Free Super Hornets

The current issue of Proceedings (1) has an article about the worsening tactical aircraft shortage and the role the F-35 plays in it.  The author’s recommendation is fascinating.  He suggests that the Navy drop the F-35C and, instead, buy the same number of F-35A’s.  Because the “A” model costs $79.5M less than the “C”, the author claims that for each “A” the Navy purchases they can get a “free” Super Hornet.  The F-35A’s could be returned to the Air Force, warehoused, or whatever;  it doesn’t matter.  This course would maintain the overall purchase numbers that are vital to the Air Force and State Department (foreign sales) and yet provide the Navy with new Super Hornets.

It’s becoming clear that the F-35C is not well suited to carrier life and represents little improvement for the Navy over the Super Hornet.  The author’s suggestion is an intriguing alternative!

(1) United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Averting the Navy’s Tactical Aircraft Crisis, Ensign Anthony Robinson, June 2013

F-35 Cost Analysis

Before you read any further, do yourself a favor and go get some aspirin.  If you don’t have a headache now, you will.  Time website has a 5-part article (1) analyzing the cost of the F-35 program.  It’s not pretty!  Here’s some notable points from the article:

-Costs are reported various ways which can make the costs seem higher or lower.  The article does a nice job of describing the reporting methods.  The most relevant seems to be the Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) which considers only the actual purchase costs over the entire buy.  R&D costs are omitted. 

-The article points out that the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) and other documents which are the best source of information are only reporting the cost of the plane without an engine.  The engine costs were broken out as a separate program with separate costs.

-APUC costs for an F-35 with an engine are $104.8M per plane in base year (2012) costs and $135.7M per plane in current year costs.  These are average costs over the entire buy and do break out the various models.

-The author points out that the costs are obtained by dividing the costs by the number of airframes.  However, the number of airframes has been decreased almost every year and will undoubtedly be reduced further, probably significantly.  This will push the average cost figures higher.

-The article debunks the myth of serial production savings resulting in any significant lowering of costs.

-Unit Recurring Flyaway (URF) costs are also debunked with the article pointing out that the plane can’t actually fly, let alone engage in combat, with the limitations imposed by the URF method of accounting.  The URF excludes support, training, spare parts, fuel, technical documents, or the inevitable upgrades and fixes that will ultimately be applied to make the plane flyable.

-Actual appropriated procurement costs rather than estimated APUCs show an average procurement cost from 2008 through 2014 of around $210M per plane with the 2014 production run costing $219M each.  Yikes!!!!  Also, that figure is rising for last several years, not falling as serial production efficiencies should be kicking in.

-The true cost impact of the F-35 program must include the large sums paid to upgrade various legacy aircraft due to the F-35’s excessive delays.  Those costs are not accounted for in conventional analysis.

These costs are eye opening to say the least.  The most important point is that all the estimates depend on the current planned number of aircraft actually being built and that is 100% certain not to happen.  The total buy will be significantly reduced as costs continue to rise and as the buy is reduced the costs will further increase.  That’s the definition of a vicious circle.

For the F-35 fanboys among you, if you’d like to dispute the costs you’d better back it up with some pretty accurate and specific data.  This is the most comprehensive and best cost analysis I’ve seen of the program.  If you want to dispute it, do so with facts!

Also, bear in mind that I'm reporting on the article.  If you want to argue, you'll be arguing with the author of the article, not me.  Personally, I see nothing in the analysis that I greatly disagree with but I have not checked out the numbers for myself.

This program is killing the military and the Navy in particular.  The Navy is going to be saddled with a generation of aircraft it doesn't really want and that offers little improvement over existing Super Hornets.  Very disappointing.

(1) http://nation.time.com/2013/06/03/the-new-era-of-good-f-35-feelings/ , Winslow Wheeler, 3-Jun-2013

Surface Ship Torpedo Defense, SSTD

Here's a bit of good news ...  A NavSea public relations release (1) describes recent tests of the Surface Ship Torpedo Defense (SSTD) conducted aboard the USS Bush (CVN-77).  The system combines an automated torpedo detection capability with an active, hard-kill torpedo defense weapon consisting of an encapsulated miniature torpedo.  Like a surface to air missile, the mini-torpedo is launched to intercept the attacking torpedo.  NavSea describes the seven test iterations as successful though without providing any details.

The release notes that the system is only an engineering prototype.  Still, this is a capability that has been an obvious need for decades so it’s good to see progress being made.  The only disquieting aspect of this is the 2035 date listed as the goal for equipping the ships.  That’s a long way off for a system that’s at the full scale prototype stage. 

A Feb 2012 Appropriation/Budget Activity document (2) describes the intent to outfit several carriers over the next couple of years with developmental versions of the system rather than wait for production models due to the high threat level.

On a related note, the British Navy has an SSTD based on passive countermeasures that is already operational.

We’ll keep an eye on this system as it continues to develop!

(1) http://www.navsea.navy.mil/NewsView.aspx?nw=NewsWires&id=246

(2) http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2013/Navy/stamped/0603506N_4_PB_2013.pdf

Small Missile Boats and Regional Sea Control

Many people advocate greater production and use of small missile boats of one type or another by the Navy.  Unfortunately, these people rarely elucidate a clear and useful mission for these craft.  They believe the Navy should have them but they aren’t really sure how they would be used.  Is there a use for small missile boats in today’s navy?  If so, what is it?  How would small boats be used in combat and how would they fare?

A friend of ComNavOps, currently serving in the Navy, offered some thoughts on small missile boats that suggest a valid, indeed vital, use for such craft.  Let’s start with an analogy.  Carriers use their air wing to keep the area around the carrier group free of unwanted pests so that the group can go about its business.  The aircraft are, essentially, regional control platforms for the region surrounding the carrier.  In this example, the “region” is mobile, moving as the carrier moves.

Consider, now, the many strategically important and localized areas (regions) around the world that could benefit from a constant naval presence.  These include the Strait of Hormuz, specific areas of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, various shipping lanes, chokepoints around the Chinese A2/AD zone, contested sites around the Philippines and Japan, etc.  These areas are all “peaceful” but would benefit greatly from a continuous naval presence with a respectable combat capability yet able to economically perform the more mundane peacetime activities of patrol, surveillance, and presence.

Now, remembering our concept of regional control aircraft, let’s apply this to the regions we just listed, however, instead of using aircraft let’s substitute small missile boats.  Thus, squadrons of small missile boats become our regional control platforms.  They perform peacetime patrol, surveillance, and presence functions with enough punch to give an enemy pause but at a fraction of the cost of a multi-billion dollar Aegis ship.  The key is having enough combat power in each ship (or the squadron as a whole) to make an enemy hesitate in whatever mischief they might be contemplating.  Not to pick on the LCS, but as a comparison point the LCS has no credible combat power and, therefore, offers no credible deterrent effect.

What are the requirements for effective regional sea control?  Well, half of the requirement is surveillance.  You can’t control what you can’t see.  Thus, missile boats should carry the most powerful sensor suite possible for their size and cost and be able to self-designate targets through the complete range of their weapons.  Small UAVs might well enter into this by providing long-loiter, long range surveillance as a supplement to the vessels on-board sensors. 



Egypt's Ambassador MkIII - Regional Sea Control Platform



The other half of the requirement for regional control is, as we mentioned, combat power.  You can’t control what you can’t destroy.  The threat of destruction is what leads to compliance. 

We see then, that our notional missile boats need a powerful sensor suite and credible combat power.  There are any number of small missile craft throughout the world that could serve as templates.

Of course, in the event of full scale conflict, small missile boats would be unlikely to survive long on their own.  That’s OK, though, because that’s not their function.  We have Aegis ships and carrier groups to deal with that type of scenario.  However, even in an all-out conflict, small missile boats can be used to maintain regional awareness of lower intensity combat areas and help keep their area free of enemy assets while operating under protective air support or Aegis AAW.  Even within the context of high intensity combat, small missile boats could prove to be a useful asset under the right circumstances.  I’ll leave discussion of the tactical uses for another forum.

We see, then, that small missile boats could have a valid and highly useful mission as regional sea control assets.  Unfortunately, the Navy’s attitude towards small combat craft is not very positive.  However, the reality is that the Navy is between a rock and a hard place with ever increasing demands for presence and a severely limited budget and shrinking fleet with which to meet those demands.  It’s time for an attitude adjustment, Navy.

A Commercial Navy?

Not withstanding some of the recent examples of new ships, naval vessels are generally characterized by strong construction, a degree of armor, extensive compartmentation, enhanced firefighting systems, high speed, and other features designed to allow a ship to fight, take damage, continue fighting, and survive.  Commercial vessels lack most of those characteristics and would be ill-suited for combat scenarios.

Consider, though, that the majority of combat scenarios we can reasonably anticipate will involve lower end threat levels and somewhat more permissive environments.  For example, putting small forces into African nations, staging anti-terrorist raids, conducting rescues, clearing mine fields, etc. would all involve combat with little risk to an offshore staging/basing vessel.  For that matter, even more intense combat scenarios would often be conducted in a protected, reasonably permissive environment under the watch of an Aegis escort and/or friendly air cover.

If we are willing to accept a reasonable degree of risk, many of these functions can be filled by commercial type cargo/barge vessels at a fraction of the cost of naval vessels.  I’m not suggesting that commercial standard vessels should replace naval amphibious ships or operate in extreme forward, high threat environments.  I am suggesting that commercial vessels could supplement our naval vessels in many scenarios at a fraction of the cost.  In concept, the USS Ponce which has been fitted out as an Afloat Forward Staging Base is an example of this type of vessel except that it is a full fledged naval vessel.  Given that it was due for retirement anyway, the low cost conversion to an AFSB was warranted.  The Navy has indicated a desire for additional AFSBs but budget constraints have derailed those plans.  Commercial vessels might well be able to fill the AFSB roles in many scenarios at an affordable price.  Heck, forgoing a single multi-billion dollar new construction amphibious ship would fund several commercial AFSB type ships.  The Navy has got to face the reality of constrained budgets for the foreseeable future and selective use of commercial vessels offers an alternative way to maintain as much capability as possible.

If the requirements for combat and damage control are removed from consideration, as we’re discussing here, what’s left is, for all practical purposes, a commercial barge or cargo vessel, is it not?  One could easily imagine a small fleets of commercial vessels providing the backbone of a permanent African presence, supplementing the standing Mid East forces, and assisting in presence and patrol duties in select areas around the Pacific.

Barges, in particular, offer a great deal of capability, under the right circumstances, for next to no cost.  Consider the photo of the barge in this post.  It’s quite large and was designed by Cross Marine in Utah as a floating hospital complex for use in remote regions.  Picture it as a base for Special Ops, helo units, UAV intelligence gathering, small unit basing, a mothership of sorts for small patrol craft, etc. 



Cross Marine's Hospital Barge



The possible uses for commercial vessels and barges are virtually unlimited and offer a viable, low cost option to supplement naval capabilities during these budget constrained times.  It’s worth thinking about!

Fire Retardant Clothing

Honestly, Navy leadership is staffed with absolute idiots.  As reported by the navy.mil website (1), the Navy is revising its clothing to incorporate a degree of flame retardancy.  That’s fine but it’s clear that leadership is doing so only in response to poor PR rather than a belief that it constitutes an actual danger.  Here’s the relevant quote from the article.

“Historical data reviewed by the working group showed the likelihood of a major conflagration on a ship is low, though the consequences could be severe to fatal.  The working uniforms currently in use, including the NWU Type I, are deemed safe when worn properly under normal steaming conditions.”

Other than the entire history of naval warfare and the entire history of peacetime disasters, I guess there’s no real evidence that fire is a major threat at sea.

Uniforms are safe under normal steaming conditions?????   I think that’s the whole point!!!!  Flame retardant uniforms are for when you’re not steaming under normal conditions – like when you’ve collided with a projectile or another ship and you’re on fire.

A professional writer who stoops to name calling, personal attacks, and gutter level trash talking risks their professional reputation.  Recognizing that, ComNavOps is, nevertheless, going to indulge for a moment.  Sometimes there is no other way to properly express an idea than with the most basic language possible.

Navy leaders are a bunch of freakin’ a—holes with absolutely no concern for the men and women in their charge.  Every one of these idiots should be fired.

Sorry, readers.  Nothing gets to me more than leaders violating the trust that has been granted them by the people they command.  Rant over. 

(1) http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=74485

Counterbattery Fire

We previously discussed the conceptual origins of the LCS as presented in a Proceedings article (1).  Read the post, here.  The Proceedings article is one of the best naval writings I’ve read in recent years.  I urge you to find a copy of the magazine and read the article in its entirety.  One of the aspects of the original LCS concept that we mentioned but did not dwell on was the ability to conduct counterbattery fire.  I’d like to examine that concept in more detail.

The article listed several capabilities that a littoral vessel should have and one of them was the ability to conduct counterbattery fire.  The article had this to say about the conceptual vessel,

          “It should have some kind of counterbattery capability to respond in real time to
           a shore-based missile attack.”

The original LCS concept, as we see, was to include the ability to stand in littoral waters and fight back against shore-based attacks on ships.  The key phrase is in the quote is “… respond in real time …”.  Thus, the littoral vessel would identify an attack, backtrack its point of origin, and conduct counterbattery fire before the launch site or platform could relocate.

Think about this capability for a moment.  What is the Navy’s biggest fear (well, one of them at any rate) in conducting amphibious operations?  Why, it’s the land-launched anti-ship missile.  That’s the reason the Navy is now doctrinally refusing to close with shorelines and why the Marines are struggling to figure out how to get ashore from amphibious ships stationed 20-50 miles offshore.  What if the Navy had a ship that could stand inshore and counter land-launched missiles?  That would greatly expand the flexibility and range of options for an amphibious force or, for that matter, for any force operating near shore for whatever reason.

Of course, a counterbattery-capable ship would not prevent the initial launch of a missile but it would limit the enemy to one shot per launch site or launch platform.  It wouldn’t take long before the enemy would become very reluctant to conduct land-based anti-ship attacks if the result was a destroyed launch platform each time.  Aegis ships would, of course, deal with the missiles that did launch.  That’s what Aegis is designed to do.  The combination of an Aegis missile umbrella and a littoral ship with counterbattery capability to limit launch sites to one shot would make for a pretty effective overall shield for amphibious operations.

 

Counterbattery Fire Needed



Remember the Scud hunts during Desert Storm?  The problem was not locating the launch position;  it was getting ordnance to the position before the mobile launchers could relocate.  An effective counterbattery capability would have greatly changed the conduct of that conflict, though with the same end result.  Inordinate resources were diverted to Scud hunts from other missions with largely ineffective results.

Let’s look at counterbattery fire a bit deeper.  Although not explicitly called for in the article, a reasonable extension of the counterbattery capability would be the application of counterbattery to artillery and mortar attacks as well as anti-ship missiles.  In general terms, ships frequently operate in close proximity to land during passages (canals, straits, and various chokepoints) and other missions.  This creates a vulnerability to artillery and mortar attacks.  Picture a ship trapped in the Panama Canal and having to fight off terrorist mortar attacks.  The ability to conduct counterbattery fire on artillery and mortars would be invaluable.  Further, the ability to actually defeat incoming ballistic ordnance would be very desirable.  In fact, the basis for doing so already exists.  The Phalanx CIWS has been adapted by the Army for land use in exactly that role and is referred to as C-RAM (Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar).  Adding that capability to the Navy’s CIWS would enhance a ship’s ability to operate in near-shore scenarios.

I believe that counterbattery was one of the most important, arguably the most important, of the capabilities in the original littoral ship concept.  Unfortunately, it was never pursued.  Even the aborted NLOS was not a counterbattery weapon but, rather, just a general land attack capability.

While I remain dubious about the actual need for a littoral vessel, if the Navy is determined to pursue such a ship, counterbattery fire should be one of the first requirements.  Counterbattery would also make a reasonable addition to the Zumwalt which is intended to fight moderately near-shore.

 (1) United States Naval Institute Proceedings, “Birth of the Littoral Combat Ship”, Captain Robert Powers (Ret), Sep 2012, p.42