Friday, September 22, 2017

Another Layer of Oversight for 7th Fleet - This One Will Work, Right?

Here’s another entry in the Category of Oblivious Navy Leadership.

“The Navy’s Pacific Fleet is standing up a new command that will consolidate training and certification oversight for ships based in Japan, according to Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson.  …

Dubbed the Naval Surface Group Western Pacific, the new command will help ensure 7th Fleet ships are properly certified.”

The entire command structure, including CNO Richardson, utterly failed to properly oversee the 7th Fleet training, personnel needs, and certifications so the solution is to create yet another layer of oversight?  Cause, yeah, this one will work even though none of the existing ones did.

Hey, Navy, why not try making the existing command structure do what it’s supposed to do? 

Yes, that means fire the entire 7th fleet chain of command, including CNO Richardson, and all their staffs and start over.  Clean house.  Are you proud of the job you’re doing, Richardson?  If you had any honor you’d resign.



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(1)Navy Times website, “New Navy command will oversee Japan-based ships’ training and certification”, Geoff Ziezulewicz , 20-Sep-2017,


MV-22 and Landing Zones

Hopefully, you’ve all seen videos of Vietnam era UH-1 Huey aviation assault landings.  The helos come in fast in a turning, gut-wrenching drop, tightly packed, land hard, disgorge their troops in seconds, and haul out.  The entire assault landing is over and done in seconds.  The landing zones (LZ) were generally fairly small – just a clearing wide enough for several helos to land at the same time.

Now, let’s consider the MV-22 and LZ’s.  I’m led to understand that the MV-22 requires 250 ft separation when it lands – so much for a tightly packed group of assault craft!  Assuming several MV-22s (or more!) make up the assault package, where are we going to find an LZ that’s big enough to support several MV-22s all spaced 250 ft apart?  That’s going to require an LZ covering several city blocks!  That immediately rules out the type of small clearings that constituted LZs in Vietnam.

On a related note, a USMC Basic Officer Course assault document specifies the LZ diameter for a single MV-22 to be 175 ft if bordering obstacles (trees, buildings, etc.) are 5-40 ft tall and an LZ diameter of 250 ft for a single MV-22 if bordering obstacles are 40-80 ft tall.  In comparison, the LZ diameter for a UH-1 helo is 100 ft for an LZ with bordering obstacles 5-40 ft tall (1).

The implications of the preceding are:

  • LZ choices will be limited and much more predictable by the enemy

  • Large, wide open LZs will place the troops in open fields without any cover and require them to move across large spaces, potentially under fire the entire time, in order to reach cover around the periphery of the LZ

The alternative to large, wide open LZs is to land aircraft sequentially, one at a time.  Given the very slow landing performance of the MV-22, that will result in an assault landing going on and on, one aircraft at a time with each aircraft, in turn, becoming the focus of enemy fire.  Survival rate ought to be around zero in a contested landing.

These considerations may force the MV-22 to land only in uncontested, unopposed areas.  If so, this further degrades the assault effectiveness of the MV-22 by ruling out most useful LZs and pushing the landings so far away from the ultimate target as to eliminate the element of surprise and speed.  In short, I don’t see the MV-22 as being a viable option for contested assaults.

I am also unaware that the Marines have ever conducted a full scale MV-22 combat assault exercise.  They may have done so but I doubt it or we would have heard about it in glowing terms, no matter how badly it went, and we’ve heard nothing.  Shouldn’t we conduct such an exercise and find out now what the MV-22 can do rather than find out the bloody way, in actual combat?

Let’s take that America class amphibious ship that has no well deck and conduct a full scale aviation assault and see what happens. 

Before we conclude, let me be clear – there is very little public domain information on MV-22 combat landing performance so much of what I’ve discussed is speculative.  However, it is all reasonable speculation backed by data.  For example, I have seen no public information on MV-22 LZ landing speed (the time from entering the LZ’s small arms fire range until the aircraft has landed and troops can begin debarking) but there are plenty of videos of MV-22 landings and they are painfully slow.  I’m sure they would be faster in combat but the point remains that they won’t be anywhere near as fast as the helos they’re replacing.



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(1)“Assault Support Capabilities / Operations”, USMC The Basic School, Marine Corps Training Command, Camp Barrett, VA, Basic Officer Course, B2C0355XQ

Thursday, September 21, 2017

Sleepy Time!

Well, here’s a welcome bit of common sense rules regarding sleep requirements for sailors.  What’s the problem with sleep?  It’s that the sailors haven’t been getting any!  From a Navy Times article (1),

“Government watchdog studies have found sailors on ships working more than 100 hours a week, and have cautioned that this can lead to fatigue and reduced readiness.”

The standard U.S. business work week is 40 hours so 100 hours is 2.5 normal work weeks compressed into one, week after unrelenting week.  How long do you think you could do that before sheer, overwhelming fatigue began to make you lethargic and mistake prone?

Now, the Navy has issued new crew sleep guidance.

“In an internal Navy message issued Friday, Rowden said surface fleet skippers will be required to implement watch schedules and shipboard routines that better sync with circadian rhythms and natural sleep cycles.”

“Such a move aims to give sailors a more consistent and less erratic sleep schedule, resulting in a more rested and alert crew.”

“In further guidance sent out this week, skippers were given the choice from among several watch schedules that follow this natural cycle, according to copies of the messages obtained by Navy Times.

While the guidance does not mandate any specific schedule, it will likely mean the end of grueling 5-hours on, 10-hours off watch schedules, known as “five and dimes,” because that does not align with circadian rhythms and a 24-hour daily cycle.”

Well, that sounds great.  No more fatigued crews.

“You’re going to have to form some level of watch bill that protects sailors’ sleep,” Naval Surface Force spokesman Cmdr. John Perkins said.”

Of course, one can’t help but wonder how crews are going to get that sleep given that the reason they’re working 100 hour weeks now is because most ships are significantly undermanned.  The manning shortfall is going to be even more pronounced if more of the crew is sleeping more of the time!  This is what lead to the widespread use of waivers to get around all those nasty expired seamanship and warfare certifications that happened due to lack of time.  Are we just going read the new sleep guidelines, congratulate ourselves, brag to Congress about our proactive reactive actions, and then begin issuing waivers?  History says, yes.  History says shipboard fatigue and mistakes are not going to go away.  History says the Navy will find ways around the new rules just as they find ways around all rules that aren’t convenient.

No More Tired Sailors or Just More Waivers To Issue?


Optimal manning is not conducive to a good night’s sleep!



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(1)Navy Times website, “Navy issues new sleep and watch schedule rules for the surface fleet”, Geoff Ziezulewicz, 20-Sep-2017,


Wednesday, September 20, 2017

Amphibious Assault - Strategic Level Follow Up

As I anticipated, no one offered a concrete, specific, foreseeable need for an amphibious assault.  All the comments were, again as anticipated, a call for continued Marine Corps amphibious capability based on vague, theoretical features of amphibious assaults such as threatening an enemy’s coastline.

I’d like to address some themes from the post and comments.

First, the common comment response was that the mere threat of amphibious assaults will tie up huge amounts of enemy troops and attention.  This is a theoretical feature only.  As I described in the post, it presents no real threat because there is no real possibility of an assault.  Sure, we could somehow circle to the far northern coastline of the Russian tundra and conduct an amphibious assault but it would accomplish nothing.  We’d have no means of resupply.  There are no worthwhile targets in the area (center of gravity).  Winter weather (always just a few weeks away there!) would destroy any forces left after their initial supplies ran out.  It’s a theoretical threat but not a credible one.  And so on for the other cases.

Second, the enemies we’re facing each have hundreds of thousands of mines.  We have two dozen mine clearing helos and a handful of barely functional Avenger MCM ships to counter the threat.  We simply do not have the capability to conduct opposed amphibious assaults when mines are involved.  This is why the Desert Storm amphibious “feint” was never a real threat.  The presence of mines precluded the possibility of an actual assault (recall the mining of USS Princeton and USS Tripoli?) – Iraq’s Hussein was just too militarily incompetent to realize this.

Third, most readers incorrectly took the post to mean that I was calling for elimination of the Marine Corps.  In actuality, I called for a reduction, not elimination, down to 6 big deck amphibious ships with the ability to embark two MEUs.  I also called for port seizure as a core Marine capability.  I haven’t gamed that one out so I don’t know what force size/structure would be needed.

As an astute Anonymous commenter pointed out,

“Remember that the USA required over two years to mobilize and deploy forces to invade Normandy in 1944.”

Retention of 6 big deck amphibious ships and two MEUs (plus whatever additional port seizure force is needed) retains a core of amphibious capability that can be reconstituted in war if we suddenly find an unanticipated need for an amphibious landing.

My post proposal was not a call for elimination of the Marine Corps and amphibious capability but a reduction based on the foreseeable operational needs.  It makes no sense to maintain a fleet of 30+ big deck amphibious ships and a 180,000 man Marine Corps when there are no foreseeable needs for significant amphibious assaults.

If no other country in the world possessed airplanes, we wouldn’t maintain a fleet of fighters, would we?  We’d maintain a fleet of bombers but there would be no need for fighters.

Similarly, if no other country in the world possessed anti-ship missiles, we wouldn’t continue to build AAW focused, multi-billion dollar ships with Aegis/Standard, would we?  We would be smart to continue to develop AAW capability in R&D programs, against future need, but we wouldn’t continue to buy unneeded capabilities.

This is no different.  There is no reasonable, foreseeable need for major amphibious assaults so why buy the ships and maintain the force?  Besides, it’s not like we haven’t abandoned the amphibious mission before, and recently, at that.  For the last couple of decades the Marines have been exclusively focused on land based operations, albeit unwisely.  We lost our amphibious capability.  We’ve been slowly attempting to “rediscover” our amphibious capabilities. 

The final piece of the puzzle is the fact that we can’t actually conduct an amphibious assault from 25-50 nm standoff distance as our doctrine calls for!  So, we have no reasonable, foreseeable need combined with an inability to execute an amphibious assault even if there were a need.  Does that sound like justification to maintain a fleet of 30+ big deck ships and a 180,000 man Corps?

In short, there is no compelling reason to maintain the Marine Corps and amphibious navy at there current sizes.  This could change over time as needs and/or capabilities evolve but, for the present and foreseeable future, we need to drastically downsize.  We also need to carefully examine the need for port seizure and how to accomplish it.



Monday, September 18, 2017

Amphibious Assault - Strategic Level

We’ve devoted much discussion to amphibious assaults in this blog and we should given that it’s both a traditional US military capability and the foundation of an entire branch of the military – namely the Marine Corps.  We’ve talked about specifics like connectors, naval gun support, LST’s, logistics, etc.  Let’s back off a bit and look at the larger picture – the strategic level, as opposed to the operational level.

The first, and only, question is whether amphibious assaults are even needed from a strategic level.  I’ve repeatedly addressed this in comments and, obliquely, in posts and it’s time to formally address this.

From a geopolitical strategy perspective we have five foreseeable “enemies” that we can identify that will be concerns for the next twenty years.  The enemies are,

  • China
  • Russia
  • Iran
  • North Korea
  • Third World / Non-State

Let’s take a hard look at each enemy and consider the likelihood of needing to conduct an amphibious assault against each.

China.  Unless we are insane, we are never going to want to land troops on mainland China.  There is no geopolitical need to do that.  The land, itself, has nothing we need and comes with many problems (extensive land borders, cultural and ethnic issues, population problems, etc.) that make forcible entry into, and occupation of, China undesirable.  That only leaves the artificial islands that China has constructed and militarized or similar small, natural, militarized islands.  However, those islands will never be subject to amphibious assault if for no other reason than they are too small to hold any troops!  They’ll be destroyed with cruise missiles and forgotten – somewhat akin to the island hopping strategy of WWII.  The only conceivable use for an amphibious assault would be to reclaim a foreign country that China has seized, such as Taiwan, Philippines, or Vietnam

From a geopolitical perspective, the only one of those that would realistically justify an assault is Taiwan.  We simply don’t care enough about Vietnam to fight for it.  China has already begun the annexation of the Philippines but will conclude that “peacefully” as they’ve done with the South China SeaChina will conduct political maneuvers aimed at ousting US influence and enhancing Chinese influence, as they’ve already started to do.  They’ll flood the country with state sponsored immigration (already underway) until the balance of population shifts to Chinese and then simply and slowly absorb the economy and government and the “Philippines” will align with China and become a Chinese state in all but name.  At that point, the US will have no internationally recognizable rationale for an invasion. 

Within the context of a Chinese Philippines (Chilippines?), seizing the Philippines as part of a larger war effort might be a possibility.  However, we are likely looking at a Chinese fortified Philippines scenario as being 20+ years down the road and, therefore, beyond the time frame of this post subject.

Taiwan remains the one possible amphibious assault scenario.  In any war scenario, Taiwan will be seized by China as the first order of business for two reasons:  one, China has always stated that Taiwan belongs to them and the opportunity of a war simply makes the seizure inevitable and, two, China cannot afford to leave Taiwan as a possible base of operations for the US so deep in its territory and so close to its mainland.  The seizure will occur quickly – far quicker than the US could possibly respond.  The US will be faced with a fait accompli.  If the US wants to retake Taiwan, it will have to be after a massive amphibious force buildup.  Given the proximity of Taiwan to mainland China, an amphibious assault to reclaim the island would be conducted under the very near umbrella of mainland China’s air power, missile power, naval power, and with a close and ready resupply of an almost unlimited amount of manpower.  This is the farthest possible scenario from a “quick” Marine Corps assault using existing forces.  Such an assault would require years of build up.  Is the US likely to do that?  I think not.  A Taiwan seizure will, unfortunately, be a one-way affair.  China will seize it and it will not come back.

Thus, there is very little need for amphibious assaults in a China war scenario.

Russia.  There is very little usable or useful Russian shoreline to assault!  That’s one of the geopolitical problems that Russia faces and is probably one of the reasons they seized Crimea.  A war with Russia will be a land war conducted through Europe.  The Cold War plans still largely apply.  There is a very remote possibility that an assault against the far eastern regions could occur which would be intended to seize military bases along the Sea of Ohkotsk.  Far more likely, though, is that those bases would be neutralized with cruise missiles and relegated to unimportance.  There is just no reason to attempt to seize the bases or the region.  There is nothing there that the US would want.

Further, there is no foreseeable scenario in which US troops would attempt to enter mainland Russia.  Combat would occur around the periphery of the Russian borders and would be aimed at restoring the pre-war boundaries.

Thus, there is no need for amphibious assaults in a Russian war scenario.

Iran.  Most combat forces would enter Iran through Iraq.  While there is a possibility of wanting to land troops somewhere along Iran’s coastline, this would not be an amphibious assault but just an unopposed unloading of troops and supplies through an already seized port or across an uncontested beach.  Iran simply does not have the capability to oppose a landing. 

Thus, there is no need for amphibious assaults in a Iranian war scenario.

North Korea.  There is some small possibility of the need for an amphibious assault along the northern shoreline.  This would be a diversionary assault or raid rather than a major, sustained assault.  The bulk of combat will be land based and troops and supplies will enter through South Korea via secured ports and airbases. 

NKorea possesses a vast inventory of mines which will be used to protect the northern shoreline.  Coupled with our almost complete lack of mine countermeasures, there is probably little likelihood of attempting even a small scale diversionary assault.

Thus, there is no need for amphibious assaults in a NKorean war scenario.

Third World / Non-State.  This is the case that is most likely to require amphibious assaults.  Assaults into Middle East locations or Africa to deal with terrorist threats or, less likely, South America to stabilize collapsing countries are conceivable.  However, given the nature of the threats, any amphibious assault would be limited in size and scope and the assault itself would likely be unopposed and revert to a simple unloading.  A single MEU/ARG would be the likely force size required, at the high end.

Thus, there is a conceivable need for amphibious assault of a limited and, likely, unopposed nature.

As a general observation, unless someone miraculously takes over the entire Pacific, as Japan did, we’re never going to need to island hop our way across an ocean again.  That recognition, alone, eliminates a huge chunk of the need for amphibious assaults.  Similarly, unless someone miraculously seizes all of Europe, we’re never going to need to conduct another Normandy invasion.  That recognition eliminates most of the remaining chunk of need for amphibious assaults.

We see, then, that there is no compelling geopolitical need for major amphibious assaults and no resulting military strategy requiring major amphibious assaults to support the geopolitical needs.  There remains a possibility of small assaults that would be more akin to unopposed unloadings than opposed assaults.

So, what does this tell us about our amphibious fleet force structure?

The obvious conclusion is that we don’t need 33 large deck amphibious ships!  A single MEU/ARG consisting of three ships is sufficient.  If we want to play it safe and call it six ships to allow for reinforcement and overhaul unavailabilities, that’s fine.  So, six amphibious ships should be sufficient.

In fact, since we just concluded that amphibious assaults are so unlikely, we now have to ask, why do we have forward deployed MEU/ARG’s?  And, if we don’t need forward deployed MEU/ARG’s, we don’t need the traditional 3-ships-to-support-one-forward-deployed.  Instead, we can take our six amphibious ships and keep them home ported until needed and provide proper maintenance along with occasional training stints.

The one valid argument for forward deployed, amphibious Marines is crisis response:  embassy protection, evacuation, terrorist response, short term stability operations, etc.  There is a valid and ongoing need for this capability but this leads to the next question which is, is an Amphibious Ready Group the best way to provide this kind of response?  Is keeping several major warships and an entire Marine Epeditionary Unit afloat for months at a time the best way to meet the need?  Alternatively, could the Army’s rapid response, aviation transported units better meet the needs?  There is a valid argument to be made that keeping crisis response troops home-based with aviation transport available on short notice is a more economical and more effective method of providing crisis response.  A MEU can only be in one area at a time and can only respond within that specific area.  An aviation transportable Army unit, however, can respond anywhere. 

The problem that any crisis response force faces is escalation – the threat rapidly escalates beyond the original level and reinforcements are needed very quickly – Mogadishu, for example.  That specific issue – excalation/reinforcement – is, however, a topic for another time.

We should also note that crisis response forces have historically been small and very light compared to a full MEU.  Again, this argues against the need for a forward deployed MEU/ARG.

All of this suggests that we should reevaluate our amphibious doctrine.  Rather than prepare for major amphibious operations that are extremely unlikely, perhaps we should be preparing for small, uncontested landings/unloadings and, perhaps, the Marine’s aviation-centric shift is not without merit.

To sum up,

  • We only need around 6 major amphibious ships.
  • We should keep our amphibious ships home ported.
  • We should investigate whether a MEU/ARG is the most economical and effective crisis response force.
  • We should reevaluate the MEU force structure in light of the historical “light” nature of crisis responses.
  • We should reevaluate Marine manning levels.

I love the Marines and desperately want to see them remain part and parcel of the US Armed Forces.  However, I just don’t see the need for major amphibious assaults in the next 20+ years.  That doesn’t mean that the Marines should be eliminated but it does mean that we should reexamine their missions and force structure.

Now, there is one other potentially useful function that the Marines can perform and which I see as far more likely than the classic amphibious assault and that is port/airfield seizure.  In any war, we are going to need access to ports for unloading the massive amounts of supplies required to keep any invasion going.  To a much lesser extent, the same applies to seizing airfields although it is simply not possible to keep an invasion going via airlifted supplies.  The tonnage and volume movement is just not there.

Port seizure is a completely different game than an amphibious assault.  The operations, tactics, and equipment are radically different.  Also, since most (all?) major ports are intimately and physically intertwined with cities, a port seizure becomes a specific case of urban warfare which brings its own set of challenges which are entirely different from the classic amphibious assault.

The likelihood of port seizures within the context of geopolitical and military strategies should be carefully evaluated.  Unfortunately, I’m simply not in a position to make that evaluation. 

All that said, my conclusions can and would change if we felt port seizure was a likely strategic need and made it a Marine mission.  Right now, however, port seizure is not a specific Marine mission in the sense that they have the equipment, doctrine, tactics, and training to accomplish it.  To the best of my knowledge, the Marines/Navy have never practiced a port seizure.  If you ask a Marine general whether port seizure is a mission, I’m sure they would say yes but it’s not really a mission if you aren’t equipped for it and have never trained for it.

I understand that most of you are going to disagree with the conclusion of this post.  That’s fine.  Feel free to tell me why.  However, do not engage in “what if”.  What if Russia takes over Europe and we need to conduct another Normandy invasion?  What if China suddenly launches an instantaneous seizure of the entire Pacific Ocean?  “What if” is not a viable or logical argument.  If you think we need to retain significant amphibious assault capability, tell me, specifically, where and under what circumstances it would be needed.  Nothing else is reasonable or logical.

Also, do not engage in “you never know” – we need to keep our current Marine force structure because you never know what will happen.  “You never know” is an argument that has no logical basis and can’t be countered.  It’s also an argument for unlimited capabilities because …  well …  you never know.  Using that argument, we should have 98 super carriers, a ten million man Marine Corps, and a thousand B-2 nuclear armed bombers in the air continuously because …  you never know.

The practicalities of budget, industry, and manpower preclude “you never know” force structures.  Therefore, “you never know” is not a valid argument.

Give me something specific or accept the conclusions of the post.


Friday, September 15, 2017

China's Carrier Construction

The Chinese are embarked on a massive aircraft carrier building program.  Here’s a brief look at the current state of affairs.

Type 001.  This is the former Soviet Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier that eventually became the Chinese carrier Liaoning.  It arrived in China in March 2002.  The rebuilt Liaoning began sea trials in August 2011 and was commissioned in September 2012.

Type 001AChina has since initiated the construction of a domestically built Type 001A carrier which was launched in April 2017 and is now undergoing fitting out and trials (1).  Construction had begun in March 2015.  This carrier is, outwardly, a copy of the Liaoning with a ski ramp for aircraft launches.  The design is, no doubt, much improved over the Liaoning.  The ship is tentatively scheduled to be commissioned around the 2020 time frame.

Type 002.  A third carrier is under construction – begun in Feb 2016 - and is likely to be a conventional cat and trap carrier with a steam catapult.  The ship is reported to be around 85,000 tons.

Type 003.  A fourth carrier is reported to be under development as a 100,000+ ton, nuclear powered supercarrier that will feature EMALS launch systems and a fully functional air wing with AEW, EW, and tanker aircraft.


Admittedly, the first two carriers are not Nimitz class supercarriers by any stretch of the imagination.  The Type 002 will likely be equivalent to the early Forrestal class or the modernized Midway.  The Type 003 will probably be China’s attempt at a true supercarrier to rival the US Nimitz/Ford carriers.  The takeaway from this is not the number or quality of China’s carriers but the pace of development and construction.  China has gone from no carriers to multiple carriers in service, under construction, and under development in less than fifteen years.  That’s breathtaking when compared to the glacial pace of U.S. military development and construction.

Yes, China’s development efforts have been aided by massive technology acquisition efforts, both legal and illegal that have allowed China to make significant “unearned” leaps in technological expertise.  For example, China’s carrier development efforts have been aided by its acquisition of the former Australian carrier, HMAS Melbourne.  Reportedly, the Chinese used the Melbourne to reverse engineer the catapult system.  The salient point, though, is that however they’ve done it, the Chinese have embarked on a very rapid climb up the capability mountain.  It is the trend that should be worrisome rather than the current status.



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(1)China Defense Blog, “Construction of China's 1st homegrown aircraft carrier ahead of schedule”, 4-Sep-2017,


Thursday, September 14, 2017

USS McCain Cyber Attack Investigation

The Navy is investigating the possibility that cyber hacking was involved in the recent collision between the USS McCain and a merchant ship (1).  The Navy is doing this as a cyber warfare test case exercise rather than because anyone believes that cyber hacking occurred.  I so often criticize Navy leadership but this deserves accolades.  This is an excellent opportunity to do a live warfighting test of the Navy’s counter-cyber capabilities and to begin establishing procedures.  Who knows, maybe there was hacking involved?  Until you do the investigation, you won’t know.  Therefore, treat it like there was an attack until you prove otherwise.  That said, please don’t misconstrue what I’m saying.  I’m not even remotely suggesting that a cyber attack occurred.

One interesting aspect of this incident that the article points out is that a cyber attacker would have been more likely to hack the merchant ship’s systems, causing it to steer into the McCain, than to try hacking the destroyer’s systems.  That presents a challenge from an investigative perspective, in trying to get access to the merchant ship’s systems.  That, in itself, is a lesson learned, already!

I would also hope that the investigation might uncover cyber vulnerabilities, as they proceed, even they weren’t exploited.  There is nothing but good that can come from this.

This needs to become routine and, indeed, it appears that it will be.

“The Navy is making cyber investigations automatic after any mishap, starting with the at-sea collision that killed 10 sailors aboard the USSMcCain.”

That’s outstanding, if overdue.  We know that China, Russia, NKorea, and Iran are conducting cyber attacks on US systems routinely – and that’s only from the incidents that have been made public!  There are, undoubtedly, many more that have not been publicized.

I cannot say enough good about the Navy’s action on this.  In fact, the only negative is how long it has taken the Navy to initiate this investigation.  They should have been on the case immediately but, hey, this is the first test case so I’ll cut them some slack.

Well done, Navy!


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(1)Breaking Defense website, "Was The Merchant Ship Hacked? McCain Collision Is First Run For Navy Cyber Investigators",Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 14-Sep-2017,