide the maritime component commander with a medium surface strike capability. Utilization of the emerging distributive lethality concept allows for an integrated strike capability from both sea frames and aircraft while maximizing their survivability through dispersion. The LCS air group is not waiting on a certification from the Department of Defense Director of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), or funding stalled in Congress, but is ready whenever and wherever the sea frames can be assembled.

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(1)Defense Industry Daily website, “LCS: The USA’s Littoral Combat Ships”,

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usas-new-littoral-combat-ships-updated-01343/

(2)National Defense website, “Builders of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Pull Out All The Stops”, Grace V. Jean, March 2010,

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2010/March/Pages/LittoralCombatShip.aspx

(3)Navy.mil website,  COMLCSRON ONE Newsletter, “USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) Commissioned In Galveston”,  MC2 (SW/AW) Garcia, SURFPAC Public Affairs,  October 2012, Volume 2, Issue 4,

http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/lcsron1/Documents/LCS_Newsletter_Vol_2_Issue4-Oct_2012.pdf

(4)GAO, “Littoral Combat Ship - Additional Testing and Improved Weight Management Needed Prior to Further Investments”, July 2014, GAO-14-749,

http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665114.pdf

(5)“The Continuation of a Damage Control Stability Module for the FFG-7”, Charles Arthur Bush, B.S.N.A., United States Naval Academy, Submitted to the Department of Ocean Engineering in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degrees of Ocean Engineer and Master of Science in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1984

(6)Curtiss-Wright website, products/naval systems/helicopter securing & traversing/RAST, 30-Sep-2016,

https://www.curtisswrightds.com/products/naval-systems/helicopter-securing-traversing/rast.html

(7)DocSlide, 30-Sep-2016,

http://docslide.us/documents/why-trigon-has-no-rails-rev6.html

(8)MacTaggart Scott website, defense products/surface ship systems/helicopter handling, 30-Sep-2016,

http://www.mactag.com/94_HelicopterHandling.html

(9)YouTube, “MacTaggart Trigon helicopter recovery and handling system”, jimbarc, published 15-Sep-2014,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xh01qPp7ia4

(10)Lockheed Martin website, products/naval systems/mh 60 seahawk helicopters,

http://lockheedmartin.com/us/products/mh60r.html

(11)Naval Air Systems Command website, aircraft and weapons/uas/firescout,

http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.display&key=8250AFBA-DF2B-4999-9EF3-0B0E46144D03

(12)Aviation Week website, “Seahawk Helicopters Provide Punch For LCS Operations”, Michael Babey, 23-Sep-2013,

http://aviationweek.com/awin/seahawk-helicopters-provide-punch-lcs-operations

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Steve Wills is a retired surface warfare officer who spent most of his sea going career in small combatants including two frigates, a mine countermeasures ship (MCM) and a patrol coastal (PC). He is currently a PhD Candidate in Military History at Ohio University. His areas of expertise are Cold War naval history and the history of British sea power from 1889-1941. He posts on a number of sites under the pen name of "Lazarus."

UAV Triton Costs

UAV proponents live in a magical world in which the UAV will blithely fly through enemy airspace undetected and unhindered and, even better, will cost nothing to build.  ComNavOps, of course, has pointed out the fallacy behind those fantasies.  Let’s face it, if you want F-35 type performance you’re going to pay F-35 type prices whether it’s manned or unmanned.  The incremental cost to include a pilot in an aircraft is relatively small and is offset by the greater instrumentation and communications needed and by the land based pilot which is still required.  In fact, the land based pilot and his control station and communications requirements actually increase the cost of a UAV over a manned equivalent.

MQ-4C Triton

Let’s take a look at some of the cost figures for the Navy’s MQ-4C Triton (BAMS - Broad Area Maritime Surveillance) as reported by USNI News website (1).

FY16  $558 (LRIP 1), 3 aircraft plus control station and facility

FY17  $563 (LRIP 2), 3 aircraft plus control station and facility

Both LRIP (low rate initial production) contracts include 3 aircraft plus 1 control station and facility.  That’s eyewatering even by F-35 standards at nearly $190M per aircraft.  While that’s not just the actual construction cost of the aircraft, it’s still a valid per-aircraft cost figure because the aircraft can’t fly without the control station and facility.

Before anyone brings up full rate production economy of scale, there won't be any.  The total production run is only planned to be around 60 or so.

UAVs are simply not the low cost item that proponents wish them to be!

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(1)USNI News website, “NAVAIR To Begin Negotiating MQ-4C Triton LRIP 2 Contract and Advance Procurement”, Megan Eckstein, 4-Jun-2015,

https://news.usni.org/2015/06/04/navair-to-begin-negotiating-mq-4c-triton-lrip-2-contract-and-advance-procurement

China War Strategy - Blockade

Various strategies have been put forth for conducting a war with China.  Why is having a strategy important?  Because the strategy determines what equipment, assets, training, and tactics we should be focusing on.  Is the LCS (or F-35 or Zumwalt or whatever) useful?  Well, that depends on the strategy that we envision using. 

One of the common China war strategies put forth is the distant blockade.  In simple terms, this strategy envisions a long range, stand off, world wide blockade imposed to deny raw materials.  Over time, China will lose the ability to continue waging war and will be forced to accept some sort of negotiated peace settlement.

Before I go any further, let me clearly state that this is simply an objective evaluation of one possible strategy.  It is not the strategy that ComNavOps would endorse! 

This strategy has the following attributes.

• It ensures a very long term process.  China has immense natural resources available within its own borders and has many overland supply routes through other countries.  It is highly unlikely that the US would be willing to interdict many of the overland supply routes since they pass through other countries.

• It minimizes large scale, direct combat in favor of small, lower end blockade actions and counteractions.

• It requires world wide military actions and necessitates using a large number of ships and aircraft, possibly more than we have available.

• It would be almost exclusively an Air Force and Navy action.

• It would cause immense disruption of the world’s economy for an extended period of time (to be fair, any war between superpowers will disrupt the world’s economy – the time frame being the key issue).

• It would result in a war of attrition.

Let’s examine the basic premise: that China could be “starved” into peace.  As stated, China has large amounts of natural resources within its borders.  Consider how long N.Korea and Iran have held out in the face of severe sanctions (an uncontested blockade, in essence) and neither of those countries has the resources that China does.  In WWII, Japan was able to continue feeding the homeland and securing sufficient raw materials to continue waging war for four years despite being a very small country and an easily isolated island nation.  Likewise, Germany was able to continue producing war materials right up until the end of the war.  Yes, each experienced shortages of various materials (as did the US) but the overall war production effort carried on and the populations were at least minimally fed.  China is many times larger and can’t be physically isolated.  How much longer could China hold out?  Does anyone think the welfare of its citizens is the Chinese government’s main concern?  We’re probably looking at decades before any serious degradation of war effort would occur.  Could the US and world economies withstand this?  Could we absorb decades worth of attrition?

In order to be successful in any useful time frame, the blockade would have to extend to China’s overland supply routes.  This would require very long range forays by aircraft to attack the routes, pipelines, etc. and would necessitate flying through other country’s airspace.  Many of those countries would be unlikely to allow such intrusions – Russia, notably, comes to mind.

The final and most important aspect of such a strategy is the end result.  What would the end result be?  Answering that starts with understanding the beginning of the war.  The US will not initiate a war with China.  Thus, the assumed start of the war would, undoubtedly, entail the seizure by China of islands, land, or, specifically, Taiwan in an initial “blitzkrieg”.  Then, after many years of blockade the end result would be a negotiated peace settlement demanded by a war-weary Western world that can’t match the long term willingness of China to continue the conflict.  The reality, in such a peace negotiation, is that China would offer to return a few pieces of land or allow a semi-autonomous governing of Taiwan under Chinese control (to be later, slowly, scrapped).  There would certainly be no return to the original boundaries and conditions.  Thus, a negotiated settlement would be a win for China.  China would have secured the vast majority of its war objectives.

In fact, if China were smart, they would grab a few extra pieces of land at the start of the war, that they don’t really want, to use as bargaining chips during eventual peace talks at which point they would “magnanimously” offer to return them, thereby demonstrating their commitment to, and extreme desire for, peace.

After the negotiated settlement giving China most of what it wanted, China would pause, rebuild its military and prepare for the next round of annexation and conflict.

We see then, that the net result of the blockade strategy is to allow China to achieve the majority of its wartime goals at a relatively small cost while leaving China with a fully functioning military and supporting defense industry and completely intact civilian infrastructure, thus ensuring that the entire cycle will be repeated down the road.

The blockade strategy is a flawed strategy that accomplishes nothing for the US.

Adaptive Electronic Warfare

Here’s an interesting project that caught ComNavOps’ eye.  DARPA is developing an adaptive electronic warfare (EW) software package (1).  The problem with EW in the past has always been that it was only effective against known, pre-programmed threats.  Today, however, many threats use frequency agile emitters with variable characteristics that we have no way of pre-programming for.  To counter this, DARPA is working with industry to create a software EW package that can analyze threats, determine their characteristics in real time, and produce a counter based on histories of what has worked in the past against similar threat profiles.  This is, potentially, a wonderful approach that offers a broad spectrum of counters without the need for perfect knowledge ahead of time. 

Of course, at the early developmental stage, like this, every project sounds great.  The reality is that few such projects actually make it to production.  Still, this is a technology that is well worth pursuing.

The next step is for DARPA to step away and one of the services to adopt and fund the program.  Unfortunately, this is where many potentially worthwhile projects die – not necessarily for lack of technical worthiness but because of politics.  The services each look at the potential project and play poker against each other.  Who will fund it?  If one service wants to use their money for another project, they may pass on it, hoping that another service picks it up, pays to develop it, and then they can hop on board when it’s mature.  Of course, politics means that they may all pass in favor of funding less deserving pet projects that they think have a better chance of getting funded by Congress regardless worthiness.

For example, the Navy has made it clear that they are going to fund the LCS no matter what.  If they come up short on budget because of that, they will not fund this EW project.  Sad but true.

Something like an EW package would be useful across all the services and should be funded at a DoD level, not at the individual service level.

Anyway, this is a potentially useful project.  It’ll be interesting to see if it gets fully developed by anyone.

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(1)Defense News website, “Pentagon Looks To Adaptive EW Systems To Thwart Future Adversaries”, Valerie Insinna, 29-Aug-2016,

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/pentagon-looks-to-adaptive-ew-systems-to-thwart-future-adversaries