Monday, November 4, 2024

Philippines Strategy

You’ve probably noticed that several of ComNavOps’ fictional stories revolve around the Philippines.  This is not by random chance.  The strategic value of the Philippines cannot be overstated.  The country, along with Taiwan, forms two gigantic ‘forts’ that China must deal with in any war.
 
From China’s perspective, those two countries act as forward enemy bases that dominate the surrounding seas and impact any operations the Chinese would attempt.  Their removal from the strategic equations is imperative.  Ideally, China would turn the tables by seizing both countries and using them as forts against any American response.
 
Taiwan’s seizure (or ‘reunification’ as the Chinese would euphemistically put it) is absolutely mandatory for both strategic and cultural reasons.  Wisely or foolishly, China’s leadership has linked themselves to the seizure of Taiwan as a national and cultural imperative.  For those reasons, Taiwan will be the first operation in any war.
 
The Philippines present a somewhat different situation for China.  The Philippines cannot be allowed to become a US forward base but it is not necessarily a requirement that the country be physically seized and occupied.  Forcing Philippines to declare neutrality is almost as good as seizing it.  A declaration of neutrality would eliminate Philippines as a forward base for the US and would have the added benefit of not tying up any Chinese forces in an occupation. 
 
Ideally, of course, China would like the Philippines to enter a war as an ally of China, thereby allowing China to use it as a base without the difficulties of an invasion and occupation.
 
By far, the most likely course of action is that Philippines would declare neutrality rather than place themselves as a target between the US and China.
 
Neutrality, however, will not prevent China, which cares nothing for international laws, from occupying areas of the Philippines that it finds advantageous in its war efforts against the US.  This, of course, leaves Philippines in a bit of a no-win situation.
 
All of this is fairly obvious so where is this going?  Let’s consider scenarios in which the US has access to the use of the Philippines, either because the Philippines enters the war as an ally of the US or because Philippines declares neutrality and China ignores that and attempts to seize or operate from the country, thereby negating Philippines’ neutrality. 
 
In this case, the US would attempt to set up bases and, perhaps more importantly, surveillance assets (radar, elevated optical sensors, etc.).   Obviously, China is not going to sit back and allow that to occur without hindrance. This raises the scenario of the US having to fight to establish and operate a base – something that we haven’t had to do since Guadalcanal.  Do we have the capability to seize suitable land, set up a base while under fire, and defend that base well enough to keep it operational?
 
The answer is no and certainly not with the equipment, units, and training we have currently.  This strongly suggests that we should be developing – quickly! – the capability to seize, set up, and defend a major base.  I’ve often suggested that the Marine’s core mission should be port seizure and this type of operation would be a logical extension of that.  Note that the Army does have existing units dedicated to the seizure of existing airbases.
 
Seizure of land for a not yet existing base could range from ‘walk in unopposed’ to a full fledged, contested, amphibious assault depending on how extensively the Chinese manage to get established.  As we’ve thoroughly discussed, our ability to conduct an opposed landing is extremely limited as we lack naval gun support, sufficient ship-to-shore connectors to allow for attrition, armor, logistic support, sea bases (if we don’t seize a port), mines to protect our sea flanks, and mobile anti-air defenses to protect forces ashore.  In addition, our ability to establish local air superiority is highly suspect and would be largely limited to the understrength air wings of our carriers which would be hard pressed to conduct simultaneous air-to-air and ground support operations with just thirty or so combat aircraft per air wing.
 
 
As we contemplate seizing land and establishing a base, consider these questions:
 
  • Do we have the ability to transport and very quickly (instantly!) set up anti-cruise and anti-ballistic missile defenses to protect a base?
  • Do we have ground forces who have been trained for base defense?
  • Can we transport armor to the Philippines for base defense.  Yes, we’ll certainly be facing Chinese armored forces.
  • Do we have sufficient numbers of C-RAM (counter rocket, artillery, and mortar) weapons to defend a base against constant, high volume attacks?
  • Do we have sufficient portable, mobile sensors to establish effective surveillance and early warning systems?
  • Are we doctrinally willing, and trained, to move our Aegis ships in close to land to provide anti-air protection for the ground forces until they can establish their own defenses?
  • Are we capable of quickly constructing hardened and/or underground hangars and fuel/weapons storage?
  • Do we sufficient airbase repair equipment that can be transported to the site?
  • Do we have sufficient engineering units to build a base under fire, continuously repair it, and keep it operational under fire?
  • Can we operate modern, finicky aircraft under primitive conditions with few spare parts, computers, and no modern state of the art repair facilities?  That’s what a forward, contested base would be, after all.  Our abysmal aircraft readiness rates during peacetime suggest that this, alone, almost rules out establishing an airbase in the Philippines.  If you can’t keep aircraft operational, there’s little point having an airbase.  If you recall, we were only able to sporadically operate F4F Wildcats from Guadalcanal and they were robust, easy to maintain aircraft by comparison, requiring only a wrench and duct tape to repair!
 
This kind of thought exercise is exactly what the US military should be doing all day, every day and yet we’re not.  Not even a little bit.  Instead we’re engaged in all manner of social programs, diversity, gender issues, environmental issues, climate concerns, etc.
 
We must start planning for the China war.  If the war never comes, that’s fine but failure to plan for it is dereliction of duty at its most extreme.

Wednesday, October 30, 2024

Blast from the Past

In the sidebar ‘Blast from the Past’ you'll see a post from July 2012 which discusses the relative merits of new construction versus upgrades.  The post also calls for a moratorium on new construction!  What?!  Stop new construction?  Wouldn't that be a disaster?  Find out.

Enjoy!

Monday, October 28, 2024

What’s a Navy To Do?

In the Ukraine-Russia war, the Russian navy has been rendered nearly irrelevant through a combination of factors, not the least of which is their sheer incompetence which has allowed Ukraine to dominate the seas.  However, there is another, larger factor at play, here, and that is that the Russian navy has no useful role ... or at least none that they’re capable of executing.
 
Consider the traditional roles of a navy in a war and how they relate to Russia.
 
Blockade/Interdict Shipping – There is no shipping moving to or from Ukraine with the exception of the so-called ‘grain corridor’ which operates under an agreement between Russia and Ukraine.
 
Destroy the Enemy’s Navy – Ukraine has no navy.
 
Conduct Land Strikes – The Russian navy has almost no land strike capability.  Early in the conflict, Russia did attempt some small degree of land strike during the attempt to seize Snake Island, however, Russia did not follow that up with any serious attempt to seize and hold the island.
 
Amphibious Assaults – Aside from the short lived attempt to seize Snake Island, the Russians have not attempted any amphibious assault because they largely control all the land that borders the sea.  The one exception is the 70-some mile strip of land centered around Odesa.  This would seem to be a candidate for assault except that Russia lacks both the amphibious transport and sufficient available land forces for such an attempt.
 
Logistics – Russia’s logistics are largely satisfied by overland supply routes.  Some degree of maritime resupply has been conducted via the ‘backdoor’ of Crimea.
 
Aerial Supremacy – Carrier based air power is capable of establishing localized aerial supremacy and supporting land operations.  Of course, the Russians possess no carriers so this is a moot consideration.
 
 
Discussion
 
Consideration of the above naval roles makes it obvious that there is little significant role for the Russian navy or, at least, little significant role that the Russian naval force structure is capable of successfully executing.
 
The inescapable conclusion is that Russia built an incorrect naval force structure.  The Russian navy lacks land strike, anti-air , amphibious assault capability, broad area maritime surveillance, and effective small boat / USV defensive capability.
 
Putin didn’t wake up one morning and suddenly say, “Let’s invade Ukraine today”.  The Russian navy knew this was coming for quite some time, dating back at least to the 2014 Crimea annexation and, obviously, that didn’t happen spontaneously.  It had to be in the planning stage for years.  So, the Russian navy had ten to twenty years advance notice and yet they failed to plan for the war with Ukraine or, if they did attempt to tailor the navy to the planned war, they badly failed to anticipate the form of the war.
 
The Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that the Russian ship designs have been found incapable of conducting effective surveillance or self-defense.  Indeed, various Russian ships have been pulled out of the war zone and production of some classes has been halted as the Russian navy has come to recognize that their ships are inappropriately designed and fitted.
 
 
Conclusion/Warning

Considering all of the above, it’s apparent that the Russian hasn’t been defeated as much as they simply have no relevant, vital role.  The proof of this is the fact that, having ‘defeated’ the Russian navy, Ukraine is in no better position, overall.  This is a land war, pure and simple.  Lacking a role, the navy has, wisely, pulled back to a relatively safe distance to preserve their forces.
 
What this tells us is that you had better know your enemy and your own strategy against that enemy as you build your force structure.  Failure to do so will guarantee that you have an inappropriate and ineffective naval force.  We need to keep this lesson firmly in mind as we build toward the inevitable war with China.  Currently, we have substituted technology for strategy and, as a result, have produced ships with no useful purpose in a China war (Zumwalt, LCS, AFSB, MLP, every amphibious ship, etc.).

Thursday, October 24, 2024

PT Gunboat Reaction

Wow!  I mean … wow!  The almost universal reaction to the last post on a PT gunboat was to hugely upgrade it by doubling the size and adding large guns (up to 76 mm), anti-ship missiles, radar fire control, UAV aviation, mines, etc.  No one was content to let the gunboat be a simple, small gunboat with the missions listed in the post.
 
Speaking of missions, no one really objected to the mission list nor did they amend the list to account for their proposed changes in weaponry and sensors.  Instead, they instantly jumped to more and bigger hulls and weapons.
 
Does this sound familiar?  It should.  It’s exactly how the Navy designs ships.  They start with a potentially focused, common sense idea and then instantly double the size, add every thing  and every function they can think of, and gold plate the entire design.
 
Don’t get me wrong, I have nothing against discussing a large patrol ship (corvette) which is what almost everyone was describing (even the ‘you should look at xxxx’ references were, invariably much larger vessels), however, none of the proposed ships retained any real relationship to the original PT gunboat subject of the post.
 
Don’t understand why the Navy designs are always so bad?  This is why.  We did it, ourselves!
 
Re-read the post and then the comments and note the instant upsizing.  Not a single person stuck with the scope and missions of the PT gunboat.  Hey, maybe you didn’t like the gunboat idea.  That’s fine but to start designing a vastly increased substitute without modifying the mission list and CONOPS is exactly how the Navy gets it wrong.
 
This was an eye opener!  I honestly didn’t expect that.  I guess I have more work to do to hammer home the proper design principles.

Tuesday, October 22, 2024

PT Gunboat

As we have previously discussed, the gunboat version of the WWII PT boat was the most effective form of the PT Boat (“PTboat”) and, along with its surveillance (ISR) duties, were the most useful functions.  Interestingly, we have modern PT boat equivalents in the Mk VI and, in a larger form, the Cyclone class, although both are being eliminated from service.  There have been other small boats, as well, in recent decades.  The Navy, although it has toyed with small boats from time to time, has rejected all attempts at establishing a persistent small boat naval component within the fleet.
 
Pivoting our thinking away from the ship-sinking role for the PT-ish boat (we’ll use the term ‘PT boat’ in a generic sense for the rest of the article) and keeping in mind that the most effective use was as barge-busting gunboats and ISR, we could easily imagine a very useful PT boat component in the Navy, today.  For example, we could flood the Persian Gulf with PT boats to monitor and eliminate Iran’s maritime harassment, ship seizures, and ship mining.  Of course, that would require us to have the will to use force, as necessary, otherwise there would be no point.
 
 
Weapons
 
Consider the impressive density and types of weapons on PT gunboats.  As an example, listed below is the weapons fit on PT-596 later in the war:
 
PT 596
  • 4x torpedo
  • 1x M4 37 mm autocannon
  • 2x Mk50 5” Rocket Launcher
  • 2x Twin .50 cal MG
  • 1x 20 mm single
  • 1x 40 mm single
 
In addition, many PT boats added various types of weapons as desired and as availability allowed.  Such ad hoc weapons included the 37 mm anti-tank gun, depth charges, mounted bazooka, .30 cal MG, 40 mm dual, 20 mm dual, 81 mm mortar, and so forth.
 
All that weaponry was packed on an 80 ft boat!  We struggle, today, to mount one CIWS on a 500+ ft Burke.
 
Now, consider modern equivalent PT boat weapons on a small boat.  With such a boat, what kinds of missions could we effectively perform?
 
 
Missions
 
Here’s a partial list of missions that could be performed by a modern PT gunboat:
 
  • Persian Gulf anti-Iranian maritime harassment
  • Philippines anti-Chinese patrol
  • Fishery anti-Chinese incursion patrol
  • Africa and South America riverine patrol and raid
  • Anti-terrorism
 
Note:  None of the above missions are major war missions.  The PT boat is simply not suited for major combat, today.  It would, however, offer benefits in the pseudo-peacetime role as long as we’re willing to use them forcefully, when necessary.
 
It’s also noteworthy that the missions we’ve discussed generally occur at a useful level, meaning at the source of problems rather than at the high end, geopolitical level where we wind up having Burkes standing by watching bad actors instead of taking action because we’re too afraid of escalation or international hurt feelings.
 
One argument against a modern PT boat is that they’re rendered ineffective by the whole ‘don’t fire until fired upon’ philosophy that so many people believe is some kind of ironclad, mandatory requirement that prevents us from using force.  This, however, is complete bilgewater.  There is nothing in the law or the UCMJ (Uniform Code of Military Justice) that prohibits US forces from firing first if they feel sufficiently threatened.  That a prohibition against firing first appears in some Rules of Engagement is a purely self-imposed constraint and, arguably, contradicts the military Code of Conduct.
 
For example, if an Iranian boat makes an attack run on a US vessel, we should assume it’s real and fire first.  We are not responsible for reading the enemy’s mind.  We cannot depend on past behavior to know for certain that the attack run is just a bluff.  Indeed, the local commander would be derelict for not taking action if it did turn out to be a real attack.  Most importantly, after a few Iranian boats are destroyed while attempting reckless harassment, they would stop harassing us, knowing that to do so is fatal.  Iran is responsible for the consequences of its own stupid acts.  It’s not our job to be responsible for their stupid behavior and to rescue them from the consequences of their own stupid behavior.
 
Additional benefits of a PT gunboat, authorized to take appropriate action, would be that it would provide low level command opportunities and would be a great way to begin identifying personnel with actual combat mindsets and promoting them into higher commands instead of the cowering crap we have for captains and admirals today.
 
What do you think?  Are there useful missions for a modern PT gunboat?
 
 
______________________________
 
Note:  For a fictional story describing the use of a PT gunboats, see, “MkVI –Gunboat Diplomacy Story”

Saturday, October 19, 2024

ET, Phone Home

Here’s a little tidbit from the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict about radio signal security. 
On top of the strikes themselves, Lebanese civilians describe shock at Israel’s ability to obstruct and overtake radio frequencies in Lebanon in order to broadcast an announcement warning people to stay away from Hezbollah sites and forecasting the air strikes to come.[1]

One of the foundational beliefs among US military planners is that our communications will be secure … despite no evidence supporting that belief and a fair amount of evidence to the contrary (see, “Communications Vulnerability”).
 
So many of our weapon systems depend on guidance signals, telemetry, data flow, and so forth and the security of those communications has been taken as an article of faith despite evidence to the contrary.  For example, Iran has had success disrupting and/or capturing our UAV control signals resulting in loss or capture of UAVs.
 
The US military consistently refuses to test communications under realistic conditions during field exercises and, in a display of unbelievable illogic, has publicly stated that using our full capabilities would be too disruptive during an exercise.  Do we not believe that China will have capabilities at least equal to our own?  Should we not, then, subject our communications to the maximum disruption possible in exercises to see what works and what doesn’t and to learn how to work in the face of disruptions?
 
I have consistently heard from military communications specialists that our communications are nowhere near as secure as we’d like to believe.  That doesn’t necessarily mean that China can decrypt our signals.  Decryption is not need to learn a great deal.  Signal frequency (number of signals, not wavelength), strength, location, etc. can offer a great deal of information as the British found out in the Battle of Heligoland Bight (see, ”The Battle of Heligoland Bight”).
 
I would hope that the military has conducted extensive and realistic tests and just aren’t sharing the information publicly but I doubt that’s the case.  It’s simply impossible to keep large scale tests of that nature a secret.  It might be possible to keep the results secret but not the event.
 
This is just a brief post to remind us about our potential communications vulnerability.  We need to begin realistic tests and exercises yesterday or we’re going to be rudely surprised when war comes.
 
 
 
______________________________
 
[1]Breaking Defense, “For Lebanon, a war in all but name has finally arrived: Experts”,   Agnes Helou, 25-Sep-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/09/for-lebanon-a-war-in-all-but-name-has-finally-arrived-experts/

Monday, October 14, 2024

SEAL Deaths

You may recall the deaths of two SEALs back in Jan 2024, off Yemen, during a night boarding operation in poor weather with 6 ft seas.  One man slipped while climbing a scaling ladder and fell into the sea.  The second man dove in to assist the first man who was struggling to regain the ladder.  The Navy’s report states that the deaths were preventable and attributes the deaths to, 
The cause of the deaths was attributed to poor training, unfamiliarity with flotation gear, and possible improper maintenance of personal flotation devices.[1]
It is also noteworthy that the men were heavily loaded with gear. 
Each SEAL carried about 50 pounds of personal and mission equipment.  Navy Special Warfare Operator 1st Class Nathan Gage Ingram, 27, dived into the sea to assist Chambers. Ingram is believed to have carried about 80 pounds of gear when he dived in.[1]
Diving into high seas with 50-80 lbs of gear is not a formula for success.
 
The Navy identified what they consider the root cause of the tragedy to be: 
The root cause of the incident was unfamiliarity with personal flotation gear and a lack of standard procedure for using, training with, or wearing it.
Other team members told investigators that while they knew the importance of their tactical flotation system — which includes two inflatable floats that attach to a belt and foam inserts that can be added — few had ever operated one in training and there is little instruction on how to wear it.[1]
Contray to the Navy's claim, that is not the root cause and the statement clearly indicates that the Navy doesn’t have the faintest idea what the term ‘root cause’ means or how to conduct a root cause analysis.  A root cause is the ultimate reason something occurs and, inevitably, produces a cascading chain of lesser causes leading to the event itself.  Almost invariably, the true root cause of anything lies with flawed leadership at fairly high levels and, almost inevitably, organizations stop their root cause analysis at a low level, well before they get to the true, upper level (leadership) cause (I wonder why they stop, he asked sarcastically, knowing exactly why).
 
In this instance, the root cause was not the SEAL’s lack of familiarity with the flotation equipment.  That was a low level cause but nowhere near the true root cause.
 
Moving up the root cause chain a bit, the person who selected/specified unfamiliar equipment for the unit was a cause but, again, not the root cause.
 
Proceeding further up the root cause chain, the assignment by leadership of a mission in questionable weather by inadequately trained personnel was a higher level cause but, again, not the true root cause.  This is similar to whoever assigned the riverine boats a mission beyond their capabilities which resulted in the boats and crews being seized by Iran.
 
The true(er) root cause, then, was high level Navy leadership who were unaware (or uncaring) of the equipment and level of training of the unit and proceeded to assign a mission anyway under very questionable weather conditions.
 
The truly ultimate root cause was a Navy system that encouraged lackadaisical training, a never say no culture, an ignorance of real world conditions, and a lack of personal responsibility towards those under their command.  To be clear, I’m talking about SecNav and Chief of Naval Operations who fostered a flawed culture.  This flawed culture has been evident repeatedly in collisions, groundings, waivers leading to fatalities, capsized amphibious vehicles, a surrender rather than fight mentality, acquisition failures and coverups, prioritizing social issues over combat readiness, and so on.  There can be no disputing the failed culture of the Navy.
 
Aside from the root cause, there is another aspect to this tragedy and that is personal responsibility.  Frankly, given the SEALs supposed creed of attention to detail, I’m astounded that they would embark on a mission with unfamiliar equipment and known shortcomings in their training.  I know they (and the Navy/military, in general) have a ‘can do’ attitude (arrogance, when it comes down to it) that drives them to do foolish things but there comes a point where personal responsibility comes into play.  In addition to knowingly endangering themselves, each SEAL knowingly allowed their fellow SEALs to begin a mission that they knew their fellows were not adequately trained or prepared for and that danger was compounded by the darkness and weather conditions.  Even if they wish to ignore the danger to themselves, each SEAL is obligated to be responsible for his fellow team members if he sees them about to do something foolish.  Each SEAL member failed their obligation to their teammates.
 
I’m deeply disappointed in the SEALs individually and as a group culture.
 
Some of you may be offended by this analysis but that doesn’t change the reality.
 
 
 
_____________________________
 
[1]Redstate website, “Investigation Reveals Drowning of Two Navy SEALs During a Boarding Operation Was Entirely Preventable”, streiff, 12-Oct-2024,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/10/12/investigation-reveals-drowning-of-two-navy-seals-during-a-boarding-operation-was-entirely-preventable-n2180468