The US military recognizes that the geography of the Pacific region dictates that a war with China will be a naval and air war. What’s more, an astute - or just semi-literate – naval analyst will recognize that the war will be, substantially, a submarine war. Of course, US Navy admirals do not qualify even for the semi-literate classification so who knows whether they recognize this or not? Regardless, the rest of us recognize the primacy of the submarine in this conflict. With that understanding, let’s take a closer look at submarine warfare and its counter, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), in a war with China.
Numbers
The obvious starting point is numbers and both sides have submarines – something the US Navy seems to forget/ignore so let’s check each side’s respective submarine numbers.
China
China has around 64 submarines of all types with the majority being SSKs. Excluding the SSBNs, the total is 56. Obviously, it is very difficult to know exact numbers and there is some uncertainty about the active/inactive status of some vessels. Acknowledging that, the numbers break down as follows:
|
Type |
Class |
Qty. |
|
SSN |
Han class (may be inactive/reserve) |
3 |
|
SSN |
Shang I class (Type-093) |
2 |
|
SSN |
Shang II class (Type-093A) |
4 |
|
SSBN |
Jin class (Type-094) |
8 |
|
SSK |
Ming class (Type-035) |
4 |
|
SSK |
Song class (Type-039) |
13 |
|
SSK |
Yuan class (Type-039A/B) |
18 |
|
SSK |
Kilo class (Project 877/Project 636/Project 636M) |
12 |
|
|
Total |
64 |
In addition, China maintains many older SSKs in reserve status and these could play a pivotal role in a sustained war after both sides lose many of the front line submarines.
United States
The US currently has 68 active submarines that break down as follows:
SSBN 14
SSGN 4
SSN 50
Of course, unless we enter a nuclear war with China, the 14 SSBN are of no combat use which leaves us with 54 combat submarines compared to China’s 56.
In addition, the US is still on the long anticipated downward trend which is projected by the Navy’s latest 30 year plan to bottom out at a low of 46 SSN in 2028 and will not reached a sustained 50+ level again until 2034. This also assumes no additional early retirements – not a bet I’d care to take.
So, at the moment, the US and China have equal numbers of submarines with China being mostly an SSK force and the US being exclusively nuclear.
SSK
United States naval observers keep clamoring for SSKs because they are so quiet and effective. Turning it around, that must mean that Chinese SSKs are a major threat to us.
Given the geography of the East and South China Seas, where combat can be reasonably anticipated to take place, China’s conventional submarines have significant advantages related to acoustics and stealth. The traditional disadvantages of SSKs – range, endurance, low speed, etc. don’t really apply when operating so close to home ports. Therefore, China, with a fleet of 47 SSKs enjoys a potentially significant tactical advantage, being able to saturate chokepoints and operating areas with extremely quiet, nearly undetectable submarines that suffer few of the SSK disadvantages.
Should the Chinese submarines attempt to venture out from the first island chain, the advantage would flip to the US with its nuclear subs.
 |
| Chinese Yuan Class SSK |
SOSUS
China has established a network of SOSUS-like listening arrays throughout the first island chain.[1, 2] US submarines will have a difficult time penetrating the first island chain and operating undetected.
On a related note, China has acknowledged having listening stations monitoring undersea activity around Guam.
The Chinese government has revealed the existence of two underwater sensors situated between the United States island of Guam and the South China Sea. …
The state-run Chinese Academy of Sciences only disclosed the pair of acoustic sensors earlier in January 2018, but had been operating them since 2016, according to a report from the South China Morning Post. One of them is in the Challenger Deep, located at the southern end of the Marianas Trench and the deepest known point on earth, and the other is situated further west near the island of Yap, part of the Federated States of Micronesia. Both reportedly can pick up acoustic signatures more than 620 miles away, putting them within range of Guam and the major strategic U.S. naval base at Apra Harbor.[3]
Similarly, the US and Japan have reportedly established a network of listening arrays throughout the first island chain and extending into the Indian Ocean.[4] Chinese subs will have a difficult time operating undetected.
Since both sides operate listening arrays, this would seem to favor neither side. However, the extreme quiet of the SSKs might seem to offer an advantage to China.
ASW
The US has much greater experience and institutional knowledge about ASW although the Navy seems intent on squandering that advantage by refusing to produce combat-effective ASW assets. For example, the P-3 Orion was not suited to operating in contested areas and replacing it with the nearly identical P-8 Poseidon was foolish. The LCS-ASW variant has been officially abandoned, leaving the Navy with no dedicated ASW surface vessel. The Burkes, while ASW-capable, in theory, are woefully deficient in training and are far too expensive to risk playing tag with Chinese SSKs.
To compensate, the US needs to focus its submarine force o on ASW, dropping strike, ISR, special ops, and any other non-ASW mission. This singular focus is necessary to produce maximum competency and thereby negate China’s SSK advantages. New submarine designs and construction with this singular focus would have the effect of making subs cheaper (no VLS) and, therefore, more numerous. It also makes them smaller and quieter. All else being equal, smaller is harder to detect than larger. VLS serves no purpose for the submarine’s main mission of ASW or even its secondary mission of anti-surface warfare. If we want land attack subs then we should build dedicated SSGNs.
The US desperately needs to begin realistic, intensive ASW training using actual SSKs as enemy surrogates. Some time ago we leased the services of an SSK for such training but we ended that practice and no longer have dedicated training against SSKs, as far as I know.
Where is our Top Gun for submarines where dedicated enemy sub simulators and surrogates operated by exquisitely trained instructors specializing in enemy tactics teach submariners how the enemy will fight and how to defeat them? We don’t have such training. The Navy has made noises about establishing such an organization but has, thus far, failed to provide actual SSKs and dedicated OPFOR crews to man them. Without that, any minor training efforts are just paper exercises.
Closely related to ASW training is the practice of anti-ASW, meaning the evasion and escape from, and defeat of, enemy ASW forces? To the best of my knowledge we do not practice that at all.
Confined Waters
Confined, often shallower waters present unique characteristics when compared to the open ocean, deep sea waters that US submarines are used to operating in. Salinity, density, thermoclines, depth, conductivity, acoustic propagation, etc. are all different inside the East and South China Seas. This confers a familiarity that gives Chinese submarines a ‘home field’ advantage. Are we actively and aggressively collecting data on the physical characteristics of the waters inside the first island chain? I would hope so but I’m not aware of any sustained program along those lines.
The differing physical characteristics dictate different submarine tactics than those used in open ocean scenarios. Are we practicing confined water (E/S China Sea) submarine tactics? Again, I would hope so but there are no programs that I’m aware of. While there may well be physical characteristics data collection that I’m not aware of, it is far less likely that there are tactics programs that I’m unaware of. I know for a certainty that there is no equivalent to Top Gun.
Summary
Both sides have equal numbers of submarines with China leaning heavily towards SSKs while the US favors nuclear subs. Both sides have listening arrays which possibly confers a slight advantage to the Chinese SSKs.
One would hope that we are diligently working on locating Chinese SOSUS arrays and have lans to destroy them at the outset of war. Finding and planning/training for the Chinese SOSUS destruction would be a worthy mission for SEALS instead of being a land combat force in the Middle East.
Neither side possesses useful, tactically relevant ASW forces. P-8s cannot survive in the anticipated operating area. US surface forces are nearly inoperable as regards ASW. When war comes we will not risk Burkes conducting ASW and, indeed, would be foolish to do so. Burkes are nearly non-functional due to lack of training. The LCS has been eliminated as an ASW asset.
On the other hand, China is completely without submarine or ASW experience and likely has little acoustic data on US submarines.
The winner of the submarine/ASW fight will win the war and the winner will be the side that trains the hardest and most realistically. While I have no knowledge about Chinese submarine warfare training, I can say that the US is not training hard, is not training productively, and is not training realistically. That doesn’t bode well for us.
We just don’t seem to be serious about war.
__________________________________
[1]Forbes website, “China Builds Surveillance Network In South China Sea”, H. I. Sutton, 5-Aug-2020,
[2]http://www.hisutton.com/Cn_Underwater_Great_Wall.html
[3]Drive website, “China Reveals It Has Two Underwater Listening Devices Within Range of Guam”, Joseph Trevithick, 30-Jun-2019,
[4]https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/fish-hook-sea-bed-sosus-network.448398/
So the world's biggest, newest navy, staffed by the world's smartest people, with more money than God, and facing only one real threat – submarines – has no useful, tactically relevant ASW forces? Is completely without submarine or ASW experience? Likely has little acoustic data on US submarines?
ReplyDeletePlease!
They also have no real MCM forces, no real opposed landing capability, and have forgotten that EMCON exists.
DeleteThe money you mentions goes into concurrency, pork, and making sure that sailors have Appropriate Thoughts only.
"They also have"
DeleteThe person you're replying to is talking about the Chinese navy, not the US.
Oh.
Delete"Is completely without submarine or ASW experience?"
DeleteThat is a mere statement of fact. The Chinese have no operational submarine or ASW experience. They are only now beginning to venture out of their backyard and into the wide open oceans.
"Likely has little acoustic data on US submarines?"
The US has assembled extensive acoustic data on Soviet/Russian - and now Chinese - submarines by trailing them for years/decades. The Chinese have no such operational history and, having confined themselves to the E/S China Seas until recently, have had no opportunity to collect acoustic signature data on US subs.
"has no useful, tactically relevant ASW forces?"
US submarines will operate largely outside the E/S China Seas with occasional forays inside. The Chinese have no open ocean, long range ASW forces with operational experience. Hence, the ASW forces they have are inexperienced and are not tactically relevant.
"world's smartest people"
That's a matter of opinion; an opinion that would seem at odds with their dependence on theft of data and intellectual property for knowledge and advancement.
Your comment is a collection of opinion and factually incorrect statements. Please try to do better on future comments.
In general, I agree with this. :)
ReplyDeleteA few things.
Our subs should train for both ASW and ASuW. If a war starts around Taiwan, sinking invasion/blockade ships will be more important than sinking Chinese subs.
I agree that we shouldn't be building VPM'd Virginias. They're too expensive for too few missiles. We also should immediately drop the current plan for the SSN(X), which is expected to cost TWICE as much as the Virginia class. That's before the inevitable DoD markup. If we're not going to just continue to iterate on the Virginias, SSN(X) should try and hit the same price point, or even lower. Any design that doesn't stay close should be tossed out. Numbers matter.
We should buy our own SSKs. Somewhere between 20 and 40. The German Type 212/214 seems to be about right. They don't need to replicate SSN capabilities. They need to be inexpensive enough to buy in volume without a big dent in the SCN budget. They also can't push the technical envelope. Low cost and low risk. Their job would be threefold:
1) Use half of them to provide mass in the Pacific. Base in Japan, perhaps Singapore, maybe port/refueling visits in the Philippines. 10-20 boats on FDNF rotations could keep 5-10 at sea at any moment. Focus on Taiwan and other China Sea hotspot areas.
2) Use 3-6 to create a Red Team to train every deploying task force and ASW asset. This can be a prestige position for sub crews, much like Top Gun instructor is for Navair.
3) Sprinkle the rest around the world to under-resourced narrow seas with potential hot spots (e.g. Baltic Sea, Persian Gulf). These areas aren't really suitable for SSN operations.
"I agree that we shouldn't be building VPM'd Virginias."
DeleteThe logical extension of this is that we shouldn't be building submarines with ANY VLS tubes. The 12 VLS cells of the Block I-IV Virginias serve no operationally or tactically useful purpose. They just add cost and size.
Again, if we want land attack submarines (yes!) then we should be building SSGNs.
ALL vessels should be single function. Multi-function leads to sub-optimum capabilities and that's how you lose in combat. A submarine's primary function is launching torpedoes (ASW/ASuW). A VPM-Virginia has a third or so of its size and cost dedicated to a tertiary function. That's badly out of whack and it's why submarines cost so much.
How much smaller, cheaper, and quieter would a Virginia be if it had NO vertical launch tubes. Fewer tubes would also mean a small decrease in crew size which would, in turn, mean smaller berthing requirements, smaller food storage, fewer heads, less fresh water requirements, and so on. A significantly smaller sub can use smaller propulsion systems. And so on. If we want numbers of subs, we need to stop making every sub a do-everything platform.
I don't know how much smaller and cheaper they would be without any VLS, but I suspect the difference would be less than you'd think. Would be interesting to know though. If it's only tens to a hundred million, I'd be inclined to keep the two VPTs, but i'm not hard set on that.
DeleteThe size will be dictated by the overall number of weapons carried, the size of the combat systems, the crew size, and the level of quieting required. It's easier to quiet a larger boat. More space and weight margins for vibration isolation, thicker hull, and so on.
I'm not in favor of land attack subs. Land attack requires a LOT of ordinance. SSGNs just don't bring (and sustain) enough weapons for the dollars spent, IMHO. Arsenal ships may be more vulnerable but the munition dollar to hull dollar ratio is far in their favor.
" I suspect the difference would be less than you'd think."
DeleteWell, let's look at actual numbers.
When you look at a schematic drawing of a Virginia, the Block I-IV VLS tubes consume around 8% of the ship's volume by eyeball estimate. The VPM adds 83 ft to the sub's 377 ft length which is a 22% increase in length. So, total VLS accounts for somewhere in the vicinity of 25%-30% of the ship's size. That's a significant amount and would have a significant impact on cost.
The Block V increases the displacement from 7900 t to 10,200 t. That's a 29% increase.
The most recent Virginia Block I-IV cost around $2.5B. The Block V costs around $3.45B. That's a 38% increase.
There. Now we don't have to 'think' or 'feel'. We have actual numbers. I'm surprised you didn't collect the numbers yourself before commenting.
The Block V changes certainly are expensive. Presumably, the majority of the cost increase goes to the VPM module addition, but there are other changes related to "Acoustic Superiority".
DeleteHowever removing the two VPTs from the previous design may or may not net a proportionally similar reduction in volume or cost. There may be other constraints that keep the boats the same length, with or without. Remember the Improve Los Angeles class program added 12 tubes without changing the overall length or volume.
I'd be open to all options to reduce cost and increase numbers, especially with SSN(X).
There's no question that eliminating 25-30% of the sub's length, volume, and displacement would significantly reduce the cost so we've settled that question.
DeleteIt would, but it's not clear you can eliminate 25% of the bow section of the Virginia class, where the current VPT reside, without a major redesign, due to things like hydrodynamic flow over the sail, position and opening of torpedo tubes, and so on.
DeleteNow with a new design, all options are open.
Of course it would be a new design. Why would you think otherwise?
DeleteWell there's always the option to keep updating and producing Virginias. It is a mature design and production pipeline.
DeleteAny new design introduces risk.
The original proposition was the removal of all VLS tubes and how that would result in a smaller, cheaper, quieter submarine. You agreed but cast doubt on the cost savings. I demonstrated the ballpark degree of cost savings (30% or so). You then made an incredibly obvious observation that such a change would result in a new design. Now, you seem to be arguing that a new design introduces risk - another incredibly obvious statement. You seem to be arguing for creating a new design by removing the VLS and, simultaneously, arguing against a new design because it introduces risk.
DeleteAre you simply arguing for the sake of arguing or do you just enjoy making obvious statements? Unless you have something worthwhile to offer that's not incredibly obvious, this ought to be the end of this thread.
One SSGN solution would be to refurbish low-milage LA class ships and the retiring Ohio class into SSGNs. But instead of wearing them out with endless deployments, generate genuine Naval Reserve crews taking them out only for periodic training missions and surge them as needed. They would be single-tasked and thus free up the Virginia class for hunting Chinse subs. In wartime, once they've shot their load of tomahawks, they can do defensive duty protecting US coastlines until they are reloaded and sent out for another strike.
DeleteThe hardest thing to sell on this idea wouldn't be refurbishing the hulls but getting the Navy to produce an actually combat effective Naval Reserve.
What about keeping the VLS tubes but loading them for antiship missiles instead of land attack Tomahawks? Right now if we were to conduct a missile attack against enemy warships using capsule Harpoon, the sub is limited to 4 shots from 4 tubes: you blow the load and then go evasive. The same math applies if we're using Mk48.
DeleteWith those 12 tubes reassigned to antiship missiles, a Virginia can now deploy 16 weapons in an attack against surface ships,a four-fold increase in throw weight and chances of a sucessful weapon hit.
"Fewer tubes would also mean a small decrease in crew size which would, in turn, mean smaller berthing requirements, smaller food storage, fewer heads, less fresh water requirements, and so on."
DeleteThis doesn't appear to be borne out by history. SSN-688 had 13 officers and 121 enlisted; SSN-719 and subsequent VLS-equipped LAs had 12 officers and 98 enlisted, a reduction in crew.
Crew size on the Ohios remained at 15 officers and 140 crew, regardless of whether they had 24 Trident tubes or 154 VLS tubes.
"What about keeping the VLS tubes but loading them for antiship missiles"
DeleteLots of problems here.
The Harpoon is not a ship-killer unless many hits occur. A torpedo is a much more efficient ship-killer.
Harpoon is an old, slow, non-stealth, obsolete weapon that can be expected to be largely unsuccessful against Aegis-type defenses. Why waste sub space/size on a weapon with an anticipated poor success rate? I'd rather have more torpedo tubes than Harpoon tubes.
VLS launch tubes make the sub bigger and drive up the construction cost. Is that a good use of money when the weapon is not anticipated to be generally successful?
Anti-ship missiles require long range target data which is difficult for a sub to generate. This makes missile use an unlikely event. If you have solid targeting data, you're probably in torpedo range and torpedoes are far preferred over missiles because they're difficult to defend against and have a much higher success likelihood and they're much better ship-killers.
"This doesn't appear to be borne out by history."
DeleteYou're ignoring all the other factors like the Navy's official minimal manning programs and increased automation. Every piece of equipment on a sub needs some degree of additional crew for monitoring, operating, and maintaining.
More VLS means more crew. The total crew requirements may decrease because of other factors.
"When you look at a schematic drawing of a Virginia, the Block I-IV VLS tubes consume around 8% of the ship's volume by eyeball estimate."
DeleteDoes that mean a VLS-less Virginia-class would only cost $2.3 billion? And, how much smaller would a VLS-less Virginia-class be?
I can't imagine it would be very much since they take up little space as it is. The upside is that it might increase torpedo storage space.
But, how small a sub are you thinking? A smaller sub also means carrying fewer torpedoes.
"Does that mean a VLS-less Virginia-class would only cost $2.3 billion?"
DeleteIf the size were reduced by 8% then, yes, as a crude, conceptual approximation.
"how much smaller would a VLS-less Virginia-class be?"
As a crude, conceptual approximation it would be 8% smaller.
"A smaller sub also means carrying fewer torpedoes."
Removing the volume taken by the VLS cells would not affect the torpedo load at all since there are no torpedoes in that volume now, anyway.
Are you being deliberately obtuse or is the logic of this beyond you?
If you wish to keep commenting, you need to drastically improve the quality of your comments.
"The Harpoon is not a ship-killer unless many hits occur. A torpedo is a much more efficient ship-killer."
DeleteThe antiship missile doesn't have to be Harpoon or Tomahawk - JSM and LRASM are stealthy antiship missiles that can already be fired out of surface VLS, and we already have sub-launched Tomahawk, so it can't be too hard to make JSM and LRASM submarine-launchable (if the will to develop it existed, of course).
In this case, I'm not attempting to do a long range attack with missiles - rather, my thinking is for a multi axis attack at around 20 kilometers away. Assuming a high subsonic speed of 800 kmh for easy math, LRASM impacts the target in 90 seconds, Mark 48 in 12 minutes (and it can take longer if the target goes to flank speed, a stern chase is a long chase afterall). Firing either weapon type means the enemy only has to defend against one axis of attack: firing both forces them to defend against torpedo and missile attack.
Every weapon deployed is a roll of the dice against the enemy: my thinking is I want to roll as many dice as I can.
We could go with the Seawolf route as an alternative approach, I suppose - but my impression is that it's easier to design a sub to be longer to fit more VLS than it is to make it wider to fit more torpedo tubes - it's my impression that being wide is a bad thing for submarines.
Alternatively, assuming the submarine was carrying supersonic antiship missiles: an attack from 20km away might be instantly detected, being within the radar horizon, but the flight time of an AShM traveling at Mach 1.2 is only 48 seconds. That might be enough time for point defenses to engage one or two missiles, but not a dozen. Of course, that would require us to HAVE supersonic antiship missiles: Britain and Japan are developing such weapons, and it would be useful to piggyback off that R&D (or just buy the finished product and make it in America).
Delete"The antiship missile doesn't have to be Harpoon"
DeleteAt the moment, that's all we have in service. If/when another sub-launched, anti-ship missile becomes available, we'll reassess.
"multi axis attack"
"firing both forces them to defend against torpedo and missile attack"
It doesn't work that way because of the speed differential between the two weapons. Assuming you mean for a simultaneous time on target, the torpedoes would have to be launched well before the missiles. This gives the target ship time to begin its defensive maneuvering (running away). Twelve minutes later, the ship needs to execute its anti-missile defense. The target will have already done all it needs/can do about the torpedoes.
Launching missiles also provides an exact location of the sub for an ASROC type counterattack. In contrast, firing torpedoes, especially at an initial slow speed, offers the sub a chance to vacate the launch point. Torpedoes can also be guided to an off axis location prior to run in, again affording the sub a chance to safely evade the counterattack.
Anti-ship missiles are simply not needed. The Mk 48 has a 50+ kt sprint speed and, if fired in no-escape range, have a high probability of hit. Missiles consume space, increase the sub's cost, give away the sub's location, are less lethal than torpedoes, and are not needed to achieve good results.
" firing both forces them to defend against torpedo and missile attack."
DeleteThis is analogous to putting 16" guns on a carrier so that the carrier could attack with both planes and naval guns. Yes, on paper, that's theoretically possible but the drawbacks far outweigh the advantages.
My thinking was more that we fire Mk 48 first, going slow, and then fire our missiles once the torpedoes' get closer and start sprinting. The attack distance of 20km away was chosen to be outside ASROC engagement range.
DeleteMy concern with Mark 48 is that at sprint speed, surely it will be detected by the enemy, and in order to get into the no escape zone, the launching submarine must get inside the radar horizon - at which point, if we're here, we might as well add missiles to the mix.
The reason I suggest antiship missiles is because I've read that in the cold war, SSNs carried encapsulated Harpoons and fired them out of the torpedo tubes for antiship attack. To my mind, if antiship missiles on subs are a bad idea, why did they do that then? It puzzles me.
DeleteThe UGM-84A submarine launched Harpoon was retired in 1997, if I recall correctly. Ask yourself why, if it was such a good idea?
DeleteWhen we talk cost, 8 torpedo tubes is going to cost more than 4. I assume with this torpedo wielding SSN we will be wanting some of these to offset the loss of VLS? It makes sense to me that there might be some manning trades in favor of having 1 less weapon system on board, but how much day to day maintenance etc do VLS need that would even be possible on an SSN?
Delete"Are you being deliberately obtuse or is the logic of this beyond you?"
DeleteYour posts have been highly entertaining as of late.
With the Navy procuring Tomahawks with an antiship capability, those 12 VLS cells would be rather useful.
"The UGM-84A submarine launched Harpoon was retired in 1997, if I recall correctly. Ask yourself why, if it was such a good idea?"
DeleteIt wouldn't be the first time we've abandoned a system that our adversaries have continually refined - consider that we had very little in the way of SHORAD, battlefield EW, or supersonic antiship missiles: all things that our adversaries continued developing.
Now, I'm not the same guy as the fella who suggested submarine launched LRASM, but it strikes me that there are two potential reasons for why sub Harpoon went away in the 90s: first, with only 4 tubes, a 688 can only generate a salvo size of 4 missiles, which is, as you've said, inadequate for penetrating Aegis-level defenses. The other reason is that it was the 90s, in the lean years of the Clinton administration, when everything was being cut because of the peace dividend. I remember all the rhethoric about the peaceful world in that decade...
Maybe the answer should be using tubes and VLS to generate AShM salvoes. 4 tubes + 12 VLS = 16 missiles.
DeleteAlthough it seems to me that would probably work better for commerce raiding and attacking convoys (assuming China will actually do convoys)
For ASW/ASuW you can complement torpedoes with missiles, not cruise missiles but dedicated anti ship missiles. They can be fired from farther away. I agree that targeting is more complicated (no periscope ...) but not much more so than for a destroyer.
ReplyDeleteThe problem is that modern Aegis type defenses, which China has, are deemed capable of defeating saturation missile attacks. The handful of missiles that could be launched won't overwhelm such a system so they wouldn't accomplish anything and their launch would give away the sub's position. It is far better for the sub to achieve torpedo launch position since torpedo defenses are very poor.
Delete"The handful of missiles that could be launched won't overwhelm such a system so they wouldn't accomplish anything"
DeleteWhile I agree with the spirit of your comment, I'd like to see this scenario actually tested for once, outside of a simulator.
" I'd like to see this scenario actually tested"
DeleteAmen!
IMO and I'm hoping I'm wrong, im far more worried about training and general level of "combativity" of our USN crews than numbers game with Chinese.....for me, SSK have 3 advantages right now:
ReplyDelete1. Take pressure off current fleet of SSN in the training role. If the USAF can get old F16s updated to the point they are almost surrogate 5th gen fighters, I can't see why we can't do the same with an SSK, maybe get 80% of a SSN for maybe 50% of the cost and increased availability? Not only are SSN than training more in "real" world compared to just some simulation training but you have to factor in the dissimilar training SSN crews are getting. USAF and USN pilots over and over again have stated its not good to train against each other, far better and safer sometimes to get dissimilar training.
2. Combativity. Reading reports about collisions with other ships and hitting that undersea mountain, safe to say, most outside USN observers have the right to question the general level of "combat fitness" of USN crews and especially its officer corps. Are they REALLY ready to face combat? Or did the captains just hit all the boxes, stayed out of trouble, outlived the competition by just having a heartbeat and got the command? I'm exaggerating but by how much??? Having SSKs as an aggressor squadron like Top Gun would make sure that captains get that combat experience plus like air wing carriers do, have them training against SSKs just before they go on patrol, work out the kinks, get the crew and officers ready for war. You could tailor the training for the mission set the SSN is going to get too, kind of workup to the mission. Or it could be just sub vs sub work.
3. Last but not least and dove tails with #2, right now, officers just go thru their careers and then, end up in leadership roles. With an SSK fleet, you get a chance to "season" the newest up and coming leaders before sending them to the big boy club of SSNs. Just imagine 10 to 15 SSK captains, fighting each other, other SSNs, patrolling all the global chock points and generally creating mayhem, being super aggressive with USN top leaders tolerating some mistakes AND weeding out the captains that just aren't cutting it. Better find out NOW on a SSK than a SSN that the captains are a bit weak OR just needs some time, not all great captains showed up for prime time ready....ex: Star Trek analogy, right now USN has too many Capt Picards and not enough Capt Kirks!!! We need a better balance.
We need to get back some aggressive spirits and I think a fleet of SSKs properly used can bring it back to the sub fleet.
In an invasion of Taiwan, China wins the ASW fight if they can simply deny US submarines the ability to accomplish ASuW / Strike missions within the first island chain (keep US subs from interfering in the invasion). In this scenario, a tie goes to China.
ReplyDeleteIf the goal is a naval blockade of China, US subs operating in the Indian Ocean could deny oil imports from the Middle East. SSN's are a huge advantage vs. SSK's in this scenario.
A big unknown are Japanese SSK's. Would they engage offensively against China? Or sit back and guard the Japanese islands?
"Or sit back and guard the Japanese islands?"
DeleteJust to offer a few thoughts on offense versus defense ... As the old saying goes, the best defense is a good offense. Want to stop sub attacks? Destroy their 'sub pens'. Want to stop ballistic missile launches? Destroy the launch sites and missile manufacturing facilities. And so on.
I have no idea what Japan's subs would do but sitting back and playing defense is likely the worst option.
Just something to consider.
"Confined, often shallower waters present unique characteristics when compared to the open ocean"
ReplyDeleteToday's sonobuoy makes submarines (all type) difficult to survive in shallow waters where temperature and salinity changes are too small to protect submarines. Worse for nuclear powered submarines is their IR signature, heat released from cooling nuclear reactors. This heat cannot fully dissipate in shallow water thus the other side can screen water temperature, then, throw sonobuoys.
One problem for sonobuoy is that they are one use consumable which means $$$$$$$$
"sonobuoy makes submarines (all type) difficult to survive in shallow waters"
DeleteYou appear to have some misconceptions. 'Shallow' is a relative term. The South China Sea, for example, is shallow relative to the open ocean but the largest, central area of the SCS is still on the order of 4000 m deep with a wide bordering band around 500 m deep. The presence of many islands of course means that there are many shallower regions but submarines would, generally speaking, avoid those. Please look at a South China Sea depth chart. There are many available on the Internet.
Sonobuoys are no greater threat in these waters than in the open ocean. In fact, in truly shallower waters, sonobuoys lose effectiveness due to increased noise from bottom flow, bottom debris, increased shipping noise, biologics, etc.
Salinity varies widely due to fresh water from inland rivers flowing to the sea and mixing in.
I am unaware of any practical, tactically useful thermal sensor that can detect submarines. If you know of one, please give me a reference.
You need to do some homework on these subjects.
What I said "shallow water" means continental shelf, usually less than 600 feet.
DeleteThere is one from USNI mentioned infrared signature of nuclear submarine:
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/june/theres-case-diesels
If surrounding water body is not big enough (too shallow), then, aircraft with precision IR sensor can detect a body of water warmer than surrounding area.
" infrared signature"
DeleteThe article you cite mentions a submarine's heat signature but makes no mention of it being detectable. As I said, I am unaware of any practical, tactically useful submerged submarine IR detector. Feel free to speculate about this but do not present it as a real capability unless you have a reference about a fielded, functional detector.
Regarding depths, you need to look at a map of water depths in the South China Sea.
Try this:
Deletehttps://min.news/en/science/4abe6e4aa2ca6cd470d1dcc10e806ae2.html
The article you cite is a poor translation of a Chinese article. The article appears to be a PURELY THEORETICAL calculation of temperature effects.
DeleteI repeat, there is not practical, effective, tactically useful thermal detection of submarines.
I agree with the major premise we need more ASW focus. VPM Virginia's won't help us much, agreed.
ReplyDelete12 cell VLS subs are going to cost and weigh nearly the same as an SSN without them. The sub diameter has mostly been the minimum needed for the quieting, growing to the current 34 feet.
Compare dry weight and length back at the beginning. SSN-717 was a 688 without and SSN-719 had them. Their lengths are the same. Light displacement of the VLS sub is 0.3% heavier.
Our Virginia SSNs also have the most numerous and largest sonars afloat. That is what we are paying for aside from quieting and nuclear endurance. We play away games, that's the anty. Our SSKs will be XLUUVs as they evolve. The UK and Australia will also have similar UUVs coming out. Lets see how they vary or are similar to our own. Australia's will be U.S> designed from resources in the same labor pool as XLUUV.
I think limited VLS will continue to have value for different payload flexibility, not considering land attack. We may need a snap shot to take out a red air ASW asset. Plus a supersonic attack outside torpedo range will still be on a red formation very fast. Its a threat to us, and its a threat to them as well. I bet we still see an SM-6 variant coming from SSN VLS tubes.
Finally, the next SSN will be even larger. 40 year reactor with electric propulsion borrowed from Columbia. At 2 per year we'd be building toward 12 SSBNs and 68 SSNs. We'll be happy in the long run. 6 billion at 40 years with a Seawolf style torpedo room will serve us well. It also makes a good starting point for a Jimmy Carter replacement or subbing in the SSGNs if needed. Keep designing the next sub, but leverage Columbia's tech while its fresh.
Also on topic. I often wonder how much we don't know about a current Mk 48. I hope its basically a tethered UUV with a warhead if need be. Also, if I were using one and it could go long range, I might fire some Harpoons and Maritime Tomahawks to complicate the game for the target. https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/11/03/better-weapons-complex-training-bolster-us-submarine-force/
ReplyDelete"Are we actively and aggressively collecting data on the physical characteristics of the waters inside the first island chain? I would hope so but I’m not aware of any sustained program along those lines."
ReplyDeleteIsn't that what that unmanned underwater vehicle was doing when it was hijacked by the Chinese at the end of the Obama administration?
On the other hand, the "controlled flight into terrain" by the USS Connecticut a few months ago suggests that we certainly aren't doing enough mapping of the sea floor in the region !!
We do have survey ships. I hope they are out there doing something along these lines.
DeleteOne ASW mission often overlooked is Convoy Escort. Chinese subs are much less likely to be targeting well protected Carrier groups than the enormous supply chain supporting that group. During WW2--and the Reagan Administration--the Coast Guard was tasked to assist with both convoy escort and coastal ASW. If the Navy was willing to help foot the bill, this could once again be viable.
ReplyDeleteFor coast ASW cutters as small as the Sentinel class could work with P-8s (which would be flying over US airspace-NOT contested airspace) carrying torpedoes and a small dipping sonar to hunt targets detected by sonar buoys. Larger cutters could have a bow sonar installed as well as torpedo tubes, and the big Legend class could carry USN SH-60's instead of rescue helicopters.
The ASW systems could be operated by Naval or Coast Guard reservists since they wouldn't be needed on a full time basis.
Ironically, the CG actually has some recent real world experience hunting submersibles and semi-submersible drug smuggling vessels. (The excellent Covert Shores website covers this in detail.)
Last September at the American Society of Naval Engineers’ annual Fleet Maintenance and Modernization Symposium Rear Adm. Jon Rucker the program executive officer for attack submarines said of its 50 nuclear attack submarines only 32 operational at one time, 18 are in maintenance (with the infamous example of Boise 8 years out of service as no nuclear yard capacity available to carry its overhaul) and with two submarines dedicated to each operational carrier group the number drops to 24/26 for other operations.
ReplyDeleteWould assume from the Chinese massive shipbuilding industry compared to US they have the resources to keep many more of their SSK submarines fully operational so would expect in Taiwan conflict that would give them a two to one advantage in operational submarines.
PS The priority in the design of the Virginia SSN was low cost coming after the high cost of Seawolf SSN, maintenance was a low priority and now seeing the result, for the new Columbia SSBN Navy keeping focus on maintenance.
Conventional SSK vs nuclear SSN, would be of interest to know numbers of the 22 IJN SSK in maintenance if the same percentage as the USN SSNs at a third plus, would be surprised if numbers as high, cost the second of the new lithium battery powered Taigei SSK class , ~70 billion yen ~$500 million, 25 five months in build from keel laid to commissioning, the last Virginia SSN commissioned Montana twice as long in build 49 months, at ~$3 billion six times the cost, question as always how do you evaluate the undoubted advantages of nuclear vs conventional vs the drawback of nuclear costs leading to such small numbers of submarines?
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/09/22/next-generation-attack-subs-will-be-designed-with-maintenance-in-mind/
I would consider SSGNs as the primary conventional strike platform. I would want SSNs to be a mix of Virginia VPMs as secondary strike platforms plus ASW, and a bunch of cheaper and smaller ASW-only SSNs. I would also like some SSKs to perform coastal and choke point missions, freeing the SSNs for blue water assignments.
ReplyDeleteMy ideal submarine force would look something like:
SSBNs - 12 Columbia (not sure they are worth the money, but the ship has already sailed on that ecision)
SSGNs - 20 based on Ohios
SSNs - 30 Virginia VPM, 30 something like French Barracuda
SSKs - 30 with AIP
Assuming USN subs are half Atlantic, half Pacific, numbers compared to current Chinese PLAN numbers would be:
SSBN - USN 6, PLAN 8
SSGN - USN 10, PLAN 0
SSN - USN 30, PLAN 9
SSK - USN 15, PLAN 47
TOTAL-USN 61, PLAN 64
EXCLUDING SSBN-USN 55, PLAN 56
Comparable numbers in total, with commanding USN lead in nukes, looks like a manageable situation. Of course, China can be expect to increase numbers significantly beyond current levels, and USN is well short of those numbers, and will remain so without aggressive increases in shipbuilding. USN will presumably have an edge in quietness for some time, and that can offset numbers to some extent.
Bottom line is that clearly the USN needs to ramp up submarine production significantly.
I'm not sure it's really necessary to divide the subs half and half between Atlantic and Pacific (except for the SSBN's), given that no other potential enemy navy comes anywhere close to China's.
Delete"I'm not sure it's really necessary to divide the subs half and half between Atlantic and Pacific"
DeletePerhaps not. That was more for rhetorical purposes than anything else. We do need some in the rest of the world, so we can't just compare 100% of our numbers to 100% of theirs. But we do need to outnumber them, or more specifically out-capbility them, in the region.
"we do need to outnumber them"
DeleteNo, that's a spreadsheet mentality. We need however many subs are required to execute out strategy (if we had one). If that means more subs then that's what we need. If it means less subs then that's what it means.
We can't get caught up in a numbers comparison. What's important is the ability to execute our strategy and providing the assets to do that, whatever those numbers are.
"We need however many subs are required to execute out strategy (if we had one)."
DeleteI knew you would chime in with that, which is why I added, "more specifically, out-capability them." We do need whatever it takes to execute our strategy. But first we need to figure out what our strategy is.
"more specifically, out-capability them."
DeleteNope, that's still not it. Having superior capability does not ensure that we can accomplish our strategic objectives (if we had any). Superior capability as a goal is actually the substitution of technology for strategy which is what's plagued the US military for decades now. We've substituted technology for strategy.
We need a strategy and then we need the means to accomplish that strategy. 'Superior capability' or 'techological superiority' is not necessarily required. As a ridiculous illustrative example, if we could accomplish our strategic objectives using lots and lots of low tech, capability-inferior dynamite, then we wouldn't need superior capability. Light amphibious warships (LAW) are not 'superior' to anything but if they allow us to accomplish our objectives then that's fine. The Ford represents overwhelmingly superior technology and capability but it's useless, not just because it doesn't work, but because it's too expensive to risk in combat even if everything worked perfectly.
I can't seem to get you to think strategically. You keep wanting to revert to nice, neat numbers and divisions (half Atlantic, half Pacific) or things you can quantify (we have x more carriers than they do). Think strategically! Maybe we don't need any carriers to accomplish execute our strategy ... or maybe we need 50 carriers. How we compare numerically or even technologically to the enemy is irrelevant.
The Viet Cong didn't have superior capability or technological superiority and yet they prevailed. We had overwhelmingly superior capability in Afghanistan and yet we lost.
Stop thinking in terms of quantities, technology, and capabilities and start thinking strategically !
"I can't seem to get you to think strategically."
DeleteI disagree, and will try to address that later.
"You keep wanting to revert to nice, neat numbers and divisions (half Atlantic, half Pacific) or things you can quantify (we have x more carriers than they do)."
The original post was about numbers, so I was responding in a similar vein. Heck, you yourself started the original post,
"The obvious starting point is numbers and both sides have submarines – something the US Navy seems to forget/ignore so let’s check each side’s respective submarine numbers."
As far as starting from strategy, perhaps I need to lay out the strategic concept that has driven my thinking. I do get down to spreadsheets and numbers in the end, because that's the best way to summarize, but that's not what drives anything.
The thought process is
1) what is our best outcome (objective) and what is the optimum strategy to get there?
2) what do we need to execute that strategy and achieve that objective?
3) how do we best get there with expected costs and budgets (this is where the spreadsheets come in)?
With what's left of my 4000 character allowance, I can't go through that here, but will try to put together another post to walk through it.
"The original post was about numbers"
DeleteAs an assessment of what each side has, not as a basis for specifying a strategy-based force structure!
"I need to lay out the strategic concept that has driven my thinking"
DeleteSo far, the only strategy you've discussed is some type of containment with no consequences (appeasement?) even though China has already broken out of containment (bases in the Pacific, Africa, and elsewhere. You haven't tied that containment into any particular force structure. Your force structure and your strategy seem to be separate, independent items. For example, your insistence on equally sized and evenly spaced groups around the world do not tie into any strategy. They're just arithmetic based.
I give you credit in that you're putting more thought into this than most people but you haven't yet made the leap into linking strategy and force structure/size.
"So far, the only strategy you've discussed is some type of containment with no consequences (appeasement?)..."
DeleteNo, that's not even close.
My "some kind of containment" has a very specific objective of keeping China off the first island chain. That requires a combined economic, diplomatic, and military effort to achieve. Appeasement has no part in that strategy.
DeleteChina has already breached the first island chain, bypassed it, and is working on surrounding and annexing it. They've established bases in various places in the Pacific, are working on acquiring more basing rights, have bases in Africa, are making inroads in SAmerica, are pushing into the Middle East, are actively converting the Philippines to a vassal state, are pushing Vietnam into a corner, are setting the stage for an imminent invasion of Taiwan, and are in the process of annexing/allying several other first island countries.
DeleteI'm sorry to be the one to tell you this but your strategy is already obsolete and invalid.
"I'm sorry to be the one to tell you this but your strategy is already obsolete and invalid."
DeleteIt's difficult, and becoming more so the longer we wait. The problem with the "Pacific Pivot" is that it never actually pivoted. But obsolete and invalid, no. And if you want to argue that it is, then fine, what do you propose as an alternative.
But until China actually has possession of some part of the chain, it is not impossible. And if PLAN can be cut off at the chain, all those advance bases are pretty useless and difficult to maintain.
"I'm sorry to be the one to tell you this but your strategy is already obsolete and invalid."
DeleteIf this were a land campaign I might be inclined to agree with you. If the Soviets had been able to extend the Iron Curtain to include Germany, France, and Italy, then the fact that Switzerland and Austria were still our friends would matter little.
But this is a naval environment. None of the first island chain (1IC) nations want to surrender to China. They are currently making various degrees of accommodation to China, because we are not there providing a viable alternative. But if we put together an attractive economic, diplomatic, and military package, like Truman and Marshall offered western Europe after WWII, I would still bet that we could get them on board. And today we can still access the 1IC easily, while our presence there could make it hard for PLAN to access its forward bases.
China isn't interested in fair fights. They want to bully and intimidate those weaker than they are. Look at the design of PLAN. It's not being designed to take on the USN, it's being designed to intimidate the Philippines and Indonesia. It's like the kid who used to beat you up walking to school and take your lunch money--until one day your big brother showed up and beat the crap out of him. If we are willing and able to be that big brother, China isn't going to mess with anybody. We can make it look to China like any contemplated action would turn out no better, and likely far worse, than Ukraine.
China doesn't want a fight with the USA, they want to subdue us economically. And they are unfortunately well on their way. If we are to deal effectively with China, our dictionary needs to lose the words "appease" and "appeasement." If we can stop them in their tracks were they are today, in a few decades some USA president will be able to reprise Reagan and bring down the Chinese economy.
I recall late last century that Boeing was developing the UUM-125A/RUU-125A Sea Lance to replace both the SUBROC and ASROC. It was cancelled in 1990 around the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The range was between 40 and 100 Nautical Miles and traveled at a speed of Mach 1.5.
ReplyDeleteIt could be a force multiplier and I think it was designed to fit in the MK41 VLS. Just a suggestion.The Navy would still have to ramp up SSN acquisition/production.
https://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-125.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UUM-125_Sea_Lance
I have had some ASW types say it had its own problems. If I were to start fresh, I'd make a Tomahawk variant that's networked to take targeting, fit it with a MAD, and then make it like the TLAM-D with submunitions, except make the submunitions depth charges. Now you have a loitering munition for subs.
DeleteA Tomahawk variant or variants of the LRASM, JASSM or the SM-6. The SM-6 has shown a promising surface-to-surface capability in addition to AAW and BMD. I am certain the pocket protector mafia at Raytheon could make it happen. I thinking that you would want to have an ASW standoff weapon to cruise at supersonic speeds to eliminate the threat(s) as quickly as possible.
DeleteAnother possible solution that bares repeating is develop a bloody carrier-based ASW hunter with an emphasis on range (endurance) and payload. That would be much cheaper than sending a $2B Burke to chase subs (although, I think a Burke probably would do better at ASW than a Constellation-class FFG).
Lastly, we are never going to catch up to the PLAN if we continue with the "Swiss Army Knife" approach to building a surface fleet, One platform does it all crap, doesn't cut it.
We just don't have the right surface ships for this.
ReplyDeleteAs CNO pointed out, the navy isn't going to be playing tag with enemy subs using Burkes.
If I had my way I'd have two types of ASW ships.
The first would be a Perry-like frigate of about 4500 tons. It would have the highest quality ASW equipment and carry a pair of ASW helicopters.
The second would be a smaller ASW destroyer. Something like a shortened Fletcher hull of 1500-2000 tons with a bow sonar and a towed array.
No helicopter, but with LM2500 engines, it would have a high sprint speed and the shortened hull should afford a small turning radius.
I could go into more detail if desired, but I'd use them as complements to each other.
The navy could probably use at least 50 of each to properly screen and patrol.
I love the idea of an ASW 'Top Gun' style school. That is exactly the type of thing they need to be doing.
Lutefisk
Good topic here. I think your baseline is the French FTI/Belharra. Smallest modern ship with an actual Captas-4 and a bow sonar bulb. Comes up short on the aviation, but its because of their larger RHIBs with internal storage. That ship could make a 2 MH-60 hangar work if you live with 1 or 2 7M RHIBs. I want to get back 2 2 MH-60 AV Dets until they get a better ASW UAV than MQ-8C. It should be based around as much gear common to MH-60 and follow ons as possible so the AVDet can actually handle the workload. If they do that and can get 2 UAVs for 1 MH-60 spot, that would be a better end state. This 1 MQ-8C 1 MH-60 is the worst option.
Delete"baseline is the French FTI/Belharra"
DeleteThe specifications are pretty good but the actual design (based on the concept are drawings) is horrible for combat. Consider the guiding principles of separation and redundancy and then look at the design.
What is the downside of using old designs like a Fletcher or Sumner/Gearing and just updating it to modern technologies?
DeleteLutefisk
I think I've mentioned this before an ASW Corvette shouldn't be too big, too costly and too complex. I'm not sure what sort of proper hull size is required for the long ranges of the Pacific but perhaps I'll hazard a guess of just under or around 100m, maybe 1000+ tons.
DeleteThis ship, if it is meant to be filling the role of the old escort ships of WW2 (DEs, Corvette/Frigate, Kaibokans) then could be something around 100m that have a top speed of 25 knots, using reliable diesel engines in multiple compartments to ensure redundancy in mobility, have reinforced structure/bulkheads for survivability, have dampening/quietening in place and all the sonar (bow + stern) required for it to do its job. For armaments it would be good to have the old ASROC box launcher, lightweight torpedo launchers on each side, a 76mm gun and a couple of some form of CIWS (gun, missile, combination of both or whatever else that is reliable, easy to maintain and efficient) to be the bare minimum. Top it off with navigation and basic search radar. This should be the baseline and it shouldn't cost anywhere close to even $300M which should be within reach since there isn't any helipad/hangar or any other stuff that is not necessary.
This Corvette will operate in a hunter group with a dedicated ASW light carrier providing all the helicopter and command support they'll need.
For USN I think this might work since you guys have plenty of air warfare destroyers to handle that bit of the equation in the fleet.
For countries in South China Sea though this vessel will need to be a little bit different. It will be smaller since the range requirement isn't as large, and it will require mid range anti air defence (ESSM and the like) since there isn't a plethora of air warfare vessels sitting around. You'd be surprised what a few 80m-ish dedicated ASW Corvette can accomplish in the region while most costing ridiculously high.
To have an idea of such vessels take a look at the Singapore Navy's Independence Class LMV and Australian Navy's projected Arafura class OPV. Those are clearly OPVs but the size and displacement is a good indicator. Half the boat is dedicated for helipad.
Actually no ComNavOps wouldn't be surprised because it is something he's been championing all along in some fashion or another.
- Loc
I forgot about thrusters for increased manoeuverability although I am unsure if this is essential or nice to have in ASW. Overall I doubt it'll add a lot of cost, weight and complexity overhead anyway so might as well have them on.
Delete- Loc
Hmmm adding a comment seemed to have deleted my earlier post?
Delete- Loc
Ran out of time there. Trick is a real ASW ship like an NSC converted to the purpose or FTI will be over 800 million. Try and scale it down to a Gowind 2500 or 3100, Damen 10514 , or even a not absurd LCS type design and you are still looking at 600+ Million. I'd be game for the 600 million ship. It gets me thinking, start from the ground up. What would ASW look like?
ReplyDeleteUkraine has exposed one weakness - Pentagon's stocks of consumable (ammunitions, etc.) are insufficient. For ASW, one important consumable is sonobuoy. Pentagon may need to look this issue.
ReplyDeleteI don't think small size is necessarily something you need or want for a modern ASW combatant. From the ground up you surely want something designed to be quiet around the speed range you expect to go sub hunting at, with enough room for ASW equipment.
ReplyDeleteSo, for me - once you know what the likely speed range for sub hunting is likely to be, you build a Hull that is hydrodynamically efficient over that range, you build it to make sure any acoustic resonances from the hull plates are well out of band. You use fixed pitch propellers instead of variable pitch to remove hydraulics noise and make them quite large to avoid cavitation at low speed. You will also want the various active systems like Prairie/Master as well.
Power plant: Obviously all machines needs rated and put in enclosures. If running all GT then you need an extremely quiet, precision gearbox which will add expense. If you can run a diesel- electric system straight to the shaft then you can massively reduce your plant noise that way.
You Obviously want both bow sonar and variable depth towed sonar, as well as a large, integrated processing centre for the data. You probably want a big flight deck and hanger to comfortably deploy two helicopters. You want those to be able to do their own autonomous sub hunting so should be big enough and powerful enough to haul some sonobouys, torpedoes, dipping sonar and on board processing.
Ship still needs to have enough situational awareness to defend itself. So requires CIWS and point defence missile systems, as well as standard EW and chaff/decot systems. VLS required for ASROC. No large gun required.
Given that the LCS, which has almost none of that, costs $600M and the new frigate, which has some of that, costs $1B+, what do you envision the cost will be for the ship you describe?
DeleteThere's a price point that you just can't risk playing tag with a submarine because the sub will win most of the encounters. You need a numerous, cheap, expendable ASW vessel. Is that the ship you described?
I suppose the difficulty as I see it is that regardless of cost or tonnage, an ASW escort that can be detected long before it detects a submarine is useless - or at least long enough in advance to give the submarine a chance to evade before being targetted. A vessel that cannot prosecute it's target is useless.
DeleteSo my question really is, what is the entry requirement for a decent ASW ship against modern SSNs and SSKs? And by decent I mean has a fair to middling chance of being able to get close enough to a target to detect and hold a contact to either drive it off or kill it?
Against modern quietened subs (and assuming - and it's a big assumption - that Chinese submarines are closer to Western boats than the 1st or 2nd gen Soviet boats) even the better Western ASW forces still struggle. Is it the case then that only very high end capability will work?
As for tonnage/expendibility - if the CONOPS is for protecting a Carrier group, then it needs to be big enough, fast enough and long legged enough to keep up. If it's for convoy duty or some other lone picket type duty then it needs sufficient self protective capabilities to survive saturation attacks by missile or drone. Doesn't all of that end up pushing capability up?
I wonder then, if the goal is a persistent, expendable ASW picket then a swarm of surface and airborne drones operated from a higher end capability "mothership" - for example a bunch of surface drones towing VDS and airborne drones with sonobouys and an integrated networking node?
You're missing a lot of fundamental concepts and, therefore, drawing erroneous conclusions. I'll list a few concepts for you:
Delete-The submarine holds the inherent advantage.
-The ASW escort surface ships don't need to go find the subs, the subs will come to them although the ships still have to detect them.
-High end ASW capability does not require great size.
-Presence is more important than effectiveness.
-The ocean is huge. Barring pure bad luck, the sub must make speed and announce its presence in order to achieve firing position.
-Multiple types/levels of ASW ships are needed for the various ASW roles.
-ASW drones in the escort role are a non-starter due to launch, recovery, and speed.
You need to come up to speed on modern submarine/anti-submarine warfare and think through the scenarios.