We’re Doomed

China has announced its UAV mothership/carrier, a UAV capable of launching 100 drones.  Well, that’s it.  We’re doomed.  I don’t know about you but I’m starting right now to learn to speak Chinese because I’m certain this means the US will be conquered within a year or two.  The Chinese can’t be stopped and this proves it.
 

The world's first drone mothership, Jui Tian, took to the skies for its first-ever flight on December 11th, 2025, in the Pucheng region of Shaanxi province in China. The massive remotely piloted jet carries up to 100 drones, which it can launch while airborne to reach faraway targets. Able to take off with a payload over 13,200 pounds and with a wingspan of 82 feet, Chinese military aviation analyst Fu Qianshao noted that it can carry more weapons and equipment than modern fighter jets and bombers. It has designated hardpoints for guided missiles and bombs on top of the 100 drones.[1]

Some Chinese reports suggest an endurance of 12 hours and a range of 7,000 km.
 

No doubt about it.  This is a weapon system that is absolutely invincible.
 
The fact that it is large, slow, non-maneuverable, and not particularly stealthy, all of which are the definition of a target drone, should in no way diminish the awesomeness of the aircraft.
 
Similarly, the fact that the hundred UAVs it carries would each be on the order of a foot or two wingspan and something around a one pound payload which makes them incredibly short ranged and of no significant lethality relative to a ship should in no way diminish the sheer terror these tiny UAVs inspire.
 
And, of course, none of these miniature UAVs can mount any sort of useful sensor so, unless they have a very close controlling/sensing aircraft nearby (how does a controlling aircraft survive near a combat ready ship?), they’re blind and helpless but that doesn’t diminish the fearsomeness of the system, at all.
 
Being that small and with that small a payload, they certainly can’t have any defense against electronic warfare but that doesn’t lessen the war-winning capability of these tiny machines, in the least.
 
As I consider all this, I can only conclude that we should preemptively surrender.
 
 
 
[1]Redstate website, “China's Giant New 'Flying Aircraft Carrier' Completes Debut Flight”, Ward Clark, 30-Dec-2025,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2025/12/30/chinas-giant-new-flying-aircraft-carrier-completes-debut-flight-n2197616

Billet Gaps

We noted in a 2022 post that the Navy had a gap of 5,000 – 6,000 unfilled at-sea billets.[1]  Today, that gap has widened to over 20,000.[2]
 

The Navy has a total of 20,683 gaps-at sea as of Dec. 3 … [2]
 
There was an overall fill rate of 88.2 percent for operational sea-duty billets … [2]

In three years the Navy has managed to worsen the billet gap by 14,000 – 15,000.  That’s impressive even by the Navy’s standards for failure!
 
Of course, I could end the billet gap by the end of today.  We have hundreds of thousands of sailors on shore duty.  Here’s a crazy thought … why don’t we put sailors in ships instead of buildings?  You know most of those shore positions are worthless.  Hell, we’ve got at least 200 worthless admirals with a total of a few thousand staff personnel.  Those staff personnel could easily return to sea duty and we wouldn’t lose a thing.  In fact, getting rid of admirals would improve the Navy!  Want to bet there are no gaps in any admiral’s staff?
 
How many tens of thousands of sailors are ashore just pushing papers?  Here’s another wild thought … abolish paperwork!  Who cares if we don’t document stuff?  It’s not like the military cares about passing an audit or anything, right?
 
Billet gaps in ships betrays the Navy’s true priority and it’s not manning the fleet – it’s budget and job security.
  
 
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[1]https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2022/02/at-sea-billet-gaps.html
 
[2]USNI News website, “Navy Has 20,000 Gaps at Sea Due to Training Backlog, Past Recruiting Shortfall”, Heather Mongilio, 15-Dec-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/12/15/navy-has-20000-gaps-at-sea-due-to-training-backlog-past-recruiting-shortfall

NSC Patrol Boat

I applauded the Navy’s decision to terminate the Constellation program and still do.  I also, initially, viewed the decision to build a NSC-frigate as a poor choice but one that had some slight potential to produce a useful vessel if certain constraints and discipline could be applied such as a rigorous CONOPS and an obsessive fixation on a single mission, presumably ASW.. 
 
Sadly, the program is already doomed. The vessel will, apparently, have almost no weapons or useful sensors and no mission focus, whatsoever.
 
The initial NSC “frigate” will have 1x 57mm gun and 1x RAM mount.[1]  That’s it for weapons.  Nothing else.  That’s not a frigate.  That’s barely even a patrol boat and is hideously oversized, overpriced, and overmanned for that level of firepower.
 
The initial NSC “frigate” will NOT have a 5” gun, VLS, anti-ship missiles, strike missiles, ASW sonar, towed array, anti-submarine torpedoes, or CIWS.[2]  What it doesn’t have is far more impressive than what it does have.
 
Looking at the equipment list (or lack thereof) one can’t help but wonder, in stunned disbelief, what the purpose of the ship is?  What is the mission?  It barely qualifies as a patrol boat.  What is the Navy going to do with it?
 
It sounds like we’re just going to be building Coast Guard cutters and not even good ones.
 
I know the Navy is incapable of learning lessons but after decades of hitting themselves in the head with a hammer wouldn’t you think they’d at least stop just to make the pain go away?  I guess not.  They’ve just picked up a new hammer and immediately started whacking themselves in the head again. 
 
Enjoy the pain, Navy!  What a bunch of morons.  Good work, SecDef, SecNav, and CNO!

 
 
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[1]The War Zone website, “Navy’s New Frigate Will Not Have A Vertical Launch System For Missiles”, Joseph Trevithick & Howard Altman, 22-Dec-2025,
https://www.twz.com/sea/navys-new-frigate-will-not-have-vertical-launch-systems-for-missiles
 
[2]USNI News website, “SECNAV: New Frigate will be Based on National Security Cutter, First FF(X) to be Built at Ingalls”, Sam LaGrone, 19-Dec-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/12/19/secnav-new-frigate-will-be-based-on-national-security-cutter-first-ffx-to-be-built-at-ingalls

Merry Christmas !

 May Jesus fill your heart and Santa fill your stocking!

Trump’s Battleship

All right, settle down.  We’re not going to build “Trump Battleships”.
 
Come on, now. You should know by now that you have to take everything Trump says with a battleship size grain of salt. He routinely puts forth ideas that are not meant to be serious and/or never come close to fruition. Remember Canada as the 51st state, buying Greenland, replacing EMALS with steam catapults, etc.?  Sometimes he makes these statements as part of negotiating ploys and sometimes just for amusement value. I note the article indicates he wants to have the ships operational in 2.5 yrs! We barely built BBs in 2.5 -3 years even during WWII. The Navy can't even build a LCS or frigate in 2.5 yrs let alone a BB.
 
The schematic of the vessel is pure fantasy and shows non-existent equipment (lasers, rail gun).  Even calling the drawing a battleship is ridiculous.  A supposed battleship with 28 VLS, one major gun (rail gun), and 12 strike missiles is a joke.  That barely qualifies as a destroyer.
 
Do you recall what happened just a couple days before Trump announced his battleship?  That’s right, China announced a supposed large UAV mothership that could launch a hundred tiny UAVs.[1]  Then, a couple days later, out of nowhere, Trump announces a battleship.  Anyone see a connection, here?  Do you think Trump may have just been trying to one up China and grab the public relations spotlight back?
 
This is an amusing story but it ain't gonna happen. Just treat it as fun!  Think of it as a Christmas present of humor.

 

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1]https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2025/chinas-giant-jiutian-drone-mothership-debuts-with-internal-bay-for-one-hundred-mini-uavs
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Navy Flag Officer Numbers

According the Navy’s web page, the service has 305 admirals[1] and 290 ships of all types[2].  That’s more than one admiral per ship. 
 
If the useless ships, such as the LCS and others are excluded, the ship count is much, much less.
 
How many admirals is the Navy allowed to have?  This is set by law with the controlling legislation being Title 10, Section 526 of the U.S. Code. The limit is supposedly set to 150 admirals.  Here’s the initial text of the legislation.
 
 
10, §526. Authorized strength: general officers and flag officers on active duty
(a) Limitations.-The number of general officers on active duty in the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force, and the number of flag officers on active duty in the Navy, may not exceed the number specified for the armed force concerned as follows:

(1) For the Army, 219.
(2) For the Navy, 150.
(3) For the Air Force, 171.
(4) For the Marine Corps, 64
(5) For the Space Force, 21
 

Unfortunately, the legislation goes on to carve out many, many exceptions and waivers, chief among them being joint duty exceptions, which explains why the Navy has 305 admirals while only authorized to have 150.
 
If you skim through the titles of the 305 admirals, as listed on the Navy website[1], you can’t help but laugh at many/most of them.  Talk about make-work and busy work!
 
This is yet another area where SecDef Hegseth should be taking aggressive action to reduce the flag officer ranks and yet he is not.  He continues to disappoint.

 
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[1]https://www.navy.mil/Leadership/Flag-Officer-Biographies/
 
[2]https://www.nvr.navy.mil/nvr/getpage.htm?pagetype=shipbattleforce

The Next Frigate Disaster

Now that the Constellation has failed miserably, the Navy has semi-formally stated that the next frigate will be a modified Coast Guard National Security Cutter (NSC, Legend class) and will be in the water by 2028.[1]  …  …  …   Sorry for the pause, there.  I had to retype that sentence several times because I kept making mistakes trying to type while laughing hysterically.  From vague concept to in the water in three years or less – that’s hilarious!
 

“We believe the future frigate can be in the water in 2028,” Jason Potter, the Navy’s acting acquisition executive, told attendees today at the Defense Forum here in Washington.[1]
 
[SecNav] Phelan also recently told attendees at a private dinner that the new frigate would be a modified National Security Cutter … [1]
 
Navy Secretary John Phelan said the new frigate would be based on an American design and stressed that any change orders would have to go through him.[1]

While such a timetable ought to be easily achievable, the recent record of Navy shipbuilding renders it a laughable fantasy.
 
Let’s set that aside and take a quick glance at the NSC and examine some potential issues.
 

National Security Cutter

Concurrency.  It’s not even a formal program, yet, and there’s already a potentially troubling bit of news, as indicated below.
 

He [Jason Potter] said the service was focused on using a design approach that separates finalizing the ship’s design from the construction of the lead ship … [1]

That’s a frightening statement because I don’t know what it means.  One of the Navy’s persistent, major problems with shipbuilding is concurrency which results in construction without a complete design.  In other words, unbelievably, the construction is treated as a separate issue from design.  Potter’s statement could be interpreted as saying that construction will NOT be linked to a requirement for a complete design (the “separation” he mentions).  If so, this would be simply repeating an approach that has failed every time it’s been used.  Did Potter just lay the groundwork for the failure of this program before it’s even become a formal program or did he mean something different and, if so, what did he mean?
 
Size.  The NSC, as it exists in Coast Guard service, measures 418ft long and 54ft in beam.  In comparison, the Constellation is 496ft x 65ft.  Thus, the NSC is 16% shorter and 17% narrower.  That’s a significant chunk of deck space and internal volume “gone”.  The Constellation was not exactly heavily armed to begin with and the reduced size of the NSC is, presumably, going to require significant reductions in the weapons fit compared to the Constellation.  If it comes with a commensurate reduction in cost, that might be okay but we’ve seen time and again that costs do not decrease in scale with capability decreases.  The Constellation was, itself, a third the capabilities of a Burke at 80%, or so, of the cost.  If the NSC “shrinks” at the same rate from the Constellation, we’ll have something on the order of 20% of the capabilities of a Burke at 60% of the cost.
 
CONOPS.  The discussion of capabilities leads us into the next troublesome issue and that is … of course you know what it is … CONOPS!  SecNav has apparently already chosen a ship to build, established a timetable, and is talking about design and construction processes but …  …  where is the CONOPS?  The Constellation never had one so they won’t be reusing that.  What is this frigate supposed to do?  What is its focus?  Its mission?  It’s going to have fewer capabilities than the Constellation, presumably, so it really needs to have a tight mission focus to ensure that it can be effective in whatever its role will be.  Otherwise, we’re going to wind up with a mini-mini-Burke.  Mini²-Burke?  I’m already sensing a ship that will attempt to do a very small amount of everything and will do absolutely nothing even slightly well.  To paraphrase … Jack of no trades, adequate of none?
 
Change Orders.  As noted above, SecNav has, apparently, identified change orders as a problem in shipbuilding, claiming that change orders will have to go through him.  If, by that, he means he won’t be approving any, that’s great.  On the other hand, if he simply means he’ll rubber stamp the change orders than we just have a sound bite with no actual improvement in the shipbuilding process.  As a reminder, all waivers for ship construction and trials must go through the CNO, personally.  The problem is that no CNO has ever met a waiver he didn’t approve so what’s the point of the approval process?  Will SecNav just become an automatic approval for change orders?  The mere fact that he even states that change orders must go through him implies that he will approve some/all.  This is the wrong approach.  He should have flatly stated that once the design is set there will be no change orders … period!  But … he didn’t.  Again, this is establishing the groundwork for failure, already.
 
Structure.  It is unknown whether the NSC meets Navy structural standards as regards strength, compartmentation, weight margins, etc.  The NSC is reportedly built to 80-90% military standards but what is lacking and how critical it is, is unknown.  As you recall, the Constellation program got in trouble trying to modify the FREMM to USN construction and survivability standards.  Will history repeat itself, here?
 
Testing.  The NSC has a near mythical reputation among naval observers who have constantly called for the Navy to adopt/adapt the NSC to naval use.  The reality, however, is that the NSC, like every ship, has problems that may render it unsuitable for naval service without extensive redesign and modifications (bye, bye budget!).  The Jan 2016 GAO report [2] noted,
 

The U.S. Navy, the Coast Guard’s independent test agent, completed initial testing for the National Security Cutter (NSC) in April 2014 and rated the NSC as operationally effective and suitable. Still, testing revealed 10 major deficiencies (some are shown in figure). Initial testing is an event designed to verify performance of critical systems to ensure assets are capable of meeting mission requirements. The event tests critical operational issues and key performance parameters. The NSC fully met 12 of 19 key performance parameters. Tests of one key performance parameter, as well as other critical systems, were deferred to follow-on testing. The Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy disagree on the NSC’s requirements for cutter boat operations. Without clear requirements the Navy and Coast Guard will not have a basis for determining actions to resolve any performance issues. Coast Guard officials acknowledged that clarifying these requirements would be beneficial.[2]
 
According to Coast Guard documentation, it may choose not to correct all deficiencies due to the cost of changes.[2]
 
During operations, the NSC has experienced performance issues that were not identified during initial testing, and the Coast Guard has planned design changes to some of the cutters’ equipment [ed. from an accompanying diagram, problem equipment includes CIWS, CIWS ammo hoist, engines, generators, boat, boat crane, 57mm gun, 57mm gun ammo hoist, TRS 3D radar, Nulka decoy launcher, and midships boat davit] …  However, the Coast Guard has not yet found the causes for problems affecting the NSC’s propulsion systems. As a result of these and other equipment failures, the NSC has been operating in a degraded condition in some mission areas. DHS has no plans for additional acquisition review boards for the NSC, which would provide oversight going forward.[2]

 
Discussion
 
The failure of the Constellation program presents an opportunity for the Navy to course-correct.  Assuming the NSC platform can be successfully adapted to meet naval combat and survivability standards at an affordable cost – no sure thing – the platform offers the ability to construct a small, focused vessel for the ASW frigate mission.    Instead of a bloated, overpriced, under armed, and unfocused ship with no defined purpose, the Navy has the chance to design a small, focused, affordable ASW-centric ship.  What the NSC does not offer is the ability to be a mini-Burke like the Constellation.  Whether the Navy will be wise enough to recognize this limitation and the opportunity it presents is an open question with an all too likely failed answer but time will tell.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Navy wants new frigate in 2028, says service’s acquisition head”, Justin Katz, 10-Dec-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/12/navy-wants-new-frigate-in-2028-says-services-acquisition-head/
 
[2]Government Accountability Office, “NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER, Enhanced Oversight Needed to Ensure Problems Discovered during Testing and Operations Are Addressed”, Jan 2016, GAO-16-148,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674924.pdf