Memo From the President On Shipbuilding

The Navy is currently a flaming hot mess.  It’s not even debatable and I won’t bother listing all the problems.  President Trump appears to recognize this to an unknown, but significant, degree and has issued a memo calling for various actions to improve naval shipbuilding capabilities and capacities.
 
The memo is a fascinating blend of solid, beneficial concepts and technical and legal challenges.  It also fails to address, or even mention, the root cause of the Navy’s shipbuilding woes.  Let’s take a closer look.
 
The very first sentence recognizes and states the problem (well, one of the problems) quite forcefully and succinctly.
 

The United States Navy has experienced a series of shipbuilding setbacks stemming from overly complex designs and iterative design change procedures …[1]

In plainer terms, it states that the Navy’s ship acquisition process is a steaming pile of crap and, very importantly,  identifies at least a couple of the major contributing factors.  Excellent!
 
It goes on to say,
 

The Department of War shall restore both capacity and competition to the maritime industrial base ,,,[1]

That’s nice but it’s like calling for world peace – a noble goal but pointless without specific, effective actions and none are listed.  Miss America calls for world peace every year but I’m pretty sure it’s still a problem.
 
We then see a vague recognition of part of the problem.
 

It will use proven, reliable, and affordable technologies and ship designs …[1]

This is saying that the days of trying to incorporate non-existent, leap ahead technologies are over.  That’s a great sentiment which I heartily endorse.  Now, ruthlessly enforce it.  However, there is also a potential pitfall here.  If we never incorporate new technology, we’ll never advance.  There needs to be a corresponding directive to make use of one-off prototypes specifically to evaluate and develop new technologies.
 
Now, here’s a stunner.
 

Within 60 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of War, in consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, shall provide to the President, … a plan on the required measures to replace the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and Advanced Weapons Elevators with steam and hydraulic systems for the construction of CVN-81 ...[1]

This has long been one of the President’s pet peeves and he appears to be trying to act on it.  I fully support this but the inertia and incompetence in Navy leadership is not going to take this lying down.  This will be vigorously opposed .  Unless the President has the complete agreement and backing of SecNav and CNO, this will not happen.  A great way to get such agreement and backing is to start firing people until people can be found who are on board with the President.
 
The memo repeatedly calls for foreign involvement in the shipbuilding process, both directly and indirectly.  This is a concept that has some appeal, under certain, limited circumstances, but has a great deal of potential to run afoul of legislative roadblocks.  Beyond that, what the President is calling for has been attempted and resulted in the spectacular failures of the LCS and Constellation.  Repeating a set of actions and expecting a different outcome is the definition of insanity.  This needs to be very carefully thought out and managed and the Navy has emphatically demonstrated they have no such management capability.  Wholesale firings of the existing flag ranks would go a long way to solving this.
 
Another major problem is addressed.
 

The Navy shall not impose iterative design changes upon the original mature parent designs within the above programs implemented pursuant to the plans developed under subsections (a) through (b) of this section. No changes from parent designs shall be made without the approval of the Secretary of War ,,,[1]

This is recognizing the destructive impact of the Navy’s never-ending change orders.  Again, though, the embedded inertia of incompetent leadership will make this nearly impossible to enforce.  Remember , the Constellation was going to a parent design with only minor changes and, yet, before it was cancelled, almost all commonality with the parent design had vanished.  I enthusiastically support this but it will require ruthless enforcement.  My suggestion is that any program manager who proposes a change order be summarily fired.
 
Here’s one of the major challenges that we mentioned above.
 

… for purposes of waiving the general prohibition on Armed Forces shipbuilding in foreign shipyards.[1]

The President is going to find that getting Congress to go along with any attempt to utilize foreign shipyards is going to be poorly received and strongly opposed.  There are also practical concerns with technological security.  Still, under certain circumstances this could be beneficial.  I’d prefer to build up our own shipbuilding capacity rather than rely on foreign involvement.
 
The memo calls for establishing a new public shipyard for maintenance and support.  Challenging but outstanding!
 
Here’s another good idea.
 

… establish a Component Repair Center to receive new and refurbish old components and parts as required by the submarine repair industrial base.[1]

Outstanding!
 
And finally, a major, major action calling for a gutting and rework of NAVSEA.
 

Reforming Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). Within 120 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of War, in consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, shall submit to the President, through the Director of OMB and the APNSA, a review of NAVSEA, including recommendations for implementing personnel, organizational, and structural reforms. The objective of these reforms should be to: introduce results‑based accountability for NAVSEA leadership, determined by speed of delivery of vessels and systems; reduce bureaucracy and red tape; eliminate competing priorities among different NAVSEA components, which often result in delayed, cost-prohibitive, or overly complex vessels and systems; and prevent NAVSEA from imposing redesigns or iterative design changes upon original mature parent designs.[1]

This is saying what ComNavOps has been saying for some time – that NAVSEA is a failed organization of total incompetents.  Outstanding, outstanding, outstanding!
 
 
Discussion
 
This memo has lots of good stuff in it and the Navy would be far better off if they can be implemented.  The reality, however, is that any changes will be actively opposed and unless SecDef and SecNav are willing to engage in wholesale firings, most it will never occur. 
 
I’m also dismayed that SecDef Hegseth did not implement all of this on day one of his tenure.  This reinforces my belief that he is a failure, perhaps not as bad as some but certainly a major disappointment.  One could read this memo as a criticism by the President of Hegseth and interpret it as Hegseth failing to the point that the President felt he had to step in and take over.
 
The aspect of all this that the memo failed to address is that the root cause of the Navy’s failures is irredeemably incompetent leadership from the flag officers.  That is what the memo should have led with and the solution is easy – fire them all.  Since Hegseth refuses to engage in wholesale housecleaning, the actions called for in the memo will be vigorously opposed and Trump and Hegseth will have only themselves to blame for their disappointment when this fails to materialize.
 
Let’s hope for the best but the sad reality is that most of this is a fantasy because they won’t take the necessary first step of mass firings.
 
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Presidential Memo: Rebuilding the United States Navy and America’s Shipbuilding Industrial Base”, staff, 13-Aug-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/08/13/presidential-memo-rebuilding-the-united-states-navy-and-americas-shipbuilding-industrial-base

Don’t Say Nothin’ At All

We were all taught the old saying,

 

“If you can’t say something nice about someone, don’t say anything at all.”

 

Well, given the military’s abysmal record when it comes to acquisition programs, program management, weapon performance, and audits, the Department of Defense has taken that age old saying to heart but modified it to,

 

“If someone can’t say something nice about us, we won’t let them say anything at all.”

 

To that end, the Defense Department has now restricted DOT&E reports, the only source of unbiased testing and reporting due to the endless series of negative findings, year after year.

 

The Department of War restricted public access to 25 years of unclassified weapons testing reports on July 30, moving them to a secure network reserved for personnel with military-issued access credentials.[1]

 

The reports, issued annually by the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), have detailed unclassified effectiveness and maintenance shortcomings in major weapons programs … [1]

Unsatisfied with merely restricting access to the reports, SecDef Hegseth has moved to hugely reduce the DOT&E capabilities and responsibilities.

 

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has cut the test office's staffing to 30 employees from 126 and removed 90 programs from its oversight list this year, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).[1]

 

There is one problem with this and that is that the military’s move appears to be illegal.[2]

 

Williams [Greg Williams, defense policy director with the Project on Government Oversight ] said the 1983 law creating the test office required unclassified annual reports, and a 2011 law directs that such reports be posted online for public access.[1]

 

DOT&E’s own website confirms this [2] and the exact wording of the relevant law appears in the references below.[2]

 

 

Discussion

 

DOT&E has been the only organization forcing the military to test weapon systems and inform the public about the results in an unclassified report.  Without the efforts of DOT&E, the military would skip even more testing than they already do.  For example, the Navy attempted to indefinitely defer shock testing of the USS Ford.  DOT&E worked through Congress to pressure the Navy into performing the tests.

 

The annual DOT&E reports have been the only publicly available source of honest weapon system test result reports for the taxpayer to understand how effectively their money was being spent.

 

DOT&E’s downfall began with the retirement of Dir. Gilmore, who ComNavOps considers one of, if not the, most important and influential men in the military field in the last fifty plus years.  When he left, DOT&E’s new director began watering down the reports into uninformative, pointless pap.  Now, even that is being restricted and unavailable to the public. 

 

DOT&E no longer serves any useful purpose.

 

The military has been embarrassed and humiliated time and again by their own failures and they have finally found a way to prevent that.

 

“If someone can’t say something nice about us, we won’t let them say anything at all.”

 

 

 

_______________________________

 

[1]Newsmax website, “Pentagon Restricts Access to Weapons Test Reports”, Jim Mishler, 5-Aug-2026,

https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/war-department-weapons-reports-restrict/2026/08/05/id/1265159/

 

[2]https://www.dote.osd.mil/

From the DOT&E website,

 

In 1983, Congress established the position of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The Director, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, is the principal official and adviser to the Secretary of War on all DoW matters related to operational (OT&E) and live fire test and evaluation (LFT&E) of DoW systems and services acquired via the Warfighting Acquisition System.

 

Pursuant to Sections 139, 4171, 4172, and 4231 of Title 10, U.S.C., Section 223 of Public Law 117-81, DoDD 5141.02, and DoDI 5000.98, the DOT&E:

• Develops and updates policies and guidance for OT&E and LFT&E.
• Designates select DoW programs for OT&E and LFT&E oversight and publishes and manages the T&E Oversight List.
• Oversees, reviews, and independently reports on all OT&E and LFT&E activities and resources for programs on the T&E Oversight List.
• Assesses the adequacy of and approves OT&E and LFT&E strategies and plans in support of all acquisition decisions. This includes the alternative LFT&E strategies required in support of waivers from full-up system-level (FUSL) testing.
• Approves the adequacy of the multi-domain operational environment, threats, and targets used in LFT&E and OT&E.
• Observes OT&E and LFT&E to evaluate compliance with approved strategies and plans.
• Conducts an independent analysis of test data from across the acquisition life cycle and M&S results and in support of acquisition decisions; submits, as applicable, reports on the adequacy of LFT&E and OT&E and evaluations of operational effectiveness, suitability, survivability, and lethality to the: OSW, Joint Staff, DoW Components, and Congressional defense committees.
• Submits a publicly releasable Annual Report to Congress summarizing key OT&E and LFT&E activities planned, executed, or reported on within the fiscal year, and related challenges.
• In coordination with the DoW Component heads, defines strategic initiatives needed to update policy and meet future OT&E and LFT&E requirements.

 

Following is an exact recording of the relevant law:

 

10 U.S. Code § 139, Section (h)

 

(1)The Director shall prepare an annual report summarizing the operational test and evaluation activities (including live fire testing activities) of the Department of Defense during the preceding fiscal year.

(2)Each such report shall be submitted concurrently to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Secretaries of the military departments, and the Congress not later than January 31 of each year.

(3)If the Director submits the report to Congress in a classified or controlled unclassified form, the Director shall concurrently submit to Congress a version of the report that is unclassified and does not require safeguarding or dissemination controls.

Failure on a Grand Scale

The Navy has announced the retirement of VAdm. Jim Downey.  Consider this excerpt, reported by USNI News website.
 

The dual-hatted Naval Sea Systems Command [ed. 2023-present] and Portfolio Acquisition Executive Industrial Operations Vice Adm. Jim Downey retired last week, the Navy announced.
 
Downey commissioned into the Navy in 1987 after graduating from the State University of New York. He’s a career surface warfare officer and prior to Naval Sea Systems Command, he served as the PEO Aircraft Carriers [ed. 2019-2023] led the Navy Regional Maintenance Center [ed. 2016-2019] and was the program manager for the Zumwalt guided-missile destroyer program.[1][emphasis added]

Can you think of any bigger failures than the pathetic performance of NavSea, the Navy’s toxic relations with industry, the sad state of our carriers and the abortion that is the Ford class, the Navy’s horrific maintenance performance, or the abysmal failure that is the Zumwalt program?
 
Downey not only failed spectacularly but was spectacularly rewarded for doing so with one prominent position after another!
 
What’s wrong with the Navy?  Well, this man and his career would be the poster child for it.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “NAVSEA Commander Downey Retires, 2 Admirals Take Over Roles in Interim”, Sam LaGrone, 10-Aug-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/08/10/navsea-commander-downey-retires-2-admirals-take-over-roles-in-interim

Who Needs a Navy When You’ve Got a P-8 Poseidon?

The Navy (and the US military) have received yet another miracle of technology from industry.  Boeing and Northrop Grumman have now simulated (they didn’t actually do anything but simulation is good enough – reality is never an issue) teaming between a manned P-8A Poseidon and unmanned MQ-4C Triton.[1]
 

Boeing and Northrop Grumman successfully simulated teaming between a manned P-8A Poseidon and unmanned MQ-4C Triton … [1]
 
The P-8A cued the Triton transit to a specific area. After receiving the request, the Triton autonomously planned and executed a transit to the area, employed sensors per the tasking, processed findings onboard, and reported results back to the P-8A Poseidon.[1]

So, the unmanned Triton flew to a waypoint and sent telemetry back?  Truly, the stuff of miracle and legend.  I’ve never even heard of “waypoints” … well, except for back in the 1970’s when that was just a routine capability … but to do that in a simulation instead of for real like we’ve done for decades is just a stunning achievement.  How do they come up with this stuff?
 
What does this miraculous development mean for the US?
 

Jane Bishop, vice president and general manager, global surveillance division, Northrop Grumman: “MQ-4C Triton and P-8A are the backbone of the U.S. Navy’s maritime patrol and reconnaissance force, delivering complementary capabilities unmatched by any other platforms. … Our commitment to pushing the boundaries of advanced technology ensures that the U.S. and allied nations operators maintain an unparalleled edge against evolving maritime threats.”[1]

“Unparalleled edge” !!!!  No other country in the world has the ability to fly waypoints and transmit data.  We are light years more advanced than anyone else.
 
This highlights the wonders of the P-8 Poseidon. 

The P-8A Poseidon is the world’s most advanced multi-mission maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft that provides anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and search and rescue mission capabilities.[1]

So, …
 

• ASW
• ASuW
• ISR
• S&R

 

Why do we even need a Navy?  Half a dozen P-8s should suffice to win any war.

 
 

____________________________________

Just out of idle curiosity, is anyone getting tired of these constant announcements about miraculous technologies that have actually existed for decades?  To paraphrase:  Those that can, do. Those that can’t take old technologies and pretend they’re new.
 
I wonder how much we paid to simulate waypoints and data transmission?

____________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Boeing and Northrop Grumman Successfully Simulate P-8A Poseidon and MQ-4C Triton Teaming”, Staff, 6-Aug-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/08/boeing-and-northrop-grumman-successfully-simulate-p-8a-poseidon-and-mq-4c-triton-teaming/

F-35 Congressional Testimony

The following is testimony provided June 23, 2026, on the F-35 aircraft program presented to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Airland.  Testimony provided by U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Gregory Masiello, Program Executive Officer F-35 Lightning II Joint Program Office.[1]
 
Here are some illuminating quotes from the transcript.[1]
 
As you know, the readiness rates are abysmal.  Here’s a major reason why.
 

Gen. Masiello:  In this session, I think I can say one of our challenges, and you talked about it, is if I have over 1,300 operational aircraft out there.  I believe we have set and enabled a sustainment system for about 700 to 800.  So, there is our challenge in readiness. [p.10]

So, the military has sized the sustainment effort for only half the existing aircraft?????!  How are people not being fired on a daily basis?
 
As a result of the sustainment issues, readiness is in the toilet and the toilet is at the bottom of a deep pit.  Rather than acknowledge the problem, firing people, and then fixing the problem, the military is still engaged in accounting games trying to make it look less bad than it is.
 

Senator Kelly: Thank you.  So, the GAO [ed. Government Accountability Office]  FMC [ed. Full Mission Capable] rate is they said 25 percent.· Your office claims it's 56 percent. [p.18]

It’s 25% and even that is overestimated!
 
As a reminder, there are two sets of mission capable measurements:
 

• Mission Capable (MC) – The aircraft can perform at least one task.  Basically, this means the aircraft can get off the ground.
• Full Mission Capable (FMC) – The aircraft can perform any of its combat mission tasks.  This is what every aircraft should be.

 
One of the problems is low expectations.
 

Gen. Masiello:  We have a North Star for 80 percent MC across the entirety of the fleet, and we need to figure out how to do that. [p.11]

So, general, you’ve set a pathetically low MC standard (only 80% are even rated to be able to get off the ground) that you can’t meet and have no idea how to even achieve that low standard.  Wow.  How are people not being fired on a daily basis?
 

That's about as ready as it gets.

Sadly, these kinds of problems are not unique to the F-35 program.  For example, the Navy is building carriers and ballistic submarines without the dry dock capacity to support their maintenance.
 
Where is SecDef Hegseth?  How can he read this kind of testimony and not fire everyone connected to the program?  Hegseth has been a major disappointment and his lack of action is why this kind of problem persists across the military.

To be fair, how can Congress hear this and not fire people?
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Testimony on the F-35 Aircraft Program”, staff, 1-Jul-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/07/01/testimony-on-the-f-35-aircraft-program

Iran War Status

Time for a quick Iran war status update.
 
As we’ve discussed many times on this blog, what are the requirements to actually win a war?
 

• Clear Objective and End State – This is mandatory before the first shot is fired.  If you don’t have a crystal clear objective/end state then you are guaranteed to fail.
• Total Commitment – In it to win it or don’t get in it.  Half measures have never won a war and lead, inevitably, to failure.
• Centers of Gravity – You can’t formulate an effective political or military strategy if you don’t correctly identify the enemy’s center(s) of gravity, meaning the “things” that are absolutely vital to the enemy and represent both the enemy’s strengths and vulnerabilities.  Every center of gravity is simultaneously a strength and, because it can be destroyed, a vulnerability.

With those basic requirements in mind, let’s check the status of the Iran war.
 
 
Objectives and End State
 
Although there has never been a formal, public listing of our objectives, certain objectives have clearly emerged.  They are:
 

• Decapitate Iranian leadership, meaning, kill the mullahs.  This has been achieved.  The leadership role has passed to (or been taken by) the Iranian military (IRGC).  We clearly failed to anticipate that this would happen.
• Destroy Iran’s nuclear capability forever.  This appears to have been totally or largely achieved based on the few public reports we have.
• Eliminate Iran’s ability to strike neighboring countries.  This has not been achieved although Iran’s strike capabilities have been severely degraded.  They are no longer capable of launching hundreds of missiles and are now reduced to a few launches at a time.
• Eliminate Iran as a functioning, rogue nation.  This has been partially achieved as Iran’s Navy has been destroyed, missile production has been severely degraded, missile stockpiles have been significantly reduced, Iran’s air force is non-existent, and Iran’s financial wherewithal has been crippled, all of which significantly reduce, but have not eliminated, Iran’s ability to export terrorism.

 
Total Commitment
 
At the start of hostilities, it seemed that the US was fully committed to the listed objectives.  Certainly, we were using significant portions of our military might.  However, after a few weeks, the force commitment declined sharply and became sporadic demonstrating that we were not fully committed.  A plausible, alternate explanation is that our weapon stockpiles have been reduced to levels that preclude additional, significant expenditures while maintaining an “adequate” reserve for dealing with China.
 
 
Centers of Gravity
 
Iran has a few readily apparent centers of gravity that should have been prioritized in any war.
 
Leadership – Iran was run by the dictatorial mullahs, as opposed to the people, and that group determined the country’s goals and objectives.  Eliminating them was vital.  This was achieved but the assumption of power by the IRGC was not anticipated and an adjustment should have been made when it became apparent what was happening.  For unknown reasons, the US has declined to go after the IRGC leadership in any significant manner.
 
Nuclear – Iran’s main world wide bargaining power stemmed from its nuclear threat.  Without a doubt, this had to be eliminated.  Without a nuclear threat, Iran is a severe nuisance but not an existential threat to anyone.  This was the true source of Iran’s geopolitical power.  It has been largely or totally eliminated.
 
Strait of Hormuz – Along with its nuclear threat, control of the strait was another source of geopolitical power for Iran and the importance of control of the strait was painfully obvious to all.  The US failure to quickly and thoroughly establish control is inexplicable and the continued failure to establish control is even more baffling.
 
Finance – Though of a somewhat lesser degree, Iran’s financial resources represented a source of power and great vulnerability.  The US has imposed sanctions and degraded Iran’s financial resources and access to an extent but has stopped well short of total financial war.  Much more could be done, as evidenced by the periodic announcement of additional sanctions.  Obviously, if additional sanctions can be imposed then that means that financial combat options were left unused which is inexplicable.
 
Financial combat is one of the overlooked “domains” of modern regional war.  It can be devastating and the US has the ability to pretty much totally isolate and “starve” Iran financially but, for inexplicable reasons, has opted not to do so.
 
 
Discussion
 
We see, then, that the US has recognized a couple of Iran’s centers of gravity while missing/ignoring or only partially acting on a couple others.  This points back to the war requirement of total commitment.  It is clear that the US is not completely invested in winning this war and, thus, has worked itself into a stalemate despite achieving some goals and inflicting a great deal of damage.  Unless the situation changes drastically, the cost of this war will continue to rise while the gains stagnate.  This is what happens when you enter a war without total commitment and a clear vision of the desired end state.  To be fair, I suspect that the Administration did have a clear vision of the end state but it did not match reality and now we are floundering.  We have overwhelming strength but no clear idea how to best use it.
 
As I have posted in the past, failure to pursue a war to total victory inevitably leads to having to refight the war down the road.  Disappointingly, it seems we are firmly on that path.
 
 
Note:  This is purely a military assessment and we will not be discussing the political aspects and I will not tolerate personal attacks on President Trump.  Discuss his military policies, if you wish, but refrain from personal attacks.  You are warned.
 

Light Amphibious Warship / Landing Ship Medium Update

As you know, the key to the Marines idiotic missile sniping (and ASW!) concept is the Light Amphibious Warship, now being called a Landing Ship Medium (some admiral-wannabe probably got another star for that reclassification!) in the latest churn which attempts to look like progress.  The LAW/LSM is already a few years late as the Marines have already stood up their littoral regiments (they haven’t explained how they’ll transport those Marines since the LAW/LSM does not yet exist).
 
The Navy has seemed reluctant to embrace the Marine’s concept and has slow-walked the LAW/LSM program, as noted in the GAO annual report.[1]
 

… after years of delays and affordability concerns, the Navy shifted to a two-block acquisition strategy in December 2024 that reduces requirements for the ships in the first block and defers pursuit of a ship that will fully meet requirements to a later block.[1]

So, the Navy is going to purchase ships that they know will not meet the requirements?  Do you know what a ship that can’t meet the requirements is called?  That’s right, it’s a reef, paperweight, target drone, LCS, embarrassment .
 
Is the Navy at least moving quickly on the Block 2 version that fully meets the requirements?
 

… program officials said they have yet to start planning the details of the transition to the second block, such as the timing of the transition or the requirements of the next block.[1]

They haven’t even defined the requirements, yet? 
 
I can’t see anything going wrong with this program.
 
 
 
___________________________________

 
[1]Government Accountability Office, "Weapon Systems Annual Assessment", Jul 2026, p.144