Memo From the President On Shipbuilding

The Navy is currently a flaming hot mess.  It’s not even debatable and I won’t bother listing all the problems.  President Trump appears to recognize this to an unknown, but significant, degree and has issued a memo calling for various actions to improve naval shipbuilding capabilities and capacities.
 
The memo is a fascinating blend of solid, beneficial concepts and technical and legal challenges.  It also fails to address, or even mention, the root cause of the Navy’s shipbuilding woes.  Let’s take a closer look.
 
The very first sentence recognizes and states the problem (well, one of the problems) quite forcefully and succinctly.
 

The United States Navy has experienced a series of shipbuilding setbacks stemming from overly complex designs and iterative design change procedures …[1]

In plainer terms, it states that the Navy’s ship acquisition process is a steaming pile of crap and, very importantly,  identifies at least a couple of the major contributing factors.  Excellent!
 
It goes on to say,
 

The Department of War shall restore both capacity and competition to the maritime industrial base ,,,[1]

That’s nice but it’s like calling for world peace – a noble goal but pointless without specific, effective actions and none are listed.  Miss America calls for world peace every year but I’m pretty sure it’s still a problem.
 
We then see a vague recognition of part of the problem.
 

It will use proven, reliable, and affordable technologies and ship designs …[1]

This is saying that the days of trying to incorporate non-existent, leap ahead technologies are over.  That’s a great sentiment which I heartily endorse.  Now, ruthlessly enforce it.  However, there is also a potential pitfall here.  If we never incorporate new technology, we’ll never advance.  There needs to be a corresponding directive to make use of one-off prototypes specifically to evaluate and develop new technologies.
 
Now, here’s a stunner.
 

Within 60 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of War, in consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, shall provide to the President, … a plan on the required measures to replace the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and Advanced Weapons Elevators with steam and hydraulic systems for the construction of CVN-81 ...[1]

This has long been one of the President’s pet peeves and he appears to be trying to act on it.  I fully support this but the inertia and incompetence in Navy leadership is not going to take this lying down.  This will be vigorously opposed .  Unless the President has the complete agreement and backing of SecNav and CNO, this will not happen.  A great way to get such agreement and backing is to start firing people until people can be found who are on board with the President.
 
The memo repeatedly calls for foreign involvement in the shipbuilding process, both directly and indirectly.  This is a concept that has some appeal, under certain, limited circumstances, but has a great deal of potential to run afoul of legislative roadblocks.  Beyond that, what the President is calling for has been attempted and resulted in the spectacular failures of the LCS and Constellation.  Repeating a set of actions and expecting a different outcome is the definition of insanity.  This needs to be very carefully thought out and managed and the Navy has emphatically demonstrated they have no such management capability.  Wholesale firings of the existing flag ranks would go a long way to solving this.
 
Another major problem is addressed.
 

The Navy shall not impose iterative design changes upon the original mature parent designs within the above programs implemented pursuant to the plans developed under subsections (a) through (b) of this section. No changes from parent designs shall be made without the approval of the Secretary of War ,,,[1]

This is recognizing the destructive impact of the Navy’s never-ending change orders.  Again, though, the embedded inertia of incompetent leadership will make this nearly impossible to enforce.  Remember , the Constellation was going to a parent design with only minor changes and, yet, before it was cancelled, almost all commonality with the parent design had vanished.  I enthusiastically support this but it will require ruthless enforcement.  My suggestion is that any program manager who proposes a change order be summarily fired.
 
Here’s one of the major challenges that we mentioned above.
 

… for purposes of waiving the general prohibition on Armed Forces shipbuilding in foreign shipyards.[1]

The President is going to find that getting Congress to go along with any attempt to utilize foreign shipyards is going to be poorly received and strongly opposed.  There are also practical concerns with technological security.  Still, under certain circumstances this could be beneficial.  I’d prefer to build up our own shipbuilding capacity rather than rely on foreign involvement.
 
The memo calls for establishing a new public shipyard for maintenance and support.  Challenging but outstanding!
 
Here’s another good idea.
 

… establish a Component Repair Center to receive new and refurbish old components and parts as required by the submarine repair industrial base.[1]

Outstanding!
 
And finally, a major, major action calling for a gutting and rework of NAVSEA.
 

Reforming Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). Within 120 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of War, in consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, shall submit to the President, through the Director of OMB and the APNSA, a review of NAVSEA, including recommendations for implementing personnel, organizational, and structural reforms. The objective of these reforms should be to: introduce results‑based accountability for NAVSEA leadership, determined by speed of delivery of vessels and systems; reduce bureaucracy and red tape; eliminate competing priorities among different NAVSEA components, which often result in delayed, cost-prohibitive, or overly complex vessels and systems; and prevent NAVSEA from imposing redesigns or iterative design changes upon original mature parent designs.[1]

This is saying what ComNavOps has been saying for some time – that NAVSEA is a failed organization of total incompetents.  Outstanding, outstanding, outstanding!
 
 
Discussion
 
This memo has lots of good stuff in it and the Navy would be far better off if they can be implemented.  The reality, however, is that any changes will be actively opposed and unless SecDef and SecNav are willing to engage in wholesale firings, most it will never occur. 
 
I’m also dismayed that SecDef Hegseth did not implement all of this on day one of his tenure.  This reinforces my belief that he is a failure, perhaps not as bad as some but certainly a major disappointment.  One could read this memo as a criticism by the President of Hegseth and interpret it as Hegseth failing to the point that the President felt he had to step in and take over.
 
The aspect of all this that the memo failed to address is that the root cause of the Navy’s failures is irredeemably incompetent leadership from the flag officers.  That is what the memo should have led with and the solution is easy – fire them all.  Since Hegseth refuses to engage in wholesale housecleaning, the actions called for in the memo will be vigorously opposed and Trump and Hegseth will have only themselves to blame for their disappointment when this fails to materialize.
 
Let’s hope for the best but the sad reality is that most of this is a fantasy because they won’t take the necessary first step of mass firings.
 
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Presidential Memo: Rebuilding the United States Navy and America’s Shipbuilding Industrial Base”, staff, 13-Aug-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/08/13/presidential-memo-rebuilding-the-united-states-navy-and-americas-shipbuilding-industrial-base

Flower Class Corvette

The Flower class corvette was the epitome of a single purpose vessel (to be fair, most ships were in WWII).  It was designed and built to provide coastal convoy escort, specifically, anti-U-boat protection although it later proved adaptable to open ocean convoy escort thanks to its impressive range for its size.  While not designed or intended to hunt and kill U-boats, the class nevertheless managed to sink some fifty U-boats. 
 
 
Design Concept
 
It’s important to understand the ship’s intended role.  It was a convoy ASW escort.  Its responsibility was to deliver convoy ships not sink U-boats.  In other words, was designed to ensure that convoy ships arrived safely.  It was not designed to go hunt and kill U-boats.  The designers recognized that a mission kill, meaning forcing a U-boat to break off an attack, was just as good as a kill in that it delivered convoy ships safely to port.  Thus, the designers, wisely, didn’t try to load every known ASW weapon and sensor onto the ship.  That would have increased the size, cost, and complexity of the ship resulting in far fewer vessels being built which would have defeated the purpose of the class.  It is vitally important to recognize this concept:  greater individual ship capability would have negatively impacted the overarching goal of getting convoys safely to port.  We have completely lost sight of this balance between mission intent and individual ship design.  By insisting on building uber-capable Burkes (to the dubious extent that they still are) we’ve been forced to give up building true destroyers, frigates, and corvettes thus hurting our overall naval capability.
 

 
Another vital consideration for the designers was that trying to fit the ultimate, top-of-the-line ASW gear on every ship would have resulted in ASW equipment shortages for every other ship class.  In a time of war, resources (meaning weapons and sensors) are limited.  Maximum ASW fits for Flower class ships would have been a case of robbing Peter to pay Paul.  We have completely lost sight of this concept today.  By only building high end Burkes we have ensured that we will be unable to outfit any other ship type (of which we have none!) in a time of war.
 
 
Design Specifics
 

• ASW fit sufficient for its task but no more than that which contributed to its affordability
• Buildable at small shipyards
• Affordable in large numbers (394 ships built)
• Good range at 3,500 nm at its cruising speed of 12 kts;  compare to a Burke with a range of 4,400 nm at its cruising speed of 20 kts
• Commercial machinery operable by reserve and merchant sailors
• Sufficient speed (16 kts) for its purpose
• Built to the minimum requirements not the maximum

 
What would a modern Flower class ship look like?  In other words, what would a modern, low end, affordable in numbers, minimally capable ASW corvette look like without advanced radars, high speed, helo hangar/flight deck, dozens of VLS, etc. look like?  Well, here’s a few characteristics:
 

• Moderate stealth shaping (no exotic coatings)
• 1x 76 mm Super Rapid STRALES/DART
• 2x Mk32 Triple Torpedo Launchers
• 2x RBU
• VDS
• Hull mounted, small, multi-frequency sonar
• SQR-20 Multi-function towed array
• Acoustic isolation
• Low end radar
• 18 kt top speed
• 5,000 nm range
• 1x CIWS/SeaRAM/RAM

 
Discussion
 
The Flower class was built not to kill submarines (though they managed to kill some fifty U-boats!) but to accomplish a mission which was the safe delivery of merchant ships to port and it filled that purpose admirably.  Given the mission, the designers recognized that a mission kill was just as good as an actual kill and cost a lot less money thus allowing the class to be built in large numbers across numerous yards.  The large numbers of vessels contributed to the mission success.  Mere presence achieved mission kills since submarines will go far out their way to avoid detection and this occurs whether the surface ship even knows the submarine is present or not.  In other words, presence equals mission kill which makes simple presence (numbers) a weapon in itself!  We need to re-learn those design lessons and re-embrace the low end, single purpose ship suitably updated and adapted to modern warfare. 

"Existing Design With Only Minor Modification" Trap

More and more, the Western naval ship acquisition world is reverting to ‘existing designs with only minor modifications’ instead of new ship designs.  This is due to fear rather than combat requirements: fear of runaway costs, fear of schedule delays, fear of bad publicity and criticism, fear of innovation, etc.  Fear.  The Western naval world is acquiring ships as a reaction to fear of their own ineptitude. 
 
Instead of honestly and objectively assessing the reasons for acquisition failures and fixing the problems, Western navies have opted for the perceived path of safety over that of combat effectiveness.
 
The latest victim is Germany which has cancelled its F126 frigate acquisition program. 
 

The German Ministry of Defense has decided to discontinue the construction of six F126-class frigates …[1]
 
According to the BMVg, Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding (DSNS), the company initially contracted as the prime contractor, was unable to meet the agreed-upon time and budget constraints.[1]

The program began around 2015, depending on what one considers the starting point, and the first production contract was issued in 2020.  Lead ship delivery had been delayed until 2032 and costs were ballooning.
 
Burned by the failure and afraid of a repeat, Germany has opted to proceed with an existing design, the MEKO A-200 frigate.
 

Instead of planning a new ship, the decision was made to use a readily available, off-the-shelf vessel with only minor modifications.[1]

On a side note, this is yet another bit of evidence that the widespread belief among American naval observers that other countries can produce quality ships, on time, on or under budget, and cheaper than US shipbuilders is false.  But, I digress …
 
So, what is the problem with using an existing design with only minor modifications?
 
There are multiple problems:
 
The “minor modifications” never happens.  The existing design gets heavily modified, commonality disappears, and the costs balloon while the schedule slips.  The US Constellation program was a prime example of this.
 
Far more serious, though, is the trap that existing designs present.  If one never builds new designs, how do ships ever get better?  At some point, you have to move to a new design in order to incorporate new technology.  There’s a reason we’re not still building sailing ships.  Yes, you can upgrade individual pieces of equipment (though limited by ship’s utilities capacity, internal volume, weight margins, etc.) but you can’t improve or change the basic ship.  No amount of equipment upgrades could turn a Burke into a Visby-level stealth ship.  If you want a Visby-level stealth warship – and you do! – it’s got to be a new design.
 
Given the several year (or decade+)  build time for a modern naval vessel, even if the parent design was adequate when the program began, it will be obsolete by the time it enters service.  Of course, existing designs are not adequate.  Consider the MEKO A-200 that Germany now intends to acquire.  The original MEKO 200 design dates back to 1987 and even the MEKO A-200 dates back to 2001, making it already a 25 year old design which will be 30+ years old by the time the ships enter service.  Is a 30+ yr old design really what you want for your most modern, front line surface warship?
 
Take a look at the MEKO A-200.  It’s not particularly stealthy which is the major survival requirement for the modern battlefield.  Its electrical capacity for the perpetually ‘just around the corner’ lasers and rail guns is inadequate.  And so on.
 
Consider the US National Security Cutter (NSC) which is to be the basis for the next iteration of the Navy’s attempt at procuring a frigate.  The design dates back to the late 1990’s and is not even built to combat standards.  Assuming the project isn’t cancelled, the Navy is going to accept frigates whose base design is going to be around 40 years old by the time they enter service!  The NSC meets none of the requirements for success on the modern naval battlefield and yet the Navy has turned to them out of desperation and fear – fear of yet another ship acquisition fiasco.  We’re not designing for combat;  we’re designing for programmatic and career safety and public relations.
 
We cannot successfully build new designs until we objectively and honestly figure out why we keep failing.  Just to save Western navies decades of study, I’ll tell you why we keep failing:
 

• CONOPS, CONOPS, CONOPS
• Change Orders

 
There you have it, Western navies.  I’ve done your job for you.  Now, go build a new ship that actually belongs on the modern battlefield.
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Germany is cancelling the F126 frigate project and procuring eight MEKO frigates”, Staff, 24-Jun-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/06/germany-is-cancelling-the-f126-frigate-project-and-procuring-eight-meko-frigates/

Constellation Lessons

Christopher Cavas has a maritime podcast and recently offered a ‘lessons learned’ episode about the Constellation.[1]  In it, he speaks with former Under and Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly and retired Rear Admiral and former Fincantieri executive Chuck Goddard about lessons from the Constellation disaster.  Both Modly and Goddard were intimately involved with the Constellation.  Modly’s contribution was the usual worthless civilian nonsense.  Goddard’s thoughts are what we’ll focus on.  The podcast is interesting and worth listening to but not for the right reasons.
 
As you listen to the podcast, understand that both men were involved with the Constellation and, given the magnitude of the program failure, clearly neither man was part of the solution which means they were part – a very large part! - of the problem.  The entire interview, then, is the problem explaining what went wrong without being aware enough to even recognize that they were what went wrong!  The problem was trying to explain what the problem was!  The resulting discussion was exactly what you’d expect:  a mishmash of delusion and obvliviousness.
 
Before we go any further, it is important to understand Goddard’s background.
 

• Senior Vice President responsible for the FFG 62 Program for Fincantieri Marinette Marine (FMM)
• Capture Executive for the $5.5 billion FFG(X) program at Fincantieri Marine Group
• CEO, President and GM of FMM from Jun 2011 – Jul 2014
• Lockheed Martin director of Aegis Program Integration and Capture Manager for the Aegis Combat Systems Engineering Agent (CSEA) competition
• During his thirty-year career with the Navy, he led a variety of complex ship programs from destroyers to sealift ships, culminating in his role as the Navy Program Executive Officer, Ships
• Vice Commander Naval Sea Systems Command
• Chairman SUBSAFE Program review
• DDG 1000 Major Program Manager during design and development
• New Construction Officer at Supervisor of Shipbuilding, San Diego, CA overseeing AOE-10, Sealift Conversion and Sealift New Construction programs

 
He has been involved in a lot of failures and had an entire career to effect positive changes and completely failed to do so.  Almost every group he was with has been heavily criticized on this blog.  He has been part of, and known nothing but, failure his entire career.
 
As a general observation, Goddard utterly fails to grasp any actual lessons learned beyond the superficial and nearly irrelevant level which is typical of managerial incompetence.  Such managers simply can’t see or grasp the real lessons.  If they could, they would have changed things while they were in a position to do so.
 
For example, one of the major (perhaps the main) lessons from the Constellation was something we’ve harped on relentlessly:  the failure to generate a comprehensive Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  The Constellation never had a sharply defined mission/function.  It was a mini-Burke which is to say that it was all things to all people.  Goddard himself offers an observation that simultaneously demonstrates this and illustrates his complete failure to grasp what it means.  He noted that the Constellation eventually sank under the weight of the never-ending flood of change orders emanating from NAVSEA’s attempt to spec and build the frigate as a destroyer because they had no experience designing and building a frigate so they fell back on what they knew:  the Burke!  They designed and spec’ed the Constellation as if it were a Burke.  This demonstrates the lack of a CONOPS that would have filtered out any destroyer-like, non-frigate changes.  Absent a sharply defined CONOPS, there was no basis to reject any change order since each change, in isolation, seemed justifiable.  
 
While he fails to understand the true relevance of his observation, Goddard nevertheless identifies a key failing of the Navy:  they only know how to make one type of surface combatant, the Burke.  All their expectations, requirements, specifications, etc. are from the Burke.  I’ve repeatedly talked about the folly of continuing to build the Burke class (see, “Burkes – TheAnchor Around the Navy’s Neck”) and the folly of building large, multi-function ships, in general.  We should be building many types of single function ships and this is yet another reason why.  We need a Navy/NAVSEA that is comfortable with multiple ship types and understands why they exist, what their roles are, how they differ, and how to spec and build them.  The Chinese have extensive classes of missile boats, corvettes, frigates, destroyers, and destroyer/cruisers.  We have Burkes and that’s it.  We are a one-trick pony surface fleet and one-trick NAVSEA.  We know nothing else but Burkes.
 
Goddard’s comment about NAVSEA attempting to spec the Constellation as a Burke finalizes and confirms the observation that the Constellation was a mini-Burke rather than an ASW frigate or convoy escort or whatever else some observers wished it was.  Again, Goddard recognizes the change orders as a problem but fails to see that the mini-Burke mindset was a problem stemming from the lack of a CONOPS and that NAVSEA should have been “educated” and squashed from day one.
 
The entire NAVSEA attempt to spec the Constellation as a Burke also offers the larger issue of how to appropriately “downgrade” a ship from a high end destroyer to a low level frigate.  What degree of reduced structural strength is appropriate?  What level of reduced survivability?  How much redundancy?  What degree of separation of key components? And so on.  A frigate must be “less” than a destroyer or else it is a destroyer.  Navy/NAVSEA have clearly not come to terms with the appropriate level of downgrading for a frigate.
 
Goddard and Modly go on to offer other, multiple, supposed lessons learned but fail to accept even the slightest blame for their own involvement and failings.  For example, Goddard notes that the Constellation, still only partially complete, had already gained 1000 ton on what was intended to be a 7000 ton ship.  That’s more than a 14% growth even before the ship was half complete!  Despite that stunning failure, no one made any attempt to figure out why the weight gain was occurring and what to do about it.
 
The podcast is interesting but ultimately worthless in terms of any actual lessons learned and illustrates that the people running the Navy are so completely incompetent that they are inherently incapable of recognizing and learning any actual lessons.
 
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1] Defense & Aerospace Report CAVASSHIPS Podcast [Dec 04, ’25] Ep: 220 Tom Modly & Chuck Goddard on Constellation Lessons Learned, 4-Dec-2025,
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/defense-aerospace-report-cavasships-podcast-dec-04/id1573063059?i=1000739767674

Still Not Serious About Passive Sensing

Naval News website has an article, relevant to the US Navy, about the French navy installing electro-optical/infrared sensors on various ships.[1]  That’s a nice step but nowhere near enough. We’ve talked about the future naval battlefield requiring purely passive sensing systems and individual ships needing a dozen or more such sensors spaced around the ship for complete hemispherical coverage and battle damage resilience (redundancy and separation).  Adding one or two sensors to a ship is woefully insufficient and indicates a peacetime mindset where the threat level is low to non-existent.  In other words, it is an action by a navy that is not serious about war.
 

According to TRAKKA Systems, … The TC-375M [ed. one of the EO/IR systems the French are using] is ideally suited for long-range naval and coast guard missions including search and rescue, illegal immigration protection, drug interdiction, economic exclusion zone (EEZ) protection, anti-piracy, maritime patrol, naval C4ISR, and naval vessel force protection.[1]

That’s quite a list of suitable tasks and none of them have anything to do with combat.  Even the French navy’s “high end” threat is laughably weak, as indicated below.
 

… the French Navy previously moved to fit Safran’s Paseo XLR advanced electro-optic infra red (EO/IR) system on all FREMM frigates and Horizon type Air Defense destroyers. The decision was taken as part of an “urgent operational requirement” in response to the escalating threat posed by kamikaze unmanned surface vehicles (USV) and unmanned air vehicles (UAV).[1]

UAVs and USVs?  That’s not a threat, it’s an annoyance, at most, for a competent navy.  Saturation missile attacks are a threat.  Ballistic missiles are a threat.  Hypersonic missiles are a threat.  Submarines are a threat.  Believing that a few tiny, unmanned drones are a threat shows the absence of a combat mentality.
 
As we’ve previously discussed, the modern battlefield requires passive sensing.  Ships need long range, hemispherical passive sensors (see, “PassiveHemispherical Sensing”) that can search, detect, track, and provide fire control.  To radiate is to die unless you’ve got missiles coming at you and, if you do, you’ve already screwed up and are already on the losing side of the battle ledger.  Ships need to be able to sail, establish situational awareness, search for enemy assets, and engage, all while remaining passive and undetected (see, “The Passive Warship”). 
 
Ship designers need to regain a combat design philosophy.  Battle damage will occur and that requires significant redundancy and separation of all key equipment.  A single EO/IR sensor is not a combat fit – it’s a peacetime design failure.
 
I’m not picking on the French.  The US Navy is doing exactly the same thing and this should serve as a lesson for us.
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “French Navy fits new EO/IR systems aboard Mistral-class LHDs”, Xavier Vavasseur, 3-Feb-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/02/french-navy-fits-new-eo-ir-systems-aboard-mistral-class-lhds/

Where’s the Lethality?

Having failed so many times, the Navy’s primary shipbuilding criteria is no longer lethality (if it ever was in modern times) but the [incorrectly] perceived need to get hulls – any hulls – in the water as quickly as possible to stop the criticisms and fend off Congressional anger.  As Naval News website notes about the new frigate program,
 

… speed [of production] is now the primary factor driving the program.[1]

Speed of production.  Not firepower, not stealth, not lethality, not operational usefulness or anything else one might think would be of importance … just the speed with which hulls can be put in the water.  Why not just buy combat canoes?  We can get them in the water quickly.
 
The new Frigate’s armament will consist of a 57mm main cannon and a RAM launcher with 21 Rolling Airframe Missiles.  A payload space will be constructed (so much for no changes to the parent design!) at the stern of the ship capable of carrying 16 Naval Strike Missiles, 48 Hellfires, or other containerized weapons or modules.[1]
 
50-65 ships will be built …  So, we’re committing to a large production run before the first design is even finalized.  Does sound identical to the LCS?
 
The horrifying concern is that this level of armament relegates this vessel to the level of a patrol boat (and not a particularly impressive one at that!) and yet it will make up something like a third of our combat fleet.  Absorb that for a moment.  A third of the combat fleet will be patrol boats.  Add in the Navy’s desire for all manner of unmanned vessels and we’re looking at half or more of the fleet being nearly devoid of serious combat capability. 
 
Sure, the Navy will talk about future upgrades but when has that ever actually happened?  Ask the LCS how those future module upgrades that we were promised are coming along.
 
If I were China, I’d bankroll this program for the United States just to ensure we field a fleet of non-lethal ships!
 
 
____________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “New U.S Navy Frigate: FF(X) Program Specs Revealed”, Ethan Gossrow, 16-Jan-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/01/new-u-s-navy-frigate-ffx-program-specs-revealed/

Parent Design

What’s the Navy’s latest fad in shipbuilding?  Yeah … parent designs. 
 
The concept is that an existing, well established, “parent” design is used in a new shipbuilding program to avoid all the problems associated with new designs.  Being already in existence and thoroughly “wrung out”, the new shipbuilding program will have no problems since it will just use the parent design.  Sounds good.  Sounds logical.  Right?
 
The concept was the foundation of the successful disastrous FREMM/Constellation frigate program.  Of course, the Navy instantly abandoned the parent design as soon as the program became official and, in a shock to no one except the Navy, costs ballooned and schedules crashed.
 
The concept has also been applied to the Burke class although not by name.  When the Navy wanted the next generation surface combatant they didn’t even consider any option other than modifying the Burke parent design.  This eventually became the Burke Flt III despite the severe limitations the parent design imposed on the desired radar equipment and capabilities, stealth signature, weight margins, and so forth.
 
The concept is now being applied to the Constellation’s replacement, the National Security Cutter frigate (NSC-FF).  The new frigate is going to be based on the NSC parent design.  Of course, as we’ve seen, the Navy has already begun implementing fairly significant changes and the parent design is beginning to fade into the rear view mirror even as the program works to become official.
 
So, yes, the Navy has butchered the parent design concept in execution but what if they didn’t?  For the sake of discussion, let’s pretend that the Navy could flawlessly execute the parent design concept, meaning, no change orders, predictable costs, and schedules that can be met thanks to the absence of continuous change orders.  Would that produce a useful product?  Would the parent design result in an affordable, timely, combat-effective ship?
 
At first glance, how could a successful parent design approach not produce a successful, useful product?  By definition, the parent design exists and was, presumably, successful and useful so the “child” design has to be, as well, right?
 
Let’s take a look at some of the issues with a parent design approach.
 
Obsolescence – By definition, a parent design is obsolete.  Consider the timelines for the Navy’s parent design attempts.  The FREMM design dates back to somewhere around 2005 making the design 20 years old.  Would any sane ship designer really want to begin a new program with a 20 yr old design?  The Burke design dates back to the mid 1970’s, making it now a 55 yr old design.  The NSC design dates back to around 2000, making it a 25 yr old design. 
 
Do we really want to be basing our newest ship designs on 2-5 decade old designs?
 
While some characteristics and features can be updated from the parent, such as weapons, software, and sensors, others cannot, such as stealth.  For example, the Burke hull/superstructure stealth is obsolete and no longer effective but there is nothing that can be done about it.  The stealth signature is largely fixed by the hull/superstructure design.  Survivability is also largely fixed by the original design.  The FREMM, for example, was inherently unable to meet Navy survivability and damage control requirements, necessitating a major redesign resulting in the Constellation having less than 15% commonality with the parent design.  The Navy had to abandon the parent design in order to meet survivability standards.  Similarly, acoustic signatures, infrared signatures, etc. that are determined by the hull/superstructure shape, materials, and construction cannot be significantly altered or improved.  They are what they are.
 
Changed Requirements – Every ship design is determined by the operational and tactical requirements of its time and those change over time, especially over several decades.  The design, however, once established, is fixed and cannot be changed without abandoning the parent concept.  Thus, using a design that was intended to meet specific requirements that are decades old, and may no longer be valid, is unwise, to put it mildly.  The Burke, for example, was never designed for today’s electromagnetic environment and advanced stealth requirements and there is very little that can be done about it.
 
Design Limitations – Many design characteristics are inherent to the original design to a very large degree.  Things such as weight margins, stability, metacentric height, fuel capacity, structural strength, armor (or the complete absence thereof), speed, endurance, etc. are largely fixed by the original design barring a major redesign in which case it’s no longer the parent design.
 
 
Conclusion
 
The conclusion is painfully obvious.  The parent design concept has so many inherent flaws and limitations that it is simply not a valid, useful approach even if it were executed flawlessly.
 
This makes one wonder why the Navy even began attempting the parent approach?  Well, the answer is obvious.  The Navy has had so many failed, disastrous shipbuilding programs that the priority changed from a useful, lethal, modern combatant to simply getting hulls in the water without controversy and failure.  It no longer matters to the Navy whether the ship is useful.  They just desperately want a shipbuilding program to “succeed”, meaning, hulls in the water, on time and on budget … effectiveness be damned.
 
I completely understand the Navy’s mental state, at the moment.  They’re gun shy in the extreme and terrified of yet another failure.  Congress is incensed at their ineptitude and has begun inserting more and more restrictive oversight and conditions on budget allocations (as they should!) and the Navy is adamantly opposed to oversight.  The only way the Navy can get Congress off their back is to produce a “successful” program, no matter how ineffective it is.  The NSC-FF is barely one step beyond combat canoes but it serves the Navy’s purpose.
 
We should be producing beyond-Visby corvettes and, instead, we’re producing decades old NSC cutters as our “new” frigate.

NSC Frigate Delusions

The degree of delusion and fantasy associated with this NSC frigate concept is already stunning and does not bode well for the program.  Let’s check out a few of the notable delusions and fantasies.
 
What is most important about the new frigate design?  We all know it is lethality in support of a focused Concept of Operations (CONOPS), presumably ASW-centric.  However, is that the most important thing about the NSC frigate in the Navy’s view?  Well, here’s their take on it.
 

The new frigate design will focus on American designs and American yards, [Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle] Caudle said.
 
“Other countries will always prioritize their own fleets, not us, ships that depend on foreign industry,” he said. “That’s why this is an American design backed by American workers, American suppliers and an established logistics and maintenance network. So wherever the ship sails, when the American flag goes into port, it does so with American industry firmly behind it.”[1][emphasis added]

Wow!  Caudle’s last two sentences use the word, “American”, five times.  Apparently, as far as he’s concerned, the NSC frigate’s main and most important characteristic is not firepower, focused mission, CONOPS, cost, or anything else.  The most important characteristic is that it’s “American”!  Got burned by the foreign FREMM design, did ya there Adm. Caudle?  Not gonna make that mistake again, are ya, huh?  Everything about this is gonna be “American”, by God!  Nope, no overreaction, there!  Lurching from one extreme to another is definitely the way to go! 
 
Just out of curiosity, if this American approach doesn’t work out and we’ve already tried, and ruled out, foreign designs, what does that leave for the next attempt?  An extra-planetary Martian design?  But, I digress …
 
So, what is the guiding philosophy for the construction of this NSC-frigate?
 

… Jason Potter, who is performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition (RDA), said the service would base the new frigate on an existing design with minimal design changes.[1]

Wait a minute … Isn’t that word for word the guiding principal behind the Constellation’s parent design concept?  Yeah, and we saw how that worked out.  What’s the likelihood that the Navy learns a lesson and leaves the design alone and doesn’t make a host of changes?  This is pure delusion!
 
Where does an NSC-frigate fit into the Navy’s force structure?
 

“The design [with] little adaptation will meet the CNO’s requirements for a small surface combatant,” [Caudle] said. “The current [battle force] requirement is 73, of which we’re meeting less than a third.[1]

Whoa, there admiral.  You think we have around two dozen small surface combatants now?  Are you counting the LCS as a small surface combatant?  The operative word is combatant and the LCS has no useful combat capabilities so you’re deluding yourself.  If you have a requirement for 73 small surface combatants, you’re short 73.
 
What’s the situation on manning for this ship?
 

The design will have accommodations for about 140 sailors.[1]

Have we finally admitted that the LCS idea of a crew of six highly cross-trained sailors plus a parrot cross-trained as a dog isn’t sufficient?  As a point of reference, the Zumwalt is over 600 ft long and 16,000 tons with a crew of 147.  Now, we’re going to build a frigate that’s 400 ft long and 4,600 tons with a crew of 140??!  One of those two ships is incorrectly manned.  Can you figure out which one it is, admiral?
 
What will the NSC-frigate do for us?
 

… this platform would help take the load off of our destroyers so they could focus on some of the higher-end missions,” a second senior official told USNI News.[1]

There it is again.  The ever-present, mythical “free up ships for higher end missions” justification.  Of course, no one has yet come up with an example of what a higher end mission is that the Burkes would be freed up for.  But, I digress …
 
Well, there may be some problems already visible with this NSC-frigate concept but I am, at least, comforted by SecNav’s strongly implied assurance that change orders will come only over his dead body, as documented in the previous post.  Ominously, though, there’s this,
 

One of the few changes the Navy intends to make to the NSC design is to construct a platform above the open boat deck for containerized mission packages …[1]

A platform to hold containerized packages on the order of 40,000 lbs!  That’s a hefty platform! 
 
So, it’s not even a formal program yet and, despite SecNav’s proclamation, we’re already making changes – changes that will affect the ship’s designed weight margins, weight allowances, stability, total weight, sea keeping and handling, etc.  Inevitably, those changes will require other changes in propulsion, ballasting, fore/aft freeboard, internal structure, etc.  There’s no such thing as an isolated change in ship design.
 
Well, at least the change is to enable a modular mission package approach.  That worked so well on the LCS that even I can’t argue against it.  Modular is clearly the way to go. … right?
 

Those containers could do a host of missions. That’s a core element of the future force design.[1]

That is some Class A delusion, there!
 
Well, at least the entire modular modification will be the only change, right?
 

Based on the FREMM design in service with the French and Italian navies, the Constellation class design required modifications to meet U.S. Navy survivability standards.[1]

Uh … say, there SecNav … are you aware that the NSC design does NOT fully meet Navy standards?  So, either we build a sub-standard vessel for Navy service or we make more changes to the Constellation NSC-frigate to meet Navy standards. 
 
Will the NSC-frigate be armed similar to the Constellation?
 

The initial FF(X) hull will be largely unmodified from the systems found on the NSC, officials told USNI News.[1]

The NSC’s entire weapons fit is 1x 57 mm gun and a CIWS.  That’s it.  That’s all.  If the NSC-frigate is going to be “largely unmodified from the systems found on the NSC”, that will be one extremely lightly armed ship, bordering on unarmed.  If we add VLS, torpedoes, anti-ship missile racks, RAM/SeaRAM, etc., that will necessitate extensive … um … what are those called when you change the design? … oh, yeah … change orders.  You know, the things SecNav implied would not happen and that he would have to personally approve.  I’m guessing he’s going to be doing a LOT of approving despite his little sound bite.  Added weapons will require internal structural changes, expanded magazines, ammo hoists, modified power and utility runs, etc.  Hmm … weight, weight margins, stability …
 
Fortunately, industry sees no problems.
 

… Chris Kastner, HII’s president and CEO, said in a statement. “Speed matters, and the NSC ship design is stable and producible and will lead to predictable schedules.[1]

I guess Mr. Kastner is unaware of all the changes the Navy is already planning to make to the NSC.  Can you say, “goodbye cost, goodbye schedule”?
 
Well, there you have it – a broad assortment of fantasy and delusion before the program has even gotten off the ground.  I can’t foresee any problems, whatsoever.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “SECNAV: New Frigate will be Based on National Security Cutter, First FF(X) to be Built at Ingalls”, Sam LaGrone, 19-Dec-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/12/19/secnav-new-frigate-will-be-based-on-national-security-cutter-first-ffx-to-be-built-at-ingalls

Do It Again!

Reader AndyM had recently offered an absolutely masterful summation of Marine Corps acquisition programs. 

Nothing says dead on ideas like just making a new repeat, LCAC, H-53 and LCU.[1]

He is dead on.  Indeed, this thought can be expanded to the entire Navy!  Consider some recent Navy acquisition programs:
 

• LCU-1700 – nearly an exact duplicate of the previous LCU class
• H-53 – in production since the 1960’s
• SSC (Ship to Shore Connector) – nearly an exact duplicate of the original LCAC
• Burke – rapidly approaching its centennial year of production
• Constellation (mini-Burke) – just a scaled down Burke
• Virginia – an upgraded Los Angeles class submarine
• F-18 Super Hornet – a little bigger regular Hornet
• Ford – a bigger repeat of the Nimitz with some [thus far] failed technological gimmicks thrown in
• E-2D – repeat of the E-2C with the next higher letter;  22 more versions to go before a new aircraft design is needed
• ACV – repeat of the AAV

 
Granted, each has incorporated some technology improvements but none have been clean sheet, unconstrained, new designs with future combat in mind.  This blog has proposed many platforms that are designed with future combat requirements in mind and none bear any resemblance to the Navy’s tired repeats.  Future combat will require entirely new ways of approaching stealth, armor, firepower, surveillance, sensors, ship design, and doctrine/tactics.  None of that has been incorporated into recent acquisition programs.
 
Not only have these platforms remained almost unchanged, unbelievably, some have been downgraded in order to keep them the same!  For example, the new Burkes have had their critical radars downsized in order to fit into the same platform.  The future war requirements have changed but the Navy has proudly demonstrated that the Burke will not change, by God!  The Navy wants no part of a new ship when they can keep making the same old one!
 
Where are the stealthy carriers with long range fighter air wings?  Where are the Visby-like stealth ships?  Where are the UAV carriers?  Where are the pure passive platforms, ship and aircraft?  Where are the dedicated ASW corvettes?  And so on.
 
As AndyM observed, this pattern of repeats clearly demonstrates an organization bereft of ideas which, in turn, denotes an organization bereft of professional warriors capable of analyzing combat and correctly predicting future needs.  Even the Marines didn’t analyze future combat in making their idiotic and useless shift to being pointless missile shooters;  they analyzed future budget share and changed to preserve their slice of the pie.
 
We must break the cycle of repeats whose main justification is that they’re viewed as “safe” acquisition programs.
 
 
__________________________

 
[1]https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2025/11/my-marine-corps.html?showComment=1762315642312#c3837210506297094006

Ship Defense

The Navy’s trend in ship design has been towards lighter and lighter built ships with less and less defensive capabilities.  Well, let’s step in and put a stop to that!  Since the Navy clearly doesn’t know how to design a ship with defensive capabilities, let’s do it for them.
 
We’re all familiar with the concept of a carrier group’s layered defense.  Aircraft provide wide ranging defense against search aircraft and provide the initial defensive layer against an attack.  Standard missiles offer the possibility of very long range intercepts.  Escort ships range dozens of miles out to provide extended ASW and AAW protection.  Medium range defense is provided by closer escorts and medium range defensive missiles.  Various missiles, electronic warfare systems, and CIWS provide close in defense.
 
Similarly, an individual ship’s defense should consist of more – much more! – than just Standard/ESSM missiles and one or two RAM/SeaRAM, as the Navy seems to believe.  A ship’s defense should be a multi-faceted, layered construct.  Let’s consider the individual components.
 
 
Outer Layer
 

• UAVs – small, stealthy, wide ranging UAVs providing passive aerial sensor coverage
• Standard Missiles – long range anti-air defense
• Passive Sonar – long range detection
• EO/IR – long range visual and infrared detection integrated into a 360 deg hemispherical sensor system
• ESM – very long range signals analysis (Outboard/COBLU and S-3 Shadow type sensing) providing detection and triangulation
• Stealth – do all the above without, in turn, being detected

 
Middle Layer
 

• EO/IR - medium range visual and infrared detection integrated into a 360 deg hemispherical sensor system combined with fire control
• ESSM – medium range anti-air defense
• EW/ECM – detection, jamming, spoofing, etc.
• Stealth – do all the above without, in turn, being detected

 
Inner Layer
 

• EW/ECM – point defense jamming, spoofing, etc.
• RAM/SeaRAM – close in anti-air defense
• CIWS – close in anti-air defense
• Decoys – integrated into Aegis
• Stealth – do all the above without, in turn, being detected

 
 
A few supplementary comments are warranted:
 
Sensors – 360 degree EO/IR with targeting capability (IRST) in addition to supplement and largely replace radar.  Such a system would involve far more than the current one EO sensor on ships today.  This would be several, perhaps dozens, of sensors each scanning a portion of the sky and acting as a single, integrated system.  During war, this may actually be the main sensor system so that the ship doesn’t have to radiate.
 
UAVs – This has been posted on previously.  Every ship should sail with several dozen small, stealthy, passive UAVs for establishing situational awareness.  These are cheap and expendable.  They must be stealthy.  It’s pointless to try to establish situational awareness if doing so gives away your own position.  We must be able to see without being seen.
 
Long range missiles – I hesitate to even include long range missiles as I believe their use will be quite limited, bordering on never.  No enemy is going to present high altitude targets other than ballistic missiles which are a special case.  So many people forget that long range missiles can only engage high altitude targets because of the radar horizon limitation.  Beyond the radar horizon, radar can only see targets at altitude. 
 
Close In – Attackers will get through.  It’s guaranteed.  Even in scripted exercises, they always do.  Every ship should have several to dozens of close in weapon systems instead of the nearly useless single (or no!) close in weapon on today’s ships.
 
Inner Layer - The inner layer has the most components and yet the Navy devotes the least amount of effort and resources to it.  The Zumwalt has no close in weapons.  The DDG(X) concept graphic has only two RAM launchers for close in defense.  The Burkes have only one CIWS.
 
EW/ECM is the most common and, historically, the most effective anti-air component and yet the Navy devotes very little attention or resources to it.  Even the current SEWIP upgrades are a limited effort, poorly executed.
 
Focus - So, what does the Navy focus its attention and resources on?  That’s right, the most expensive and least likely to be used component:  long range missiles.

Surface Ship Aviation

It has been some 80+ years since WWII and in that time we have seen some truly remarkable advances in tank design, aircraft design, missile development, sensors, etc.  One would think that ship design would have advanced at least as much and yet this is clearly not the case.  Not only has ship design not advanced, in many respects it has regressed.  Armor, weapon density, survivability, redundancy, endurance, sailing range, etc. have all regressed.  Well, at least we can say that surface ship aviation has advanced with the development of the helicopter … right?  Or has it?  Let’s look.
 
As a reminder, WWII US cruisers typically carried four seaplanes operated from two catapults and recovered with one or two cranes.  The seaplanes they used included, primarily, the OS2U Kingfisher and, at other times in the war, the Curtis SC-1 Seahawk and Curtis SOC Seagull.  Today, Burke class destroyers Flt IIa and beyond carry one SH-60 type helo (theoretically capable of two but never done, as far as I know) and provision for a small Fire Scout type UAV which have rarely been used and are being phased out (see, “Fire Scout Status”).  Flt I/II Burkes, have no hangar and carry no helos.  The Constellation class carries one SH-60 type helo and one Fire Scout type UAV.  The LCS carries one SH-60 type helo and one Fire Scout or smaller UAV.
 
 
Aircraft
 
Just as the value of an aircraft carrier is wholly dependent on the size and abilities of the air wing, so too is the surface ship aviation value dependent on the aircraft they carry.  Following is a comparison of the primary aircraft from WWII surface ships and today’s surface ships.

OS2U Kingfisher

Discussion

 
The main function of ship’s aviation both in WWII and today is scouting/targeting.  In WWII, ship’s planes, with a few hundred miles of search radius and an enemy ship speed of advance of only 30 kts maximum, a ship/scout could ensure the ship’s safety for the better part of a day.  Today, with enemy weapons having a speed of advance of several hundred miles per hour or more, long range searches are more critical than ever and yet today’s shipboard aircraft have around half the range of WWII aircraft.  Does that make sense?  What ship designer thought, “Hey, let’s cut the range of our shipboard aviation in half and go with that.”  and everyone agreed with him instead of laughing him out of a job?
 
The other notable regression is in the number of embarked aircraft.  A WWII cruiser carried four aircraft.  Today’s ships carry one full size helo and a small UAV.  Quite a drop!  Admittedly, a WWII cruiser is a bit bigger than even a Burke but the WWII cruiser also didn’t have the 100 ft flight deck and enormous hangar that a Burke has.  Approximately one third of a Burke’s total length is devoted to aviation.  WWII ships devoted almost no length to aviation.  Catapults were placed wherever there was a small amount of room available, including on top of gun turrets!  

The one area where an argument can be made that aircraft have significantly improved is anti-submarine warfare (ASW).  Helos have proven quite useful and effective at this thanks to sonobuoys, dipping sonar, and air-dropped torpedoes.  Unfortunately, the reduction in number of embarked aircraft have rendered the ASW helo only marginally useful unless several ships can pool their aircraft.  As the saying goes, if you have one helo, you have none.  This is recognition of the very high maintenance demands of helos and their inability to maintain a high readiness rate.
 
So, while ASW helos are theoretically significantly improved, the reality of reduced numbers and readiness rates have rendered any theoretical improvement only marginally useful.
 
As with so many other aspects of ship design, today’s surface ship aviation capabilities have not significantly improved and have, in many ways, regressed.  Today’s ships carry fewer (half or less) aircraft with significantly shorter ranges.  
 
How can we address the shortcomings in surface ship aviation?  We have, potentially two possible alternatives to today’s aviation problems:
 
1. Revert to shipboard seaplanes.  With modern engines, enhanced aerodynamic designs, stealth shaping, etc., we should be able to design a ship’s seaplane with range in excess of a thousand miles and a reasonable degree of stealth for survivability and the ability to scout without being instantly detected.  Four (to use the historical number) such aircraft would go a long ways towards providing ships with effective situational awareness and target detection.
 
2. UAVs.  We’ve discussed the use of small, stealthy UAVs for shipboard surveillance many times.  Operated by the dozens at a time, small UAVs can be quite effective while representing little financial risk if some are lost (see, “UAV’s – Numbers Matter”).

A Stealthy Carrier

Reader ‘SRB’ recently wondered about how to make a carrier stealthy.  What a great thought exercise!  Let’s have some fun and explore the idea a bit.
 
At first glance, it would seem difficult or impossible to make a carrier stealthy and still retain its full functionality.  The sheer size, alone, makes it a challenging task.  In addition, the sponsons add all kinds of non-stealthy protuberances.  Sprinkle on the multitude of weapons, masts, radars, domes, etc. and the task seems impossible.  Well, that means we’ll need to think outside the box to design a stealthy carrier.  In no particular order, here are some design characteristics of a stealthy carrier.
 
Aircraft Elevators – Conventional external, side opening elevators would be eliminated in favor of internal elevators that momentarily open at flight deck level to load/unload aircraft.  This eliminates the non-stealthy openings and external elevator gear and allows a smooth, uninterrupted hull whose shape can be maximized for stealth.
 
Sponsons – Sponsons, whose purpose is to mount weapons out of the way of the flight deck, would be eliminated and the weapons converted to forms that are embedded in the hull (side angled VLS cells, for example) or retractable (under the flight deck, for example, as flight ops would not be conducted while firing weapons).  A carrier is mammoth and it’s not as if a carrier has lots of weapons.  We should be able to find plenty of room.
 
Island – The island, if it is still needed, would take the form of a typical slanted superstructure of a surface ship like the LCS or Visby.  In fact, the Ford class has a slightly stealthy island with a couple of slanted faces.  Of course, it then totally negates any benefit by festooning the island with protruding bridges, catwalks, masts, domes, etc.
 
Even better than a stealthy, slanted superstructure would be no superstructure, at all.  Why not have the functions buried inside the ship?  The only possible legitimate need for an island is to provide an elevated overwatch from which to direct flight deck activities and movements.  However, I’m thinking that we could function without this by using extensive camera views from many dozens of angles with the views being assembled into an ‘overhead’ view via software manipulations. 
 
Antennae – All antennae (Satcoms and the like) would have to be flush mounted into the superstructure just as radar panels are now.
 
Aircraft Spotting – Assuming a stealthy carrier would only operate stealthy aircraft, deck spotting should not be a major problem as far as impacting radar signature since the aircraft are, inherently, stealthy. 
 
Overhangs – I don’t know whether deck overhangs negatively impact stealth but I suspect they do.  A stealthy carrier would need a smooth hull that joins the deck all around – no overhanging decks.
 

An artist's concept of a stealth carrier

Discussion
 
One obvious implication from the preceding is that we’ll need a lot more internal ship’s volume to contain the many external functions that need to be internalized.  Just as it is a challenge to find room for internal weapon bays on stealth aircraft, so too, will it be a challenge to find room for the carriers external functions that now need to be moved internally.  This dictates that we ruthlessly eliminate any current function that is not directly combat related.  That means eliminating crew comforts, non-essential functions such as the extensive and powerful radar fits (carriers don’t radiate in combat), one or two aircraft elevators, and so forth.
 
Clearly, any attempt at a serious stealth carrier would result in a design well outside the conventional box but, why not?  There’s nothing inherently impossible in the task.  The basic carrier design hasn’t changed since pre-WWII.  Perhaps it’s time.  What do you think?  Could we build a stealthy carrier with enough stealth to be worth the effort?