Get the US Out of NATO

NATO once served a valid purpose and did so admirably.  That purpose, however, is long gone and with it NATO’s reason for existence or, at least, the US’ reason for remaining a member of NATO.  Unfortunately, the mere mention of the faintest possibility of the US exiting NATO seems to trigger angst and panic among so many observers in Europe and the US.
 
Panic among European observers is especially ironic given that so many in Europe despise the US to begin with and work to actively undermine and obstruct any US action or desire.
 
Let’s examine some of the arguments against the US pulling out of NATO.
 
Isolation.  Many seem to feel that pulling out of NATO would automatically lead to the US being isolationists on the world stage.  This is ridiculous.  Aside from erasing our name from a piece of paper, we’re just talking about removing our military presence from Europe.  We would still have extensive and intimate financial, trade, cultural, and scientific interactions.
 
Russian Threat.  This argument has been forever laid to rest by the Ukraine war.  If a single, small country with almost no military to begin the war and a population a quarter the size of Russia can fight Russia to a standstill, albeit with significant munitions resupply help from the West, then the Russian threat is overblown to the point of irrelevance.
 
Political Balance.  Some suggest that the US presence balances political and territorial ambitions among the European countries as if our absence from NATO would trigger all out wars between European countries.  This seems patently absurd if for no other reason than the European countries don’t have much in the way of extensive or effective militaries, as evidence by their very low defense expenditure levels and nearly non-existent munitions inventories (remember Libya?)!
 
Mutual Military Support.  The contention is that the US would lose the military cooperation and support of European countries and access to bases.  Well, any country can assist the US at any time and in any way they choose without the US needing to be part of NATO.  The reality, however, is that all too often European countries already refuse to assist the US militarily.  Overflight permissions have been refused during US actions and foreign ships have pulled out of US naval task forces when the possibility of US action has arisen.  Sometimes foreign countries assist us and sometimes they don’t.  They have their political objectives and we have ours.  Short of invoking Article 5 of the NATO agreement, nothing would change the degree of cooperation with the US.
 
Defense of Europe.  Some seem to think that if the US is not a member of NATO, that precludes the US from helping to defend Europe.  This is absurd.   If Europe is threatened, the US will most certainly step in to help, treaty or no treaty.  It’s in our best interest.
 
 
Options
 
An option, for those too queasy about the US formally pulling out of NATO, is that the US could simply pull out of Europe while remaining a member of NATO.  Nothing that I’m aware of obligates us to be physically present on the continent.  This would allow all the resources currently devoted to Europe to be redirected at the real threat which is China.
 
Another option would be to use US withdrawal from NATO as a major bargaining chip in a Ukraine-Russia peace settlement.  For example, the US might agree to withdraw from NATO if Russia returns Crimea and returns to pre-war borders and Ukraine is granted NATO membership.
 
 
Conclusion
 
In summary, there is no valid argument for the US remaining in NATO and every reason for the US to leave NATO.  The world faces an extreme threat from China and US resources need to be focused on that threat not babysitting a Europe that faces no realistic threat.  It is past time for Europe to stand on its own.

Beckoning Beacon

Over the last several years ComNavOps has, quite rightly and wisely, criticized and mocked the Navy’s many absurd, ill-considered, individual plans and acquisitions.  It’s time, now, to look at the Navy’s overall fleet concept and see how it holds up to analysis.  Of course, given the failure and poor performance of the many individual elements, it’s probably not too hard to anticipate the result of this analysis but we’ll go through the exercise anyway in the hopes that it can offer some guidance about what not to do.
 
When I talk about the Navy’s overall plan, I’m referring to the Navy’s vision of the ideal task force.  Again, we’ve discussed the individual components but let’s bring them together, now.
 
HVU (High Value Unit).  The ideal task force will have a HVU(s) which could be a carrier(s), amphibious ships, or vitally important cargo ships surrounded by escorts. 
 
Escorts.  The escorts are envisioned to be a few (2-3?) Burke class destroyers for AAW and control of unmanned assets.  The Burkes will be in constant two-way communication with the unmanned assets as well as the other Burkes and HVUs.
 
The unmanned assets will consist of:
 
LUSV (Large Unmanned Surface Vessel).  Sailing near the Burkes will be these small (by ship standards and large relative only to the smaller unmanned vessels), missile-carrying, unmanned vessels operationally tethered to and controlled by a Burke.  Essentially, these are unmanned, mini-arsenal ships whose purpose is to supplement the missile magazines of the Burkes.  They have no weapons or sensors, themselves, and are wholly dependent on the Burkes for control.  These vessels will be in constant communication with the controlling Burkes who will provide them with remote operation and fire control solutions.
 
MUSV (Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel).  Forming an outer ring around the Burkes will be these small, sensor vessels operationally tethered to and controlled by a Burke.  Their function is to provide detection and situational awareness for the task force.  They will have no significant weapons or fire control.  Essentially, these are very large floating sensor barges.  These vessels will be in constant two-way communication with the controlling Burkes, continuously broadcasting high bandwidth, large volume data streams for analysis by the computers and analysts on the Burkes as well as receiving operational remote control.
 
UAV.  Ranging out beyond the task force ships, these small UAVs will conduct surveillance.  An example would be the MQ-8B/C Fire Scout.  These UAVs will be in constant communication with the controlling ship for remote operational control and continuously streaming transmission of sensor data.
 
USV.  Farthest out from the task force will be these tiny, free roaming, unmanned surface vessels that will operate way out in front of the task force, detecting and tracking enemy submarines and providing situational awareness.  Sea Hunter and the tiny sailboats we’ve seen are examples of these assets.  These USVs will be in constant communication with the controlling ship for remote operational control and will continuously stream sensor data back to the controlling ship.
 
P-8/Triton (BAMS – Broad Area Maritime Surveillance).  When available, the P-8 Poseidon/Triton combination, the pairing being referred to as BAMS, will provide overwatch and far distant surveillance, situational awareness, and, in their spare time, anti-submarine detection and prosecution.
 
 
Discussion
 
There you have it – the ideal Navy task force.  Of course, I’ve ignored a multitude of problems which would render the individual components ineffective but, setting that aside, did you notice the one, overriding characteristic of every element of the task force?  That’s right, it’s the requirement for constant, high bandwidth, streaming communications between the various elements.  We don’t have Terminator level AI yet so constant control communications are required.  None of the unmanned assets have any significant degree of on-board computer analysis so all data must be streamed back to the control vessel for analysis, interpretation, and decision making.
 
What we’ve just described is, in reality, a large task force sized, floating electromagnetic beacon continuously shouting, “Here I am!”, while some enemy surveillance technician tasked with finding the American running dogs smiles and says, “Well, that was easy.”.
 
Having handed the enemy our exact location, the only remaining unknown is the exact amount of time it will take for final ship of the task force to be sunk.
 
One of the constants of warfare throughout the ages has been EMCON.  This is beyond elementary.  You stay silent while, hopefully, tracking the enemy who is oblivious to your presence.  This allows you to choose the time and conditions of battle, - an enormous advantage!  The ideal task force not only violates the very concept of EMCON, it is directly the opposite.  It is a continuous electromagnetic beacon, pinpointing your location for the enemy. 
 
To believe that the degree of required communication can escape notice by the enemy is simply delusional.  If anyone has conducted a wargame about this (I doubt they have or they would have recoiled in horror at the idiocy of the concept), I’d love to see how they hand-waved away the free detection advantage for the enemy … and I’m sure their wrists were sore from all the waving!
 
What about the special case of a carrier as the HVU?  Wouldn’t this change things?
 
Carrier.  Of course, if the HVU is a carrier, this changes things a bit but, disappointingly, not all that much.  A carrier’s air wing will add another layer to the task force’s defense, which is good, but it comes at the price of additional communications.  The E-2 must communicate with the aircraft it controls and must transmit its sensor data to the ships of the task force.  The individual aircraft must communicate with the E-2 and the carrier for air traffic control.  The carrier must communicate with the aircraft.  And, of course, the Ford class EMALS is just the world’s largest electromagnetic beacon all by itself!
 
So, what has this analysis taught us?  It has demonstrated that we are violating the oldest principle of warfare by not concealing our location.  We need to be structuring the fleet to operate with the least amount of communication possible – none, being the ideal condition. 
 
Every asset we design and procure that requires communication is a step along the path to defeat.  The path to victory is silence (and firepower!).  During the Cold War, we practiced EMCON operations (we learned how to launch an entire carrier strike without transmitting!).  Unfortunately, the situation has gotten worse since every new piece of electronics seems to require even more power and communications. 
 

• We need to reverse this trend. 
  
• We need to restore the requirement that every piece of equipment (I’m looking at you, EMALS) be shielded and EMCON-capable.
• We need to halt the rush down the unmanned path.
• We need to realistically exercise our communications in a combat setting and see how bad the problem is.
• We need to begin designing equipment with minimal communications as a mandatory requirement.
• We need to rethink our command and control concept and eliminate the top down control bias.
• We need start thinking in terms of combat operations rather than technological fixation.

 
In combat, you talk, you die.  Stop talking!

LCS Mine Countermeasures Module Ready? Not Really

The LCS modules have been under development for something on the order of two decades, now, and none are yet ready at anything approaching the original specifications or concepts.  In fact, the anti-submarine (ASW) module has been terminated.  The anti-surface (ASuW) module is a joke, having little capability and what there is, is a faint shadow of the original intent and specifications.  The mine countermeasures (MCM) module is ready in the sense that there are a group of individual components that kind of perform limited mine clearance.  Even those components are constrained in their performance, as a Naval News website article documents.[1]
 
For starters, the entire MCM module doesn’t fit in the LCS!
 

The components of the LCS MCM mission module were not originally designed to be loaded into the 30,000 square feet of mission bay space and shortcomings have been encountered in balancing the space between 11 meter CUSVs, four or five 12-foot CONEX boxes, a lift system for the CUSVs, and an independent berthing box for the operators of the MCM suite.[1]

The unmanned tow vessel is also causing performance problems.
 

According to Captain Scott B. Hattaway, Director of the SMWDC Mine Countermeasures Technical Division, the 11 meter CUSV is currently limited by form factor, limiting the endurance of the platform and the weight of the cable for towed sonar depth. The current form factor of the CUSV is limiting the maximum performance that can be extracted from the AN/AQS-20C sonar suite.[1]

Communications are another issue.
 

Another limiting factor, according to Captain Hattaway, is the range offered by the CUSV. Line of sight between the LCS mothership and the CUSV is required. In heavy sea states, effectiveness is limited. Bandwidth is taxed by the amount of information that needs to be shared back and forth to the operator and the sensor suites.[1]

The original intent was to keep the host LCS well away from the actual minefield but the communication issues are causing the ship to operate near the minefield, nullifying the original intended benefit of unmanned operations.
 
The Navy is looking to incorporate some kind of UAV as a communications relay.
 

“We’re looking at having a UAV with a towed antenna, raising the elevation to hundreds of feet in the air that will allow us to increase the range of USVs …[1]

The MCM module is becoming a real ‘Rube Goldberg’ collection of increasingly ridiculous, mismatched, and constrained components attempting to meet a bare minimum capability.
 
A reminder … Even if all this works perfectly, it’s still a failure in that it’s predominantly a one-at-a-time hunting method which is operationally useless in a combat situation.  Yes, the Navy claims to have an influence sweep capability but, to the best of my knowledge, that has never been tested and certainly not realistically.  I have severe doubts that the sweeping method will work against modern smart mines.
 
Two decades or more of work and we have a cobbled together collection of misfit, limited capability MCM components.  Well done, Navy!  You’ve made us proud.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Update On The U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package”, Carter Johnston, 4-Jan-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/update-on-the-u-s-navys-littoral-combat-ship-mine-countermeasures-mission-package/

No More Russian Subs in the Med

It is being reported that the last Russian submarine has left the Mediterranean due to the loss of the Tartus naval base in Syria.  This is a good thing, in case anyone is confused.  You may recall that we recently discussed the idea of the US seizing Syria or, in some other fashion, denying the base to Russia.  This is pretty compelling evidence as to the desirability such actions.

Bye, bye!

NATO Spending

ComNavOps has opined that it is long past time for the US to pull out of Europe, militarily, and that Europe/NATO can more than stand on its own.  The bogeyman specter of the Russian bear has been shown to be an illusion, thwarted by the tiny state of Ukraine.
 
Here’s some interesting data on NATO spending for 2023.
 
Here’s the top 10 countries for defense spending as a percentage of GDP.[1]
 
Poland              3.9%
United States    3.5%
Greece              3.0%
Estonia              2.7%
Lithuania           2.5%
Finland              2.4%
Romania           2.4%
Hungary            2.4%
Latvia                2.3%
UK                     2.1%
 
 
Here’s the top 10 countries for total defense spending (million USD).[1]
 
United States   $860,000
Germany            $68,080
UK                      $65,763
France                $56,649
Italy                    $31,585
Poland               $29,105
Canada              $28,950
Spain                 $19,179
Netherlands       $16,741
Turkey                $15,842
 
 
 
The US spent $860B.  The rest of NATO spent $400B combined.
 
 
The reason for NATO’s existence has ended.  It’s past time to leave NATO and let Europe take care of itself.
 
 
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[1]https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/nato-spending-by-country

Cable Cutting – Act of War

You may or may not have heard of the most recent cable cutting incident involving a cable connecting Finland and Estonia in the Gulf of Finland, off the Baltic Sea.  A Russian tanker is believed to have been responsible for the act, as described in a Redstate website article.[1]
 

Finnish commandos boarded and seized an oil tanker Thursday that is believed to have temporarily disabled the Estlink-2 power line connecting Finland and Estonia. The vessel in question, the Cook Islands-registered Eagle S,  was traveling from St. Petersburg to Port Said, Egypt. The Eagle S is thought to be part of Russia's "shadow fleet" that smuggles Russian crude oil to market.[1]

The proof of sabotage is pretty convincing as shown in the photo below which tracks the ship’s path as it crosses back and forth over the cable.
 

Track of Russian ship showing back and forth
movement over cable

This was a deliberate act of sabotage against the infrastructure of Finland and the world at large, arguably an act of war, and it was not a one time accident. 
 

This is the fourth time power or telecom cables crossing the Baltic have been damaged by deliberate actions. In October 2023, a Chinese container ship damaged a gas pipeline and two telecom cables between Finland and Estonia by dragging an anchor across them … In November 2024, a Chinese ship disabled a 745-mile cable linking Germany and Finland and a 135-mile cable linking Lithuania and the Swedish island of Gotland, again by dragging an anchor across them.[1]

In each case, the Chinese have refused to cooperate in any investigation.  Russia and China are at war with us, and the West, only we refuse to pull out heads out of the sand and see it.  As a result, we’re losing the war.
 
I like that, in this case, Finland finally took some moderately decisive action by quickly boarding the ship.
 
This also refutes the legion of Chicken Littles out there who are terrified that sneezing in the direction of Russia or China will bring nuclear escalation down upon us.  Finland seized the offending vessel and, shockingly, did not immediately get attacked with nuclear weapons.
 

The Finnish customs service said it had seized the vessel's cargo.[1]

What is the lesson in all this?  As the article’s author opines,
 

The obvious collaboration of Russian-controlled and Chinese-registered vessels to damage the telecom and power grid running beneath the Baltic Sea threatens NATO and the EU. NATO must take this hybrid war being waged underwater seriously and develop equally serious strategies for combatting it. What can't be tolerated is China stepping in to block investigations and legal actions by affected countries.[1]

We are at war but it’s a one-sided war.  We refuse to engage.  That must change.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Redstate website, “Finland Boards Russian 'Shadow Fleet' Tanker in Connection With Damage of Undersea Electric Cables”, streiff, 26-Dec-2024,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/12/26/finland-boards-russian-shadow-fleet-tanker-in-connection-with-damage-of-undersea-electric-cables-n2183645

Marine Light Amphibious Warship Debacle Continues

As you’re well aware, the Marines have come up with a poorly conceived idea to act as hidden anti-ship missile shooters.  The absolute key to the entire concept was the Light Amphibious Warship (now called the Landing Ship, Medium, LSM), a small landing ship which would ferry small Marine units among the first island chain islands, enable relocation, and conduct resupply.  The Marines were asking for something on the order of 30 such vessels although the Navy seemed to be in mood for around 18.
 
The LSM is envisioned as a small vessel with cargo carried on an open deck, a capacity for around 70 troops, no viable defensive weapons, and a transit speed of 14 knots.  Construction was to have started a few years ago but that hope quickly fell by the wayside due to lack of Navy interest and buy in.
 
Now, with the Navy finally ready to proceed, the program has suffered a resounding setback.
 

After receiving bids from industry, the Navy canceled the request for proposals for the Landing Ship Medium …
 
“We had a bulletproof – or what we thought – cost estimate, pretty well wrung out design in terms of requirements, independent cost estimates,” Assistant Secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition Nickolas Guertin said at an American Society of Naval Engineers symposium last week.
 
“We put it out for bid and it came back with a much higher price tag,” he added.[1]

The LSM, the key to the Marine’s concept, has been abruptly halted due to being shockingly expensive.  Shocking to the Navy, perhaps, but to no one else.
 
This raises a few issues.
 
Cost Estimate – This demonstrates just how unrealistic and incompetent Navy cost estimators are.  I don’t have the exact number in front of me but the Congressional Budget Office, for example, estimated the LSM cost at over twice the Navy’s estimate and it looks like they were much closer to reality.  If this were just one isolated incident of a cost estimate failure we might write if off as a fluke but the history is that every Navy cost estimate is ridiculously, absurdly, laughably, stupidly, incompetently low.  That kind of a pattern isn’t bad luck, it’s intentional, systematic fraud on the Navy’s part.
 
Look at the mismatch between CBO estimates and the Navy, as documented below.
 

The Congressional Budget Office projected the lead ship in the class costing anywhere from $460 to $560 million, according to an April report. If the Navy buys the 18 to 35 ships according to current plans, each hull could cost $340 to $430 million. Initial plans in 2020 called for each ship to cost $100 to $150 million.[1]

The Navy believed the ships would cost $100M-$150M versus the CBO estimate of $340M-$430M with a lead ship cost of up to $560M!
 
Priority – The key to the entire Marine concept (setting aside the idiocy of the concept) was the LSM.  It was the first piece of the puzzle that had to be nailed down before anything else could proceed.  Without the LSM, you have nothing but a stupid idea on a piece of paper.  Did the Marines secure the LSM first?  NO!  Instead, the Marines (and by ‘Marines’, I mean Commandant Berger) proceeded to dump armor, tanks, artillery, and firepower and reshape their entire organization and focus with the assumption (when you assume you make an …) that the LSM would magically appear when needed.  This is program mismanagement of the worst kind.  Commandant Berger destroyed the Marines and now has nothing to show for it. 
 
Buy In – It doesn’t matter whether it’s the military or industry, when you attempt change, you have to get buy in from all affected parties or you won’t succeed.  Not only did Commandant Berger fail to get buy in from his own personnel, active and retired, he failed to get buy in from the party that would have to pay for the most important element of his concept, the LSM.  Berger simply issued commands and assumed everyone would see the brilliance of his idea and fall meekly in line.  Well, that worked internally with active duty Marines who were intimidated into silence but the Navy, being outside Berger’s chain of command, responded with indifference, to put it mildly.  Again, buy in from the Navy is something the Marines should have secured before tearing down their organization.
 
 
Future
 
The Marines seem determined to ride their ill-conceived concept down to combat-irrelevance, if they haven’t already gotten there.
 
Along with a stunning failure to deploy when requested at the beginning of the Ukraine conflict, the Marines have lost their place as America’s crisis response force and are now relegated to an afterthought, if that, by civilian and military leadership.
 
Nothing is going to progress regarding the LSM for the foreseeable future.  For the immediate future, the Navy may obtain a used vessel for the Marines to play with while negotiations between the Navy, Marines, and industry resume and drag out.
 

For now, to quickly get the Marines a ship that can move them around the region, the Navy plans to buy a “non-developmental vessel” while it works on the requirements … [1]

The utter failure of the program and the cancellation of the RFP offers a way out for the current Marine Commandant.  The Marines can cancel the entire concept, claiming that industry and the Navy have made the LSM unaffordable, and that the Marines are going back to doing what they historically should have been doing.  Will the current Commandant, General Eric Smith, have the courage and wisdom to seize this opportunity?  Unlikely, but it’s there for the taking.
 
The more likely scenario is that the LSM will linger in negotiations for several more years and the Marines will wind up with a missile shooting organization that has no way to deploy.  What an embarrassment and a waste !
 
 
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[1]USNI News website, “Landing Ship Medium Program Stalled Over Price, Navy Cancels Industry RFP”, Mallory Shelbourne, 17-Dec-2024,
https://news.usni.org/2024/12/17/landing-ship-medium-program-stalled-over-price-navy-cancels-industry-rfp