MQ-8 Fire Scout Status

Remember when the Navy was claiming that the unmanned helicopter, the MQ-8 Fire Scout, was going to revolutionize naval warfare, providing area wide surveillance, total situational awareness, target detection and tracking, fire control for remote weapons, anti-surface capability, mine countermeasures, and … well … total battlefield dominance?  Let’s check in and see how that’s coming along.
 

The Future of Naval Warfare ... bye, bye

For starters, the Navy has all but abandoned the Fire Scout.

 

The current inventory is 36 aircraft with no additional procurement planned.[1]
 
President’s Budget 2023 included a significant divestment within the MQ-8 program, resulting in the removal of all MQ-8B AVs [ed. AV = Air Vehicle] from inventory and reduction of the MQ-8C AV active operational inventory. Currently there are 11 aircraft dedicated to operational employment with 3 allocated to test and training, an increase of 1 from last year’s Annual Report. Projections for FY24 will increase the operational employment number to 15. The remainder are in a preservation status and are planned to be used for maintenance parts as necessary to support the pool of operational aircraft.[1]

Budget documents from 2024 indicate that the Fire Scout is being phased out completely.
 

Operational employment of the MQ-8C will end in Q4 FY2024 and sundown will be completed by Q4 FY2026.[2]

Instead of having hundreds of Fire Scouts roaming the battlefield and dominating our enemies, as promised, the Navy is down to around a dozen, which are being phased out, and appears to have lost interest in the platform.
 
With the near abandonment of the Fire Scout as context, there are, nominally, three variations (increments, as the Navy terms it) of Fire Scout in the works:
 

• Endurance Baseline Increment – imaging EO/IR sensor and laser range finder and designator
• SUW Increment – maritime search radar
• Mine Countermeasure Increment – COBRA near shore mine detection

 
How is testing coming along?  DOT&E states,
 

The Navy has yet to complete land-based testing necessary to characterize radar performance against maritime targets.[1]

Conclusion
 
It seems that the Navy has all but abandoned the Fire Scout, presumably having realized that it has no effective use case in combat.  Of course, ComNavOps has been saying this since the first MQ-8 appeared.  Nice of the Navy to finally catch up.
 
Like the LCS, Zumwalt, and others, the Fire Scout platform has gone from being the future of naval warfare to an afterthought in a remarkably short period of time.
 
 
 
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[1]Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2023 Annual Report, Jan 2024,
 
[2]Flight Global website, “US Navy’s MQ-8C Fire Scouts fly into retirement just two years after entering operational service”, Jan Tegler, 29-May-2024,
https://www.flightglobal.com/helicopters/us-navys-mq-8c-fire-scouts-fly-into-retirement-just-two-years-after-entering-operational-service/158500.article

MQ-8C Fire Scout Status

Many commentators have described the near magical benefits of the MQ-8C Fire Scout in the surveillance and targeting role especially as it relates to the Navy’s distributed lethality concept.  ComNavOps is not one of those.  But, I digress …

MQ-8C Fire Scout

It seems that the Navy has assessed the MQ-8C as a failure, at least for the moment.

Although there are marked improvements in endurance over the MQ-8B, the Navy and DOT&E assessed the MQ-8C system as not operationally effective, not operationally suitable, and not cyber survivable. (1)

Well that was a touch damning.  Why the negative assessment?

Primary degraders that led to this assessment included the overall air vehicle reliability, image quality and system performance of the BRITE Star II EO/IR system, and the poor reliability and inconsistency of the Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL). The TCDL is the conduit for payload video and control. Excessive operator workload coupled with an immature supply support system also contributed to the assessment of not operationally suitable. (1)

So, essentially, the Fire Scout can’t see, hear, or talk but at least it’s slow and not stealthy!  This reminds me of the common assessment of my favorite cellar dwelling hockey team:  they may be small but they’re slow.

So, there you have the DOT&E testing assessment.  Despite the results and the Navy’s own negative assessment, the Navy declared that the Fire Scout achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in Jun 2019 .

The Navy declared its MQ-8C Fire Scout unmanned helicopter mission capable and ready to deploy aboard Littoral Combat Ships. (2)

Let me understand this.  The Navy believes that the Fire Scout is not operationally effective, not operationally suitable, and not cyber survivable and that constitutes a declaration of IOC?????  Well, doesn’t that just sum up the state of the Navy today?

Many people believed that the Fire Scout would also be used to defeat swarm boat attacks but the Navy has dropped that idea.

A little more than a year ago, the Navy was still testing how Fire Scouts could be used to repel swarm attacks of small attack craft. By this spring, the Navy scrapped those plans in favor of loading the aircraft with sensors to provide an LCS with superior over-the-horizon targeting capabilities. (2)

Why did the Navy opt to drop the idea of arming the FireScout?

The decision to focus on targeting missions comes after the Navy experienced some space constraints associated with arming the Fire Scout aboard an LCS. The Navy intended the Fire Scout to carry BAE System’s advanced precision kill weapon system (APKWS), which are modified 70mm Hydra rockets fitted with a guidance system.

While a smaller MQ-8B Fire Scout was able to successfully demonstrate its ability to operate the weapon aboard an LCS in 2018, it became clear the LCS ships themselves do not have a lot of magazine space, explained Capt. Jeff Dodge, the Navy’s Fire Scout program manager … (2)

The Navy has bought, or is planning to buy, 38 MQ-8C Fire Scouts.

The MQ-8C first flight occurred in 2013.  Now, seven years later, this is where we’re at.  The -8C should have been about the easiest development program possible.  It used existing airframes and technology.  There was nothing particularly novel about it and, yet, the Navy can’t seem to make it work.  I think the lesson herein is that technology is always oversold.  It always suffers from performance problems despite glowing manufacturer’s claims.  It’s always more difficult to implement than anticipated.  Observers who marvel at the latest claims are just deluding themselves.  The more technology you put into something, the more problems you’ll have (Ford, LCS, Zumwalt, F-35, etc.).  There is a very good argument for simpler, more basic equipment that has a much higher chance of actually working.

There you have the current status of the Fire Scout.  It will not be armed and will be tasked with surveillance and targeting despite being assessed by the Navy and DOT&E as not operationally effective, not operationally suitable, and not cyber survivable.  Sounds like the basis for an effective distributed lethality concept, right?

The new DOT&E category of cyber survivability is an interesting one.  This suggests that the possibility exists that an enemy could take control of a Fire Scout during flight via cyber attack or, at least, render it a mission kill.

With all that in mind, keep going Navy!  Against all reason, you’ve declared IOC so keep going!

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(1)Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), FY 2019 Annual Report, 20-Dec-2019, p. 151-2

(2)USNI News website, “Navy Declares Unmanned MQ-8C Fire Scout Helicopter Mission Capable”, Ben Werner, 9-Jul-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/07/09/navy-declares-unmanned-mq-8c-fire-scout-helicopter-mission-capable

MQ-8C Fire Scout

The MQ-8C Fire Scout is a helicopter-type unmanned aircraft intended to act as a scout asset for the LCS.  The aircraft is based on the commercial Bell 407 helicopter.  The MQ-8C represents a substantial improvement over its predecessor, the MQ-8B, although the improvements come with drawbacks such as increased size which impacts stealth and survivability.  Let’s take a look at what the MQ-8C can do and how it might be used.

MQ-8C Fire Scout

MQ-8C Fire Scout Specifications (1)
Maximum Speed	135 kts
Cruise Speed	115 kts
Service Ceiling	16,000 ft
Std Day Max Endurance w/ 300 lb Payload	12 hrs
Hot Day Max Endurance w/ 300 lb Payload	10 hrs
Empty Weight	3200 lbs
Length	34.7 ft

Note: Wikipedia cites endurance of 15 hours, max speed of 140 kts, max ceiling of 20,000 ft, a range of 150 nmi (170 mi; 280 km), and a payload capacity of 701 lb.  These claims appear to be largely unsubstantiated and, more importantly, unrelated to each other.  For example, if the claim of 700 lbs payload capacity is true, it would significantly affect the speed and endurance as indicated in the table.  In short, the table values seem much more realistic than the Wiki values.

As of the 2018 GAO annual report, the Navy apparently plans to procure 55 operational units with a program unit cost (production and development) of $46.25M each. (2)  Contracts are being issued as fixed-price, incentive type contracts.  It should be noted that the commercial airframe is being provided to the primed contractor as Government Furnished Equipment and the cost for the airframe may not be included in the GAO unit cost estimate. (2) I’m unable to determine whether that is the case or not.

The somewhat limited procurement quantity impacts CONOPS in that it means that the MQ-8C cannot be considered expendable as there would be few or no replacements.  With 30 or so LCS, there are less than two aircraft per ship.  Thus, the inherent non-stealthy character of the aircraft combined with the need to actively broadcast, thus giving away its location, would seem to severely limit the aircraft’s use to very low threat scenarios.

The acquisition program has been run under an accelerated approach which has bypassed many of the normal risk reduction actions and reviews.  Further, the Navy is acquiring the aircraft totally under low rate initial production (LRIP) status which violates Department of Defense acquisition practices.  LRIP acquisition is limited to 10% of the total acquisition.  No surprise that the Navy is ignoring acquisition practices since they routinely do so.

… the program has yet to demonstrate that its critical manufacturing processes are in statistical control—an approach inconsistent with best practices. (2)

The MQ-8C is being equipped with Leonardo-Finmeccanica’s Osprey AESA radar in a 2-panel configuration which provides a 240 degree field of view.  The unit has a maritime surveillance, small target mode, among other modes.  The radar uses a Line of Sight (LOS) communications procedure and is, apparently, intended to operate at high altitudes to enable longer distance communications (longer LOS).

Operational Considerations

Communications.  The radar’s LOS communications requirement means that in order to achieve useful extended coverage range from the host ship the aircraft must fly high and thus be very visible to enemy detection (the MQ-8C being decidedly non-stealthy) and highly susceptible to destruction (having no speed, maneuverability, or countermeasures).  Alternatively, the aircraft can fly very low and decrease its chance of being detected but then the useful coverage range becomes not much more than the 15-20 mile horizon due to the LOS communications requirement.

How a large, slow, non-stealthy, high flying aircraft will survive long enough in high end combat to perform its function is a mystery that the Navy has not yet explained.  Such an aircraft seems very useful for no-threat scenarios but not viable for high end combat.

Detection.  If equipped with radar, the aircraft will be continuously broadcasting its presence.  Radar is like the flashlight analogy – you can see the flashlight much farther away than the flashlight can see you.  So too, with radar.  While there are claimed low probability of intercept radars, the low probability is accomplished by significantly reducing the radar’s power output.  Unfortunately, significantly reduced power output also means significantly reduced range and capability.  So, the radar user is faced with the choice of either broadcasting at full power to achieve significant range and announcing his presence/location or reducing power which reduces range and capability.

The other sensor option for the MQ-8C is EO/IR sensors.  Being passive, these sensors would allow the aircraft to remain as stealthy as its non-stealthy airframe allows by not broadcasting its location.  This offers some potentially useful tactical possibilities although the data communication back to the host ship still requires LOS which means high altitude or short range.

An alternative mode of operation would be the use of passive EO/IR sensors and low altitude with no data transmissions.  The data would be collected and stored onboard the aircraft for download upon its return to the host ship.  Of course, this would require a degree of autonomy from the MQ-8C in identifying and stealthily maneuvering around threats that does not currently exist.  It would also impose a significant lag in data analysis and would negate any chance of using the aircraft for real time targeting.  Still, it would allow the establishment of general situational awareness.

Risk.  As noted above, the limited acquisition quantities render the MQ-8C decidedly non-expendable.  Unfortunately, as also noted above, the aircraft is non-stealthy and non-survivable which means that to be effective the aircraft must be considered expendable and large numbers of replacement aircraft must be immediately available onboard the host ship.  There is an obvious conflict of requirements, here!

In a war, it is possible that production could be ramped up to the point that the aircraft could be considered expendable.  However, that only solves half the problem.  The more immediate problem would be the number of aircraft available onboard the host ship and the LCS simple doesn’t have the room to carry more than a couple.  Thus, the inexorable conclusion is that the MQ-8C must be considered non-expendable and must be operated under a risk-averse doctrine to avoid having the host ship become ‘blinded’.  This suggests that the Navy’s concept of using the MQ-8C as a long range scout using its radar is not viable.  This is why ComNavOps has repeatedly called for large numbers of much smaller UAVs to fill the scout/surveillance role.


Conclusion

The Navy views the MQ-8C as the key to enabling the LCS as a viable anti-ship threat and yet it is difficult to see how the aircraft can effectively and survivably perform the intended scout/targeting function.  The non-stealthy nature of the aircraft combined with the communications constraints simply preclude any effective tactical utilization. 

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(1)Naval Drones website, “MQ-8C Fire Scout”, retrieved 2-Oct-2019,

http://www.navaldrones.com/MQ-8C-Fire-Scout.html

(2)Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Apr 2018, GAO-18-360SP

(3)https://www.leonardodrs.com/media/5350/osprey-mm_data-sheet.pdf