Hypersonic Intercept … Well, Not Really

ComNavOps never ceases to be amazed at the deceptive spin (I’ll refrain from using the word fraud, in this case) put out by manufacturers, the Navy, and complicit ‘news’ sources.  As you know, the ability of defensive systems to intercept hypersonic attacking missiles is questionable.  Well here’s a headline from a Naval News website article that sounds like a piece of great news:
 
Aegis Combat System Demonstrates System’s Capability to Counter Hypersonic Threats[1]
 
A Burke class destroyer, USS Pinckney (DDG-91) conducted a successful intercept of a hypersonic missile.  Well, that certainly sounds like good news.  Aegis performed a successful intercept of a hypersonic missile.  Great!
 
However, as we read a bit further into the article, we note the following: 

The USS Pinckney (DDG 91) successfully completed Flight Test Other 40 (FTX-40), also known as Stellar Banshee, using Lockheed Martin’s Aegis Combat System to detect, track and perform an engagement against a live advanced hypersonic Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) target using a simulated SM-6 Block IAU.[1][emphasis added]

Wait, what now?  The intercept used a simulated SM-6 defensive missile????  So, in reality, all the destroyer’s Aegis system did was track the hypersonic target.  It didn’t engage.  No actual intercept occurred.
 
Well, that changes the tone of the article and essentially refutes the headline, doesn’t it?
 
So, what did the test actually accomplish?  I don’t know the test objectives but it certainly didn’t demonstrate a successful intercept.  At best, it demonstrated the ability to track a hypersonic target which we already knew we could do.  At worst, it was a purely theoretical, software exercise that proved nothing.
 
The main thing all of this demonstrates is the need for us to be very careful and diligent in our reading of articles.  Take nothing for granted.  Assume whatever you’re reading is deceptive and make sure you really understand what you’re reading.
 
Congratulations Lockheed and Navy.  You theoretically shot down a target drone with a theoretical missile.  Theoretically … good job.
 
Congratulations Naval News website.  You managed to parrot a Lockheed press release without adding any analysis or value whatsoever.  You’re a credit to news reporters everywhere.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Aegis Combat System Demonstrates System’s Capability to Counter Hypersonic Threats”, Carter Johnston, 25-Mar-2025, Lockheed Martin Press Release
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/03/u-s-navy-downs-maneuvering-hypersonic-missile-in-sm-6-block-iau-test/

Garbage In, Garbage Out

Here’s another Air Force issue that is highly relevant to the Navy and the military, in general.
 
Boeing’s T-7A Red Hawk is years behind schedule.  This is not a highly complex, F-22/35 type stealth combat aircraft;  it’s a simple trainer intended to replace the Air Force’s T-38 Talon.  As a Drive website article notes, the T-7A was going to revolutionize aircraft design and construction by using computers and digital models. 

Advertised by the Air Force and Boeing as the service’s first "digitally designed and engineered" aircraft, T-7A was lauded as a poster child for developmental speed.[1]
 
The Red Hawk was expected to begin a new era in rapid design and engineering with iterative development carried out in the virtual world via modeling and simulation without having to bend metal or conduct extensive real-world testing. Systems integration would be accelerated and the time from the first flight to production significantly compressed.
 
It hasn’t worked out that way.[1]

Foolishly, we assign an aura of infallibility, bordering on a religious faith, to everything digital.  The reality, however, is that everything in the digital world  …  everything  … let me repeat that  …  everything  …  is governed by the ancient computer programming adage, GIGO which stands for,
 
Garbage In, Garbage Out
 
It doesn’t matter how brilliant your program is, if you feed it garbage input, you get garbage output. 

“A funny thing happens when you move out of digits to reality,” Teal Group analyst J.J. Gertler said.  “Digital engineering has the capability to rapidly iterate but it’s only as good as the information you put into it. It may also help you get to a wrong answer faster which you then have to back out of.”[1][emphasis added]

 
There you have it.  GIGO. 

“Digital engineering isn’t going to make issues go away,” he [Dr. Will Roper, former assistant secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics] noted. “It’s going to create a new issue which is – do you trust the underlying models and simulation upon which your performance predictions are based?”[1][emphasis added]

 
When hand held calculators were introduced, teachers noted that they all too often helped students get the wrong answer faster.  The calculator was electronically correct but the students were too ignorant to input the correct data.  GIGO.  The same phenomenon is prevalent in industry. 
 
Closely related, students lost the ability to recognize obvious incorrect results caused by mistaken inputs (accidentally pushed the wrong button) because they lost the ability to quickly estimate expected results and be able to recognize that an answer was patently incorrect.  I can instantly estimate 18x20 by rounding it to 20x20=400.  Therefore, I can recognize that an answer of 3600 is an order of magnitude off.  Students no longer have the ability to do that and cannot recognize obvious errors - the calculator said it so it must be right.
 
We’ve become so caught up in our blind worship of technology that we’ve completely ignored the constant presence of the GIGO phenomenon.  Digital results are accorded unquestioned faith.  Whether it’s artificial intelligence, computer aided design, pilot or ship driver training via simulation, or command and control networks, they’re all plagued by the constant presence of garbage input. 
 
Every Navy and Air Force design and acquisition program for the last two decades has claimed to be computer designed and computer aided and yet none have been what anyone would judge a success.
 
We had far more successful ship and aircraft design results from people using paper, pencil, and a slide rule then we do now using computers.  Common sense is screaming lessons at us but we’re too busy worshipping at the altar of technology to hear them.
 
How’s that simple, straightforward Air Force KC-46 tanker coming along?  It’s been well over a decade and still counting! 
 
Remember the Ford?  Computer modeled and computer designed?  How’d that turn out?
 
The F-35’s ALIS logistics, maintenance, and mission planning program was going to solve all our problems and yet it’s been abandoned and nothing has yet taken its place.
 
And so on.
 
The problem is that the people inputting the information are all too often incompetent idiots who can’t even rattle off their multiplication tables without consulting a calculator.  Have you ever tried to get change from a cashier who hasn’t got access to the register’s computer output?  They can’t calculate simple change in their head.  Why would we expect such people to be able to recognize garbage input and avoid it?  They can’t.  We’ve crippled ourselves, as a society, by allowing calculators in schools.  But, I digress …
 
We now have military leaders who are inputting idiotic data into wargames, computer models, and simulations and are unable to even recognize the idiotic results.
 
This isn’t just about arithmetic errors.  In the military, the idiotic inputs are things such as
 

• Assuming the enemy won’t respond in any harmful way to us.
• Assuming everything we do will work and nothing the enemy does will work.
• Assuming that we have capabilities the enemy doesn’t.
• Assuming our systems will work flawlessly.  Does any wargame factor in, oh, say, Ford EMALS breakdowns?  We have hard data but we’re hand waving away the reality.
• Assuming our surveillance assets will be allowed to conduct their missions without hindrance.
• Assuming we’ll have no problem working around the enemy’s electronic warfare even though any attempt at introducing even a modicum of EW into a real exercise has ended in the complete collapse of the exercise.
• Assuming our networks will work flawlessly even though we’re being successfully attacked and penetrated by enemy cyber forces on a daily basis.

 
This is the kind of idiotic, garbage inputs that are producing garbage outputs.  Unfortunately, we’re too stupid to recognize the garbage nature of either our inputs or outputs and so we blindly follow our technology down ever more incorrect paths.
 
 
Garbage In, Garbage Out
 
 
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[1]The Drive website, “T-7A Delays Compound Pilot Shortage, Expose Digital Engineering Pitfalls”, Jan Tegler, 12-May-2023,
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/t-7a-delays-compound-pilot-shortage-expose-digital-engineering-pitfalls
 

The Navy and Intellectual Property

One of the problems the Navy has run into in recent years is intellectual property rights. Understandably, manufacturers don't want to give up their proprietary data. Equally understandable, the Navy wants exactly that data so that they can model system performance as they contemplate system integration and modifications.

It's an impasse, currently, and has resulted in the Navy abandoning some promising systems.

The seriousness of the problem is magnified by the Navy’s [unwise] attempts to substitute modeling for actual tests in order to save money.  DOT&E has documented this problem multiple times across multiple weapon system programs in their various annual reports.

 

Consider some of the implications of this issue.  What about the manufacturer who was asked to provide proprietary data for the 32 Zumwalts.  Hmm … a contract for 32 ships might be worth giving up the data.  Unfortunately, the production run was reduced from 32 to 3.  Is it still worth it to the manufacturer to potentially give up their hard won institutional knowledge that gives them a competitive advantage for just 3 ships? 

The Navy is erratic, to say the least. Those 20 FFG may become 40 or the Navy may decide to go whole hog on unmanned and cut the FFG at 8. Who knows? The point is that the manufacturer is being asked to give away their proprietary information for the hope of a substantial sale that history strongly suggests is unlikely to occur.

Further, the Navy's ability to protect proprietary data is highly suspect with network infiltrations happening all the time in addition to whatever unethical and improper actions the Navy might opt to take that gives away the manufacturer’s data.

If I were a manufacturer, I'd be very reluctant to give away my hard-earned industrial advantage for a shaky deal with the US Navy.  Some companies might consider it worthwhile but, apparently, many are deciding it's not worth it.

 

Consider the following specific example from a DOT&E report.

 

In FY15, DOT&E learned that the Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) stopped work on the P_RA [ed. Probability of Raid Annihilation] Test Bed for the Freedom variant because a high-fidelity model of the ship’s AN/SPS-75 radar was not being developed. Development of an acceptable radar model requires intellectual property rights that the Navy does not hold … the Navy has also been unable to develop a high-fidelity model of that ship’s AN/SPS-77 radar for the same reason.[1, p.226]

 

Instead of conducting realistic, live tests, the Navy wants to model and simulate self-defense capabilities for the LCS.  That’s a very poor approach.  Modeling and simulation are fine but as an adjunct to live fire testing, not as a replacement for it.  That aside, in order to construct a valid model the Navy needs all the data on the radars.  The radar manufacturers, however, refuse to provide the proprietary data.  This leaves the Navy unable to program realistic models and simulations. 

 

It is easy to see, then, that the Navy’s choice of future equipment (of all types) is limited to those for which they can obtain proprietary data.  This eliminates many fine pieces of equipment from manufacturers who are unwilling to expose their data.

  

 

 

________________________________ 

[1]Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, “FY 2015 Annual Report”, Jan 2016

Confusion and Training

The Navy is in the process of establishing a TopGun type training program for surface warfare after decades of neglect.  During that time the Navy came to depend on simulation training and highly scripted exercises.  While a dedicated training program is a step in the right direction, it is woefully inadequate.  The simple fact that the training facility is going to be located at NAS Fallon in Nevada, far from any sea, is ample proof that the training will be inadequate.  By reason of its location, the training can’t be anything more than tabletop study and wargaming.  As I said, that’s better than the current situation but completely inadequate.  No amount of simulation can prepare a student for the chaos and confusion of actual battle.  No amount of simulation can replicate the physical sensations of a wildly heeling ship, the confused reports of crew, the inevitable mistakes and failures associated with a real situation, the darkness, the fog, the rain, the waves, and the resulting adrenaline and mental pressure that will be encountered in a real situation.

Let’s consider an historical example from WWII.  The first battle of Savo Island, off Guadalcanal, resulted in one of the worst defeats ever for the US Navy.  I won’t recap the battle.  Summaries are readily available on the Internet and in many books.  One of the main reasons (among many) was the utter confusion that reigned despite all the training that the ships, crews, and command personnel went through.  Here are some quotes from Wiki that illustrate the level of confusion.

Prior to the battle, the approaching Japanese force was sighted by a US sub and a contact report was sent. 

“The warnings, however, were considered vague and the size of the force reported did not suggest an attack was pending.”

The approaching force was also spotted by RAAF Hudson reconnaissance aircraft. 

“The first Hudson misidentified them as "three cruisers, three destroyers, and two seaplane tenders".

Another reconnaissance opportunity was squandered due to confusion.

“Mikawa's run down the Slot was not detected by Allied forces. Turner had requested that U.S. Admiral John S. McCain, Sr., commander of Allied air forces for the South Pacific area, conduct extra reconnaissance missions over the Slot in the afternoon of August 8. But, for unexplained reasons, McCain did not order the missions, nor did he tell Turner that they were not carried out. Thus, Turner mistakenly believed that the Slot was under Allied observation throughout the day.”

Confusion continued as the battle approached.

“[Adm.] Crutchley left the southern group in Australia to attend the conference, leaving Captain Howard D. Bode of Chicago in charge of the southern group. Crutchley did not inform the commanders of the other cruiser groups of his absence, contributing further to the dissolution of command arrangements.”

Sighting reports were incorrectly evaluated.

“Turner, Crutchley, and Vandegrift discussed the reports of the "seaplane tender" force reported by the Australian Hudson crew earlier that day. They decided it would not be a threat that night, because seaplane tenders did not normally engage in a surface action.”

More confusion,

“Crutchley elected not to return with Australia to the southern force but instead stationed his ship just outside the Guadalcanal transport anchorage, without informing the other Allied ship commanders of his intentions or location.”

The Japanese launched floatplanes that offered an opportunity for the Allied forces to react but they failed to do so.

“Although several of the Allied ships heard and/or observed one or more of these floatplanes, starting at 23:45 on August 8, none of them interpreted the presence of unknown aircraft in the area as an actionable threat, and no one reported the sightings to Crutchley or Turner.”

Once combat started, confusion increased.

“[USS] Patterson increased speed to full, and fired star shells towards the Japanese column. Her captain ordered a torpedo attack, but his order was not heard over the noise from the destroyer's guns.”

“… knocking out power to the entire ship before Canberra could fire any of her guns or communicate a warning to other Allied ships.”

“[Capt.] Bode ordered his 5 in (127.0 mm) guns to fire star shells towards the Japanese column, but the shells did not function.”

“Bode did not try to assert control over any of the other Allied ships in the southern force, of which he was still technically in command.  More significantly, Bode made no attempt to warn any of the other Allied ships or personnel in the Guadalcanal area as his ship headed away from the battle area.”

“[USS] Bagley, whose crew sighted the Japanese shortly after Patterson and Canberra, circled completely around to port before firing torpedoes in the general direction of the rapidly disappearing Japanese column; one or two of which may have hit Canberra.”

“Astoria'​s captain, awakened to find his ship in action, rushed to the bridge and ordered a ceasefire, fearful that his ship might be firing on friendly forces. As shells continued to cascade around his ship, the captain ordered firing resumed less than a minute later.”

“Quincy'​s captain gave the order to commence firing, but the gun crews were not ready.”

“Vincennes hesitated to open fire, believing that the searchlight's source might be friendly ships.”

So it was that a supposedly highly trained US and Allied force encountered total confusion for which they were unprepared.

Well, some of you say, that can’t happen today.  We have radar, IFF, and communications that ensure total situational awareness.  You’ll claim that actions are conducted from CIC so simulated training is all that’s needed.  History, however, begs to differ.

The highly trained CIC and bridge crew of the Aegis cruiser Vincennes made every mistake possible in shooting down an airliner.

The highly trained bridge crew of the Aegis cruiser Port Royal ran aground in broad daylight.

The highly trained crew of the submarine Greenville collided with a 190 ft Japanese fishery training ship causing it to sink.

There’s a reason why naval aviators qualify on the carrier rather than on the simulator.

There’s a reason why RN submarine command candidates qualify at sea rather than at a desk.

There’s a reason why the AF found that as simulator training increased, so too did crashes.

We’ve shot down friendly helicopters flying a clearly communicated flight plan. 

We’ve inflicted countless examples of friendly fire in recent conflicts. 

And so on…

There’s a reason why the TopGun training program was not a tabletop lecture.  The pilots had to fly to learn the lessons because no amount of lecture can replicate the heart pounding stress of pulling G’s, the possibility of air or ground collision, the effect of weather, the garbled radio communications, and the split second decision making that makes up real actions.

Similarly, no amount of lecture and tabletop training will replicate the confusion of real action at sea.  While we can’t engage in live fire, life and death training we can replicate the stresses as much as possible and the only way to do that is to be at sea.  This latest Navy training program is a step in the right direction but, as with so many Navy decisions, stops short of being a truly worthwhile program.

You recall all those Perry class frigates that we’re retiring and giving away?  Those would make excellent training ships.  Crewed for a few days at a time at sea, they would offer the opportunity to greatly enhance the value and realism of tactical training.  Throw in small boat drone target swarms, realistic cruise missile surrogates, and a dedicated opposing force (OPFOR) and you’d have the basis of as realistic training as possible.

I know some of you will moan about the cost but the cost of operating a dozen Perrys on a greatly reduced manning level pales in comparison to the cost of a ship sunk because we skimped on training.

In combat, confusion and chaos reign.  In a simulator, calmness and clarity reign.  We need to train for the former and the only way to do that is at sea.

Imagine …  Trainees are at sea.  The ship is pitching and heeling radically from constant full speed turns.  Just staying seated is a challenge.  Smoke is introduced into CIC.  Trainees are dressed for combat including gas masks.  Visibility is poor.  Voices are muffled.  Multiple threats are bearing down.  The noise level rises.  It’s harder to hear.  Some reports are completely wrong, some are partially correct, few are totally correct.  A swarm of surface drone boats are approaching quickly.  Friendly forces may be in the area.  Inevitably, data and commands are miscommunicated up and down the chain of command.  Enemy ECM compounds the confusion.  Occasional system failures occur.  GPS is blocked.  Higher authority wants to know what’s happening.   ……..  This level of training is badly needed and it can only take place at sea.

OpFor

We’ve discussed in previous posts (here and here and here) about the lack of realistic training in the Navy.  Oddly, though, the Navy established one of the best and certainly the most famous training program of all time, namely Top Gun.  Top Gun assembled a group whose dedicated mission was to assemble and study everything known about enemy aircraft, weapons, and tactics, develop our own tactics for defeating the enemy, and then train a continual rotation of pilots to take advantage of their findings.  By all accounts, the program was a major success until the mid ‘90s when it was merged with the Navy’s strike training program.

Consider this, though …  Almost all of the information collected and taught at Top Gun was available to the pilots on their own.  In other words, the pilots in the fleet had access to everything needed to draw their own conclusions and develop their own tactics and yet it didn’t happen.  Why not?  Well, the pilots were too busy with routine training, patrols, paperwork and the thousand other things that consume a pilot’s typical day.  It was necessary to form a group whose entire day was devoted to studying the enemy because the fleet pilots simply didn’t have the time to do their own studies.  There’s also an economy of scale – no sense having every pilot in the fleet reinvent the wheel.  Of course, it was also beneficial to have a set of standardized tactics that all pilots knew instead of having each pilot develop their own with the result that no pilot would know what pilot next to them would do in combat.

The other services also offer similar dedicated adversary (Opposing Forces - OpFor) forces for realistic training such as the Air Force’s Red Flag or the Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA.

The key feature to these Opfor commands is that they provide training by using platforms and tactics that closely simulate the expected enemy.

Previous posts have discussed and documented that even current leadership of the Navy, by their own admission, recognize that ships and crew are not being trained against realistic threat platforms using enemy tactics.  Simply gathering ships, splitting into two groups, and then “fighting” is not providing realistic training in recognizing and countering enemy tactics.  For the same reason that individual pilots were unable to develop their own tactics, ship’s Captains just don’t have the time to study enemy platforms, weapons, and tactics and then develop counter-tactics.  The Navy needs a standing OpFor – a Top Gun of the sea.

To the extent possible, OpFor’s use platforms that mimic the characteristics of the enemy platforms.  Instead of retiring and selling off the Perry FFGs, why not use them as simulators of enemy corvettes/frigates/destroyers?  The Meggitt Hammerheads would provide extremely realistic simulations of small boat swarms and missile boats.  The Cyclone class, which the Navy has never embraced, could simulate fast attack craft, missile boats, and corvettes.  There are plenty of used (or new) non-nuclear subs on the market that could be used to simulate enemy platforms. 



It's Got To Be Real



A standing OpFor would certainly not be a cost-free program but compared to the cost of the first multi-billion dollar ship saved as a result of superior training, the cost would be negligible.  All the platforms already exist and have been paid for.  Most are headed for retirement and scrapping so their use as OpFor platforms wouldn’t deprive the fleet of active ships.  All that would be needed is some minor upgrading and instrumenting for the role.  Even the manning requirements of the simulator platforms could be greatly scaled back through automation and the need to only man for exercises of a few days duration. 

The combination of a standing OpFor and appropriate live fire exercises would provide the most realistic and useful training possible.  It’s one thing to read a book about tactics or run through a computer simulation but it’s another to stand on the bridge of your ship watching a Hammerhead approach at 35 kts, about to crash into the side of your ship and leave a giant dye mark splashed all over the side of your ship because you didn’t honor the threat appropriately, while a drone flashes overhead that you didn’t detect in time, and knowing you’re going to be mocked by your fellow Captains (even though they wouldn’t do any better) upon your return with your ship bearing the red blotch of shame.

Before I close this discussion out, I know I’m going to have to address those of you who are already starting to type in your reply that all we need is to use simulators;  that combat takes place in the CIC, anyway, so we can train dockside in front of computers.  Well, the Air Force found that as simulator usage increased, so too did real world mishaps.  Simulators just can’t replicate the stress, adrenalin, and confusion found in the cockpit of a plane pulling G’s and with the threat of collision with other planes or the ground only seconds away.  Yeah, but that’s the Air Force;  it’s different for naval combat, right?  Wrong!  Remember the Vincennes incident where a highly trained CIC crew made every mistake possible and a few considered impossible.  Simulators largely remove stress.  Once stress is added back in, performance suffers greatly – and that’s the environment to train in! 

Don’t get me wrong.  Simulators are a great complement to, but not a replacement for, live training.

It’s time to start putting our ships and crews up against trainers who thoroughly know and can apply enemy tactics.