Constellation Lessons

Christopher Cavas has a maritime podcast and recently offered a ‘lessons learned’ episode about the Constellation.[1]  In it, he speaks with former Under and Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly and retired Rear Admiral and former Fincantieri executive Chuck Goddard about lessons from the Constellation disaster.  Both Modly and Goddard were intimately involved with the Constellation.  Modly’s contribution was the usual worthless civilian nonsense.  Goddard’s thoughts are what we’ll focus on.  The podcast is interesting and worth listening to but not for the right reasons.
 
As you listen to the podcast, understand that both men were involved with the Constellation and, given the magnitude of the program failure, clearly neither man was part of the solution which means they were part – a very large part! - of the problem.  The entire interview, then, is the problem explaining what went wrong without being aware enough to even recognize that they were what went wrong!  The problem was trying to explain what the problem was!  The resulting discussion was exactly what you’d expect:  a mishmash of delusion and obvliviousness.
 
Before we go any further, it is important to understand Goddard’s background.
 

• Senior Vice President responsible for the FFG 62 Program for Fincantieri Marinette Marine (FMM)
• Capture Executive for the $5.5 billion FFG(X) program at Fincantieri Marine Group
• CEO, President and GM of FMM from Jun 2011 – Jul 2014
• Lockheed Martin director of Aegis Program Integration and Capture Manager for the Aegis Combat Systems Engineering Agent (CSEA) competition
• During his thirty-year career with the Navy, he led a variety of complex ship programs from destroyers to sealift ships, culminating in his role as the Navy Program Executive Officer, Ships
• Vice Commander Naval Sea Systems Command
• Chairman SUBSAFE Program review
• DDG 1000 Major Program Manager during design and development
• New Construction Officer at Supervisor of Shipbuilding, San Diego, CA overseeing AOE-10, Sealift Conversion and Sealift New Construction programs

 
He has been involved in a lot of failures and had an entire career to effect positive changes and completely failed to do so.  Almost every group he was with has been heavily criticized on this blog.  He has been part of, and known nothing but, failure his entire career.
 
As a general observation, Goddard utterly fails to grasp any actual lessons learned beyond the superficial and nearly irrelevant level which is typical of managerial incompetence.  Such managers simply can’t see or grasp the real lessons.  If they could, they would have changed things while they were in a position to do so.
 
For example, one of the major (perhaps the main) lessons from the Constellation was something we’ve harped on relentlessly:  the failure to generate a comprehensive Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  The Constellation never had a sharply defined mission/function.  It was a mini-Burke which is to say that it was all things to all people.  Goddard himself offers an observation that simultaneously demonstrates this and illustrates his complete failure to grasp what it means.  He noted that the Constellation eventually sank under the weight of the never-ending flood of change orders emanating from NAVSEA’s attempt to spec and build the frigate as a destroyer because they had no experience designing and building a frigate so they fell back on what they knew:  the Burke!  They designed and spec’ed the Constellation as if it were a Burke.  This demonstrates the lack of a CONOPS that would have filtered out any destroyer-like, non-frigate changes.  Absent a sharply defined CONOPS, there was no basis to reject any change order since each change, in isolation, seemed justifiable.  While recognizing the harmful effect of the constant change orders, Goddard fails to understand that they originated from his early involvement with the Constellation and his failure to establish a CONOPS.
 
While he fails to understand the true relevance of his observation, Goddard nevertheless identifies a key failing of the Navy:  they only know how to make one type of surface combatant, the Burke.  All their expectations, requirements, specifications, etc. are from the Burke.  I’ve repeatedly talked about the folly of continuing to build the Burke class (see, “Burkes – TheAnchor Around the Navy’s Neck”) and the folly of building large, multi-function ships, in general.  We should be building many types of single function ships and this is yet another reason why.  We need a Navy/NAVSEA that is comfortable with multiple ship types and understands why they exist, what their roles are, how they differ, and how to spec and build them.  The Chinese have extensive classes of missile boats, corvettes, frigates, destroyers, and destroyer/cruisers.  We have Burkes and that’s it.  We are a one-trick pony surface fleet and one-trick NAVSEA.  We know nothing else but Burkes.
 
Goddard’s comment about NAVSEA attempting to spec the Constellation as a Burke finalizes and confirms the observation that the Constellation was a mini-Burke rather than an ASW frigate or convoy escort or whatever else some observers wished it was.  Again, Goddard recognizes the change orders as a problem but fails to see that the mini-Burke mindset was a problem stemming from the lack of a CONOPS and that NAVSEA should have been “educated” and squashed from day one.
 
The entire NAVSEA attempt to spec the Constellation as a Burke also offers the larger issue of how to appropriately “downgrade” a ship from a high end destroyer to a low level frigate.  What degree of reduced structural strength is appropriate?  What level of reduced survivability?  How much redundancy?  What degree of separation of key components? And so on.  A frigate must be “less” than a destroyer or else it is a destroyer.  Navy/NAVSEA have clearly not come to terms with the appropriate level of downgrading for a frigate.
 
Goddard and Modly go on to offer other, multiple, supposed lessons learned but fail to accept even the slightest blame for their own involvement and failings.  For example, Goddard notes that the Constellation, still only partially complete, had already gained 1000 ton on what was intended to be a 7000 ton ship.  That’s more than a 14% growth even before the ship was half complete!  Despite that stunning failure, no one made any attempt to figure out why the weight gain was occurring and what to do about it.
 
The podcast is interesting but ultimately worthless in terms of any actual lessons learned and illustrates that the people running the Navy are so completely incompetent that they are inherently incapable of recognizing and learning any actual lessons.
 
 
 
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[1] Defense & Aerospace Report CAVASSHIPS Podcast [Dec 04, ’25] Ep: 220 Tom Modly & Chuck Goddard on Constellation Lessons Learned, 4-Dec-2025,
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/defense-aerospace-report-cavasships-podcast-dec-04/id1573063059?i=1000739767674

Still Not Serious About Passive Sensing

Naval News website has an article, relevant to the US Navy, about the French navy installing electro-optical/infrared sensors on various ships.[1]  That’s a nice step but nowhere near enough. We’ve talked about the future naval battlefield requiring purely passive sensing systems and individual ships needing a dozen or more such sensors spaced around the ship for complete hemispherical coverage and battle damage resilience (redundancy and separation).  Adding one or two sensors to a ship is woefully insufficient and indicates a peacetime mindset where the threat level is low to non-existent.  In other words, it is an action by a navy that is not serious about war.
 

According to TRAKKA Systems, … The TC-375M [ed. one of the EO/IR systems the French are using] is ideally suited for long-range naval and coast guard missions including search and rescue, illegal immigration protection, drug interdiction, economic exclusion zone (EEZ) protection, anti-piracy, maritime patrol, naval C4ISR, and naval vessel force protection.[1]

That’s quite a list of suitable tasks and none of them have anything to do with combat.  Even the French navy’s “high end” threat is laughably weak, as indicated below.
 

… the French Navy previously moved to fit Safran’s Paseo XLR advanced electro-optic infra red (EO/IR) system on all FREMM frigates and Horizon type Air Defense destroyers. The decision was taken as part of an “urgent operational requirement” in response to the escalating threat posed by kamikaze unmanned surface vehicles (USV) and unmanned air vehicles (UAV).[1]

UAVs and USVs?  That’s not a threat, it’s an annoyance, at most, for a competent navy.  Saturation missile attacks are a threat.  Ballistic missiles are a threat.  Hypersonic missiles are a threat.  Submarines are a threat.  Believing that a few tiny, unmanned drones are a threat shows the absence of a combat mentality.
 
As we’ve previously discussed, the modern battlefield requires passive sensing.  Ships need long range, hemispherical passive sensors (see, “PassiveHemispherical Sensing”) that can search, detect, track, and provide fire control.  To radiate is to die unless you’ve got missiles coming at you and, if you do, you’ve already screwed up and are already on the losing side of the battle ledger.  Ships need to be able to sail, establish situational awareness, search for enemy assets, and engage, all while remaining passive and undetected (see, “The Passive Warship”). 
 
Ship designers need to regain a combat design philosophy.  Battle damage will occur and that requires significant redundancy and separation of all key equipment.  A single EO/IR sensor is not a combat fit – it’s a peacetime design failure.
 
I’m not picking on the French.  The US Navy is doing exactly the same thing and this should serve as a lesson for us.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “French Navy fits new EO/IR systems aboard Mistral-class LHDs”, Xavier Vavasseur, 3-Feb-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/02/french-navy-fits-new-eo-ir-systems-aboard-mistral-class-lhds/

Where’s the Lethality?

Having failed so many times, the Navy’s primary shipbuilding criteria is no longer lethality (if it ever was in modern times) but the [incorrectly] perceived need to get hulls – any hulls – in the water as quickly as possible to stop the criticisms and fend off Congressional anger.  As Naval News website notes about the new frigate program,
 

… speed [of production] is now the primary factor driving the program.[1]

Speed of production.  Not firepower, not stealth, not lethality, not operational usefulness or anything else one might think would be of importance … just the speed with which hulls can be put in the water.  Why not just buy combat canoes?  We can get them in the water quickly.
 
The new Frigate’s armament will consist of a 57mm main cannon and a RAM launcher with 21 Rolling Airframe Missiles.  A payload space will be constructed (so much for no changes to the parent design!) at the stern of the ship capable of carrying 16 Naval Strike Missiles, 48 Hellfires, or other containerized weapons or modules.[1]
 
50-65 ships will be built …  So, we’re committing to a large production run before the first design is even finalized.  Does sound identical to the LCS?
 
The horrifying concern is that this level of armament relegates this vessel to the level of a patrol boat (and not a particularly impressive one at that!) and yet it will make up something like a third of our combat fleet.  Absorb that for a moment.  A third of the combat fleet will be patrol boats.  Add in the Navy’s desire for all manner of unmanned vessels and we’re looking at half or more of the fleet being nearly devoid of serious combat capability. 
 
Sure, the Navy will talk about future upgrades but when has that ever actually happened?  Ask the LCS how those future module upgrades that we were promised are coming along.
 
If I were China, I’d bankroll this program for the United States just to ensure we field a fleet of non-lethal ships!
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “New U.S Navy Frigate: FF(X) Program Specs Revealed”, Ethan Gossrow, 16-Jan-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/01/new-u-s-navy-frigate-ffx-program-specs-revealed/

Parent Design

What’s the Navy’s latest fad in shipbuilding?  Yeah … parent designs. 
 
The concept is that an existing, well established, “parent” design is used in a new shipbuilding program to avoid all the problems associated with new designs.  Being already in existence and thoroughly “wrung out”, the new shipbuilding program will have no problems since it will just use the parent design.  Sounds good.  Sounds logical.  Right?
 
The concept was the foundation of the successful disastrous FREMM/Constellation frigate program.  Of course, the Navy instantly abandoned the parent design as soon as the program became official and, in a shock to no one except the Navy, costs ballooned and schedules crashed.
 
The concept has also been applied to the Burke class although not by name.  When the Navy wanted the next generation surface combatant they didn’t even consider any option other than modifying the Burke parent design.  This eventually became the Burke Flt III despite the severe limitations the parent design imposed on the desired radar equipment and capabilities, stealth signature, weight margins, and so forth.
 
The concept is now being applied to the Constellation’s replacement, the National Security Cutter frigate (NSC-FF).  The new frigate is going to be based on the NSC parent design.  Of course, as we’ve seen, the Navy has already begun implementing fairly significant changes and the parent design is beginning to fade into the rear view mirror even as the program works to become official.
 
So, yes, the Navy has butchered the parent design concept in execution but what if they didn’t?  For the sake of discussion, let’s pretend that the Navy could flawlessly execute the parent design concept, meaning, no change orders, predictable costs, and schedules that can be met thanks to the absence of continuous change orders.  Would that produce a useful product?  Would the parent design result in an affordable, timely, combat-effective ship?
 
At first glance, how could a successful parent design approach not produce a successful, useful product?  By definition, the parent design exists and was, presumably, successful and useful so the “child” design has to be, as well, right?
 
Let’s take a look at some of the issues with a parent design approach.
 
Obsolescence – By definition, a parent design is obsolete.  Consider the timelines for the Navy’s parent design attempts.  The FREMM design dates back to somewhere around 2005 making the design 20 years old.  Would any sane ship designer really want to begin a new program with a 20 yr old design?  The Burke design dates back to the mid 1970’s, making it now a 55 yr old design.  The NSC design dates back to around 2000, making it a 25 yr old design. 
 
Do we really want to be basing our newest ship designs on 2-5 decade old designs?
 
While some characteristics and features can be updated from the parent, such as weapons, software, and sensors, others cannot, such as stealth.  For example, the Burke hull/superstructure stealth is obsolete and no longer effective but there is nothing that can be done about it.  The stealth signature is largely fixed by the hull/superstructure design.  Survivability is also largely fixed by the original design.  The FREMM, for example, was inherently unable to meet Navy survivability and damage control requirements, necessitating a major redesign resulting in the Constellation having less than 15% commonality with the parent design.  The Navy had to abandon the parent design in order to meet survivability standards.  Similarly, acoustic signatures, infrared signatures, etc. that are determined by the hull/superstructure shape, materials, and construction cannot be significantly altered or improved.  They are what they are.
 
Changed Requirements – Every ship design is determined by the operational and tactical requirements of its time and those change over time, especially over several decades.  The design, however, once established, is fixed and cannot be changed without abandoning the parent concept.  Thus, using a design that was intended to meet specific requirements that are decades old, and may no longer be valid, is unwise, to put it mildly.  The Burke, for example, was never designed for today’s electromagnetic environment and advanced stealth requirements and there is very little that can be done about it.
 
Design Limitations – Many design characteristics are inherent to the original design to a very large degree.  Things such as weight margins, stability, metacentric height, fuel capacity, structural strength, armor (or the complete absence thereof), speed, endurance, etc. are largely fixed by the original design barring a major redesign in which case it’s no longer the parent design.
 
 
Conclusion
 
The conclusion is painfully obvious.  The parent design concept has so many inherent flaws and limitations that it is simply not a valid, useful approach even if it were executed flawlessly.
 
This makes one wonder why the Navy even began attempting the parent approach?  Well, the answer is obvious.  The Navy has had so many failed, disastrous shipbuilding programs that the priority changed from a useful, lethal, modern combatant to simply getting hulls in the water without controversy and failure.  It no longer matters to the Navy whether the ship is useful.  They just desperately want a shipbuilding program to “succeed”, meaning, hulls in the water, on time and on budget … effectiveness be damned.
 
I completely understand the Navy’s mental state, at the moment.  They’re gun shy in the extreme and terrified of yet another failure.  Congress is incensed at their ineptitude and has begun inserting more and more restrictive oversight and conditions on budget allocations (as they should!) and the Navy is adamantly opposed to oversight.  The only way the Navy can get Congress off their back is to produce a “successful” program, no matter how ineffective it is.  The NSC-FF is barely one step beyond combat canoes but it serves the Navy’s purpose.
 
We should be producing beyond-Visby corvettes and, instead, we’re producing decades old NSC cutters as our “new” frigate.

NSC Frigate Delusions

The degree of delusion and fantasy associated with this NSC frigate concept is already stunning and does not bode well for the program.  Let’s check out a few of the notable delusions and fantasies.
 
What is most important about the new frigate design?  We all know it is lethality in support of a focused Concept of Operations (CONOPS), presumably ASW-centric.  However, is that the most important thing about the NSC frigate in the Navy’s view?  Well, here’s their take on it.
 

The new frigate design will focus on American designs and American yards, [Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle] Caudle said.
 
“Other countries will always prioritize their own fleets, not us, ships that depend on foreign industry,” he said. “That’s why this is an American design backed by American workers, American suppliers and an established logistics and maintenance network. So wherever the ship sails, when the American flag goes into port, it does so with American industry firmly behind it.”[1][emphasis added]

Wow!  Caudle’s last two sentences use the word, “American”, five times.  Apparently, as far as he’s concerned, the NSC frigate’s main and most important characteristic is not firepower, focused mission, CONOPS, cost, or anything else.  The most important characteristic is that it’s “American”!  Got burned by the foreign FREMM design, did ya there Adm. Caudle?  Not gonna make that mistake again, are ya, huh?  Everything about this is gonna be “American”, by God!  Nope, no overreaction, there!  Lurching from one extreme to another is definitely the way to go! 
 
Just out of curiosity, if this American approach doesn’t work out and we’ve already tried, and ruled out, foreign designs, what does that leave for the next attempt?  An extra-planetary Martian design?  But, I digress …
 
So, what is the guiding philosophy for the construction of this NSC-frigate?
 

… Jason Potter, who is performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition (RDA), said the service would base the new frigate on an existing design with minimal design changes.[1]

Wait a minute … Isn’t that word for word the guiding principal behind the Constellation’s parent design concept?  Yeah, and we saw how that worked out.  What’s the likelihood that the Navy learns a lesson and leaves the design alone and doesn’t make a host of changes?  This is pure delusion!
 
Where does an NSC-frigate fit into the Navy’s force structure?
 

“The design [with] little adaptation will meet the CNO’s requirements for a small surface combatant,” [Caudle] said. “The current [battle force] requirement is 73, of which we’re meeting less than a third.[1]

Whoa, there admiral.  You think we have around two dozen small surface combatants now?  Are you counting the LCS as a small surface combatant?  The operative word is combatant and the LCS has no useful combat capabilities so you’re deluding yourself.  If you have a requirement for 73 small surface combatants, you’re short 73.
 
What’s the situation on manning for this ship?
 

The design will have accommodations for about 140 sailors.[1]

Have we finally admitted that the LCS idea of a crew of six highly cross-trained sailors plus a parrot cross-trained as a dog isn’t sufficient?  As a point of reference, the Zumwalt is over 600 ft long and 16,000 tons with a crew of 147.  Now, we’re going to build a frigate that’s 400 ft long and 4,600 tons with a crew of 140??!  One of those two ships is incorrectly manned.  Can you figure out which one it is, admiral?
 
What will the NSC-frigate do for us?
 

… this platform would help take the load off of our destroyers so they could focus on some of the higher-end missions,” a second senior official told USNI News.[1]

There it is again.  The ever-present, mythical “free up ships for higher end missions” justification.  Of course, no one has yet come up with an example of what a higher end mission is that the Burkes would be freed up for.  But, I digress …
 
Well, there may be some problems already visible with this NSC-frigate concept but I am, at least, comforted by SecNav’s strongly implied assurance that change orders will come only over his dead body, as documented in the previous post.  Ominously, though, there’s this,
 

One of the few changes the Navy intends to make to the NSC design is to construct a platform above the open boat deck for containerized mission packages …[1]

A platform to hold containerized packages on the order of 40,000 lbs!  That’s a hefty platform! 
 
So, it’s not even a formal program yet and, despite SecNav’s proclamation, we’re already making changes – changes that will affect the ship’s designed weight margins, weight allowances, stability, total weight, sea keeping and handling, etc.  Inevitably, those changes will require other changes in propulsion, ballasting, fore/aft freeboard, internal structure, etc.  There’s no such thing as an isolated change in ship design.
 
Well, at least the change is to enable a modular mission package approach.  That worked so well on the LCS that even I can’t argue against it.  Modular is clearly the way to go. … right?
 

Those containers could do a host of missions. That’s a core element of the future force design.[1]

That is some Class A delusion, there!
 
Well, at least the entire modular modification will be the only change, right?
 

Based on the FREMM design in service with the French and Italian navies, the Constellation class design required modifications to meet U.S. Navy survivability standards.[1]

Uh … say, there SecNav … are you aware that the NSC design does NOT fully meet Navy standards?  So, either we build a sub-standard vessel for Navy service or we make more changes to the Constellation NSC-frigate to meet Navy standards. 
 
Will the NSC-frigate be armed similar to the Constellation?
 

The initial FF(X) hull will be largely unmodified from the systems found on the NSC, officials told USNI News.[1]

The NSC’s entire weapons fit is 1x 57 mm gun and a CIWS.  That’s it.  That’s all.  If the NSC-frigate is going to be “largely unmodified from the systems found on the NSC”, that will be one extremely lightly armed ship, bordering on unarmed.  If we add VLS, torpedoes, anti-ship missile racks, RAM/SeaRAM, etc., that will necessitate extensive … um … what are those called when you change the design? … oh, yeah … change orders.  You know, the things SecNav implied would not happen and that he would have to personally approve.  I’m guessing he’s going to be doing a LOT of approving despite his little sound bite.  Added weapons will require internal structural changes, expanded magazines, ammo hoists, modified power and utility runs, etc.  Hmm … weight, weight margins, stability …
 
Fortunately, industry sees no problems.
 

… Chris Kastner, HII’s president and CEO, said in a statement. “Speed matters, and the NSC ship design is stable and producible and will lead to predictable schedules.[1]

I guess Mr. Kastner is unaware of all the changes the Navy is already planning to make to the NSC.  Can you say, “goodbye cost, goodbye schedule”?
 
Well, there you have it – a broad assortment of fantasy and delusion before the program has even gotten off the ground.  I can’t foresee any problems, whatsoever.
 
 
 
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[1]USNI News website, “SECNAV: New Frigate will be Based on National Security Cutter, First FF(X) to be Built at Ingalls”, Sam LaGrone, 19-Dec-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/12/19/secnav-new-frigate-will-be-based-on-national-security-cutter-first-ffx-to-be-built-at-ingalls

New Drydock

It is a rare occasion when ComNavOps gets to sincerely recognize and praise a US Navy accomplishment but such is the case with the recent delivery of a new dry dock intended to support Columbia class ballistic missile submarines.
 

The new dry dock, designated “Atlas” was announced as received by General Dynamics Electric Boat’s primary shipyard in Groton, Connecticut … [1]
 
Atlas was constructed by Bollinger Shipyards in Louisiana and completed the ~2,100 mile (3,380km) journey to Groton on January 3rd. …
 
As detailed by GD Electric Boat, the dry dock stands at 618 feet long, 90 feet tall, and maintains a width of 140 feet.[1]

Dry Dock Atlas

As a reminder, the first Columbia class submarine began construction in May 2019 and will be delivered sometime around 2030.  This is a discouragingly poor construction performance but at least the dry dock is ready.  As a point of comparison, the first modern, tear-drop shaped submarine, the USS Albacore, a truly revolutionary vessel, was laid down in Mar 1952, launched in Aug 1953, and commissioned Dec 1953.  Adding nuclear power to the modern submarine, in the form of the USS Skipjack, SSN-585, resulted in the vessel being laid down in May 1956 and launched in May 1958 with commissioning in Apr 1959.  Clearly, over a decade to build the Columbia class is disappointing compared to what we used to do routinely.
 
Submarine construction woes aside, the delivery of the dry dock is a rare moment of accomplishment that deserves recognition.  Good job, Bollinger.
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Electric Boat receives new floating dry dock to support Columbia-class submarines”, Ethan Gossrow, 7-Jan-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/01/electric-boat-receives-new-floating-dry-dock-to-support-columbia-class-submarines/

We’re Doomed

China has announced its UAV mothership/carrier, a UAV capable of launching 100 drones.  Well, that’s it.  We’re doomed.  I don’t know about you but I’m starting right now to learn to speak Chinese because I’m certain this means the US will be conquered within a year or two.  The Chinese can’t be stopped and this proves it.
 

The world's first drone mothership, Jui Tian, took to the skies for its first-ever flight on December 11th, 2025, in the Pucheng region of Shaanxi province in China. The massive remotely piloted jet carries up to 100 drones, which it can launch while airborne to reach faraway targets. Able to take off with a payload over 13,200 pounds and with a wingspan of 82 feet, Chinese military aviation analyst Fu Qianshao noted that it can carry more weapons and equipment than modern fighter jets and bombers. It has designated hardpoints for guided missiles and bombs on top of the 100 drones.[1]

Some Chinese reports suggest an endurance of 12 hours and a range of 7,000 km.
 

No doubt about it.  This is a weapon system that is absolutely invincible.
 
The fact that it is large, slow, non-maneuverable, and not particularly stealthy, all of which are the definition of a target drone, should in no way diminish the awesomeness of the aircraft.
 
Similarly, the fact that the hundred UAVs it carries would each be on the order of a foot or two wingspan and something around a one pound payload which makes them incredibly short ranged and of no significant lethality relative to a ship should in no way diminish the sheer terror these tiny UAVs inspire.
 
And, of course, none of these miniature UAVs can mount any sort of useful sensor so, unless they have a very close controlling/sensing aircraft nearby (how does a controlling aircraft survive near a combat ready ship?), they’re blind and helpless but that doesn’t diminish the fearsomeness of the system, at all.
 
Being that small and with that small a payload, they certainly can’t have any defense against electronic warfare but that doesn’t lessen the war-winning capability of these tiny machines, in the least.
 
As I consider all this, I can only conclude that we should preemptively surrender.
 
 
 
[1]Redstate website, “China's Giant New 'Flying Aircraft Carrier' Completes Debut Flight”, Ward Clark, 30-Dec-2025,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2025/12/30/chinas-giant-new-flying-aircraft-carrier-completes-debut-flight-n2197616