The Commandant's ASW Podcast

Commandant Berger was a guest speaker on a USNI Proceedings podcast (1) and discussed his vision of Marines conducting ASW.  A link to the podcast is referenced below.  It’s around 44 minutes and is well worth listening to.  It offers some insight and perspective on the Commandant’s thinking on ASW and a number of other topics.  I’ll examine the Commandant’s statements and see what insights we can gain.  The podcast timeframes are listed with each quote, for those who wish to hear it for themselves.

 

The Commandant started by laying out the basis for his motivation and he cited Title 10 and his desire to support naval campaigns.  Of course, the cynical might see that support as a budget grab more than a core belief.

 

More specifically, his rationale for involving the Marines in ASW is that precision strike has eliminated any inherent advantage the surface Navy has.  However, he believes that the Navy retains a significant advantage in undersea warfare and wants to help ‘maintain and grow’ that advantage and sees Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) as the means to do that.

 

Berger acknowledges that most of the EABO discussions and planning were classified or not publicized, leaving observers to form their own idea about what his vision is – the implication being that observers are wrong.  I got the sense that Berger felt that the lack of public support – or out and out opposition and criticism – was unfair.  Well, that’s what you get when you operate in total secrecy.  If you want support, you have to provide at least some basic information.  No one is asking for detailed operational plans but you have to give observers something to work with if you want their support.  The lack of transparency has been a strategic mistake on his part.

 

Here is Berger’s statement about a major portion of EABO operations which is different than what has previously been put forth:

 

I think a huge aspect of how we’re going to use EABO going forward is how we’re going to, what the naval force might call scouting and counter-scouting, or the Army calls reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance.” (1, 8:27)

 

Expeditionary naval forces … they’re going to have advanced sensing capability forward.  We don’t have it yet. … We’re experimenting with all that now. (1, 8:50)

 

‘We don’t have it yet.’  Um … okay, if you don’t have the sensing capability why are you remaking the Corps as if you do?  This seems eerily similar to concurrency where you build as you design.  You’re rebuilding the Marines around a capability that doesn’t yet exist and is only now in the early stages of development.  We’ve seen the disasters of the F-35, LCS, Zumwalt, and Ford concurrency debacles and now you want to add the entire Marine Corps to that list?

 

Just to confirm, for anyone who still thinks the Marines will conduct amphibious landings,

 

The big amphibious landing … that’s not where we’re headed. (1, 9:17)

 

This kind of leads into another problem.  I don’t think the Commandant is truly focused on combat.  I think he’s more focused on peacetime activities and monitoring.  He says as much:

 

We’re going to organize, train, and equip to compete in the maritime gray zone and help contribute towards this scouting, counter-scouting competition ...  all of this in the framework of deterrence and, potentially, de-escalation. (1, 9:20)

 

and,

 

The game is about deterrence and competition. (1, 22:50)

 

He seems to be viewing all of this as a peacetime, gray zone, deterrent exercise more than a high end war effort.  This is troubling in the extreme if he’s remaking the Marine Corps from a combat organization to a peacetime, deterrent organization.  Of course, he acknowledges in his comments that if the gray zone transitions to war, the Marines at the EABOs will have to fight but that appears not to be the EABO focus and main purpose.  Very troubling.

 

If EABOs are a peacetime construct, this raises the question of where these bases will be located.  The US owns almost no territory in or around the first island chain and very few countries (likely none) will allow the US to establish such bases on their territory.  Further, if such bases can be established during peacetime, they’ll hardly be secret.  Their locations will be pinpointed and in the first several minutes of a war, will be targeted with a handful of cruise missiles and cease to exist.  No matter how you twist this concept and look at it, it makes no sense.

 

Discussing his idea of the Marines being involved in ASW, Berger acknowledges that other Marines and observers may think the idea is questionable but he says:

 

I think that’s close-minded. (1, 11:00)

 

I think this reveals Berger’s ‘smartest man in the room’ syndrome:  only he can see the brilliance of his ideas.  The rest of us are not capable of grasping the glory of the concept.

 

I am pushing folks to think wider, to elevate, to think in a non-conventional, non-traditional way.  I’m not asking them to go into science fiction but this is reasonable.  Move beyond the traditional comfort level in your intellectual boundaries.  (1, 11:05)

 

Again, this is showing his belief that he, and he alone, can see the future.  Now, to be fair, this is the characteristic of true visionaries.  They ARE the only ones who can see the future and grasp the new revelations.  Da Vinci, Einstein, and others could see what no one else could.  Of course, for every Einstein, there have been thousands of others who claimed to be able to see what others could not but were proven to be completely wrong.  Is Berger one of those very, very few who CORRECTLY see what others do not or is he just another misguided, incorrect failure?  Only time will tell but the problem is that if he is wrong, he will have destroyed the Marine Corps in his pursuit of his vision.

 

Berger believes that the problem is that outside observers don’t have the imagination to think of the uses that he’s come up with.

 

… public conversations about what EABO could bring to the Navy-Marine team are less imaginative than the ones actually happening behind closed doors.” … I’d ask folks to stretch out their brains for us and think of EABO much wider than that.

 

I seriously doubt there's anything he can think of - THAT MAKES SENSE - behind closed doors that I can't think of. I'm sure there are lots of things he can think of that are every bit as idiotic as his hidden bases idea and that would never occur to me … BECAUSE THEY'RE STUPID.

 

Regarding Marines and ASW, Berger said,

 

Although some would think, immediately, what kind of weapon system are we talking about, my first thought is how do you paint a picture … Is there a way where Marine units could complement, could add to that undersea picture? (1, 18:57)

 

All right, now this has some validity, at least conceptually.  Literally, throwing torpedoes into the water from shore, as was postulated in some articles, is ridiculous but providing an ASW ‘coastwatcher’ capability would be quite useful.  Of course, this ignores all those pesky bits of reality like how you set up and operate a sonar array without being detected and how you operate a sonar analysis station in the jungle, using Marines, and so on but, at least, the underlying goal is valid.  Anything that can extend the undersea picture is quite useful.

 

Though not related to ASW, the Commandant touched on the light carrier concept.  He sounded ambivalent and only mildly interested.  He seemed to have no particular interest in it and gave no indication that it was important to the Marines. 

 

… we’ll have to sort through going forward is this whole notion of a light carrier and what that might mean and I don’t know where that one will go … (1, 30:52)

 

That being the case, that it is not a Marine interest, this means that it is a Navy interest, only, which changes the various views of how a light carrier would be used.  Those who are interested in the light carrier concept should now be asking what the Navy would gain from such a concept because, clearly, notions of Marine aviation using a light carrier to support ground forces is not a concern or interest of the Commandant’s.

 

Further reinforcing the impression that the Commandant had little interest in a light carrier, he was asked about possible upcoming experiments or exercises involving a light carrier and his answer, boiled down, was that there were no plans to do so.

 

The Commandant was asked about manning and his reply was that he sees budgets as holding or declining and he has chosen to reduce manning to pay for modernization.  In his mind, the end result is,

 

It will be a better Marine Corps, just a little bit smaller. (1, 34:30)

 

This is the oft repeated and never realized rationalization for manpower cuts to enable more shiny new toys.  Berger has bought into the same flawed reasoning as everyone else.  Taken to its logical conclusion, the best possible Marine Corps would have only a single member surrounded by a Star Wars death star.

 

Asked about professional education (1, 40:00), Berger was strongly in favor of it and firmly believes that it is mandatory for a competent force and that educational efforts over the last couple decades have vastly improved the force.  If that’s the case, why is the Corps at its lowest point in decades as far as capability, readiness, operational and tactical expertise, etc.?  Shouldn’t it be at a peak?  This suggests that professional education offers little or no direct warfighting benefit.

 

Finally, and to return to the EABO/ASW concept, hey, Commandant, why don’t you try your concept?  Have the US military look for you while you clandestinely establish a base on some island off the Carolinas or Florida and see whether you can do it without being seen.  Then, do your listening for submarines and see if you can detect any.  And, just for fun, simulate a cruise missile attack on your base and see if you can survive it.  I’m betting that this kind of exercise would give you all the answers you need to evaluate your concept and I’m pretty sure what that evaluation would be.

 

I think this podcast offered some good insight into the Commandant’s thinking.  It all boils down to this:  if the Commandant is a true visionary and is right, then he is in the midst of accomplishing an amazing transformation of the Corps.  However, if he’s wrong, the Marines are finished as a useful fighting force and will be decades recovering from this disaster.  I know which of those options I believe is happening but I’ll leave it to you to draw your own conclusion.

 

 

 

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(1)USNI News website, “CMC Berger Outlines How Marines Could Fight Submarines in the Future”, Megan Eckstein, 8-Dec-2020, Proceedings Podcast Episode 198 – “Commandant on Marines Fighting Subs”, 7-Dec-2020,

https://news.usni.org/2020/12/08/cmc-berger-outlines-how-marines-could-fight-submarines-in-the-future

Japanese Resupply of Guadalcanal

The Marines have a vision of establishing small, hidden, forward bases inside enemy territory.  From these bases, the Marines will rain death and destruction down upon the hapless Chinese ships (and now subs!).  The bases will be established, resupplied, and, when necessary, relocated by small Light Amphibious Warships (LAW) and all of this activity will remain blissfully undetected by the enemy.

 

Let’s focus on the resupply aspect.  Even if the entire concept were to work perfectly – meaning, that the Marine units could be inserted, establish a base, and launch missiles without being detected – each unit would only be able to launch a few missiles and operate for a few weeks before they ran out of weapons and food.  In other words, in order to be an ongoing threat they must have a means of resupply.  That’s elementary and yet it is an aspect of the concept that has received zero public discussion or explanation.

 

Presumably, the same LAW vessels that would be used to transport and establish the hidden units would also be tasked with the resupply since the presumption is that these miraculous vessels, although slow, defenseless, and non-stealthy, are somehow immune to detection and destruction.  So, we see that a need exists for resupply on a regular basis - every few weeks, presumably.

 

Can this resupply work?  Well, the Marines have hand-waved aside any possible difficulties so that leaves it to us to examine the issue.

 

We’ve already noted the slow, defenseless, and non-stealthy nature of the LAW itself which, for any other platform, would instantly and automatically preclude its survivability and effectiveness in a combat situation.  Had we known that slow, defenseless, and non-stealthy had no negative impact on survivability, we could have saved a lot of money and built the F-22/35 to be slow, defenseless, and non-stealthy and just assumed they’d be undetectable like the LAW … but we didn’t.  Instead, in the world of reality, we know that survivability on the modern battlefield requires speed, stealth, and firepower (which we only sporadically include in designs!).  So for this reason(s) alone, the resupply concept is not viable. 

 

However, let’s dig deeper.  Let’s look where all thorough examinations should look:  history.

 

One of the best examples of contested resupply was the Japanese attempts to resupply their force on Guadalcanal.

 

Initially, the Japanese attempted major resupply convoys escorted by powerful surface groups which led to some of the largest naval battles of the war and resulted in heavy losses on both sides.

 

After those failed, they resorted to smaller efforts by individual ships such as destroyers crammed with troops and supplies.  That, too, failed.

 

The Japanese then attempted resupply using floating supply drums dropped from destroyers.

 

During the Battle of Tassafaronga on the night of 30 November–1 December 1942, the U.S. Navy, at great cost, had thwarted the Japanese navy’s first attempt to resupply Japanese troops on Guadalcanal using the new floating supply-drum method. The Japanese tried again on 3 December, fighting off a 15-plane long-range U.S. air attack from Guadalcanal at dusk and proving that radically maneuvering high-speed destroyers were very difficult targets to hit. The ten destroyers dumped 1,500 drums of supplies just off Guadalcanal, but at dawn, strafing from U.S. aircraft sank most of the drums before Japanese troops could retrieve them. (2)

 

Resupply by submarine was also attempted.

 

The Japanese continued resupply efforts by submarine that had begun the previous month, making three deliveries in the first week of December, before U.S. Navy radio intelligence pinpointed the schedule for the next delivery. In the pre-dawn hours of 9 December, the Japanese submarine I-3 surfaced right between PT-44 and PT-59 waiting in ambush, and was hit and sunk by a torpedo from PT-59 (Lieutenant Jack M. Searles, commanding) which actually worked. Searles was awarded the Navy Cross. The Japanese suspended further submarine supply runs. (2)

 

In addition, resupply was attempted with small landing craft and barges, moving at night.  This gave rise to night battles with US PT boats modified as barge-busting gunboats.

Kinugawa Maru - Beached and Sunk on Guadalcanal Nov 1942

 

Guadalcanal demonstrated that contested resupply is very difficult, bordering on impossible.  The key takeaway from the Guadalcanal example is that almost all of the Japanese resupply efforts were spotted and contested with most efforts failing and this was during a time when sensors were limited to visual range, Mk1 eyeballs in the form of coastwatchers or search/patrol aircraft.  There were no effective radar, IR, satellite, UAV, EO, or other sensors as the Chinese have today.  How we think we’ll be able to resupply the Marine’s bases in the face of modern sensors inside the enemy’s A2/AD zone where the sensor density will be extremely high is a mystery to me and I have yet to hear any Marine address and explain this aspect of the overall concept.

 

  

 

__________________________________

 

As a brief reminder, here are some of the characteristics of the Light Amphibious Warship from the CRS report (1, p.6-7) :

 

 

Light Amphibious Warship Characteristics
Length	200 ft – 400 ft
Displacement	4000 tons
Crew	40
Troop Capacity	75 Marines
Cargo Capacity	4,000 – 8,000 sq.ft.
Unloading	stern or bow ramp
Speed	14-15 kts
Range	3,500 nm
Defensive System	25-30 mm gun

 

 

A seemingly minor but incredibly important feature is the use of open deck storage as the main means of cargo storage.

 

The LAW’s maximum draft of 12 feet is intended to permit the ship to transit shallow waters on its way to and from landing beaches. The Navy prefers that the ship’s cargo space be in the form of open deck storage. (1, p.8)

 

This enlarges the vessel’s radar signature, making it even less stealthy and, therefore, less survivable.

 

 

What about cost?

 

The Navy states that it wants the LAW’s unit procurement cost to be $100 million to $130 million. (1, p.8)

 

Given the Navy’s demonstrated inability to even remotely estimate costs correctly, it is a virtual certainty that the cost will be double or triple what the Navy wants.  That puts the cost in the $200M - $390M range.  At that point, these are no longer cheap, throwaway vessels.  Add in the value of the cargo/troops that might be lost with each vessel and the notion of expendable vessels becomes even less viable.

 

 

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(1)Congressional Research Service, “Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, 23-Nov-2020

 

(2)https://www.sofmag.com/guadalcanal-campaign-battle-of-rennell-island-and-operation/

Ford Minimal Manning

Minimal manning always fails and the Navy always winds up increasing the crew size.  Despite this, the Navy keeps justifying new ship classes based, in part, on reduced manning and anticipated cost savings from the reduced crew size.  Let’s take a look at how this is working out with the USS Ford.

 

Ford was ‘sold’ partly on the basis of significantly reduced crew size and, hence, reduced Operating and Support (O&S) costs compared to legacy carriers.  The table below, adapted from Table 4 in the GAO report (1, p.42), shows the crew size and O&S costs for the Nimitz class, the Ford’s initial estimates upon which the design was ‘sold’, and the Ford’s current levels.  Critically, the Ford’s berthing capacity is 4660.(2)  Thus, Ford is already at or beyond its berthing capacity.

 

 

	Nimitz	Ford - Initial	Ford - Current
Crew Size	5200	4476	4656 – 4758 b
Annual O&S Costs a, $M	490	278	391

 

^a costs adjusted to constant FY2000 dollars

^b from DOT&E annual reports, ref. (2); ship berthing capacity is 4660

 

 

We see that the Navy sold the Ford as requiring 724 fewer crew resulting in a 43% drop in O&S cost.

 

The current reality is a 544 – 442 drop in crew size and a 20% drop in O&S cost.

 

Without a doubt, crew size and O&S costs will continue to increase as an actual deployment approaches, sometime in the next few years, perhaps.  However, the Ford has already reached the limit of its designed berthing capacity of 4660.

 

… the Navy has already increased the size of the planned crew to the maximum allowed by the ship’s design. Nonetheless, additional crewing concerns persist for key systems—including the weapons elevators, advanced arresting gears, the machinery control system, among others—that are not yet well understood and may require additional sailor support to operate and maintain. (1, p.53)

 

The history of the LCS, Zumwalt, LPD-17, and Ford demonstrate, with near 100% certainty, that the Navy’s estimates, whether crew size, O&S costs, or construction costs are always wrong and always significantly underestimated.  Despite this, the Navy keeps pumping out fraudulent estimates (fraudulent, because they know they’re wrong) and Congress keeps lapping them up.

 

Increased crew sizes over and above initial estimates have occurred for other ships and the increases have resulted in increased O&S costs.

 

Similarly, DDG 1000, LCS, and LPD 17 program officials also reported that increasing crew sizes was a major contributor to higher sustainment costs for these programs. (1)

 

The Navy has made a habit of assuming cost savings from unproven practices only to have the practices fail and the supposed savings turn into added costs.  For example,

 

Further, the shipbuilding programs we reviewed made assumptions based on unproven initiatives, in conjunction with reducing crew sizes that ended up having a greater effect on the cost of maintaining ships than initially estimated. For example, for four ship classes—SSN 774, DDG 1000, LPD 17 Flight I, and LCS—the Navy originally planned to use a maintenance initiative called performance-based logistics, which called for the use of contractors to conduct maintenance instead of sailors on board the ships.  … Shipbuilding program officials stated that the Navy has now largely abandoned this approach after attempting to contract for performance-based logistics and discovering that it was much more costly than planned.  (1, p.42-43) [emphasis added]

 

There’s your entire LCS manning and maintenance model … gone.  Wouldn’t you have thought that around day two of the LCS concept, someone would have actually made a few phone calls and priced out the contractor support instead of making a ridiculously optimistic estimate, based on nothing?  But, I digress …

 

One of the crippling aspects of the designed-in minimal manning assumptions is that the berthing capacity is physically limited.  Ford has already reached or exceeded the limit of its berthing capacity with more crew increases sure to come and the LCS long ago exceeded theirs.  I’ve heard reports and complaints from the LCS about doubling up racks and other, less than desirable berthing accommodations but I can’t independently verify them.  If you recall, one of the selling points about the LCS was that it was going to provide ‘luxurious’ accommodations, by comparison to other ships.  Well, that selling point has vanished.  It will be interesting to see what Ford does to squeeze in more berths.

 

The Ford is yet another example of the abject failure of minimal manning (and that’s before we consider damage control and combat casualties) and yet the Navy resolutely continues down that path.

 

 

 

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(1)Government Accountability Office, “Navy Shipbuilding - Increasing Focus on Sustainment Early in the Acquisition Process Could Save Billions”, GAO-20-2, Mar 2020

 

(2)Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), FY2019 Annual Report, Dec 2019, p.123

Mishap Rates

The National Commission on Military Aviation Safety (NCMAS) has published a report analyzing military mishaps for the last decade or so.  For those of you who, like me, have no idea who/what this organization is, it is a commission established by Congress in 2019 to examine the rates and causes of military aviation mishaps.

 

The report identifies the many causes in great detail though they have a tendency, I think, to emphasize funding over other causes.  Funding is an issue, certainly, but is a secondary one.

 

I’m not going to bother listing all the findings of the report.  They’re what you’d expect and you can read the details for yourself, if you’re so inclined.  Instead, I want to pick out a few key aspects and apply my own analysis.

 

The following table from the report shows the combined Class A-C mishap rates for the various services and shows that the Army and Air Force mishap rates from 2007 – 2018 have held steady, on average.  In contrast, the Navy rate increased steadily from 15 in 2007 to 24 in 2018 and the Marine rate increased from 11 in 2007 to 32 in 2018.

 

 

 

My takeaways and analysis for the increased mishap rates for the Navy and Marines:

 

Simulators – As supposed budget constraints (a fraudulent meme, by the way) have been imposed, simulator usage has increased in an attempt to reduce expenditures.  However, as simulator usage has increased, so too have mishaps.  Simulators are simply not a viable substitute for the sheer overwhelming physical sensations of actual flight.  A simulator is a nice way to review emergency procedures but it is not an effective method of learning to fly.  There is a reason why naval aviators qualify on the boat, not on simulators.

 

Monthly Flight Hours – Monthly flight hours have been severely cut back.  Minimum flight hour waivers are now commonplace.

 

Navy aviators said they are not getting 11 hours per month unless they are preparing to deploy. Although the Marine Corps’ goal for CH-53E pilots is 15 flight hours per month, one pilot said, “We too often are in the single digits for flight hours per pilot per month, a dangerously low number of flight hours to be decent at a very difficult trade.” Many Marine Corps aviators said they averaged about five hours per month. (1, p.61)

 

Waivers – There are only two solutions to insufficient flight hours: increase the hours or use waivers.  Which do you think the Navy chooses?

 

With fewer flight hours, pilots risk losing currency. The Commission found evidence that the Services have increased their reliance on waivers to operate despite currency and proficiency shortcomings. (1, p.61)

 

Do you recall the last time a discussion of waivers came up?  That’s right.  It was during the aftermath of the two Burke collisions with cargo ships when it was found that numerous required certifications were being routinely waived.  How did routine waiver use turn out then?

 

What happens when waivers are routinely used?  The report put it quite nicely:

 

The proliferation of waivers represents a new normal and acceptance of degraded standards. The Commission found senior leaders and safety officials unaware to what appears to be an erosion of safety. (1, p.62)

 

Waivers represent failure.  Failure to adhere to standards.  Failure to make the hard choices.  Failure to correct known, on-going problems.  Failure of leadership.  Failure.

 

Pressure – The pressure in the military to make do and always respond in the affirmative is enormous and has been cited in almost every plane and ship incident report.  ‘Gung ho’ makes a great advertising slogan on a recruiting poster but a lousy safety philosophy involving multi-billion dollar ships and multi-hundreds of million dollar aircraft.  Unceasing ‘can do’ inevitably turns on itself and results in mishaps and fatalities as we’re witnessing over and over again, today.

 

The immediate result of ‘can do’ attitudes is the acceptance of shortcuts.  In the report, the Marines were identified as the biggest culprit in maintenance and procedural shortcuts.  It’s hardly surprising then, that the Marines also demonstrated the biggest rise in mishap rate.

 

 

Summary

 

The Navy and Marine mishap rate increases are not a random occurrence.  They are not an Act of God that can’t be controlled.  They are not something that just happens, like catching a cold.  Instead, they are a conscious choice by Navy and Marine leadership to have more mishaps.  Wait, what now?  No way!  No Navy or Marine leader would make a conscious decision to have more mishaps, you say?  Well, you’re wrong.  No decision IS a decision.  The decision to do nothing about the ever-increasing use of waivers IS a decision to have and accept more mishaps.  The decision to do nothing about the use of simulators over actual flight hours IS a decision to have and accept more mishaps.  The decision to do nothing about the increased use of shortcuts and maintenance deficiencies IS a decision to have and accept more mishaps.  Make no mistake.  Navy and Marine leaders have chosen to have and accept more mishaps.

 

 

 

 

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(1)National Commission on Military Aviation Safety, Report to the President and the Congress of the United States, 1-Dec-2020

Army Admits Abject Failure

I know this isn’t a Navy matter but this is too important to ignore.  Here’s a stunning admission of failure from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

 

In addition to reaching something of a stalemate, where the Taliban can’t conquer the U.S.-backed Afghan security forces, and the U.S. can’t bring the Taliban to its knees, Army Gen. Mark Milley said Wednesday during a Brookings Institution event, the U.S. has probably done all it can do.

 

“We believe now that after 20 years, two decades of consistent effort, that we he have achieved a modicum of success,” he said.

 

Since the first boots hit the ground in October 2001, more than 2,400 American troops have died and nearly 21,000 have been injured, along with close to $1 trillion spent on trying to stabilize Afghanistan enough that it won’t again become a training ground for terrorist groups.

 

 

Are you kidding me????  Twenty years of effort and we have achieved a ‘modicum of success’?  And you know he’s spinning that in the best possible way.  The reality is much less rosy than even that marginal claim.

 

2400 deaths

21,000 wounded

$1 trillion

 

A ‘modicum of success’?

 

Let’s consider some of the issues this raises:

 

• Why are we pursuing high tech when we couldn’t even beat a bunch of goat herders with no technology?  How would even more technology produce a better result?  What’s going to happen when we go up against China?
• Is this an example of our misguided focus on technology, networks, and data at the expense of actually killing people in the most efficient manner possible – meaning with the greatest degree of overwhelming firepower?
• Is 20 yrs and a ‘modicum of success’ the standard of success for our professional military leaders?  Shouldn’t heads be rolling by the dozens?
• Why are we continuing to jump into conflicts that have no possible successful outcome?
• Do we have the will to win these types of conflicts or has our military (and, to be fair, our civilian leadership) become so feminized that we no longer have the stomach to do what has to be done to achieve victory? 
• Has avoidance of casualties, both ours and the enemy’s, become so ingrained in our military that we can’t be brutal enough to win?  What will happen when we fight China?
• Why are we entering conflicts without clear victory conditions?

 

 

This reprehensible abomination of a result would be beyond the comprehension of our WWII military leaders.  They would be in total shock over this.  They won a world war in a few years and today we can’t even defeat goat herders in 20 yrs.

 

We’re paying for a standing military that can’t even defeat third world terrorist goat herders.  We spend $700B/year to maintain a military that is, by the admission of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, manifestly incompetent and incapable.  We could have abolished the military, saved all that money, not gotten involved in Afghanistan at all, and wound up in about the same place.  What did our investment in the military get us?

 

We need to either drastically downsize the military or drastically upsize our standards and clean house of all current flag officers and then start demanding actual performance from the next group of leaders.

 

If Gen. Milley had an ounce of integrity he’d fire every flag officer and then resign in disgrace and embarrassment.  That he doesn’t is symptomatic of what’s wrong with our military.  This man disgusts me.

 

 

 

(1)Military Times website, “Military’s top officer says we’ve had a ‘modicum of success’ in Afghanistan”, Meghann Myers, 2-Dec-2020,

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/12/02/militarys-top-officer-says-weve-had-a-modicum-of-success-in-afghanistan/

Unthinkable

Unthinkable. 

 

Untouchable. 

 

Inviolable. 

 

There are some things related to the military that are constants and can never be changed.  As we discuss the various issues, I often see this attitude reflected in comments.  People scoff at certain ideas because they see them as constants, as givens.  This introduces and promotes a degree of rigidity of thought;  an unwillingness to even consider certain ideas.

 

What is a real world example of what I’m talking about? 

 

Over the last few years, I posted that the Marines were moving steadily down the path of becoming light infantry and that they would shed their armor and firepower.  This notion was roundly and soundly dismissed and mocked with statements such as:

 

‘The Marines are never going to drop their tanks.’

 

‘The Marines are never going to reduce or drop artillery.’

 

‘The Marines are never going to abandon amphibious assault.’

 

And yet, all of those unthinkable things have come to pass.  The people who held fast to their inviolable beliefs were wrong.  Completely and totally wrong.  The unthinkable not only happened but it happened with stunning speed.

 

The point of this post is not to mock those who were wrong, the point is to note that the unthinkable can, and does, happen and we have to at least consider the possibility. 

 

With that backdrop, I’d like to consider some unthinkable possibilities for the Navy.  Please note that just because I mention these, it does not mean that I favor them or believe them likely to happen.  In fact, I’m far more likely to be violently opposed to them but they need to be contemplated so that we can watch for their appearance and react appropriately.

 

So, here are some previously unthinkable actions that could come to be:

 

 

Burkes Early Retired and Replaced With Umanned Vessels – I have made this statement many times and the common reply is mocking and scoffing and yet the Navy has stated publicly that Burkes will be replaced, if not on a one for one basis, with unmanned vessels.  I suggest that it is possible that the entire Burke fleet may eventually be replaced with unmanned vessels and far sooner than anyone might think.

 

Carriers Reduced to 9 – The Navy has tried multiple times to early retire one of the carriers only to have Congress stop them.  We only have 9 air wings so you can see where the Navy is planning to go with carrier numbers.

 

Air Wing Size Reduced To Less Than 60 Aircraft – Air wings have dropped from around 90 to the current mid 60’s and the Navy has already stated that when the F-35C joins the fleet, F-35 squadron sizes will be reduced from 12 aircraft to 10.

 

Entire LCS Fleet Retired Early – Would this one really be a surprise?  The Navy has already announced that the first four ships are being early retired and the remainder have no mission.  Given the Navy’s obsession with reducing manning, do you really see them continuing to crew ships that have no mission?

 

Ballistic Missile Submarines Eliminated – The Navy already rationalized a reduction in SSBNs from the current 14 with 24 Trident missiles each, to 12 with 16 Trident missiles each.  Given the enormous cost of construction and operation and the unlikeliness of ever using them, is it really unthinkable that they would be eliminated?  The Navy could build a lot more unmanned ships if they didn’t have to pay to build and operate SSBNs.

 

Amphibious Ships Eliminated – The Marine Corps Commandant has publicly stated that the Marines are out of the assault business and has called for small transports instead of large amphibs.  I suspect the amphibs will be early retired without direct replacement.

 

 

Summary

 

I strongly suspect that most readers would instantly claim that none of the above could happen (with the possible exception of the LCS fleet being retired) and would mock the very notion.  However, all available evidence suggests that some or all of these will happen.  Recall that we’ve seen the Air Force attempt to eliminate the A-10, the most effective close air support aircraft ever built.  Who would have ever thought that?

 

Once you recognize the Navy’s real objectives – to put new hulls in the water and to reduce manning to zero – many of the above possibilities become much more ‘reasonable’ and likely from the Navy’s warped perspective.

 

So, with all that we’ve seen, go ahead and tell me how none of the possibilities I’ve listed could ever happen!  Or, tell me what unthinkable possibility you see.

F-35 On Carriers? Sorry, Can't Use 'Em

When the USS Ford was being built, we all assumed, quite logically, that the ship would be able to operate the F-35 which had been around for twenty years or so, in various stages of development.  The timing was looking about right – the carrier and the F-35C would both be ready about the same time.  Well, in yet another disappointment for the Ford, it turns out that the carrier wasn’t actually built to operate F-35s.  No, this is not an April Fools post or some ComNavOps comedy piece.  This is real.  The Navy’s newest carrier can’t operate the F-35.

 

As it turns out, most of the Navy’s carriers and amphibious ships (LHA/LHD) can’t operate the F-35. 

 

Yes, the F-35C can take off and land on the carriers but the ships lack the communications, data integration, and maintenance facilities to fully utilize the supposed capabilities of the F-35 – those much hyped surveillance capabilities.  Without the proper comms and data handling facilities on the carriers, the F-35 can collect data but can’t effectively relay it to the carrier and allow the carrier to make use of it. 

 

On a related and stunning note, the US Navy has almost no ability to transfer F-35 engines to carriers.  The Ford is the only carrier that has the equipment to receive an engine.  The MV-22 has demonstrated the ability to transport a single engine to a carrier but this can only be done over very short distances.

 

As far as the amphibious ships, none can land the F-35B due to its excessive exhaust heat which damages the flight deck unless it has been specially modified.  You’ll recall that even the new USS America was unable to operate the F-35B, as the ship was built.  It had to be modified with special deck heat treatments, thermal and structural modifications to compartments immediately beneath the flight deck, and relocation of equipment in the path of the F-35B’s downward landing exhaust in addition to numerous communications and data handling facility installations and modifications.  Yes, America, the ship that was purpose built for the F-35B was unable to operate the F-35B without extensive and expensive modifications.

 

In fact, of 11 carriers and 33 amphibious ships, currently only 4 amphibious ships can fully operate the F-35.(1)  The lucky four are listed below.

 

• USS Essex
• USS Makin Island
• USS America
• USS Wasp

 

Even with the modifications, the F-35B can only land on a couple of limited spots.  For the America, the F-35B can only land on spots 7 and 9.(2)

 

It is worth noting that none of the supercarriers can operate the F-35.

 

The USS Bonhomme Richard, LHD-6, which recently suffered a massive fire that burned out of control for several days, would have been the fifth ship altered to operate the F-35.  The Bonhomme Richard is now, officially, being scrapped.

 

So, for those of you who envision air armadas of Navy F-35s sweeping the skies clear of enemy aircraft, that vision is still a long way in the future because we only have four amphibious ships that can even operate the F-35!

 

It is worth noting that the modifications required to operate the F-35 require many months and hundreds of millions of dollars to install (I assume the F-35 proponents are dutifully adding that to the cost of the F-35?).  It is not a capability that can be quickly installed when needed.  It will take decades to bring the current ships up to the standard required to handle the F-35.  If a war were to start today, we’d be limited to four amphibious ships operating our F-35s.

 

What is all this telling us?  What lessons are being demonstrated (and ignored!)?

 

• In our pursuit of technology, we created an aircraft too complex to even communicate with our carriers.
• Concurrency kills.
• Even the modified ships have only a limited F-35 operating capability and, in the event of battle damage, we might lack the ability to operate the aircraft due to damage to the couple of specific landing spots.
• In pursuit of the big, expensive, flashy toys, we’re ignoring the mundane support and infrastructure needed to even fully operate the toys.

 

 

 

Just a reminder … When the F-35C reaches squadron service, the Navy is planning to reduce the squadron size from the current 12 aircraft to 10, further shrinking the already shrunken air wings.  The F-35 is the gift that keeps on giving!

 

 

 

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “USS Bonhomme Richard Heads For Scrapyard After Devastating Fire ”, Paul McLeary, 30-Nov-2020,

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/11/uss-bonhomme-richard-heads-for-scrapyard-after-devastating-fire/

 

(2)Jalopnik website, “Navy Builds Ship For F-35, Ship Needs Months Of Upgrades To Handle F-35”, Tyler Rogoway, 13-Apr-2015,

https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/navy-builds-ship-for-f-35-ship-needs-months-of-upgrade-1697523492

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