As long time readers know, ComNavOps writes at two different levels:
What is – where I describe current conditions and problems.
What should be – where I describe what we should be doing.
I’d like to delve into a third level for this post and take a look at ‘what will be’. In other words, I’d like to offer my predictions for what will happen based on what is. Note, these are by no means my recommendations. In fact, most are horrible ideas that I would strenuously disagree with. Instead, these are developments that I predict the Navy will do regardless of how unwise they are. In no particular order, here are my predictions.
Big deck amphibious ships (LHA/LHD) will no longer be built once the current contracts are fulfilled. They simply do not offer enough for the Navy to champion their cause in an era of flat budgets and lack of Marine Corps interest and support. This prediction is, of course, subject to change when a new Commandant takes over the Marine Corps.
The LCS class will be retired early – significantly early. This has already begun with the announcement that the first four ships will be retired early next year. The LCS offers no significant combat capability and even the Navy is reluctantly recognizing that. The Navy is also discovering that the LCS costs far more to operate than they had hoped. Again, budget constraints will ensure early retirement.
No further Ford class carriers will be built once the current contracts are fulfilled. The Ford class is hideously expensive and the Navy has been buying into the distributed lethality concept which is the antithesis of the Ford class.
The Ticonderoga class will be idled and/or retired within the next four years.
The Navy will begin replacing retiring Burke class destroyers with unmanned vessels though not, initially, on a strict one for one basis.
Air wings will further shrink to around 60 aircraft as F-35s enter service.
The Navy will not develop an unmanned strike aircraft in the foreseeable future. The economics offer no advantage, whatsoever, for unmanned aircraft and, quite likely, are a net increase in costs. Besides, we already have an unmanned strike aircraft – it’s called a cruise missile.
The Navy will not build an SSGN despite its obvious value.
The Navy will eliminate a carrier and decrease the carrier force level from the current legislatively mandated 11 to 10 and eventually to 9. Recall that we only have 9 active air wings so …
Predicting the Navy’s actions and decisions is challenging because they are illogical and often seem random in nature. Still, there is a pattern that can be discerned. The Navy is driven by politics and budget rather than warfighting so that provides a basis for accurate predictions. With that in mind, what are your predictions?
I think most of your predictions will happen, so I am responding with my thoughts:
ReplyDelete“Big deck amphibious ships (LHA/LHD) will no longer be built once the current contracts are fulfilled.”
“No further Ford class carriers will be built once the current contracts are fulfilled.”
“The Navy will eliminate a carrier and decrease the carrier force level from the current legislatively mandated 11 to 10 and eventually to 9.”
“Air wings will further shrink to around 60 aircraft as F-35s enter service.”
Reopen the Nimitz production line (incorporating cost-effective improvements learned from the Fords) and build a class of conventional carriers—somewhere between Midway and Kitty Hawk—9 to 12 of each. Until the conventional carriers start coming in (I am guessing 10-15 years) convert the LHAs/LHDs to interim Lightning Carriers/ASW helo carriers. Convert the LPDs to HII ABM/BMD ships to protect places like Guam.
I would propose air wings of 90 for the CVN, 60 for the CV, and 40 for the interim CVLs. Come up with aircraft and pilots for additional air wings by focusing Marine air on ship-to-shore movement and CAS, and assigning their air superiority F/A-18s to Navy air wings.
I would build some more conventional amphib squadrons and refocus the Marines on being an amphibious/commando organization like the Royal Marines.
“The LCS class will be retired early – significantly early.”
“The Ticonderoga class will be idled and/or retired within the next four years.”
“The Navy will begin replacing retiring Burke class destroyers with unmanned vessels”
I propose a surface fleet of:
8 Battleships, with 2x3 16-inch guns forward, a missile field of 32 IRBM/large cruise missiles and 192 Mk41s aft, and possibly adding an angled flight deck for up to 10 STOVL and 10 helos.
20 Cruisers on Des Moines hull as replacements for Ticos, with 2x3 8-inc guns fwd/aft, a missile field of 128 Mk41s and 16 IRBM/large cruise missiles.
40 AAW destroyers, which could be Burkes.
60 GP escorts, which could be FREMMs in their original configuration of close to it (not Constellation less capable numeric replacements for Ticos)
80 ASW frigates, basically ComNavOps’s ASW escort.
Get rid of the LCSs ASAP and build no large unmanned vessels.
“The Navy will not develop an unmanned strike aircraft in the foreseeable future.”
First the Navy needs to make vast improvements in its strike missile capability. I see a need for at least three missiles:
1) A long-range, supersonic/hypersonic, stealthy cruise missile for anti-ship and land attack (Russian Shipwreck might be a model).
2) An intermediate-range ballistic missile (intermediate by ballistic missile standards, not cruise missile standards) for land attack.
3) A cheaper, subsonic shorter-range anti-ship missile for destroyer and smaller surface combatants (could be NSM).
Jerry Hendrix is a huge proponent of a long range, stealthy, unmanned strike aircraft. What I propose is a (manned or unmanned) long range, stealthy strike aircraft that carries 1-2 cruise missiles. Carriers could operate well outside China’s A2/AD envelope, launch strike aircraft to go closer in and launch the missiles at shore targets. The strike aircraft would be hard to locate, develop a fire control solution, and shoot down at the distance offshore where they would operate. Say you kept the carriers 2000 NM offshore, the strike aircraft had a combat radius of 1000+ NM, and the cruise missile had a range of 1000+ NM, you could make it work.
“The Navy will not build an SSGN despite its obvious value.”
SSGNs should be the primary strike platform. I would build 20 Ohio-based SSGNs instead of the Columbia-based SSGNs that appear to be in the Navy’s long-range plan after the Columbias. Virginia VPMs should be the secondary strike platform, surface ships third, carrier-based strike aircraft fourth. Strike aircraft would also have a role against non-peer adversaries.
Overall I think these ideas make more sense than what the Navy will do.
"strike aircraft that carries 1-2 cruise missiles."
DeleteAside from my fundamental disagreement with your emphasis on strike aircraft (this being yet another example), there is a basic flaw in your concept and that is numbers. Recall that we used around 60 missiles to conduct a PARTIAL strike on an undefended Syrian airfield and 70+ to strike an undefended Syrian chem weapons storage facility. To successfully strike a peer defended military target will require multiple hundreds of missiles … let's say 300 for sake of discussion. Your conceptual strike aircraft can carry 1-2 (if you're thinking a combat radius of 1000+ nm, you'll be doing well to carry one!) you'll need 150-300 strike aircraft. Our carriers operate <40 strike aircraft. Even in a group (and you've proposed groups with reduced carriers and reduced air wings), you're not going to muster 150-300 strike aircraft while simultaneously providing carrier defensive fighters, strike escort fighters, HVU escort fighters, BARCAP, TARCAP, etc. In short, your strike concept is numerically non-viable as its strike firepower is insufficient for any significant target.
"8 Battleships, with 2x3 16-inch guns forward, a missile field of 32 IRBM/large cruise missiles and 192 Mk41s aft, and possibly adding an angled flight deck for up to 10 STOVL and 10 helos."
DeleteI would advise separating out the big guns from the large missiles and place them on separate specialized ships. Gun ships are the knife fighters of the strike world now. Missiles can stand off but guns not so much. That would tend to suggest that ideal placement in a battle scheme is different for each function.
Agree with that. Single-purpose ships would be optimum. Let gun ships just be gun ships, and the same for AAW, ASW, etc. The only crossover would be that any VLS-equipped ship could(should??) carry some strike weapons. Im not convinced about having pure strike platforms (missile barges) that dont submerge, because of the "eggs in one basket" and Murphys law issues...
Delete
Delete“Aside from my fundamental disagreement with your emphasis on strike aircraft.”
My emphasis on strike aircraft? We both posted notional air wings a thread or two back, and mine had fewer attack aircraft (12) than yours (14) and a smaller percentage of the air wing (12.6% v. 13%). If mine is emphasis on strike aircraft, wat is yours? I know you said there would be missions were you would replace your strike aircraft with fighters. So would I.
“you've proposed groups with reduced carriers and reduced air wings”
I have? I’ve proposed 2-carrier CVBGs (which is more than the USN operates with) that would combine to form 4-carrier CTFs, which I believe is the same number you ve used in your fleet structure. And my notional air wing of 90-95 on a CVN is about 50% more than the USN currently operates, so I’m not sure where I’m reducing anything. Yes, my 95 is smaller than your 108, but I question whether 108 is doable. If it is, then I’m at 108 with you, but I just doubt that it
You've proposed 2-carrier groups of a full CVN and a reduced CV or CVL with reduced air wings ("air wings of 90 for the CVN, 60 for the CV, and 40 for the interim CVLs"). Even with two 2-carrier groups, it's a reduced total air complement. In contrast, I've proposed full 4-carrier groups with max air wings and, for any of these kinds of missions, no strike aircraft.
DeleteRegardless, the point is that you can't assemble enough strike aircraft to execute a successful, effective strike, as I pointed out.
"My emphasis on strike aircraft?"
Every time you discuss carriers you emphasize strike aircraft and their characteristics. You rarely/never discuss fighters. For example, in today's comment you described your strike aircraft in detail but did not mention fighters, at all. That certainly seems like an emphasis on strike aircraft.
“You've proposed 2-carrier groups of a full CVN and a reduced CV or CVL with reduced air wings … Even with two 2-carrier groups, it's a reduced total air complement. In contrast, I've proposed full 4-carrier groups with max air wings and, for any of these kinds of missions, no strike aircraft.”
DeleteI’ve proposed that because I think 1) that is what we can get congress to build, and 2) 90 is about the maximum I think we can operate off a big carrier. That’s way more than the 60 that the Navy is talking about, so we are agree there.
“Regardless, the point is that you can't assemble enough strike aircraft to execute a successful, effective strike …”
In your post about three years ago on carrier strike, you said, for a minimum strike,
“So, where are we at on this strike, so far? Here’s the totals.
F-18 148
EA-18 12
Tanker 20
E-2 3
Total 183”
My CVN 90-aircraft air wings would be 48 fighters (basically your proposed fighter discussed elsewhere), 12 attack aircraft, 12 S-3 or replacement (6 ASW/patrol, 5 tankers, 1 COD), 8 EW (I’d like to look at an adaptation of the F35C with an operator in the space where the lift fan goes on the B and additional electronics and fuel in the bomb bays), 4 AEW, 3 unmanned tankers, and 3 helos, total 90 (which I think is the upper limit of what can be operated). The 2 CV air wings would be something like 36 fighters, 10 attack/EW, 8 S-3/replacement (4 ASW/patrol, 3 tankers, 1 COD), 4 AEW, 2 helos, total 60. So that 4 carrier CTF would give me 168 fighters, 60 attack/EW, 20 ASW/patrol, 16 manned tankers, 6 unmanned tankers, 16 AEW, 8 helos, total 296 (plus 4 COD). That is more than enough to meet your minimal strike numbers.
For the interim CVLs, I would look at something like 24 fighter/attack aircraft and 16 V-22/helos (1 V-22 COD). Thus, a CTF of 2 CVs and 2 CVLs would give me 144 fighters, 24 attack, 16 EW, 12 ASW/patrol, 10 manned tankers, 6 unmanned tankers, 8 AEW, and 36 V-22/helos, total 256 (plus 4 COD). That’s marginal on your requirements for a minimum strike, but that could be accomplished by subbing out a few numbers. And once we got to 2 CVNs, 1 CV, and 1 CVL (basically Mitscher’s CTF), we would be well above your minimums.
I understand that is a minimum strike requirement and would fall far short of anything to go after the Chinese (or Russian) mainland, but remember, I think those would be fool’s errands. That’s why I’m more inclined to contain, and ultimately strangle, as a strategy, supported by a lot of diplomatic and economic tools, basically the way we beat the Soviets in Cold War I.
"Every time you discuss carriers you emphasize strike aircraft and their characteristics. You rarely/never discuss fighters. … That certainly seems like an emphasis on strike aircraft.”
OK, OK, OK. I haven’t mentioned fighters except to say that I would have 4 times as many in a notional air wing as I would strike aircraft (you have 4.3 times as many), and to describe my proposed fighter/interceptor as having long legs, long-range sensors, and stand-off weapons, plus enough visibility, acceleration, and maneuverability to win a dogfight if it came down to that (which it sometimes will). And I’ve made it pretty clear that my strike platforms, in order, would be first SSGNs (which the USN seems loathe to build, as you noted), second Virginia VPMs, third surface ships under carrier air cover (and I’ve proposed a modern battleship and a modern cruiser that would carry more and bigger missiles for that purpose), all three with IRBMs and supersonic/hypersonic cruise missiles better than Tomahawk or Harpoon or anything in the current inventory, and fourth carrier air (presumably to clean up after the other three have done their damage). If that sounds like an emphasis on strike aircraft, I’m sorry but that is not my intent. I think it’s unfair and unjustified to keep insisting that I am somehow emphasizing strike aircraft. If talking more about fighters would get over that hump, I’m happy to do so.
"I understand that is a minimum strike requirement and would fall far short of anything to go after the Chinese (or Russian) mainland, but remember, I think those would be fool’s errands."
DeleteAnd there's where your air wing vision is a mismatch with your operational vision. You imply that the strike capability would only be sufficient for lesser targets without making the logical connection that lesser targets can be more easily and cheaply serviced with simple cruise missiles than a complex, expensive carrier strike which risks aircraft attrition (which can't be replaced in any useful time frame).
You also claim to rank air strikes as your fourth place priority for strikes. If that's the case, why would you even consider having a strike squadron(s) on a carrier just for lesser targets and a fourth place priority? The carrier's main mission is air superiority and yet you want to maintain a strike squadron(s) which reduces the number of air superiority aircraft from the carrier's main mission. That makes no sense.
I also note that my vision of carrier strike aircraft would be much closer to Tucanos than B-1 bombers. I envision that any strike aircraft would be very basic, only moderate range, moderate stealth, basic sensors … just a very pedestrian aircraft which would, hopefully, cost a moderate, pedestrian amount.
You, on the other hand, have proposed a 1000+ nm strike aircraft that is very stealthy and has a (presumably) large payload capacity and very advanced sensors which will be hideously expensive … … … to accomplish your fourth rated priority against only lesser targets. Does that make sense? Every hideously expensive strike aircraft is one (or two!) less air superiority fighter that can be procured. You would sacrifice aircraft for your top priority mission to enable your fourth level mission. Does that make sense?
I can't say that I recall you ever even saying that air superiority is the main mission. To be fair, you may have and I just don't recall. You seem, instead, to believe that some kind of vague 'sea control' is the main mission. I may be mischaracterizing your concept so feel free to correct me on that!
DeleteWhat do you see as the carrier's main mission? My view is simple: air superiority. What's yours in two or three words?
"2 CVNs, 1 CV, and 1 CVL "
DeleteAs best I can tell, this seems to be your ideal carrier group. Using your numbers, that gives a total of 46 strike aircraft.
Did you note that the strike post you referenced called for 70 STRIKE AIRCRAFT and that was for a lesser target where the goal was to deliver 70 missiles which would only be for a very much lesser target? Even a 4-CVN strike in your concept would only be able to muster 48 strike aircraft.
This is the part that I'm really stuck on. Just 46/48 aircraft, carrying 2 missiles each, against a peer defended target (so, say 50% missile attrition) just isn't an effective strike. So why even have strike aircraft when they just take away from the carrier's main mission of air superiority … assuming you think air superiority is the main mission and I suspect you don't think that?
"What do you see as the carrier's main mission? My view is simple: air superiority. What's yours in two or three words?"
DeleteAir superiority.
That's why my notional air wings always contain way more fighter/interceptors than strike aircraft.
Then drop the emphasis on strike aircraft, drop the emphasis on highly capable (incredibly expensive) strike aircraft, drop the strike squadron(s) other than as a nominal, occasional asset and design your groups for the main mission.
DeleteThat, alone, should tell you why the CVL is a poor idea. The number one requirement for air superiority is maximum numbers of fighters. A CVL barely has enough aircraft for its own defense. It's not a significant net benefit to a carrier group and contributes nothing as far as EW and AEW and is, in fact, a net detriment. There is no place in a carrier group for any kind of CVL.
Having stated the main mission, now follow up and design your group/navy with that in mind. For example, your notional CV with 36 fighters and 10 strike is just wrong. You need to maximize the fighters. Same for your CVN.
Consider attrition. You're going to lose fighters in combat. You don't want useless strike aircraft taking up room on the carriers. Fill the carriers with as many fighters as you can since that's the main mission and then you'll be better able to deal with attrition.
Give up the middle of the road, balanced, able to do anything but nothing well, conservative approach typical of a peacetime navy and, instead, acknowledge the mission and ruthlessly go about maximizing your ability to execute it. Remember, you go out, execute the mission, and return to base. If, for some unfathomable reason, you need to execute a strike mission then you take on strike squadrons and go do it. What you don't do is wander around endlessly with a sub-optimal main mission payload of aircraft. Optimize and execute!
"That's why my notional air wings always contain way more fighter/interceptors than strike aircraft."
'Way more' is another way of saying 'not enough' and 'I've lost sight of the main mission'.
We've already established that your total strike aircraft are insufficient for any worthwhile mission so why have them taking up top priority fighter spots?
"As best I can tell, this seems to be your ideal carrier group. Using your numbers, that gives a total of 46 strike aircraft."
DeleteMy ideal carrier group is 2 CVNs and 2 CVs. The CVLs are just an interim step to get more carriers until the CVs start coming into the fleet (which I would estimate to be 10-15 years, or about the remaining service lives of the LHAs/LHDs that I would convert to CVLs).
As nearly as I can tell from your Fleet Structure page, your carrier group would be 3 CVNs and 1 CV. That would give you 224 VF, 42 VA, 16 AEW, 30 EW, 30 AEW, 30 tanker. You appear to be looking at a CVN air wing of 108 and a CV air wing of 48, or 372 for your carrier group. I just don't think you can make 108. We used to have around 90 on CVAs, and the biggest difference I can see for the modern CVNs is that the wider flight deck allows room for the 6-pack (or apparently 8-pack on the Fords). 90ish plus a 6-pack doesn't get you to 108, so I don't see where you are getting the room. But if you can get 108, then I'm right there with you.
Taking another look at the CVs, I'm thinking you could get 75+ on them since they are roughly the same size as what we got 90 on back in the 1970s. That could be 44 VF, 10 VA, 8 S-3 (4 ASW/patrol, 3 tanker, 1 COD), 5 EW, 3 AEW, 3 unmanned tanker, 2 helo.
If we can get 95 on the CVNs and 75 on the CVs, that's a total of 340 for the 4 carriers, which could be 184 VF, 44 VA, 40 S-3/replacement (20 ASW/patrol, 16 tanker, 4 COD), 14 AEW, 28 EW, 16 unmanned tanker, 14 helos. And of course there could be some shifting around--228 VF and 0 VA, or other changes depending on mission.
The biggest difference I see is that you are looking at 108 on your CVN, and I'm looking at 95. On the other hand, I'm looking at 75 on my CV and you are looking at 48.
Bottom line is that we are both playing games with numbers that the USN will never consider. You probably go a bit further from where the USN is likely to go than I do, but we both would go basically in the same direction. I probably don't go as far as you do (95 versus 60 instead of 108), probably in large part because I think that I constrain my projections more by budget than you do.
Delete"Then drop the emphasis on strike aircraft, drop the emphasis on highly capable (incredibly expensive) strike aircraft, drop the strike squadron(s) other than as a nominal, occasional asset and design your groups for the main mission."
DeleteThat's kind of what I thought I was doing.
"That, alone, should tell you why the CVL is a poor idea."
I've never seen the LHA/LHD conversion to CVL as a particularly good idea, not as an end objective, and certainly not as anything more than an interim attempt to get more aircraft into the air until we can get CVs into the fleet. And conveniently, the time frame in which we could probably get CVs into the fleet (10-15 years) fits pretty closely with the remaining service lives of the LHAs/LHDs.
"We've already established that your total strike aircraft are insufficient for any worthwhile mission so why have them taking up top priority fighter spots?"
DeleteProbably for the same reason you are.
So... ex army, but why can't a modern Tomcat carry a modern Harpoon/NSM if we had F111, Eagles, Hornets and 16s doing that? What is the difference between an interceptor or air superiority and a strike aircraft?
DeleteLinked is my shipbuilding budget based on the FU22 shiipbuilding budget to daye and some of my other ship designs. I’ll comment more later when I don’t need to do this on a phone. It evolves from left to right. https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1DOTBSdKsDoQeuZQz--qyTiHqAkA3DX-RAuU_xZCYaWY/edit
ReplyDeleteFound my way to my laptop. My plan stays conservative on service life. It also tosses AMDR and larger radars our the window. Not sure how to resolve that yet. But in the end it gets us to a fleet of about 600 ships when including MSC and unmanned. Keeps the budget inside the high end of what's on the table in FY22 dollars.
DeleteIf you look at what we pay for the Fords and what we pay for Nimitz RCOHs, you could just speed up CVN buys to 32 months and land on 9 newer CVNs for the same money. This assumes we get Fords working before CVN-81 has its keel laid. We'd land on 9 modern carriers while retaining the ability to expand the fleet with an RCOH. Now we have a Ford sized dock available for east coast emergencies we don't have now.
Evolve the LHA line into a STOVL CVL. and build them consistently for a fleet of 10.
We need to live with the idea we may only get 1 non-VPM Virginia while Columbias are building. I'd plan 2 SSNs a year therafter with 40 year reactors based on Columbia and retaining 4 large vertical tubes. Then we are working toward an 80 sub sleet with 68 SSN/SSGN.
Surface combatants. Go with what is proven, 1 NSC a year turned into a frigate, 2 flight IV DDGs with EASR with better margins, hybrid drive, etc, for less money, 1.5B. I left Connie in there at 1 per year. That's more a political decision. My preference would be to figure out how to afford a cruiser class.
Amphibs - I'd upscale the LAW so it can sustain 20 knots. I'd also allow their main deck to submerge so they can either beach themselves and launch or launch surface connectors. Keep the combat system light with RAM/Searam. Nulka, and SEWIP. Keep a flight deck that can land anything and maybe see about a hangar. That's there 1 ship. Supplement the rest with EPF and sealift ships. I do absorb the surface connector money to build these and the EPFs though. EPFs have to be improved to allow unhindered helo ops of any type and ability to launch a vehicle from the ramp.
Yes, there is lots of unmanned, but I'd call all buy XLUUV to be minimally manned. I also cheat by not budgeting the payload, but the Navy already does that too. Big picture. Is it a better fleet that can be sold to the powers at be, the navy, and the American people.
From there
Sadly I think these predictions are pretty on target. I dont see the dumping LCS as a negative, and Im completely behind that. Its pretty hard to look that far ahead, but I think Naval Aviation and its proponents have enough inertia to get one more Ford after the Miller, for 5 total. After that the economics will absolutely force a serious look at smaller and/or conventional designs. (Not that I personally feel anything less than a full size CVN is worthwhile, but...)
ReplyDeleteI WAS intrigued to read that the Navy does propose a new Columbia-based SSGN in 2036 after the SSBN line finishes. Only problem here is the decade+ long gap between the last Ohio SSGN retirement and the new version. Ohio SSGNs are probably the most potent and survivable conventional strike platforms in history, and not looking hard at converting more is foolish. I'd frankly accept a further reduction of 2-3 SSBNs to see that happen (focusing on China, and largely ignoring Russia, we have plenty of strategic deterrence overmatch for the near future).
Load those LCS with anti-ship missiles...make them missile trucks. Forward station them in areas of interest/choke points (Japan, Singapore, Bahrain) and have them make patrols in pairs in an overwatch scenario. They are not for 6 month deployments but patrols in areas of interest as a stopgap of sorts for destroyers? Not to shabby an idea.
DeleteWe spent a sh%tload of money on them....lets get some sort of something out of them.
"Load those LCS with anti-ship missiles...make them missile trucks. Forward station them"
DeleteOkay ……. Now, a couple of questions:
1. If forward stationed, where/how will they be supported since they require port maintenance every two weeks and major port maintenance every 4-6 weeks?
2. Where will the over-the-horizon targeting come from since the ship's sensors are limited to horizon range?
3. In a war, Japan already has an entire navy. What will a couple of LCS accomplish? Singapore will NOT enter a war against China so where/how will LCS be supported. In what war/scenario will operating around Bahrain be necessary?
Why do you think Singapore will not enter a war with China? I was under the impression they're arming up for trouble in the SC Sea.
DeleteThey have nothing to gain and everything to lose. Their military is dwarfed by China. It would be a no-win situation. Unless they believed that the US would quickly and overwhelmingly win a war with China and they opted to piggyback on to that effort, they'd have no reason to get involved.
DeleteSingapore's military is aimed as much, or more, at Malaysia and the surrounding countries as China.
"The Navy is driven by politics and budget "
ReplyDeletePls, define Navy politics ?
Are there internal fights, what is modern of Black shoe vs. Brown shoe ?
What it the hostility level between the Navy & Army and Air Corps ? Is it at Imperial Japanese levels ?
"define Navy politics"
DeleteGoodness, no! I'm not talking about internal service politics, I'm talking about civilian/govt politics. The military leaders of all branches are bowing to civilian politics. This is not a political blog so I'm not going to go into any great depths on this but, as one example, the push to stamp out 'extremism' (clearly defined as conservative viewpoints) is an example of leaders bowing to political demands. Gen. Milley is another glaring example.
"The Navy will begin replacing retiring Burke class destroyers with unmanned vessels though not, initially, on a strict one for one basis."
ReplyDeleteHow long do you suppose it will take till we have a crop of admirals that have never even set foot on a ship?
I think there's a few already?
DeleteWe already have an admiral whose major command tour, the Zumwalt, never deployed. He's commanding a carrier group with no major command sea time.
Delete"The Navy will begin replacing retiring Burke class destroyers with unmanned vessels though not, initially, on a strict one for one basis."
ReplyDeleteNavy has set up DDG(X) program office for next generation destroyer. DDG(X) are likely replacement for both Tico and Burke.
No Worries /s
ReplyDeleteThe navy and all of US military has no prioritized climate change. So the Navy bit will be back to the "Great Green Fleet" ran on 100+per gallon "biodiesel" and then of course all the really important stuff like sex changes for new trans recruits (fgibill that was for racist southerners and uppty blacks that wanted to raise their standard through the mil), CRT, etc.......
"The Navy will not build an SSGN despite its obvious value."
ReplyDeleteBut, is the value of an SSGN worth the cost? The production cost of a Columbia-class SSBN is better than $8 billion. The Navy could buy 7 Virginia Block Vs for the cost of 3 Columbia SSGNs.
The best way to put more VLS cells into the fleet is with surface ships, manned or unmanned. A smaller version of the Zumwalt destroyer might be an option.
If we carve VLS cells into its own problem and by sub and surface.
DeleteRight now the battle force has 1180 Tomahawk size tubes. If you follow my plan above that would eventuaally yield 1904 tubes. Even in a world where the navy screws up and we never get there we'd be hedging our bets and should come out ahead vs current plan and trajectory.
Right now we have 9408 cells in the surface fleet. We know this is really lower because some of those Cruisers are never going to deploy again. My plan works out to 9200 cells assuming 96 on Burke IV, 32 on Connie, 16 on the NSC, and 32 on MUSV.
Obviosuly, both sets of these ships comprise much more than their VLS cells so there is a need to consider the balance.
"The best way to put more VLS cells into the fleet is with surface ships"
DeleteAn SSGN is unmatched in stealth, survivability, and flexibility. Surface ships are much more susceptible to detection and destruction and would be proscribed from operating in contested waters which eliminates a lot of launch points.
"The Navy could buy 7 Virginia Block Vs for the cost of 3 Columbia SSGNs."
You just described why Virginias are a bad idea compared to a dedicated SSGN - it's the weapons load. A current SSGN has 154 missiles. A Virginia VPM has 40. You need 4 Virginias to equal a single SSGN. Trying to coordinate 4 subs actions for a single strike versus coordinating one SSGN is obviously a problem during war. Multiple subs also increase the chance of one or more being detected and destroyed. Finally, pulling four SSNs away from other duties to deliver a single strike is undesirable versus letting those four subs pursue other tasks while a single SSGN does the strike. The benefits of the SSGN are pretty evident.
"Right now the battle force has 1180 Tomahawk size tubes."
Delete"Right now we have 9408 cells in the surface fleet."
?????????
Sorry 1180 sub tubes, Tomahawk size.
Delete"A current SSGN has 154 missiles. A Virginia VPM has 40. You need 4 Virginias to equal a single SSGN."
DeleteA Columbia-class SSGN would have 98 to 112 VLS cells. Adding additional tubes would only jack up the unit cost to 10 billion or more.
And, if we can't coordinate an attack from three submarines, how is the Navy ever going to operate a carrier group of 4 supercarriers and 30+ surface combatants and support ships?
"if we can't coordinate an attack from three submarines,"
DeleteOh come on … surface ships in a group are miles apart in open air - easy comms. Subs are widely dispersed (50+ miles or more to avoid friendly fire) and underwater, essentially out of contact from both the surface and other subs.
CNO, With the proliferation of anti-ship missiles, the potential waning of CVBG spatial dominance, its growing inability as a strike platform, many ships being AAW-centric(defensive) etc, do you see or advocate a move towards a sub-heavy future fleet??
Delete"do you see or advocate a move towards a sub-heavy future fleet??"
DeleteI ALWAYS advocate a sub-heavy fleet regardless of any concerns about carrier groups!
"the potential waning of CVBG spatial dominance"
Who says the carrier group's spatial dominance is waning?! It's not! Consider,
-You've got escorts out ?50? miles around the carrier and those escorts have radars and passive sensors looking hundreds of miles beyond that. You've got AAW missile coverage extending hundreds of miles in any direction. E-2 Hawkeyes are maintaining awareness for hundreds of miles. Fighter aircraft extend the group's awareness and AAW capability several hundred miles around the group. Submarines operate hundreds of miles in front of the group's path to sanitize the route.
An attacker, be it aircraft, missile, ship, or sub has to penetrate several hundred miles of layered sensors and defenses. The carrier group (my wartime version, not the Navy's pathetic 1 carrier and two escorts) remains the most powerful and difficult entity to target and attack in the world.
A properly commanded 4-carrier task force is incredibly powerful and dominates its space for hundreds of miles around. If my posts have given you the impression that I think the carrier is not the most powerful force around, I abjectly apologize.
"inability as a strike platform"
On the contrary! A CVBG is an immensely powerful strike force. You just need to recognize that the aircraft are no longer the strike asset - Burkes are. The carrier exists, now, to escort and defend the Burkes. Five 'strike' Burkes accompanying the CVBG's normal force could launch nearly 500 cruise missiles; enough to deal with almost any target on land or at sea.
The carrier's 'dominance' has not diminished at all. What's changed is its role.
Now, admittedly, the Navy is making every wrong decision they can which could lead one to believe that the carrier is losing its effectiveness but the Navy will relearn all the proper lessons in short order when a peer war occurs. We know the lessons; we just unwisely believe they no longer apply. The naval Gods of the Copybook Headings will remind us very quickly how to run a navy when the shooting starts.
"Oh come on … surface ships in a group are miles apart in open air . . ."
DeleteSo, submarines don't get updates on threats or friendlies they might come in contact with?
Between the opening salvo and subsequent actions, most large-scale battles will require hundreds of cruise missiles. One SSGN is not always going to cut it. I think the Navy can put a few submarines where they need to be, when they need to be there.
But, the bigger issue is the cost of an SSGN and they are unaffordable for today's Navy.
"So, submarines don't get updates on threats or friendlies they might come in contact with?"
DeleteNot on a real-time basis, no.
Which is also why a sub does its best when alone: just assume anything you encounter is an enemy and go from there.
"So, submarines don't get updates on threats or friendlies they might come in contact with?"
DeleteNot on a real time tactical basis, they don't. In a combat operating area, no submarine is going to come to the surface or anywhere near it. Once a sub enters the area, they're incommunicado for all practical purposes. Trying to coordinate the actions of several subs to the extent of timing strikes and/or adjusting schedules is just not possible.
This is why friendly subs don't cruise around the periphery of a surface group trying to act as an escort.
Sadly, CNO predictions are spot on, probably on the "optimistic" side because ship numbers wise might not look too bad BUT what's not being seen is all the other factors: recruiting and quality of the sailors, motivations , poor training and supervision, poor leaders, lack of challenge to grow the sailors, etc....factor in lack of parts, poor maintenance, etc...USN and generally US forces "look" good on paper but its just paper numbers.
ReplyDeleteI think your projections are spot on except the carriers - both the Navy and Congress are addicted to these and they will build them in preference to more useful smaller ships.
ReplyDeleteI do think Ticos and older Flight I Arleigh Burkes will be kept on the books even if they're not operational and rusting away moored to a dock somewhere. This will be done to maintain illusion of large navy and in some ways is already being done ie all the ships waiting for years for refurbishment/modernisation.
I also think the Constellation class will blow out in cost with fewer ships acquired. At some point it will be realised they probably shouldn't have tinkered with the initial FREMM design and there will be an acknowledgement they are undergunned.
Arleigh Burkes will continue to be acquired in very small batches.
I think the Navy will also pump more money into the F/A-XX and like the F-35 it will be horrifically late, horrifically overbudget and not deliver what was required thus requiring an acceptance of lower standards like they did with F-35 and especially F-35C.
Light Amphibious Warship (aka less useful under gunned version of WWII LST) will continue but blow out in cost and delays.
Missile procurement will continue to be in small amounts and insufficient to arm even the existing operational vessels (continuation of what is currently happening).
Also maintenance and too many deployments will continue to be a problem.
Biggest change I suspect will be in Navy posture and that's already happening through EABO. Literally the US will tacitly acknowledge Chinese supremacy in the first and second island chain.
The USN will change its strategy in Pacific to containment of China within the second island chain (ie Japan, Philippines, Indonesia).
However lack of operational assets will make this containment strategy very porous and unsustainable.
There will be an attempt to get allies to fill the gaps but most of them are already in China's pocket (eg old Cold War allies Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia are already close to China whilst South Korea is increasingly independent and Japan won't want to really commit and will hide behind its constitution which most Japanese oppose changing).
As such Australia will become ever more key to US concepts in the region - both as a source of naval projection (with its dismal 12 warships and 6 ageing subs - nuke subs aren't meant to be delivered until 2040s) and as a base (already meant to be rotating 2500 USMC troops per annum through Darwin).
Again this is all based on current developments.
Just my $0.02.
My prediction is that the Navy will come to its senses.
ReplyDeleteSomeone will pull off the rubber mask of the Secretary of the Navy, a la Scooby Doo, and underneath it will be Chairman Xi.
He will then say bitterly, "I would have gotten away with it if it wasn't for that mangy Navy-Matters blog!"
Lutefisk
Thank you for this!!! Almost spit my morning coffee🤣
DeleteComNavOps,
ReplyDeleteI guess what really frustrates me about our disagreements is that most of the ideas we disagree on, I got from you. I’d like to walk you through my thought process.
Back in my active duty days, we in the Gator Navy thought the LHAs/LHDs were a mistake by putting too many eggs in one very expensive basket. One unlucky missile or torpedo and your whole assault was kaput. We pretty much all felt that a conventional PhibRon made more sense.
Finally realizing the risk, the Navy adopted the approach of keeping them 25-50 miles offshore. As you pointed out, from that distance there are no effective ship-shore connectors for armor and artillery—boats are too slow and ride too rough, V-22s and helos cannot lift the weight, and LCACs are not reliable enough to be trusted in an assault. So LHAs and LHDs are essentially useless in amphibious assaults. I think this fact is why Marines have started to think of themselves as extremely light infantry and come up with ideas like EABO and the LAW. I would take a page out of the Royal Marines book and focus the USMC on being a smaller, elite force concentrating on amphibious and commando ops.
I started out thinking in terms of the 12-15 carriers like in my active duty days. Like you, I prefer Nimitzes to Fords. Your proposed fleet has 27 carriers (15 Nimitz CVN, 12 CV), operating in modern versions of Marc Mitscher’s WWII 4-carrier task force. Those CTFs made sense to me. To avoid busting the budget, I began to think in terms of 24 carriers—12 CVNs like Nimitzes and 12 CVs like Kitty Hawk, probably costing in total something close to what it would take to build 12 Fords—making 6 wartime CTFs or 12 peacetime CVBGs (with 1 CVN and 1 CV). Since we have 10 or 11 CVNs now, adding 1 or 2 net would make 12, but it would probably take 10-15 years to get the upgraded Kitty Hawks into the fleet. Raising air wings would be a problem, but with that kind of lead time it should be doable. One thing I would do is to eliminate the Marine air superiority mission and focus Marine air on ship-to-shore movement and close air support, and move the Marine F/A-18s to Navy carrier air wings.
In that context, I started thinking about what we could do with the LHAs/LHDs. Parking $3B assets would not sit well with congress. I read the RAND report about future carrier options, and several other articles/reports mentioning the Lightning Carrier concept. I started out thinking in terms of 12 CVNs and 12 Lightning Carriers, but you convinced me that we needed something more on the low end. Since most of the LHAs/LHDs service lives will expire in about the 10-15 year time frame that it will take to get the Kittys to the fleet, I began to think in terms of converting the LHAs/LHDs to interim Lightning Carriers, and operating them in company with CVNs until they are replaced by the Kittys.
True, a LHA/LHD converted to Lightning Carrier is no match for a Nimitz. But they would not be fighting Nimitzes, and they are more than the equal of any carrier that anybody else has, with the possible exception of the French DeGaulle. If you took away all our CVNs, and just gave us 12 Lightning Carriers, we would still have the strongest naval air force in the world, by leaps and bounds.
As far as strike aircraft, I took my cue from your proposed air wings, and our percentage compositions are similar, with mine downsized a bit (but still way bigger than the USN is proposing) because I question whether a Nimitz can truly operate and maintain 108-110 aircraft. That’s the main difference between us, not some emphasis by me on the air strike mission. We used to vary our aircraft load with the mission, and I would expect to continue that. Also, with 4 carriers, not all of them would need to carry the balanced wings including AEW and ASW/patrol aircraft, making more room for fighters.
I have kind of walked you through how my thinking has evolved and how it has been significantly influenced by you. Thank you for your thoughts.
You have the belief that we are essentially on the same page and that's just not true. For example, I substantially disagree with almost every paragraph statement you wrote. I've explained (or tried to!) why in previous discussions so I won't bore you with a repetition. My thoughts may have triggered your own concepts but they are nowhere near the same.
DeleteI may disagree with your various concepts and conclusions but at least you're putting thought into them so the blog has accomplished at least part of its purpose!
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DeleteFair enough. I very much appreciate your providing a forum to discuss ideas. I do feel that some of my comments have drawn criticism from people who did not read them fully, or conflated them with things that I did not say. That is why I tried to walk through the evolution of my thinking. For anyone who wishes to respond to any of my comments in the future, all I ask is that you please comment on what I say instead of what I might have said 5 years ago when my thinking was different.
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