History is the greatest
source of lessons for the student of modern combat. To that end, let’s see what history can tell
us in today’s post.
WWII saw the evolution of
amphibious assault culminate in the Pacific island invasions late in the
war. By the end of the war, the
equipment and tactics had been as nearly perfected as possible. Ironically, most of those hard won lessons
have since been abandoned and forgotten.
One of the needs that was
identified was for the ability to provide a massive pulse of explosives just ahead
of the assault waves. One of the ways this
was accomplished was by the LSM(R) which was a specialized version of the
Landing Ship Medium which mounted rocket launchers as well as 5” guns and
mortars.
A typical, early LSM(R) was
the -188 class,
LSM(R)-188
class , 200 ft, 1100 tons
5”
gun
75
x 4-rail Mk36 rocket launchers
60
x 6-rail Mk30 rocket launchers
Further development of the
LSM(R) culminated in the -501 class
LSM(R)-501
class , 203 ft, 1200 tons
5”
gun
20
x Mk102 twin tube continuous loading 5" spin stabilizer rocket launchers
4
x 4.2” mortars
 |
| LSM(R) |
The Mk102 rocket launcher
was an amazing weapon. It was a twin
tube, continuous fire launcher with train and elevation. It was capable of a sustained rate of fire of
32 rockets per minute. The latter
LSM(R)s mounted 10 or 20 of these launchers – that’s 320 to 640 5” rockets per
minute.
The rockets fell into three
broad categories,
Mk7 5” Spin Stabilized
Rocket, 10,000 yds, 2.8 lbs TNT
Mk10 5” Spin Stabilized
Rocket, 5,000 yds, 9.6 lbs TNT
Mk12 5” Spin Stabilized
Rocket, 2,500 yds, 12.0 lbs TNT
 |
| Mk 102 Rocket Launcher |
A single LSM(R) could
deliver amazing amounts of firepower and several ships operating together
provided absolutely incredible amounts.
Of course, the LSM(R)s were only a part of the naval fire support. Dozens of battleships, cruisers, destroyers
and other specialized fire support ships also contributed to the massive
delivery of explosives to the assault site.
Contrast that to today’s few ships armed with only 5” guns and relegated
to operating beyond the gun’s range.
Tomahawk missiles are available but those are not really intended for
area bombardment due to their expense and very limited quantity. We have abandoned fire support for amphibious
assaults which calls into question the viability of assault doctrine in general.
The LSM(R) provided a small,
cheap vessel that could get in close to an assault site and deliver massive
amounts of cheap firepower. The
proximity to the beach assumed a high degree of risk but the small size and cheapness
of the vessels made the risk acceptable.
Today, we have $2B Burkes with a single 5” gun that are constrained by
doctrine to remain so far from the assault site that their gun can’t even reach
the beach! Even if we wanted to place a
Burke in close, who would seriously consider risking a $2B ship playing tag
with shore based artillery and missiles.
Our ships have become too expensive to risk doing the very jobs they
were built for!
So, is there a need for a
modern LSM(R)? If we’re seriously
contemplating amphibious assaults, there is.
Current doctrine does not call for tanks and artillery in the initial
landings (another lesson forgotten). With
no naval gun support and few aircraft (probably exclusively tied up defending
the fleet), the Marines will have no heavy explosive firepower until they can
get their own artillery and tanks ashore.
Of course, remember that the Marines are cutting tanks and artillery in
their quest to get “light” so there’s not much coming ashore even if they could
get it ashore.
Against a peer defender,
trying to come ashore with only infantry and AAVs with 0.50 cal machine guns is
a recipe for disaster. A modern LSM(R)
could help address the initial firepower gap.
Sadly, we have become so enamored with precision application of
firepower that we have allowed our total firepower delivery capability to
nearly vanish. There is still a
significant place for suppressive fires during the initial landing.
History is talking to us but
we’re not listening.
