F-35 Block 4 – Total Crap

As you know, the F-35 does not yet have its full combat capabilities.  Those were part of the incremental Block software upgrades and should have happened years ago.  Now, the Block 4 upgrade effort has been delayed yet again.
 

The Pentagon now anticipates the F-35’s Block 4 modernization won’t be complete until 2031 at the earliest, a five-year delay from its original timeline, even as the department rescopes the effort to include fewer capabilities than originally envisioned … [1]

Note the phrases,
 
“at the earliest”
 
“include fewer capabilities than originally envisioned”
 
You know, beyond the slightest shadow of a doubt, that the even the much delayed 2031 date will slip further still and the already downgraded capabilities of the Block 4 will be further downgraded.  Honestly, at the rate we’re going, Block 4 isn’t going to deliver much in the way of new capabilities, at all.  Many features have already been deferred to a nebulous, non-existent, unfunded, future upgrade instead of the Block 4.
 
In addition, the Block 4 program is being reorganized, yet again.  GAO reports,
 

According to program officials, the new Block 4 major subprogram will have fewer capabilities, will experience schedule delays, and will have unknown costs until the program office finishes developing its cost estimate.[1]

The cost for this pile of digital crap is stunning, even by Department of Defense standards.
 

An updated cost estimate for the Block 4 effort, which was $16.5 billion as of 2021, is expected “later in 2025,” according to the GAO.[1]

Well over $16B and counting (with at least five more years of costs still to come!) and with next to nothing to show for it.  I really don’t know how to apply any value-added analysis to that.  People should be rotting in jail for this.  Okay, I guess that was my value-added analysis.
 
On the off chance that you aren’t angry about this, yet, the following should correct that.
 

The F-35 program’s use of incentive fees has largely been ineffective at holding the contractors accountable to delivering engines and aircraft on time,” the GAO stated. “For lot 15 aircraft, where the program originally tied incentives to on-time delivery, the program gave the contractor a second chance to earn fees by redirecting those incentives to other aspects of the program when it was clear that Lockheed Martin would not deliver any aircraft on time.[1]

So, we set up a contract with incentives and then paid the manufacturer incentives even after they failed to deliver aircraft on time.  People should be rotting in jail for this.  See?  More value-added analysis.
 
This is exactly the kind of thing I had hoped that SecDef Hegseth would address but he is disappointing me.  Heads should be littering the halls of the F-35 program.  What is Hegseth doing with his time?
 
 
 
_____________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “F-35 Block 4 upgrade delayed until at least 2031: GAO”, Valerie Insinna, 3-Sep-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/09/f-35-block-4-upgrade-delayed-until-at-least-2031-gao/

Ship Order Quantities

Continuing on a little bit of an acquisition theme, we have become conditioned to think of military acquisition ordering, specifically ship ordering, as occurring in large quantities.  For example, here’s some planned or built orders for some classes:
 

 
 

But, this was not always the case.  In fact, this is an anomaly in the history of the Navy.  Historically, most shipbuilding programs resulted in small orders.  Consider the following sequential list of combat ship types in the WWII era and note the size of each class, as shown in the table below.

 

We see that even in the midst of an emergency wartime crash construction program that would see the Navy ultimately build a fleet of 6000 ships, the individual class sizes were still very small … stunningly small by today’s norm.
 
Even the smaller ships, of which the Navy needed many hundreds, were built in fairly small quantities as shown below.
 

 

Even these larger destroyer and destroyer escort class numbers are deceptive in that they were all built in the span of a few years.  Thus, although the numbers may have been larger, the construction period for the classes was very short which is almost the same as being a very small class as far as how it impacts ordering, construction, and pricing.  Contrast this with the LCS class, a corvette size ship, which has been under construction for some twenty years or the 3-ship Zumwalt class which began construction in 2009 and is still continuing, sixteen years later!
 
 
Future Proofing
 
One of the major impacts of class size has to do with the misguided notion of future proofing, the concept so beloved by so many naval observers.  The idea of future proofing is that if we build excess capacities (weight margin, electrical power, internal hull volume, hull length, extra cabling and ducting, etc.) into the new ship it will be much cheaper to upgrade it in the future as new technologies emerge.  While superficially appealing, the concept has failed almost completely in practice and has resulted in more expensive ships that never get ‘futured’, meaning, they never receive those nebulous, undefined future upgrades.
 
Future proofing results in compartments that have no function, cables and ducting that are dead ends, and length, width, and volume added to the ship for future needs that, history tells us with near 100% certainty, will never happen.  In short, we increase the cost of ships trying to future proof them despite knowing full well that we’ll never apply the future upgrades.  Instead, when the time comes for adding future upgrades, the Navy will claim, as they always do, the ships are too old and that it is no longer cost effective to upgrade the ship and that the ship is too worn out to be worth upgrading and that we must buy new hulls.  How many times have we seen this happen and yet naval observers keep calling for future proof designs?  Remind me, what’s the definition of insanity?  Oh yeah, that’s right …
 
In WWII, there was zero future proofing built into ships.  Future proofing, meaning the incorporation of new technology, was handled by building small classes so frequently that classes with new technologies (or the lessons of actual combat) were always just around the corner.
 
 
Order Size
 
One might think that industry would love large orders and, in theory, that would be correct if the Navy ever followed through on the large order (see, “Follow Through”).  In theory, large orders would lend stability to shipbuilders since they could plan years ahead for their workloads, better manage workforce levels, and intelligently plan facility improvements.  Of course, this is not what happens in practice.  In practice, shipbuilders are left unsure about future workloads since every program is always on the verge of being cancelled or reduced, orders surge and wane resulting in frantic attempts to hire workers followed shortly by layoffs, and facility improvements and, indeed, basic maintenance, keeps getting pushed into an undefined ‘someday’ that never arrives.  What’s the point of large orders that just get cancelled or reduced?
 
Contrary to what one might think, small orders actually promote stability in the shipbuilding industry because industry has a much higher confidence that the order will be fully carried to completion and that subsequent small orders are coming.
 
Large orders have had the effect of reducing new classes and new projects to near zero.  For example, we’re down to one new combat aircraft order every twenty or thirty years now.  This results in one winner in industry getting all the work for decades (Lockheed Martin and the F-35, for example) and the other manufacturers being forced to consolidate and/or die due to lack of work.
 
It is time to return to the historically more normal practice of building frequent, small classes of ships with short life spans (10-20 years).  We knew this, once upon a time, but stupidly abandoned timeless wisdom.  Let’s study our history, recall the lessons, and return to sanity.

Follow Through

We are constantly amazed – but, by this time, not surprised – by the inevitable increases in prices on military acquisition programs and the 100% guaranteed cost overruns.  We’ve discussed many of the factors that cause this but here’s one that we haven’t emphasized enough:  quantity reductions.
 
The more you build of something, the cheaper it gets due to economy of scale … at least, that’s the theory although it’s almost impossible to find evidence of that in any acquisition program.  But, what happens when the initial quantities get reduced as the program progresses?  Prices skyrocket for the remaining items and subsequent construction bids soar.
 
As a reminder, consider the historical programs listed below and the change from the initial quantities to the final purchased amounts, as shown.  Note that some of the quantities, especially the planned quantities, vary depending on source.  I’ve listed the most commonly cited quantities that I’ve found.  For programs with international sales, the figures shown are for US sales only.
 
 

• Seawolf-class - planned 29, built 3
• Zumwalt-class – planned 32, built 3
• Zumwalt AGS – planned 64, built 6
• F22 - planned 750, built 195
• LCS – planned 55, built 35
• LCS Modules – planned 64, built 35
• B-2 – planned 132, built 21
• M10 Booker – planned 504, built 80
• MQ-8C – planned 177, built 38
• EFV – planned 1025, built 0

 
 
There are also programs that have not yet concluded but appear to be on their way to reducing the planned quantities.
 

• LRASM – interest has died and the program is on the verge of termination
• F-35B – planned 353, now planned 280
• F-35C – planned 353, now planned 280
• ACV – planned 1122, now planned 632
• P-8 – planned 138, now planned 128
• F-35   planned 2866, now planned 2470
• MQ-4C Triton – planned 70, now planned 27

 
With this background, does anyone think programs such as the B-21, Columbia-class, and Constellation-class will survive with no quantity reductions?
 
 
Discussion
 
To return to the original premise, how do quantity reductions impact costs and future program bids?  Think about it.  If you’re running a defense industry company and you’re asked to bid on a project, you know, with near 100% certainty, that the quantity you’re bidding on will be reduced at some point.  So, what do you do?  Obviously, you calculate the actual cost to produce the specified number of products and then you add a significant extra amount to your bid to cover the inevitable reduction in quantity.  You have to do this to ensure your profit.  This isn’t price gouging … it’s just basic, common sense business.
 
The military’s instability in program quantities drives up costs as a simple matter of business.  If the military would hold to the planned quantities, the savings would be huge.

Northrop B-21 Financial Loss

Northrop has, so far, totaled more than $2B in losses on the B-21 program.[1]
 
Can no one estimate a program anymore?  Are the people running industry and the military really as stupid as the evidence demonstrates?  It would appear so.
 

 
_____________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Northrop logs new $477M loss on B-21 bomber due to higher manufacturing costs”, Valerie Insinna, 22-Apr-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/04/northrop-logs-new-477m-loss-on-b-21-bomber-due-to-higher-manufacturing-costs/

USS Constellation Update

The Navy’s new frigate, the USS Constellation, is now expected to deliver 3 years late, or more (spoiler alert!  It will be more!).  What’s going wrong?  Let’s get an update.
 
 
Design
 
The Constellation contract was awarded in April 2020 which means the design work began more than 5 years ago and is still nowhere near complete.  That’s astounding.  Over 5 years to generate a design and it still isn’t complete.
 

… the U.S. Navy had to significantly modify the design to meet U.S. survivability and growth margin standards.
 
Speaking at the Naval Institute’s Defense Forum Washington event, Fincantieri Marinette Marine CEO Mark Vandroff said the Navy and the shipyard underestimated the complexity of altering the design.[2]

The entire point of the so-called parent design approach was exactly to avoid significant design changes and yet the Navy ignored that philosophy and instituted extensive changes.
 
Concurrency and Schedule
 
As we’ve seen with every acquisition program in recent years, concurrency (simultaneous design and construction) always causes cost and schedule havoc.  Despite this repeated, soul-deep lesson, the Navy opted for concurrency, yet again, beginning construction with only partial design plans.  Predictably (well … predictable by everyone except the Navy), this has caused schedule problems among other issues, with the ship now scheduled to deliver more than three years late.
 

The Navy’s decision to commence construction before completing the design has led to significant schedule slippages.[1]

Cost
 
As always, the Navy’s cost estimates have proven fraudulently underestimated.
 

Initially, the estimated cost for the first ship was around $1.28 billion, with subsequent ships expected to cost approximately $1.05 billion each. However, these estimates have proven to be overly optimistic. The actual costs have increased significantly, with some estimates suggesting that the final cost per ship could be as high as $1.6 billion. This 40% increase in costs has raised concerns about the program’s affordability and sustainability.[1]

Actually, those costs aren’t even true.  The Congressional Research Service Feb 2021 report notes,
 

The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission estimated that subsequent ships in the class will cost roughly $940 million each in then-year dollars.[emphasis added][2]

Weight
 

The weight of the ships has increased by over 10% from the initial estimates. This weight growth is attributed to design decisions and the challenges of adapting a foreign design to meet U.S. Navy requirements.[1]

Unfortunately, the Navy is now looking at reducing or eliminating other capabilities in order to compensate for the weight increase.  It is almost certain that the range and speed requirements will be downgraded among other detrimental changes.
 
Workforce
 

The shipyard is reportedly a “few hundred” workers short, which has contributed to delays in the construction schedule.[1]

Come on, now.  It’s not as if the builder didn’t know how many workers they had when the bid the project.  If they’re short of workers now, they certainly knew they were short of workers when they bid.  This is, again, fraud on the part of the builder and willful complicity on the part of the Navy who also knew the builder’s workforce compared to the project requirements.
 
Risks
 

The Navy has yet to demonstrate the full capabilities of the propulsion and machinery control systems … [1]
 
The Navy is considering additional land-based testing to mitigate these risks and ensure the reliability of the systems before the ships are deployed.[1]

When have we ever seen ‘risks’ not become problems?  The point of land based testing is to find problems and solutions before beginning construction.
 
Second Yard
 
Given the inability of Fincantieri to meet the contracted schedule, the Navy has begun looking at a second source shipyard.  Possibilities include:
 

… specifically mentioned Austal USA, Bollinger, HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works as potential second yards.[2]

 
Conclusion
 
The Navy’s absolute refusal to design and build a ship the proper way (complete the design and then begin construction) is, after so many demonstrated failures using this approach, a near criminal act of fraud and negligence perpetrated against the American taxpayer.
 
As we all knew, with 100% certainty, concurrency has, once again, caused schedule slippage and cost overruns.
 
The Constellation class is now in the process of having its requirements downgraded to compensate for weight increases.  So much for the supposed benefits of a parent design.  The Navy never had any intention of building the parent design.  That was just a ploy to evade additional Congressional oversight.
 
It bears noting that the yard’s manpower shortages are not exactly a new problem that suddenly reared its head.  Both the yard and the Navy knew they couldn’t build the ship in the required time frame with the workforce they had.  Essentially, the yard and the Navy conspired to hide the inability to meet the contract.
 
Worse than all the listed problems is the fact that even if there were no problems, it would only produce an obsolete design unsuited for modern combat.
 
There is no other way to describe this program than as a massive fraud and failure. 
 
 
 
____________________________

[1]1945 website, “The U.S. Navy’s New Constellation-Class Frigate Is In Big Trouble”, Isaac Seitz, 25-Feb-2025,
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/02/the-u-s-navys-new-constellation-class-frigate-is-in-big-trouble/
 
[2]USNI News website, “Navy: Constellation Frigate Design Will be Ready in May, Second Yard Could Come in FY 2027”, Mallory Shelbourne & Sam LaGrone, 13-Dec-2024,
https://news.usni.org/2024/12/13/navy-constellation-frigate-design-will-be-ready-in-may-second-yard-could-come-in-fy-2027

Multi-Year Amphibious Ship Buy

As reported by Naval News website, the Navy has awarded a multi-year contract for the purchase of three San Antonio LPDs and one America LHA. 

The deal, which will fund three San Antonio-class LPDs and one America-class Flight II LHA, will save taxpayers an estimated $1 billion.[1]

I have a couple of problems with this contract award.
 
Savings – The supposed savings is estimated at $1B.  In the aggregate, that sounds impressive.  A billion dollars!  Wow!  However, across four ships that’s just $250M savings per ship.  That’s not nothing but it’s not a miraculous savings, by any means.  More importantly, you know those savings will never materialize.  With 100% certainty, the ships will come in over budget and behind schedule with a litany of excuses like supply chain disruptions, parts shortages, design modifications, and all the other usual suspects.  There won’t be any savings.  The absolute best case is that the ‘savings’ (let’s be optimistic and assume there will be actual savings) will slightly reduce the magnitude of the inevitable cost overruns.  Again, better than nothing but let’s not kid ourselves into thinking we’re actually going to save money.
 
Make no mistake, the Navy didn’t do this to save the taxpayers any money; they did it to lock down budget commitments.  The Navy doesn’t care what a ship costs.  It’s not their money.  Congress will always give them more money.  They did this to lock down budget share.
 
Doctrine – This is the real puzzler.  Neither the Navy nor the Marines have any intention of ever again doing an amphibious assault.  The Marines have publicly and explicitly stated that they are out of the assault business.  The Navy doesn’t care about amphibious assaults and, indeed, balked at procuring more amphibious ships when they instituted a ‘strategic pause’ in amphibious ship procurement. 
 
Similarly, the Navy’s total indifference to the Marine’s Light Amphibious Warfare ship is yet more evidence of their disdain for amphibious operations.
 
Further evidence is the Navy’s total abandonment of naval gun support for amphibious operations and the doctrinal decision to move amphibious ships 25-50 miles off shore – a distance at which it is impossible to conduct an amphibious assault with current technology. 
 
The Navy is never going to conduct another amphibious assault so why are we continuing to buy more amphibious ships?
 
Legality – By law, multi-year procurements can only be applied to a single design that is mature and stable.  While I’m not a lawyer, the mix of ship types and the inclusion of a single (not multi) LHA would appear to be illegal.  Of course, this would hardly be the first time the Navy has ignored the law.  Here’s the verbiage describing the main requirement for using a multi-year procurement. 

FAR17.105-1(b)(3) There is a stable design for the supplies to be acquired, and the technical risks associated with such supplies are not excessive [2]

This is intended to be applied to a single, stable design.  The Navy is most certainly violating the spirit and intent of the law, if not the actual verbiage.
 
 
 
Discussion
 
So, with no savings and no intention (Marines) or interest (Navy) in ever conducting an amphibious assault, tell me again, why are we continuing to procure any amphibious ships? 
 
It seems clear that the only viable reason for the Navy going down this path is the desire to lock in budget share.
 
Layer the potential illegalities on top of this highly questionable contract and it becomes even more clear that this is a budget machination, not a sincere attempt at saving the taxpayers money.
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “U.S. Navy’s First Ever Multi-Year Amphibious Ship Contract Awarded”, Carter Johnston, 25-Sep-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/us-navy-finalizes-first-amphibious-multi-year-buy/
 
[2] https://www.acquisition.gov/far/subpart-17.1

Stupidity Abounds!

The Boeing KC-46 tanker woes and resultant financial devastation should have been a cautionary tale for defense industries.  The lessons are myriad and obvious.
 
Now, we learn that Northrop Grumman (NG) has crafted its own aircraft production debacle with the B-21 bomber.  Grumman has officially taken a $1.6B loss and the production is just barely beginning! 

For several quarters, the defense contractor has disclosed in earnings reports that due to a fixed-price contract for the B-21 Raider’s low-rate initial production (LRIP) phase that was signed in 2015, a loss of up to $1.2 billion could be possible amid high inflation and workforce disruptions. That loss is now realized in a pre-tax charge of $1.56 billion, or $1.17 billion post taxes, according to the company’s 2023 year-end earnings report.[1]

Before you weep for Grumman and begin sending them donations, note that the fixed price contract isn’t actually fixed. 

The Pentagon so far has provided $60 million to offset some inflationary impacts for the B-21 program … discussions are ongoing for more …[1]

Sure, $60M is a drop compared to a $1.6B loss but I’m sure this is only the beginning of the financial assistance from the government.
 
Can Northrop Grumman learn any lessons from this stupidity-birthed disaster? 

As Northrop Grumman absorbs the losses associated with B-21, the aerospace giant is heeding lessons learned by other contractors about the pitfalls of fixed-price contracts. Since bidding on B-21 in 2015, “we certainly have changed our view on bidding of contracts where we did not have a mature design at the point of bid and yet we committed to fixed-price options into the future,” Warden said. “And we have, to my knowledge, not done that again.”
 
Northrop Grumman has “passed on high-profile programs” due to its apprehension around fixed-price contracts, according to Warden, and been more cautious in its bids.[1] [emphasis added]

So, by their own admission, NG knew what they were doing was stupid and yet they did it anyway.  In essence, they offered a fixed price bid on a fantasy wish list of a product.  A junior high school student would know not to offer a fixed price on an undefined product.
 
At least they now seem to realize that fixed price bids on immature product designs are stupid.  Of course, that’s closing the barn door after the $1.6B horse is out.
 
The military, of course, loves the idea of fixed price contracts on ill-defined products!  What they fail to realize is that, ultimately, they’re hurting themselves because it causes companies to refrain from bidding or to bid exceedingly high to cover anticipated cost overruns.  What the military should be doing is finalizing product designs before requesting bids.  That way, the companies know exactly what they’re bidding on and can make realistic cost estimates and bids.  In the end, both the manufacturers and the military win from that approach.  Unfortunately, that would require intelligence from the military and, like so many shortages today, there seems to be a severe shortage of intelligence in the military.
 
 
 
__________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Northrop Grumman logs billion-dollar charge on B-21 stealth bomber”, Michael Marrow, 25-Jan-2023,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/01/northrop-grumman-logs-billion-dollar-charge-on-b-21-stealth-bomber/

! ! ! !

This is not a Navy issue but it warrants a notice.  The Boeing KC-46 tanker program has had lots of problems and the manufacturer has taken massive losses.

... KC-46 losses now total more than $5 billion on a $4.9 billion contract ... [1]

Boeing has lost more than the contract was worth !

KC-46 Tanker [1]

Sooner or later, the various military and industrial contracting parties have got to learn some lessons such as:

• Don't design products that are more complicated than they need to be.  Seriously, it's a tanker.  It's a flying fuel tank with a pump for transferring the fuel.  We've been doing this for how many decades?  But no ... we had to make the new tanker an all-digital, remote vision, automated, fly-by-wire boom, with super glass panoramic displays.  In addition, we couldn't just have it dispense gas.  No, that would be too simple and cheap.  We had to make it a multi-function, combination tanker, passenger transport with seating for 58, cargo transport with capacity for 18 pallets, and medevac with room for 54 patients.[2]
• Don't low ball bids[1]
• Don't accept bids that are obviously unrealistic.  The Air Force is just as much to blame as Boeing.
• Don't ask for and don't offer fixed price bids for unproven products.
• Demand prototypes and test them thoroughly before issuing contracts.

The Air Force may think they were clever by using a fixed price contract but what did they gain?  The program began in 2001 and Boeing was selected in 2011.  Now, 11 years later, the Air Force has yet to receive new functional tankers.  The Air Force may not be footing the bill for the problem fixes and schedule delays but they aren't receiving any product, either.  So, what did they really gain?

[1]https://breakingdefense.com/2022/07/new-boeing-defense-ceo-signals-different-approach-in-future-fixed-price-contracts/

[2]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_KC-46_Pegasus

LRASM Update and Production History

The Navy has been trying, half-heartedly, to replace the obsolete Harpoon anti-ship missile.  The initial attempt was/is the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM).  Let’s check the status of the program.

 

The LRASM program began in 2009 and production was authorized in February 2014 as an urgent capability stop-gap solution to address range and survivability problems with the Harpoon missile.[1]  This is a completely valid need/requirement as the Harpoon is obsolete against any moderate defense.  As an urgent need, accelerated program, the LRASM should have been put into production in, what, several months, maybe a year given that it is a modification of an existing missile, the Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)?  By now, thirteen urgent years later, we should have thousands of missiles in the fleet and in inventory, right?

 

As a reminder, the LRASM program initially had two paths:  the LRASM-A version was a subsonic cruise missile based on the Lockheed Martin's AGM-158 JASSM-ER while the LRASM-B version was a supersonic missile.  The –B was cancelled in 2012.

 

The initial plan was for LRASM to be launched from aircraft and, eventually, adapted to ship launch from VLS systems.  As we’ve noted, after some initial feasibility tests, the ship launched version seems to have ceased development.

 

A brief timeline is presented below.  Note that this was an urgent need program.  With that in mind, the drawn out time frame is quite disappointing.

 

 

2009 – Program start with LRASM-A subsonic version and LRASM-B supersonic version.

2012 – LRASM-B cancelled.

2013 – Testing begins.

2013 – Company funded VLS test.

2015 – Designated AGM-158C

2017 – Lot 1 Low Rate Initial Production contract for 23 air-launched missiles.

2018 – Approved for use on B-1 bomber.

2019 – Approved for use on F-18 Hornet.

 

Had the urgent need been met in a year or less, this program would have been an excellent example of rapid adaptability and responsiveness.  As it stands, however, it is yet another example of a badly broken R&D and procurement system.

 

Here is a timeline of the LRASM production contracts.

 

Jul 2017 - LM awarded $86M contract for production of 23 missiles for Lot 1 LRIP [3]

Jan 2019 - LM awarded $172M contract for production of 50 missiles for Lot 2 [4]

Apr 2020 - LM awarded $167M contract for production of 48 missiles for Lot 3 [6]

Feb 2021 – LM awarded $414M contract for production of 137 missiles for Lots 4 and 5 [2]

Nov 2021 – LM awarded $125M contract for production of 42 missiles for Lot 6 [5]

 

The contract totals appear to be $964M for 300 missiles which gives an average cost of $3.2M per missile.

 

So, an urgent need program has delivered (meaning contracts awarded rather than missiles actually delivered) 300 missiles in 8 years using an existing missile as its basis.  That’s disappointing performance, to say the least.  I guess ‘urgent’ doesn’t mean in the military what it does in real life.

 

 

________________________________

 

Related Note: The LRASM was to have been quickly followed by the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment 2 anti-ship missile slated for entry into service in 2024.  In reality, the 2020 DOT&E report states that the Navy is now hoping for OASuW Increment 2 sometime in the FY28-30 time range and, without a doubt, that will slip by a few to several years.  This really is pathetic.

 

 

 

________________________________

 

[1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-158C_LRASM

 

[2]https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/lockheed-martin-lrasm-production-usaf-navy/

 

[3]https://www.defensedaily.com/lockheed-martin-wins-87-million-lrasm-production-contract-tests-ship-launch/air-force/

 

[4]https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/sna-2019/2019/01/u-s-navy-air-force-award-lockheed-martin-2nd-lrasm-production-lot/

 

[5]https://www.govconwire.com/2021/11/lockheed-awarded-125m-for-6th-long-range-anti-ship-missile-production-lot/

 

[6] https://finance.yahoo.com/news/lockheed-martin-lmt-secures-168m-145202359.html

Weapon System or Jobs Program?

As we’ve so thoroughly demonstrated, our professional military has forgotten what real war is and is no longer producing weapon systems based on combat effectiveness.  Instead, other factors have become paramount in weapon system design and acquisition.  The F-35, for example, was clearly designed as a jobs program and accounting exercise rather than a truly effective combat system.  The LCS very quickly demonstrated that it was not an effective combat system and yet production continues, even today.  Why?  Jobs program.

 

Here’s an example that demonstrates that this phenomenon is not limited to the US.  Below is a graphic advertising the Franco-British Maritime Mine Counter Measures (MMCM) project.(1)  Note what system attribute is displayed with the largest typeface number.  That’s right, it’s a claim that the project will support 215 jobs.

 

The West has pretty much abandoned any pretense that it is designing combat systems.  Instead, it’s designing jobs programs or accounting projects or budget balancing exercises or public relations demonstrations.  Of course, if the project just happens to have some actual military value … well … that’s a bonus but it’s not a requirement.

 

 

___________________________________

 

(1)Naval News website, “MMCM Program Enters Manufacture Stage with Initial Production Contract Award”, Nathan Gain, 26-Nov-2020,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/11/uks-mmcm-program-enters-manufacture-stage-with-initial-production-contract-award/

Air Force 5-Year Fighter Production Plan

The Air Force must be reading this blog since they’re copying one of ComNavOps’ posts almost verbatim.  The Air Force wants to build a new aircraft in just five years.  What?!!!  Five years?  How is that possible?  Well, ComNavOps explained how to build an aircraft in five years in a post a couple of years ago (see, “How To Build A Better Aircraft”).

Now, the Air Force is jumping on the bandwagon.  Presumably, the F-35 debacle has scared them to the point of recognizing that the current acquisition process is not viable.

The U.S. Air Force is preparing to radically alter the acquisition strategy for its next generation of fighter jets, with a new plan that could require industry to design, develop and produce a new fighter in five years or less. (1)

Build a new aircraft in just five years?!  Astoundingly, that’s exactly the time frame that ComNavOps put forth.

How will the Air Force accomplish this?  Why, the same way that ComNavOps has repeatedly stated should be done – by building with only existing technology and building in small batches!  To wit,

… the NGAD [Next Generation Air Dominance] program will adopt a rapid approach to developing small batches of fighters with multiple companies … (1)

Instead of maturing technologies over time to create an exquisite fighter, the Air Force’s goal would be to quickly build the best fighter that industry can muster over a couple years, integrating whatever emerging technology exists. The service would downselect, put a small number of aircraft under contract and then restart another round of competition among fighter manufacturers, which would revise their fighter designs and explore newer leaps in technology. (1)

… instead of trying to hone requirements to meet an unknown threat 25 years into the future, the Air Force would rapidly churn out aircraft with new technologies … (1)

This is exactly the process I’ve called for in both aircraft and ship acquisition.  Stop designing mega-programs that try to future proof platforms (not possible and hideously expensive) and, instead, build for shorter lifespans (see, “Ship Service Life Reduction”) and smaller batches of specialized assets.  The small batches and shorter lifespans allow future tech to be incorporated as it becomes available.  There’s no need to future proof that new aircraft because you’ll be building a new batch in a few years anyway and you can incorporate the future tech then.  This is just common sense on a cracker.

This approach also has the added and hugely important side benefit of keeping more industrial companies current and viable as opposed to the winner-take-all mega-project that ensures we wind up with just one or two companies.

I may have to sue the Air Force for plagiarism!  They are almost literally copying my posts.  Relax Air Force, it’s okay.  I don’t mind if you copy and adopt my ideas.  You should and you have my blessing!

Okay, Navy, the Air Force has seen the light of ComNavOps’ brilliance now what about you?  Get on board!  Let’s start building smaller, specialized ships with 15-20 year lifespans (you aren’t conducting maintenance so they won’t last long, anyway) and no need for future tech concurrency which has proven to be the downfall of the last several ship programs.

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(1)Defense News website, “The US Air Force’s radical plan for a future fighter could field a jet in 5 years”, Valerie Insinna, 16-Sep-2019,

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/2019/09/16/the-us-air-forces-radical-plan-for-a-future-fighter-could-field-a-jet-in-5-years/

Haven't Got A Clue

We’ve belabored the professional incompetence of Navy leadership in these pages on an on-going basis.  Each example seems more unbelievable than the last as the Navy absolutely, steadfastly, unwaveringly, refuses to learn any lessons, whatsoever, from each succeeding debacle.  Here’s a Breaking Defense article that kind of sums up the utter lack of professional military thinking that is now guiding Navy operational thinking and associated equipment purchases as the Navy struggles to find an ‘offset’ advantage to hang their hats on. (1)

The Navy is scrambling to write its new acquisition and operational playbook on the fly, a decision based as much on what US rivals are doing as it is on what the service hasn’t done in recent decades. (1)

Well, how can acquisitions and doctrine/operations developed “on the fly” not produce a good result?  Isn’t “on the fly” the key to a successful, solid, well founded program?  OF COURSE IT’S NOT!!!!  Only an idiot – or the Navy – would initiate major programs “on the fly”.

The construction and innovation booms being undertaken by the Chinese — and to a lesser extent Russian — navies, are forcing the admirals at the Pentagon to push new, still mostly theoretical,  unmanned technologies into the water as quickly as possible for urgent make-or-break tests. (1)

Why are we reacting to the Russians/Chinese instead of the other way around?  What have our esteemed, professional, military leaders been doing the last decade or two while the Russians and Chinese have been steadily catching up to us?  We know what they’ve been doing – they’ve been pursuing gender sensitivity, green energy, jobs creation, diversity, misanthropy, humanitarian response, and the like.  What should they have been doing?  They should have been studying the Russians and Chinese, anticipating future military challenges and needs, preparing for combat, and maximizing readiness.  But, they weren’t.

The biggest gamble — with potentially the highest payoff — is the $3.7 billion worth of unmanned programs the service included in its 2020 budget submission. The spending includes $447 million to buy two large unmanned surface vehicles [LUSV] that can provide a variety of missions from long-range surveillance to offensive operations. (1)

So, in a desperate attempt to find some military advantage, after having squandered our previous advantages, the Navy has latched on to ‘unmanned’.  Yes, unmanned platforms (doesn’t matter what kind!) will give us unrivaled military advantages and vanquish our foes.  True, none of these unmanned platforms are designed and based on solid warfighting principles, none have valid concepts of operation (CONOPS), and none have been tested in realistic combat exercises but that’s beside the point because …  they’re unmanned !!!!! 

Well, let’s be fair.  ComNavOps has repeatedly called for more extensive prototyping and the Navy is just buying two of the LUSVs so what’s wrong with that?  It’s only one more than a prototype, right?  Well, there’s also this,

After the 2020 budget, the Navy plans to buy two LUSVs a year until 2024, for a total of about $2.7 billion. The Navy is making plans to buy 232 unmanned platforms of different sizes and configurations over the next several years. (1)

I guess the Navy is already committed to more than two LUSVs.  It looks like, sight unseen and utterly untested, they’re committed to a $2.7B program to obtain around ten of the LUSVs !!!!  Did the Navy learn nothing from the LCS debacle where they committed to 55 ships before the first was even designed?  Apparently, not.  So, we’re going to repeat our mistake because we’re in panic mode and flailing around looking for something to give us an advantage since we wasted the advantages we had and appear incapable of reasoning out and developing legitimate advantages based on professional military acumen.

It appears, though, that some vital questions have not yet been addressed and answered despite our commitment to the acquisition program.

But most key questions over how these unmanned ships will be controlled, by who, and if they will deploy independently or as part of traditional strike groups, have yet to be answered. (1)

Correct me if I’m wrong – and I’m not – but these kinds of questions are exactly what a CONOPS would answer.  So, having failed to learn the lesson of building ships (LCS, AFSB, new frigate, etc.) without a CONOPS, we’re going to do it again.

Why are we doing this?

Announcing these huge investments without a corresponding operational plan is “an expression of the urgency the Navy is attaching to the situation” of trying to stay operationally unpredictable while keeping ahead of the Chinese and Russian, Ronald O’Rourke, the top naval analyst at the Congressional Research Service, told an audience Monday at the Heritage Foundation. (1)

No, this is not a sign of urgency, this is a sign of stupidity and, given the repetitive nature of the errors while hoping for a different outcome, a sign of insanity.

“Operationally unpredictable”?  Yeah, I guess stupidity, by its very definition is unpredictable but that doesn’t make it combat-useful.  Hey, Navy, why don’t you build a fleet of attack rowboats?  It would be a lot cheaper and still meet the goal of being “operationally unpredictable”!

This is bad but at least it’s not like this kind of scatterbrained, haphazard, clueless acquisition is normal … or is it?

The big spending on unmanned systems before many core questions are answered “is emblematic of where some acquisition may be heading in the coming years … (1)

After how many failed acquisition programs, we’re now going to codify this type of idiotic acquisition process and make it our new standard?  Are you kidding me?

Navy observers, at least, can see that this approach will lead to failures.  Noted observer Eric Labs stated,

The Navy “needs to socialize for various audience that we’re going to have failures,” as these programs move forward quickly, and continue to change, said Eric Labs, appearing alongside O’Rourke at Heritage. (1)

Of course you’re going to have failures.  It’s baked into the idiotic process.  It would be surprising if it produced anything but failures.

Labs continued,

“If they don’t do that socialization as part of the acquisition process many people might draw parallels to the LCS program,” which has suffered years of criticism — much of it earned — as it slogged through different operational concepts and technology failures. (1)

Parallels to the LCS????  It’s an exact duplicate!  It’s already an assured failure.

Honestly, I grow weary of the institutional incompetence of the Navy.  The failures-in-the-making could not be more obvious and yet the Navy refuses to heed the warnings and learn any lessons.  The entire Navy flag rank needs to be fired.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “232 Unmanned Ships May Be Key To Countering China, Russia ”, Paul McLeary, 15-Apr-2019,

https://breakingdefense.com/2019/04/232-unmanned-ships-may-be-key-to-countering-china-russia/

The Inmates Are Going To Run The Asylum

We all believe that the Pentagon acquisition system is badly broken and needs to be reformed.  How to do that, however, is highly debatable.  The latest trend sees the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) pushing the milestone decision authority back down to the individual services (1).

“Ellen Lord, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, logistics and technology, or AT&L, said her intention is to continue to hand off the day-to-day running of programs to the services, preferring her office serve as a kind of high-level group providing overall guidance.

… Lord said she intended to shift the “bulk” of major defense programs from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or OSD, down to the services …”

For the Navy,

“The same [transfer of milestone authority to the services] is happening with the Navy. James Geurts, the newly confirmed service acquisition head, testified that the Navy currently has milestone decision authority for 40 ACAT 1 [Acquisition Category 1] programs, including the future Guided Missile Frigate and the MQ-25 unmanned system, a change from before the 2016 NDAA. More importantly, the service is in charge of five of its 10 ACAT 1D programs, the biggest efforts that require the most oversight.”

What could possibly go wrong?

The concept is to allow program managers in the services manage their programs with less oversight.  The hope is that this will streamline and speed up the overall acquisition process – and it will!

Now let’s look at why it will.

The Navy is famous for battling DOT&E, the military’s testing organization.  The Navy consistently makes claims of progress and performance that are proven to be largely false when subjected to DOT&E testing.  The DOT&E test results are currently factored into the milestone decision process and the Navy is not very happy about that because the program failures are brought to light and the programs are delayed, modified, or cancelled as a result. 

With milestone decision authority now resting with the Navy, it’s a pretty safe bet that almost nothing is going to be negatively evaluated or delayed.  This will essentially relegate DOT&E to irrelevance since the Navy can freely ignore the test results.  We are going to see a slew of bad weapon systems getting approved with nothing but glowing statements about how they will revolutionize warfare.

How did this change start?

“The drive to push milestone authorities out to the services originated with the office of Sen. John McCain, the Arizona Republican who chairs the SASC. He included such a demand as part of a wide-ranging package of reform efforts in the 2016 NDAA.

Not everyone agreed with the changes.

Such a move was opposed by Frank Kendall, who led AT&L [Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics ] from May 2012 until President Donald Trump’s inauguration in January of this year. Part of Kendall’s opposition was about oversight, with concerns that the services would run wild without AT&L keeping a close look at what they were doing.” [emphasis added]

What was Sen. McCain’s response to these concerns?

“While we have empowered the services, that doesn’t mean you can go and do whatever you like,” the chairman admonished his witnesses. “The services must let OSD set strategy and policy and do real oversight. That means being transparent — providing data to, and following the guidance set by, OSD.”

Yes, that should work because the Navy is all about transparency – you know, other than refusing to provide data to DOT&E and refusing to allow an accounting audit!

I’m all in favor of acquisition reform but this isn’t the way.  Giving the services, who have consistently botched every program and lied about performance, more acquisition decision authority is not the way to do it.

The inmates are going to run the asylum.  I can’t see anything going wrong with this.

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(1)Defense News website, “Policy shift: DoD is pushing major program management back to the military”, Aaron Mehta, 11-Dec-2017,

https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/12/11/policy-shift-dod-is-pushing-major-program-management-back-to-the-military/

That's An Expensive Gun You've Got There

Here’s another stunning contract.

“Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Bethpage, New York, is being awarded a $68,786,952 firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee, and cost-only contract for the production of Littoral Combat Ship gun mission modules, including support for basic outfitting assembly installation, interim deport level maintenance, engineering support and sustainment.  This contract includes options which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $812,000,000.”

I have no idea what, exactly, this includes or, indeed, what it is even referring to.  The LCS only has two guns.  If it refers to the main gun, the Mk 110 57 mm gun, that’s supposed to be included in the construction contract cost.  If it refers to the 30 mm guns, we’re only purchasing around 24 or so for the ASuW modules.  That works out to $34M per gun for a glorified machine gun.  That’s absurd raised to the power of absurd (for you math geeks!). 

I’m truly baffled about this one.  Anyone got any ideas what this is about? 

Lockheed Strikes Back

Here’s the latest stunning contract award for highly questionable work.

  

“Lockheed Martin Mission Systems Sensors … is being awarded an $80,556,000 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification to a previously-awarded contract (N00024-16-C-5103) for additional Aegis implementation studies for future foreign military sales … expected to be completed by November 2019. 

This one is wrong on multiple levels.

We’re paying the company that produces the Aegis system to sell their product????  Isn’t that what the company is supposed to do on their own?  Would you pay Ford Motor Company to study how to sell cars?

How much study does the producer of Aegis really need to do to be able to answer questions about possible future sales?

How about that dollar amount?  That’s $80M over 20 months.  That’s $4M per month.  If there were 100 people dedicated to nothing but this (a ridiculous number of people but what the heck) and their time was charged at $100/hr, the cost would be $1.7M for a month’s work.  That leaves us short $2.3M per month!!!!!

You know Lockheed doesn’t have 100 people working full time on this.  I’d be surprised if they have 10.

Lockheed is raping the government which means they’re taking my tax dollars.  How is the Navy being a good steward of my tax dollars on this?

Is this Lockheed’s response to the unilateral contract imposition on the F-35 program?