Submarine Anti-Air Capability

The Navy is looking to develop an anti-air missile for use in submarines (and surface ships).
 

The U.S. Navy has shared details about its vision for a new family of modular surface-to-air missiles that is expected to include a version that will arm future variants of the Virginia class submarine.[1]

The War Zone website has an interesting article about this with a decent discussion of the weapon and some of the benefits and drawbacks.[1]  The weapon is presented as a modular miracle that can include hypersonic versions, various ranges, and various packaging options and will be capable of destroying everything that flies, from drones to hypersonic ballistic missiles.  Truly a miracle weapon … as all new weapons are.
 
Will this be a common sense, evolutionary development or enhancement of an existing, proven weapon?  No!  It will be revolutionary!
 

The United States Navy (USN) is seeking a new, modular interceptor to serve as the basis for the Naval Modular Missile (NMM) program, a next-generation initiative designed to revolutionize surface naval capabilities … [1]

How many weapon systems just over the last few years have promised to revolutionize naval warfare?  Dozens!
 
How many weapon systems have actually revolutionized naval warfare?  None!
 
And yet we keep making the claim.  Hmm …
 
But, let’s get back to the specifics on this particular system.
 
The article describes the potential use by submarines to shoot down ballistic missiles in the launch/boost stage, at any point in flight, or for terminal defense as well as for use in providing AAW protection for carriers and, of course, for shooting down local ASW helos and patrol planes. 
 
To be fair, the article does briefly mention a few potential issues with this and we can think of others.
 
A submarine operating tactically close enough to a surface group to provide anti-air protection is subject to the ages old problem of blue-on-blue friendly fire.  No surface ship is going to allow an unknown submarine to operate near it on the possibility that it might be friendly.  Submarines are a sink-on-sight target, no questions asked.  It is the responsibility of the submarine to not operate near any other friendly submarine or ship because of the inability to distinguish friend from foe.
 
Every subsurface to air missile cuts into the very limited missile inventory of the submarine and reduces its offensive capability which is, of course, the submarine’s entire reason for being.  A submarine’s need for subsurface to air (SSAM) capability would be extremely rare.  Let’s face it, if you’re a submarine captain and you find you need SSAM very often then you’re not doing your job correctly!
 
A submerged missile launch requires the submarine to come to a shallow depth – generally the opposite of what a submarine wants to do in combat.
 
A missile launch creates a great deal of noise, heat, and visual display.  In other words, it likely gives away the submarine’s position.
 
Most obviously, the major issue is targeting.  A submerged submarine has extremely limited air search capabilities so where is the targeting for all these wondrous anti-air scenarios coming from?  Even the local anti-air scenario presents difficulties in targeting.  You may be able to hear a helo and have a general direction but that’s not enough for an anti-air launch.  Surface ships with exact radar pictures have a hard time establishing exact targeting for SAMs and a submerged submarine has far less chance.  Simply launching a SSAM and hoping it can find a target somewhere in the hemisphere around the sub is a recipe for wasting missiles. 
 
As far as receiving targeting from a remote platform, it is challenging, at best, to send real time targeting data to a submerged submarine without unacceptable risk to the submarine.  This also ignores the practical question of what platform could survive long enough to produce targeting data deep inside enemy waters.
 
 
Discussion
 
The SSAM inventory on a submarine would be very small unless someone wanted to abandon the submarine’s primary mission and instead perform AAW.  Is a very small inventory, meaning a very small AAW contribution, worth risking the submarine and compromising its main role?  I think not.  This smacks of yet another example of the Navy’s misguided attempts to make every platform a single-handed war winner.  We have ships designed specifically for the AAW role.  Let them do their job and let submarines do theirs which is offensive operations.  Do we want to risk (due to friendly or unfriendly fire) a several billion dollar sub trying to shoot down a million dollar missile when there are surface ships (Aegis) designed and suited exactly for that task?
 
Some might say that a submarine could be the unseen, forward AAW “shooter” with targeting provided by some other platform in a scenario analogous to the unmanned USV “shooter” vessel being placed far in front of a surface group and cued by a Burke or patrol plane .  Of course, that ignores the problem of how to communicate real time targeting data to a far distant, submerged submarine (as well as the blue-on-blue issue).  As far as I know, that’s a practical impossibility.
 
That said, it might be worthwhile having a half dozen or so SSAMs for the local defense scenario (anti-ASW helo) if the targeting issue can be solved.
 
There’s a reason why there has not been wide spread adoption of this technology among world navies.
 
 
 
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[1]The War Zone website, “U.S. Navy Is Seeking A Submarine Launched Anti-Air Missile”, Joseph Trevithick, 31-Jul-2026,
https://www.twz.com/sea/u-s-navy-is-seeking-a-submarine-launched-anti-air-missile

More Defensive Missile Data

I’ve repeatedly stated that ship anti-air / anti-missile defenses will perform far worse than the Navy believes.  I’ve backed that statement up with all the available historical data which, to be fair, is not a lot.  However, what data exists unequivocally proves that defensive surface to air missiles (SAM) have a probability of kill (pK) in the range of 1%-25% with the vast majority falling in the 1%-10% or so.  Despite this, there is a group of observers/commenters who have a vastly inflated confidence in SAM systems that is based on nothing but the same promise of improved technology that accompanies every new SAM system and that, ultimately, fails to deliver.  Well, here’s a new data point for Russian S-300 system performance against Israeli aircraft:

Syrian air defense forces having launched more than 1,000 surface-air missiles to try and foil the repeated Israeli attacks. They’ve had little effect so far. (1)

While this does not provide exact numbers, the trend seems clear.  I’ve heard of no reports of downed Israeli aircraft nor any credible claims of downings by Syria.  Thus, the Russian S-300 system would seem to have a pK of, essentially, zero.

S-300 - Ineffective?

I know exactly what some of you are going to say.  You’re going to wave away the failings of this system and point to the wondrous S-400 system.  Well, I’ll remind you that the S-300 once got the same rave reviews that the S-400 gets today.  Dr. Carlo Kopp, the renowned author, had this to say about the S-300 system in 2006.

The S-300 SAM systems remain one of the most lethal, if not the most lethal, all altitude area defence SAM systems in service … (2)

This is yet another data ‘point’ that proves that SAM success rates are quite poor across all eras and all systems.  Despite this body of evidence, the US firmly believes that its missile systems are extremely effective, to the point that we don’t even mount close in weapon systems on the Zumwalts.  We desperately need to put our defensive missile systems through real, live fire weapon trials on sacrificial barges and find out what they can, or cannot, do.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Unanswered Israeli Air Strikes Against Syria Raise S-400 Questions ”, Arie Egozi, 9-Jun-2020,

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/06/unanswered-israeli-air-strikes-against-syria-raise-s-400-questions/

(2)Dr. Carlo Kopp, 25-Feb-2006,

https://web.archive.org/web/20110928142727/http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.93/pub_detail.asp

Helos in the Littorals

The Navy is heavily invested in helicopters from a tactical perspective and few people even pause to consider the limits of their applicability.  Before I go any further, let me state that I, too, see the obvious capabilities of helos.  However, I also see their limitations.  Let’s look at bit closer at the use of helos in a littoral combat zone since helos will be a major, or perhaps the major, weapon system of the LCS. 

SAM - Counter to the Helo?

Regarding the littoral surface warfare scenario (ASuW) and setting aside the question of why we would be there, as discussed in a previous post, I’ve often heard comments that a couple of helos will make short work of a swarm of small craft and, to be fair, in an otherwise permissive environment, that’s probably a true statement.  But think about it …  Is there anything in a littoral zone, and a small craft swarm scenario, that might negate the effectiveness of a helo?  How about man-portable surface-to-air missiles (SAM) like the Stinger or SA-16/18/24 family?  Such missiles have max ranges of around 5 miles and effective ranges of 3-4 miles.  Compare those ranges to the helo’s air-to-ground (AGM) weapons such as Hellfire (5 miles) or Griffon (3 miles).  The opposing ranges basically overlap.  If one’s in range, so is the other.  SAMs can be fired from shore, from hiding in civilian/commercial small craft or, in what should be an obvious tactic, from each boat in a swarm.  The other obvious danger to helos, since we’re going to be fighting in someone else’s littoral zone, is aircraft from nearby airfields.  So, absent a permissive environment, the helo versus swarm is hardly the one-sided affair that many visualize.  Throw in a helo’s limited number of weapons and possibility of mechanical unavailability when needed and the situation is further complicated.  Finally, what about good old fashioned surprise?  If the helo is not in the air when an attack begins, the attack will be over by the time the helo can get airborne.  Helos are not a rapid reaction weapon system.

The above comments also apply in general to littoral ASW.  In the ASW role, helos made their reputation, and deservedly so, during the Cold War sub hunting days in the open ocean which did, indeed, constitute a permissive environment.  In the littoral zone, as described above, the helo is capable of being targeted multiple ways and may well find itself at high risk.  One wonders if this may have been part of the rationale for the original LCS conceptual ASW module consisting of multiple, off-board unmanned underwater and surface vehicles – an attempt to reduce dependence on easily targeted helos.

Helo - Endangered Species?

In summary, the helo is a powerful weapon system but is not the invincible platform that many make it out to be.  The closer helos operate to shore and shallow water with its fleets of small civilian boats, any one of which may harbor a man with a Stinger, the more at risk they are.  For the helo, operating near shore is analogous to the Army fighting in a city.  Snipers can hide anywhere and blend in with the population.  Stingers can be anywhere and can hide amongst the civilian craft.  One has only to look at the Soviet's Afghanistan experience to see how helos fared against Stingers.

The point of this little thought exercise is that we should not become overly dependent on the helo alone.  The LCS (or any ship attempting to fight in the littoral zone) needs a range of options which should include a small ship-launched Griffon/Hellfire-like missile with a range of several miles or more as well as a robust gun arrangement with multiple guns and fields of fire to the stern so that the LCS can use its speed as a tactic to maintain separation.  What’s needed for shallow water ASW is a topic for another day.