"Existing Design With Only Minor Modification" Trap

More and more, the Western naval ship acquisition world is reverting to ‘existing designs with only minor modifications’ instead of new ship designs.  This is due to fear rather than combat requirements: fear of runaway costs, fear of schedule delays, fear of bad publicity and criticism, fear of innovation, etc.  Fear.  The Western naval world is acquiring ships as a reaction to fear of their own ineptitude. 
 
Instead of honestly and objectively assessing the reasons for acquisition failures and fixing the problems, Western navies have opted for the perceived path of safety over that of combat effectiveness.
 
The latest victim is Germany which has cancelled its F126 frigate acquisition program. 
 

The German Ministry of Defense has decided to discontinue the construction of six F126-class frigates …[1]
 
According to the BMVg, Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding (DSNS), the company initially contracted as the prime contractor, was unable to meet the agreed-upon time and budget constraints.[1]

The program began around 2015, depending on what one considers the starting point, and the first production contract was issued in 2020.  Lead ship delivery had been delayed until 2032 and costs were ballooning.
 
Burned by the failure and afraid of a repeat, Germany has opted to proceed with an existing design, the MEKO A-200 frigate.
 

Instead of planning a new ship, the decision was made to use a readily available, off-the-shelf vessel with only minor modifications.[1]

On a side note, this is yet another bit of evidence that the widespread belief among American naval observers that other countries can produce quality ships, on time, on or under budget, and cheaper than US shipbuilders is false.  But, I digress …
 
So, what is the problem with using an existing design with only minor modifications?
 
There are multiple problems:
 
The “minor modifications” never happens.  The existing design gets heavily modified, commonality disappears, and the costs balloon while the schedule slips.  The US Constellation program was a prime example of this.
 
Far more serious, though, is the trap that existing designs present.  If one never builds new designs, how do ships ever get better?  At some point, you have to move to a new design in order to incorporate new technology.  There’s a reason we’re not still building sailing ships.  Yes, you can upgrade individual pieces of equipment (though limited by ship’s utilities capacity, internal volume, weight margins, etc.) but you can’t improve or change the basic ship.  No amount of equipment upgrades could turn a Burke into a Visby-level stealth ship.  If you want a Visby-level stealth warship – and you do! – it’s got to be a new design.
 
Given the several year (or decade+)  build time for a modern naval vessel, even if the parent design was adequate when the program began, it will be obsolete by the time it enters service.  Of course, existing designs are not adequate.  Consider the MEKO A-200 that Germany now intends to acquire.  The original MEKO 200 design dates back to 1987 and even the MEKO A-200 dates back to 2001, making it already a 25 year old design which will be 30+ years old by the time the ships enter service.  Is a 30+ yr old design really what you want for your most modern, front line surface warship?
 
Take a look at the MEKO A-200.  It’s not particularly stealthy which is the major survival requirement for the modern battlefield.  Its electrical capacity for the perpetually ‘just around the corner’ lasers and rail guns is inadequate.  And so on.
 
Consider the US National Security Cutter (NSC) which is to be the basis for the next iteration of the Navy’s attempt at procuring a frigate.  The design dates back to the late 1990’s and is not even built to combat standards.  Assuming the project isn’t cancelled, the Navy is going to accept frigates whose base design is going to be around 40 years old by the time they enter service!  The NSC meets none of the requirements for success on the modern naval battlefield and yet the Navy has turned to them out of desperation and fear – fear of yet another ship acquisition fiasco.  We’re not designing for combat;  we’re designing for programmatic and career safety and public relations.
 
We cannot successfully build new designs until we objectively and honestly figure out why we keep failing.  Just to save Western navies decades of study, I’ll tell you why we keep failing:
 

• CONOPS, CONOPS, CONOPS
• Change Orders

 
There you have it, Western navies.  I’ve done your job for you.  Now, go build a new ship that actually belongs on the modern battlefield.
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Germany is cancelling the F126 frigate project and procuring eight MEKO frigates”, Staff, 24-Jun-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/06/germany-is-cancelling-the-f126-frigate-project-and-procuring-eight-meko-frigates/

Air Force Follows Navy Playbook for A-10

You probably know that the Air Force has attempted to kill the A-10 Warthog, the best close air support aircraft ever built, for many years now but has been repeatedly thwarted by Congress.
 
The Navy faced a similar situation with the Ticonderoga class cruisers.  They attempted to early retire them, multiple times, only to be thwarted by Congress.  The Navy’s solution was to agree to a blatantly bogus “modernization” program which, in reality, was a way to remove funding for the cruisers while they literally rotted pier side until the Navy could claim that they could no longer be economically upgraded.
 
Like the Navy, the Air Force has, yet again, been prevented by Congress from retiring the A-10 but, ignoring the intent of Congress, has settled on the tactic of simply no longer funding the operation, maintenance, and support of the A-10.  As Redstate website reports,
 

… by the end of this year, the A-10 will be without depot support, without a training pipeline, without weapons-school instruction, and without operational-test capacity.[1]

With no funding for support, the aircraft  will rapidly fall into unflyable status.  The Air Force will have, technically, kept the A-10 but will have achieved practical retirement.
 
Congress should fire every Air Force general and withhold all Air Force funding until A-10 support is restored.
 
The military seems to feel it is above the will of Congress.  It is past time for Congress to re-exert its authority.
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “Act Now: Fund A-10 Warthog or Lose Combat Power Forever”,  Ward Clark, 24-Jun-2026,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2026/06/24/act-now-fund-a-10-warthog-or-lose-combat-power-forever-n2203670

ASROC or Helicopters?

Helicopters are generally recognized as the best ASW platform above the surface; another submarine being the best ASW platform below the surface, of course.  Unfortunately, this leads to the widespread mindset that every ship must have helos embarked for ASW.
 
The problem with the concept of helos on every ship is that the aviation element of a ship is shockingly expensive.  A helo needs a flight deck (something on the order of 80ft x 50ft), hangar (another 80ft x 50 ft), dedicated weapon magazines, fuel storage, maintenance shops and parts storage, pilot and maintainer berthing (and food, water, etc.).  The extra 160ft x 50ft of ship size means more power is needed to move the ship which means bigger engines which requires more ship size which …  You get the idea.

Another problem is that helos are only sporadically available, being notorious for needing maintenance at inconvenient times.
 
Sure, there’s a penalty to be paid for putting helos on every ship but, really, what’s the alternative since we need ASW?  Well, one alternative is ASROC (anti-submarine rocket).  ASROC began back when submarines still had to get fairly close to their target in order to attack.  Today, submarines can attack with torpedoes or missiles from far beyond ASROC range (vertical launch ASROC has a range of around 12 nm). What’s needed is a much longer range ASROC, perhaps on the order of a hundred miles.  Given that we have thousand mile cruise missiles I can’t see any problem with developing a hundred mile ASROC. 
 
In the past, ASROC used arm launchers, box launchers, and common VLS cells.  The flexibility in launch mechanism means that some kind of suitable launcher can be placed on any ship tasked with ASW.
 

A long range ASROC would offer a viable alternative to the incredibly expensive helicopter on every ship.  Note that this does not mean we don’t need ASW helicopters.  We do!  We just don’t need them on every ASW ship.  Helicopters should be reserved for true destroyers (of which there are none in the world), ASW carriers, and, perhaps, a specialized convoy escort frigate.  They should not be on corvettes, general purpose frigates, and cruisers (meaning Burke/Zumwalt “destroyers”).  Want to build a cheaper Burke?  Eliminate the helicopter!

Statistics Will Say Whatever You Want Them To Say

Here is a cost estimate for the war in Iran, as reported by Reuters and provided by the Pentagon.
 

The ​United States' war in Iran has cost $29 ‌billion so far, a senior Pentagon official said on Tuesday, an increase of $4 billion from an estimate provided ​late last month.[1]

I have serious doubts about that figure
 
How can there be any doubt or discrepancy, you ask?  Don’t you just add up the costs?  Well, it depends what you consider to be costs.  For example, it’s incredibly expensive to operate an aircraft carrier so the cost of operating one in this conflict must be significant, right?  Well, no.  That aircraft carrier was going to be operating whether it was involved in the Iran conflict or just on routine deployment.  Those costs would be the same.  Whether in a war or not, you still have to pay for the crew, food, expendables, escort ships, and so on.  That carrier costs nothing extra to operate in war versus peace. 
 
The only true costs of war are the direct, extra costs such as the additional munitions that would not otherwise have been expended.  Thus, the war cost of the carrier is only the extra munitions, fuel, and the like that would not have otherwise been used.  That’s a pretty small figure compared to $29B !
 
I can go through endless other examples but you get the idea.  The cost of the war is only the direct, extra cost.  We have to pay for all the personnel, aircraft, ships, fuel, food, etc. that we would have if there were no war.
 
So, what did the Pentagon include in their cost estimate?  Only the Pentagon knows and they aren’t saying.  As Reuters acknowledges,
 

It is unclear how the Pentagon arrived at the $29 billion figure.[1]

You can say anything you want with statistics by manipulating what you include and exclude.  Here’s a hint that the Pentagon’s estimate may include more than the direct costs.
 

Jules Hurst, ‌who ‌is performing the duties of the comptroller, told ‌lawmakers that the cost included updated repair and replacement ‌of equipment and operational costs.[1]

Repairs and replacement due to battle damage is a legitimate war cost but routine repairs and replacements that would have happened anyway, are not.  Similarly, operational costs are not a direct cost unless they are over and above routine costs.  Even munition expenditures cost zero.  Those munitions have already been paid for.  They cost nothing.  Their replacements will cost something but there has been near zero direct replacement of any of the expended munitions, as yet, since replacement takes months or years.  As Congress begins to allocate munitions replacement funding and the Pentagon begins placing production contracts, then the legitimate war costs will begin to accumulate.  And, yes, I understand including anticipated replacement costs in a war cost estimate.  That’s reasonable, if not accurate.
 
I’m certain – with no concrete evidence – that the Pentagon has loaded every cost they can think of into the cost estimate.  Why?  Because the Pentagon is not in the business of fighting wars;  they’re in the business of securing funding from Congress and a large war cost estimate is a great way to get Congress to provide additional funding.  It’s as simple as that. 
 
The Pentagon wants more money.  You don’t get more money by telling Congress the war is well within your existing budget.  You get money by lying exaggerating falsifying creative accounting to pressure Congress into giving you more money. 
 
Every cost estimate I’ve ever seen from the Pentagon has been highly, and artificially, skewed, up or down, to serve the purposes of an agenda.
 
What has this war cost?  I have no idea but I’m sure it’s not what the Pentagon says.
 
 
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[1]Reuters website, “US war in Iran has cost $29 billion so far, Pentagon says”, Staff, 12-May-2026,
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-war-iran-has-cost-29-billion-pentagon-says-2026-05-12/

Jump Over Justification

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued a report on the Navy’s unmanned systems acquisition efforts and they list various challenges the Navy faces in expanding the unmanned fleet.  For example,
 

• Inconsistent leadership and priorities impeded RAS [ed. robotic and autonomous systems] investments
• Domain- and platform-centric approaches impeded progress of RAS

 
That’s nice, however, the report entirely ignores the fundamental question, why do we even need unmanned assets?  Instead, they jump over the “why” and proceed immediately to address the “how”.  The Navy, and those who report on the Navy, has done this repeatedly and always to their detriment, if not regret.  Can you say “LCS”?  Can you say “Zumwalt”?  Can you … well, you get the idea.  I don’t need to cite the nearly endless list of acquisitions that ignored the why (the CONOPS, in other words) and focused on the how.
 
The report simply accepts the official Navy spiel about unmanned.
 

Recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East prove that robotic and autonomous systems(RAS) are disrupting naval warfare and challenging traditional naval superiority. To provide more adaptable, distributed operations, the Navy intends to shift away from its World War II-era operating model, which was based on closely knit battle groups comprised of several traditional platforms, such as planes, ships, and submarines. [1]

Consider that statement.  Ukraine proves nothing about naval warfare except that a sufficiently inept navy can be injured by drones.  The Middle East proves nothing about naval warfare because there hasn’t been any naval drone warfare.
 
The statement then unquestioningly accepts the Navy’s idea that unmanned assets will somehow, in some unproven, magical manner be successful.  There has been absolutely no relevant, real world experience to justify drones and no exercises that do so.
 

According to Navy strategic documents, a hybrid fleet is necessary to enable this shift and would incorporate smaller, more numerous, and distributed capabilities—including RAS capabilities—as a complement to larger, more individually powerful, traditional capabilities.[1]

So, a hybrid fleet is “necessary”?  Based on what?  Not based on the real world and not based on exercises so … what?
 
I’ll repeat what I’ve said many times:  I have yet to see a viable CONOPS (the why) for unmanned assets.  The people reporting on the Navy need to question the Navy’s proclamations, not blindly accept them.  GAO needs to examine the why before they examine the how … and so do we.
 
 
 
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[1] Government Accountability Office, “GAO Report to Congress on the Navy’s Robotic Autonomous Systems”, 16-Jun-2026, GAO-26-109014,
https://news.usni.org/2026/06/16/gao-report-to-congress-on-the-navys-robotic-autonomous-systems

Where Are The Troops?

This is not a land combat blog but, sometimes, I’ve just gotta dip my toe into that world. 
 
We’ve repeatedly seen the US get attacked (with very little success) in the Strait of Hormuz by a drone or a speedboat and then we retaliate by striking combat related facilities.  The blindingly obvious question is why aren’t we striking these targets before they can be used against us since, clearly, we know where they are?  What kind of idiot commander allows known enemy combat facilities to exist during a war?
 
Now, here’s the land combat portion.  Why haven’t we put a brigade ashore to sweep, say, a 5-10 mile deep swath along the length of the strait?  As best I can tell, that would eliminate every remaining speedboat and most of the relevant combat facilities (weapons warehoused, radars, command and control facilities, troop housing/hideouts, etc.
 
Oh, but what if Iranian troops confront us?  Oh no!  What will we do?  Well, how about we thank them for revealing themselves and gathering together in one place so that we can more easily and efficiently kill them?
 
A sweep would remove most of the remaining ability of Iran to harass shipping in the strait.
 
Are we so afraid of casualties that we won’t risk soldiers?  If so, then this war isn’t very important.  If it is important, then ground troops are justified.  This would be a training exercise for a WWII battalion.  
 
We started the war with a good approach but it’s devolved into a decidedly half-assed affair the last couple of weeks.

US Helo Crew Rescued By Drone!

An Apache helicopter crashed in the water off the coast of Oman and the military is telling us that the 2-man crew was rescued by an unmanned boat, a 24 ft Corsair.  That’s astounding!  An unmanned boat rescued downed aircrew who had been adrift for two hours.  Here’s the headline.[1]
 

In First, 2 US Apache Pilots Rescued by Drone Boat

 
The promise of unmanned is finally being fulfilled!
 
We have no details, only sensationalistic headlines but, presumably, the boat located the aircrew on its own, plotted a course, found the crew, lifted the crew into the boat, applied emergency first aid as needed, and returned the crew to safety.
 
Of course, unless the boat had capabilities I’ve never heard of, it didn’t locate the crew, lift the crew into the boat, or apply emergency first aid because unmanned boats can’t do any of that.  Don’t get me wrong.  Pulling up near the crew so that they could climb aboard, unaided, see to their own first aid (were there any emergency supplies on the boat?  I doubt it), and be transported out of the area is very helpful if no manned asset was available but to call this a rescue by an unmanned boat is akin to saying that a sling on a helicopter rescued a swimmer in the water.  The sling didn’t do anything.  It was just a tool.
 
My larger question is, given that we’re in a high intensity war in the area, shouldn’t we have manned assets blanketing the area, including dedicated search and rescue units?  For example, an SH-60 type helo traveling 170 mph could travel the length of the strait in a half hour or so, depending on the start and end point and could reach any specific point in less time than that, flying a straight line.  Was there no manned ship, boat, or helo anywhere in the strait?  To rescue downed aircrew, we pull out all the stops.  All the stops meant no manned assets?  We’re not talking about covering the entire Pacific Ocean.  The area around the strait is pretty small.  The Navy’s presence in the area seems abnormally sparse which may explain why we seem incapable of escorting ships through the strait.  Is this a war we’re serious about or not?  The Navy doesn’t seem all that serious about it and this is just one more example.
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “In First, 2 US Apache Pilots Rescued by Drone Boat”, 9-Jun-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/us/drone-boat-rescue-us-pilots/2026/06/09/id/1259057/