Chinese Seizure of Solomon Islands

The Chinese just completed a security agreement with Solomon Islands which gives China’s military access to the islands.  What, specifically, does the agreement allow?  No official copy of the agreement has been released but a leaked ?draft? copy reveals,

 

A draft of the deal leaked online said it would allow China to send armed forces to the Solomon Islands to protect Chinese investments. Chinese warships would also be permitted dock on the islands.[1]

 

Prime Minister Mannesseh Sogavare told his parliament in Honiara a day later that [the security agreement] will allow China to send police and military personnel to the Solomon Islands “to assist in maintaining social order”. Chinese warships also could stop in port there for “logistical replenishment.”[2]

 

According to the draft text, the agreement would allow China to “make ship visits to, carry out logistical replenishment in, and have stopover and transition in Solomon Islands”, leading to fears that China could secure a naval base less than 2,000km from Australia’s east coast.[3]

 

“The agreement states that China may, according to its own needs and with the consent of the Solomon Islands government make ship visits to the Solomons and carry out logistical replenishment and stopover and transition in the Solomons.”[4]

 

The above is bad.  It gives China the opening it needs to begin establishing a permanent naval base.  However, far worse is the following passage from the document:

 

… the relevant forces of China can be used to protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects in Solomon Islands.[5]

 

This passage gives China carte blanche to establish a permanent military presence in the Solomons in the name of ‘protecting the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects’.  How flimsy of an excuse would the Chinese need to justify bringing in military forces?  The thinnest of excuses would suffice.  Given the blatant lies the Chinese routinely engage in, they won’t hesitate to concoct some ‘safety’ issue when the time comes to establish their base.

 

Does anyone recall the Chinese assurances that the illegal artificial islands in the South China Sea would not be militarized?  Of course, they were militarized in short order.  China’s word means nothing and China has a habit of militarizing everything it touches.  There is absolutely no doubt that China will construct a naval base in the Solomons under the guise of ‘logistical replenishment’ facility improvements.

 

There is also a confidentiality clause in the agreement which prohibits either party from publicizing any of the terms or actions related to the agreement without the other’s consent.[5]  This provides further cover for the Chinese to act clandestinely.

 

So, what has been America’s response?

 

A high-level American delegation will go to the Solomon Islands next week.  The United States said it will re-open its embassy in Honiara, which has been closed since 1993.[1]

 

Talk about closing the barn door after the horse has got out! 

 

The US has talked about a Pacific Pivot but has utterly failed to do anything.  We haven’t substantially increased our military presence.  We haven’t made any significant attempt to conduct a political campaign in the region.  We’ve exerted no economic influence.  And so on.  Clearly, we’ve ignored relations with the various Pacific countries. 

 

Sending a delegation to the Solomons after the fact is simultaneously useless, embarrassing, and humiliating.

 

At this point, one might ask whether a Chinese base (and there will be one) in the Solomon’s is a serious concern for the US.  After all, the Solomons are around 3970 miles from the Chinese mainland coast, depending on exactly where one measures from.  Isn’t that an awfully distant and isolated base for China?  Is it really a threat?

 

A Chinese base in the Solomons gives them their Pearl Harbor … their far forward base to support deep Pacific air and naval forces in both times of war and times of war.  Huh?  Did I just repeat myself?  Don’t I mean times of war and times of peace?  No, I don’t because, for China, there is no difference between war and peace.  For China, peace is just the non-shooting portion of the war.  They are already at war with us and they’re winning.  We’re steadily retreating and appeasing.  They’re achieving all their objectives and we’re failing ours, to the extent that we even have any objectives. 

 

In the mind of the Chinese, peace and war are the same thing.  There’s no difference other than methods and means.  China is at war and we’re just sitting back in a Chamberlain appeasement mode.  A base in the Solomons gives the Chinese a resupply and support facility to further their expansion efforts.

 

Just for fun, let’s check the distance from Pearl Harbor to San Francisco … it’s 2400 miles.  That’s awfully isolated and far from the US mainland and resupply.  So, if the isolation/distance argument is valid for China in the Solomons, it’s also valid for the US and Pearl Harbor.  Of course, Guam is even more isolated and far from the US and resupply at 5800 miles.  On a related note, the distance from Pearl Harbor to Guam is 3800 miles.  So, as China acquires bases in the Pacific, who’s more isolated and distant? 

 

Consider these distances: 

• Distance from Chinese coast to Solomon Islands = 3970 miles 

• Distance from San Francisco to Solomon Islands = 5960 miles
• Distance from Pearl Harbor to Solomon Islands = 3560 miles
• Distance from Guam to Solomon Islands = 1914 miles
• Distance from Darwin to Solomon Islands = 2000 miles

 

It is the US that has far flung and isolated bases.  With a couple more security agreements with other Pacific island nations, it will be the US in the position of being isolated and unsupported in the Pacific.

 

Aside from Japan, the only other Pacific military of any note is Australia and they are an extremely small force.  For example, the entire combat fleet of the Australian navy[6] consists of :

 

• 8x Anzac frigates
• 3x Hobart destroyers
• 6x Collins submarines

 

That’s not a significant naval force. 

 

The US currently has a significant advantage in terms of global geopolitics, finances, economics, presence, and military force.  However, we are doing very little to maintain those advantages and almost nothing to enhance them.  Meanwhile, China is expanding their influence in all those areas at a breathtaking pace.  They are expanding and winning;  the US is shrinking and losing.

 

A Chinese Pearl Harbor in the Solomons is just the next step in China’s plan to conquer the Pacific.

 

We need to recognize that we are at war with China and start fighting back.

 

 

 

_________________________________

 

[1]VOA News website, “Solomon Islands Sign Security Pact With China”, Phil Mercer, 20-Apr-2022,

https://www.voanews.com/a/solomon-islands-sign-security-pact-with-china-/6537279.html

 

[2]https://www.channelnewsasia.com/world/solomon-islands-china-pact-has-us-riled-2642971

 

[3]The Guardian website, “China requested heavily armed security team be sent to Solomon Islands, leaked documents reveal”, Kate Lyons, 12-Apr-2022,

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/12/china-requested-heavily-armed-security-team-be-sent-to-solomon-islands-leaked-documents-reveal

 

[4]https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/03/25/leaked-draft-china-solomon-islands-security-pact-causes-pacific-stir/

 

[5]https://www.michaelsmithnews.com/2022/03/text-of-whats-reportedly-a-securitymilitary-cooperation-agreement-between-china-and-solomon-islands/comments/

 

[6]https://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/current-ships

Marine Missiles

Marine Commandant Berger keeps talking about hidden bases with small units that will rain missiles of death and destruction down on the hapless Chinese who won’t have a clue where the Marines are.  Well, let’s attempt to be fair and take a look at the missiles that the good Commandant envisions using.  Are they small enough to remain hidden?  Can they be easily moved as the Marines nimbly relocate from island to island on Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) ships?

 

Note:  The inspiration and, indeed, much of the organization and content of this post is taken from a Naval News website article by Peter Ong.[1]

 

 

Naval Strike Missile

 

The smallest of the potential missiles for the Marines is the Naval Strike Missile (NSM). 

 

The Marine Corps’ Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) mounts two Naval Strike Missiles (NSM) on a remote-operated, driven, and NSM launched unmanned Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) 4×4 vehicle.  … The 900-pound (410 kilogram) NSM (or 910 pounds with booster) can be internally loaded aboard a CH-53 and onto the flatbed of a Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) 6×6 truck via a forklift.  … it is possible to push an NSM container on a trolley cart but loading it onto the JLTV will require a … forklift.[1]

NMESIS Naval Strike Missile on JLTV

That’s a hefty brute of a vehicle.  Note that it carries two missiles.  To be operationally relevant and combat effective, a unit is going to need … what ? … twenty or so missiles, at a minimum?  That would be a minimum of ten such vehicles.  That’s no longer a small, secretive, hidden footprint.  Of course one could always use fewer launch vehicles and just use reloads but that would require forklifts and some type of missile storage facility which, again, is not a small, secretive, hidden footprint.

 

These vehicles (JLTV or forklifts) give off very large infrared signatures, especially in the tropical sun.  Again, not conducive to remaining hidden.

From Wikipedia, here's a description of the components of a Norwegian coastal defense battery which is, essentially, what the Marines are trying to set up:

An NSM coastal battery consists of three missile launch vehicles, one battery command vehicle, three combat command vehicles, one mobile communication center, one mobile radar vehicle with TRS-15C radar, one transport and loading vehicle, and one mobile workshop vehicle. 

Again, that's not a small footprint ! 

 

 

Tomahawk

 

Another missile option is the cutting edge, brand new, ultra advanced, futuristic  Maritime Strike Tomahawk ... which you knew this as the 1980’s – 1990’s era Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM).  In any event, the Tomahawk will be deployed on 40 ft long, 34 ton, M872 trailers.

 

The semitrailer is designed to be towed over smooth, hard-surfaced roads with loads up to 34 tons (68,000 lbs payload) at speeds as high as 55 mph (88 km/h). It can also be towed over unimproved roads, trails and open rolling terrain with the same load limit, but at a sustained speed of no more than 10 mph (16 km/h).[2]

 

The M872 semitrailer is designed to be towed by the M915 Series 6x4 Truck, Tractor.[2]

 

Tomahawk Launching From Trailer Mounted VLS Cell

Note the immense size of the trailer, VLS cell, and then factor in the trailer tow vehicle.  The photo depicts a feasibility demonstration but the final launch vehicle will not be any smaller.  Again, assuming we want more than a single missile shot, we’ll need dozens of these trailers, tow vehicles, and, potentially, large cranes to handle the VLS cells.  Imagine a large city freeway with a string of twenty giant tractor-trailers and you’ll get an idea of how hidden this operation will be.

 

Also, note the 10 mph speed limit for movement over unimproved roads and terrain.  This will not be a quick, agile, shoot and scoot operation !

 

The MST uses a two-way communications link for mid-course guidance and targeting updates.  This could prove problematic during combat as it violates EMCON and allows the enemy to locate the communications source. 

 

 

 

HIMARS

 

Another missile option is the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HiMARS) which is a podded rocket system with six rockets per HiMARS pod and are launched from a modified USMC Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle (FMTV) 6×6 truck.[1]  HiMARS rockets may require new seekers to target moving ships.

 

HIMARS Pod on FMTV 6x6 Truck

Note the size of the 6x6 truck.  Again, several such trucks/pods would be needed.

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

The options discussed above all involve dozens of sizeable vehicles – no easy thing to hide on an island inside your enemy’s zone of control.  Also, bear in mind that other necessities must be provided including large amounts of fuel, fuel handling equipment, vehicle maintenance and repair capabilities, spare parts, etc. in addition to the operator’s food, health, and shelter needs.  All of this is in addition to the gear and supplies that the regular Marines will require.  While the Commandant may have some fanciful notion of Marines living off the land (that has actually been discussed in various published articles), that is simply not feasible for any sustained period of time.  There is also the matter of health.  The tropics are renowned for myriad diseases and Marines weakened by malnourishment will be quickly rendered sick and ineffective.

 

We’re also ignoring the challenges associated with transporting and loading/unloading large vehicles to/from islands in secret.  Does the Commandant really believe he can transport and unload dozens of large vehicles without being noticed?

 

The other aspect that is not covered is targeting.  The Marines will need some type of UAV or radar or something to provide targeting beyond the 12 mile horizon.  That thousand mile Tomahawk sounds great on paper but how are you going to get thousand mile targeting?  Whatever vehicle or sensor the Marines use will further reduce their ‘hiddenness’.  Sensor assets will require two-way communications which, again, point back to the Marine’s location.

 

When all the vehicles, UAVs, sensors, support equipment, storage facilities, etc. are considered, it is difficult to see how anyone can believe that missile-shooting units will remain undetected even assuming that they can penetrate the enemy’s zone in a small, non-stealthy, painfully slow LAW and establish themselves on an island in the first place.

 

Finally, the Commandant has stated that in the unlikely event that the Marines are discovered, they will simply hop aboard a LAW  and relocate, thus regaining their secrecy.  Of course, loading and unloading all the equipment we’ve discussed is not an insignificant feat in itself.  Trying to load all the vehicles and equipment onto a LAW will be a pretty noticeable event, one would imagine.

 

By the way, when this unlikely relocation becomes necessary, where will the multiple transport LAWs come from?  Will they be floating offshore, waiting?  If so, wouldn’t they be quickly spotted?  If they’re not waiting and, instead, they’re back on, say, Guam.  It will take weeks to get them to the Marine’s island.  That’s not exactly going to allow for quick, agile relocations, is it?

 

Nothing about this concept appears feasible.  The Commandant either needs to come out and address some of these issues, at least in general terms, or he will continue to face resistance.  He appears to have successfully stifled internal dissent but has run into staunch resistance from former Marine generals and other top-ranking former officials.  Commandant, if you want support you’ve got to provide some information and address the gaping holes in the logic of the concept.

 

 

 

 

 

Side note:  Does anyone recall the Cuban missile crisis?  The Soviets attempted to secretly transport missiles using small, slow, unarmed transport ships (sounds like a LAW !) and place the missiles on the island of Cuba without being noticed and yet they were instantly spotted with 1950’s – 1960’s technology.  How’d that work out?

 

 

______________________________________

 

[1]Naval News website, “A Look At The Sizes Of U.S. Land-Based Strike Missiles”, Peter Ong, 29-Jun-2022,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/06/a-look-at-the-sizes-of-u-s-land-based-strike-missiles/

 

[2]https://olive-drab.com/idphoto/id_photos_m872_trailer.php

The Degraded Warship

Officially, the Navy’s equipment is near perfect, almost flawless in its performance.  Why?  Because either the equipment is tweaked ahead of inspections and exercises or because the exercises are largely simulated and every piece of equipment works perfectly in simulations.  Thus, Navy leadership has no reason to believe that when real combat comes, the equipment won’t work perfectly.

 

You and I, however, know that it is an absolute given that when war comes, our systems will be degraded across the board.  We get hints of this when ships are forced to perform real operations (like sailing through a navigation channel) and wind up running aground or colliding and the incident reports inevitably wind up citing a litany of degraded or non-functional equipment that contributed to the incident.

 

The inevitable combat degradation may result from a variety of reasons:

 

• enemy electronic warfare
• battle damage
• confusion (the fog of war)
• panic (the Vincennes and Mason scenarios)
• weather conditions (our technology hasn’t risen above the effects of weather yet)
• lack of maintenance
• self-imposed degradation such as from EMCON (Emissions Control)
• degradation due to removal of expert contractor support
• crew attrition due to battle casualties

 

Given the absolute certainty of degraded systems, the naval ship designer would be wise to design in degradation resilience.  How, you might ask, can we design a WARship that can function degraded?  What features and characteristics are needed?

 

Here are some features that will make a WARship more resilient in the face of inevitable system degradation:

 

Backups – Anything critical to combat must have at least one backup, meaning, an alternate (preferably, dissimilar technology) way to accomplish the same task.  When systems are degraded, having an alternate way to accomplish a task is a good way to increase the likelihood of success.  For example, when the ship’s radar is degraded due to jamming, lack of maintenance (no civilian contractors that we’ve come to depend on will be aboard ship during war), or lack of highly trained technicians (again, a fateful dependence on contractors) it will be critical to have a backup sensor like a 360 degree electro-optical and/or infrared scanning system to supplement or replace the radar.

 

Redundancy - When systems are degraded, having more than one of them is a good way to mitigate the impact.  For example, when the ship’s radar is destroyed, a second, redundant system could be the salvation of the ship.

 

Targeting – This blog has long identified targeting as the Achilles Heel of modern weapon systems.  A million mile missile is useless when all you have is a horizon targeting system.  We’ve also noted that modern ships have very few targeting systems, regardless of range.  For example, the trend towards collapsing all radar systems into a single radar is the opposite of what we should be doing with WARships.  Alternate targeting systems can provide targeting options and flexibility.  For instance, onboard optical sensors are an effective supplement to conventional radar targeting.  Add to that various sensors mounted on small UAVs that can extend and supplement the ship’s targeting sensors and you have the makings of a robust and flexible targeting system.

 

Armor – There is no better way to mitigate degradation due to battle damage than by the routine and extensive use of armor.  We knew this lesson in WWII and have forgotten it, today.

 

Manning - Increased manning is the only counter to battle casualties.  It is also the number one requirement for successful damage control

 

Internal Communications – Having ridiculed external communications (data links, networks, regional command and control, etc.), we must recognize that internal ship’s communications are vital during battle.  We need resilient internal comms using extensive sound powered phone circuits and hand held radios (kept sealed away until battle to avoid unwanted emissions).

 

Power – One of the most common and crippling conditions a ship can face is loss of power during battle.  We need an extensive and robust cross-connectable power grid throughout the ship.  The ship should be designed with hundreds of connection nodes so that power can always be quickly and easily re-routed around cable breaks. 

 

We need backup generators that are physically widely separated and scattered throughout the ship.  No single hit should be able to leave a ship without power.

 

UAVs - Organic UAVs can provide remote sensing and situational awareness when our regional networks fail and we can’t get outside data.

 

Propulsion – A backup propulsion pod, located on the forward half of the ship, for limp-home use will save a ship’s life.

 

Distributed Sensors – The current trend is towards having a single sensor replace multiple sensors.  For example, the Ford’s dual band radar was claimed to replace several separate radars.  This is a good business/budget case but an exceedingly poor combat case.  Distributed sensors provide resilience as battle damage occurs.  For example, the RAM launcher which depends on the ship’s main radar for targeting is a very poor choice for a combat weapon.  The better choice is the SeaRAM which, like the CIWS, has its own, self-contained radar sensor.  It doesn’t matter what happens to the ship’s main radar or any of the other sensors on the ship.  The SeaRAM will continue to function perfectly because it has its own radar.  We should have multiple, distributed, small radars (SPQ-9B or TRS-3D/4D, for example) dedicated to providing horizon targeting for the VLS system so that they can continue to function when the main radar is damaged or destroyed.  Optical systems tied into the VLS can provide yet another level of resilience for when the radars are jammed or degraded by enemy electronic warfare attacks.  We need to abandon the misguided trend of centralized sensors and the single, overarching, master sensor.

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

Degradation is the norm during war.  Heck, let’s be honest.  Degraded systems are the norm right now, during peacetime due to lack of maintenance, lack of contractor support, lack of spare parts, and lack of expert level trained Navy technicians.  Recall the Port Royal grounding incident where the ship had multiple degraded systems despite having just come out of a dry dock availability (see, “Port Royal Grounding Lessons”)!  Given our woeful current state, why would we think ships won’t operate degraded during war?  Of course they will !  It is our responsibility to design ships that can absorb degradations and still function with at least a reasonable degree of effectiveness.  We have to stop designing ships to budgets and business cases and return to designing to combat requirements.

Sri Lanka Collapse – China Takeover?

Here’s a fascinating development that illustrates the brilliance of China’s expansionistic plans.  You may recall that in 2018 China negotiated a 99 year lease for the Sri Lanka port of Hambantota (see, “China Seizes Sri Lanka Port”).

 

Now, a few years later, Sri Lanka is apparently in the midst of total collapse and anarchy.

 

Sri Lanka is in the middle of a full-scale collapse after the president announced the nation is “bankrupt,” having run out of both money and energy.[1]

 

How did this occur?

 

Sri Lanka’s government has been implementing ESG policies (environment, social, and governance) for years, following the lead of the World Economic Forum. That includes banning agrochemicals such as fertilizers in an effort to lower nitrogen emissions. Flowery tales of “organic” farming and saving the planet have now been replaced with horror, as the island nation’s top exports have been laid to waste. People are starving, they can’t get gas or electricity, and none of the globalists who used Sri Lanka as a testbed for their green fantasies are coming to help.[1]

 

I won’t go any further than that with the hows and whys since this is a naval website.  You can investigate the causes on your own, if you’re interested.

 

What this means is that the one organization on Sri Lanka that will continue to function and function quite well is … yes … the Chinese establishment at Hambantota.  In fact, if Sri Lanka totally collapses, this would give China the immediate presence and access to implement life-saving measures for the populace - in exchange for greater access, control, and dependence of the people on China, of course.  This would allow a ‘soft’ takeover of the country.  

Alternatively (or in combination), China could opt to declare martial law over the entire country, in the name of protecting Chinese ‘civilians’ in the country.  Either way, China could wind up owning the country, if they so choose.

 

I can’t imagine that China isn’t gleefully rubbing their hands together at this development.  What is the US doing while this is happening?  Nothing that I’m aware of.

 

You’ve got to acknowledge brilliance when you see it.  China is on the verge of ‘conquering’ an entire strategically vital country without firing a shot and may even be perceived as saviors! 

 

 

 

Note:  Ref [2] has a nice write up about the Sri Lanka state of affairs.

 

 

_____________________________________

 

[1]Redstate website, “WATCH: Protesters Storm Presidential Palace in Sri Lanka After Climate Hysteria Destroys the Nation”, Bonchie, 9-Jul-2022,

https://redstate.com/bonchie/2022/07/09/watch-protesters-storm-presidential-palace-in-sri-lanka-after-climate-hysteria-destroys-the-nation-n591691

 

[2]https://www.aidiaasia.org/research-article/will-hambantota-port-become-a-chinese-military-base

SEWIP Problems

The Navy has, historically, relegated electronic warfare (EW) systems (SLQ-32 and the evolutionary SEWIP) on ships to a decidedly lower level of interest and importance.  We’ve covered the developmental history of EW systems (see, “SEWIP Update”) and it’s depressing.  We’ve also noted many times that historical data shows EW to be far and away the most effective form of anti-missile defense.  That makes the Navy’s apathy all the more baffling.

 

Now, SEWIP appears to be having serious problems although, since DOT&E caved into pressure to hide test results, we have only tidbits of information that have leaked out from the unclassified but controlled version of the Congressionally mandated annual report.

 

The electronic warfare capability scheduled for installation onboard several classes of Navy warships experienced multiple problems while in use on an aircraft carrier during testing in April 2021 … [1]

 

… testing last year on the aircraft carrier Gerald Ford (CVN-78) showed the system reporting “extraneous contacts for the radio frequency emitters it detects” and misidentifying “non-radio frequency emissions as [anti-ship cruise missiles],” according to the Pentagon’s chief weapons tester.[1]

 

Unfortunately, I have no more information than that.

 

 

SEWIP Block III

 

____________________________________

 

[1]Breaking Defense, “Disrupting the ‘critical linkage’: What is the Navy’s SEWIP?”, Justin Katz, 4-Apr-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/disrupting-the-critical-linkage-what-is-the-navys-sewip/

USS Connecticut, SSN-22, Collision and Repair Timeline

It has been 9 months since USS Connecticut, SSN-22, suffered an underwater collision with a sea mount in the South China Sea.  Let’s review the timetable with an eye towards what this tells us about our potential wartime battle damage repair capability and capacity.

 

 

2-Oct-2021        Collision with sea mount in South China Sea

8-Oct-2021        Arrived Guam for temporary repairs

4-Nov-2021       CO, XO, COB reported relieved

18-Nov-2021      Leaves Guam for temporary repair sea trial

12-Dec-2021      Arrives San Diego after surface transit from Guam

15-Dec-2021      Left San Diego, CA

20-Dec-2021      Arrived Puget Sound for thorough damage assessment

21-Dec-2021      Arrived Bremerton, WA for repairs

?-Feb-2023        Scheduled start of permanent repairs

 

The damage is expected to be repaired during a scheduled Extended Docking Selected Restricted Availability starting in February 2023.[2]

 

If – and that’s a very big ‘if’ – the repairs start on time in Feb 2023, it will have been 16 months since the collision.  That’s a pretty poor repair response for peacetime and would be atrocious during war. 

 

Here is what little we know about the extent of the damage.  Based on photos – because the Navy isn’t saying anything – the bow was sheared off (or removed as part of temporary repairs) and the sonar dome is gone, presumably resting at the bottom of the South China Sea.[2]  Reports suggest that the rudder is damaged, as well.

 

What will that cost to repair?  Here is a hint at the magnitude of the eventual repair bill.

 

Buried deep in the National Defense Authorization Act, two lines—crafted to prevent easy searching—authorize the Navy to receive an initial tranche of $50 million in repair funds—$10 million for a “spare Seawolf class bow dome” (page 1815) and $40 million for “USS Connecticut emergent repairs” (page 1850).[1]

 

That’s $50M just for the beginning of the repair bill, largely intended to cover long lead items.  A reasonable guess would put the final repair bill in the $300M-$400M range.

 

As a comparison, here is the cost and timing for a similar repair on the Los Angeles class submarine, USS San Francisco:

 

In 2005, the USS San Francisco, a Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine, also struck an underwater mountain, a crash that killed a sailor and injured 97 others. It took 3 1/2 years in Puget Sound to install a sonar dome from the decommissioned USS Honolulu onto the boat, in maintenance that in total cost $134 million.[3]

 

USS San Francisco

The USS McCain required 2 yrs and 2 months to complete repairs.  The USS Fitzgerald required 3 yrs to return to active duty and repair costs were reported as $327M[4].

 

We’re looking at a 2025-2026 time frame to return to active service.  That’s four or five years to effect repairs and that’s only if the repairs start on time which I strongly doubt will happen. 

 

This incident and the Navy’s near state of paralysis regarding the repairs tells us what we need to know about our ability to deal with wartime battle damage … we have no abililty!

 

Damage repair, whether due to combat or accidents, is critical for the maintenance of a strong fleet.  Our repair capacity is almost non-existent, repair timelines are terrible, and costs are enormous.  Our repair response is atrocious.  We have no ability to ‘surge’ a repair. 

 

‘Surge’ a repair?  Yes!  If you recall, the USS Yorktown, CV-5, was badly damaged at the Battle of the Coral Sea.  Repair estimates were for 90 days.  In a massive repair surge, Yorktown was repaired in 3 days and sailed to participate in the Battle of Midway.  The repair surge involved 1400 men and required rolling blackouts in Hawaii to supply the required power for the repair effort.

 

Connecticut’s repair surge is going to require something on the order of 4-5+ years.

 

Yikes!

 

We are not ready for war.

 

 

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]Forbes website, “Congress Authorizes Millions For Repairs Of USS Connecticut”, Craig Hooper, 20-Dec-2021,

https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2021/12/20/congress-authorizes-millions-for-uss-connecticut-ssn-22-repairs/?sh=24e12022656c

 

[2]Naval News website, “U.S. Navy Comments On USS Connecticut Submarine”, Peter Ong, 5-Jul-2022,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/07/u-s-navy-comments-on-uss-connecticut-submarine/

 

[3]Yahoo News website, “USS Connecticut, damaged in crash with underwater mountain, arrives in Bremerton”, Josh Farley, 21-Dec-2021,

https://www.yahoo.com/news/uss-connecticut-damaged-crash-underwater-220043902.html

 

[4]USNI News website, “USS Fitzgerald Leaves Mississippi Drydock After More Than a Year of Repairs”, Sam LaGrone, 16-Apr-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/04/16/uss-fitzgerald-leaves-mississippi-drydock-after-more-than-a-year-of-repairs

 

The Navy and Intellectual Property

One of the problems the Navy has run into in recent years is intellectual property rights. Understandably, manufacturers don't want to give up their proprietary data. Equally understandable, the Navy wants exactly that data so that they can model system performance as they contemplate system integration and modifications.

It's an impasse, currently, and has resulted in the Navy abandoning some promising systems.

The seriousness of the problem is magnified by the Navy’s [unwise] attempts to substitute modeling for actual tests in order to save money.  DOT&E has documented this problem multiple times across multiple weapon system programs in their various annual reports.

 

Consider some of the implications of this issue.  What about the manufacturer who was asked to provide proprietary data for the 32 Zumwalts.  Hmm … a contract for 32 ships might be worth giving up the data.  Unfortunately, the production run was reduced from 32 to 3.  Is it still worth it to the manufacturer to potentially give up their hard won institutional knowledge that gives them a competitive advantage for just 3 ships? 

The Navy is erratic, to say the least. Those 20 FFG may become 40 or the Navy may decide to go whole hog on unmanned and cut the FFG at 8. Who knows? The point is that the manufacturer is being asked to give away their proprietary information for the hope of a substantial sale that history strongly suggests is unlikely to occur.

Further, the Navy's ability to protect proprietary data is highly suspect with network infiltrations happening all the time in addition to whatever unethical and improper actions the Navy might opt to take that gives away the manufacturer’s data.

If I were a manufacturer, I'd be very reluctant to give away my hard-earned industrial advantage for a shaky deal with the US Navy.  Some companies might consider it worthwhile but, apparently, many are deciding it's not worth it.

 

Consider the following specific example from a DOT&E report.

 

In FY15, DOT&E learned that the Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) stopped work on the P_RA [ed. Probability of Raid Annihilation] Test Bed for the Freedom variant because a high-fidelity model of the ship’s AN/SPS-75 radar was not being developed. Development of an acceptable radar model requires intellectual property rights that the Navy does not hold … the Navy has also been unable to develop a high-fidelity model of that ship’s AN/SPS-77 radar for the same reason.[1, p.226]

 

Instead of conducting realistic, live tests, the Navy wants to model and simulate self-defense capabilities for the LCS.  That’s a very poor approach.  Modeling and simulation are fine but as an adjunct to live fire testing, not as a replacement for it.  That aside, in order to construct a valid model the Navy needs all the data on the radars.  The radar manufacturers, however, refuse to provide the proprietary data.  This leaves the Navy unable to program realistic models and simulations. 

 

It is easy to see, then, that the Navy’s choice of future equipment (of all types) is limited to those for which they can obtain proprietary data.  This eliminates many fine pieces of equipment from manufacturers who are unwilling to expose their data.

  

 

 

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[1]Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, “FY 2015 Annual Report”, Jan 2016