Chinese Territorial Objectives

An anonymous commenter recently discussed war with China in relation to US Army operations and land operations.   I replied with a discussion about China’s land objectives in a war.  I think it’s worth a post to repeat the essence of that discussion since China’s objectives will determine, in large measure, what our objectives will be.

Looking at a map, China has two semi-exposed flanks: to the east is N/SKorea and to the south is Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar with Thailand and Cambodia further on (Indochina). In the paranoid Chinese world view where everyone is potentially out to get them, these flanks are vulnerabilities and must be secured. Further, seizing Indochina solidifies their hold on vast sections of ocean and major shipping lanes in addition to resources.

Note:  I use the term "semi-exposed flanks". By this, I meant that the flanks are not under Chinese control but neither are they active threats - kind of like Mexico and Canada are semi-exposed flanks of the US - not controlled but not a threat (at least, not militarily). For the US, this means that we happily leave them alone. For China, being paranoid and having a global domination desire, semi-exposed flanks are unacceptable.

Taiwan, due to its proximity to China, represents another vulnerability as well as a long-stated political objective.  The seizure of Taiwan is a foregone conclusion on day one of any war.  China simply cannot allow Taiwan to exist as an enemy base that close to China’s mainland.  The Taiwan invasion will be massive and swift.  Taiwan will, undoubtedly, put up a good fight but will be swamped and the US will be unable to muster any significant assistance in time to do any good.  The most the US could hope to do is operate some Air Force stealth bombers in the area and attrite Chinese forces a bit.  It would be a useless gesture and would risk our very small fleet of stealth bombers for no strategic gain.

The Philippines are another enticing territory.  Control of the islands would provide the basing and staging to ultimately secure the South/East China Seas, expand into the Indonesian region, and roll back America’s Pacific presence.  At the moment, China is in the process of politically and culturally annexing the Philippines with the active support of the Philippine President.

Japan is the intriguing element in this analysis.  China desperately wants to eliminate Japan but Japan, supported by the US, represents a major military challenge.  Would China attempt to fight a war with the US without engaging Japan at the same time by politically maneuvering Japan into neutrality?  Undoubtedly, but given Japan’s attitudes towards China, it seems unlikely that would succeed.  Thus, any war China would initiate with the US almost automatically becomes a war with Japan, too.  Can China successfully fight Japan and the US? 

Much, much further in the future, China will want to deal with India, Russia, and the Middle East but those are a step too far for the moderate to near future.

Having some idea what China’s territorial objectives might be, we can begin to speculate about US reactions.  In other words, what territories would America fight for?

Taiwan is a near hopeless affair until the very end of a Chinese war.

Korea (South, at least) is defensible because Korea has significant armed forces of their own that could make a successful defense feasible.

Indochina is questionable. Would we care enough to commit to another Indochina war? I don't know but I suspect not.

These, then, are the possible areas where the US might engage in land combat during a war with China and, as such, are the areas where should be planning for operations and determining what force structure and size we need to be successful.

More importantly, we need to determine what naval and air forces we need since any China war will be primarily a sea and air affair.  While we may debate what exact force structure we need, there is no debate that the force we have now is not well suited for a China war.

For example, for an air war conducted over vast distances, if not intercontinental distances, we need long range, penetrating bombers and lots of them.  What do we have?  We have around 18-19 functional B-2s.  The proposed B-21 program is a step in the right direction but whether we can build the aircraft in useful quantities remains to be seen.  The Air Force “envisions” 175-200 bombers but the Air Force “envisioned 132 B-2s and we wound up with only 21 so …

We can go on and analyze what else we need but that’s not the point of this post.  Moving on …

This also demonstrates the need for a Pacific NATO-ish alliance.  Unfortunately, unlike NATO where several countries had credible, if small, militaries, there are only two such countries in the Pacific region:  South Korea and Japan.  Australia could build a credible military but has so far shown no great inclination to do so and has given very mixed messages about its desired relationship with China.  India, though somewhat outside the direct Pacific rim territory, would make a great addition for a Pacific NATO, having a credible military.  Unfortunately, the US and India have shown no great desire to engage closely with each other.  The US should seek to change that.

The main benefit to forming a Pacific NATO would not be the very small military force that most of countries could contribute but, instead, would be the basing opportunities they would, presumably, offer for the U.S.

Someday, someone will write about the future U.S.-Chinese war and state that the objectives and needs were evident in hindsight but no one could have foreseen them at the time.  Well, this is the time and hindsight is not required.  China’s objectives and our responses/needs are pretty evident.  Now, we just need to begin acting.

Chinese Type 22 Missile Boat

Today we’re going to take a look at the Chinese Type 22, Houbei class missile boat.  It is a small, fast, stealthy assassin with massive firepower relative to its size.  The class has been built in large numbers (Wiki cites 83 boats currently built and active) which suggests that it will operate in squadrons, allowing it to mass its firepower.  Properly used, this is a formidable threat.

Let’s take a closer look.

Type 22 Missile Boat

Size - The vessel is a 140 ft long catamaran design with a 220 ton displacement and a crew of 12 (1).  For comparison, this puts it at around 1/3 the length of the LCS and a 1/16 the displacement.

Propulsion - Four waterjets give it a speed of 36 kts. 

Number - Wiki cites 83 boats currently built and active.

Range - Range is a potential issue with suggestions of a 300 mile range based on similar civilian craft. (1)

Sensors - Sensors are an issue but operating within the A2/AD zone may greatly mitigate sensor limitations.  It has a Type ESR-1 362 surface search radar plus a Fenis-ME electro-optical tracker and a Kolonika II low-light-level optical director and backup CIWS fire control director, on top of the bridge.  A mast-mounted Type 765 I-band navigation radar rounds out the sensor fit. 

Armament - It carries 8x C-802/803 anti-ship missiles with a range of 100-125 miles depending on variant, an AK-630 (30 mm) CIWS, and a small FLS-1 surface-to-air launcher for QW series missiles. (1)  The Type 22 has extensive communications and data link equipment which suggests the capability for off board control of the missiles.

As noted, this vessel is a combat vessel with firepower far out of proportion to its size.  Add to that, numbers and stealth and you have a vessel that will be hard to detect and can operate in squadrons for concentrated missile salvos – a formidable naval force, to be sure!

The number of vessels built, 83, is magnified by the small operating area that the boats will operate in.  Unlike a 300 ship US Navy which is spread over an entire world, the entire Type 22 fleet of 83 boats is concentrated in the relatively small East or South China Seas.  This has the effect of magnifying the vessels firepower because it automatically concentrates it.

This also suggests that the Chinese will use it as an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) asset to keep US naval forces out of the South and East China Seas.  This also suggests a defensive mindset as opposed to an open ocean, long range naval hunter vessel.  If true, this in turn suggests how the Chinese view the S/E China Seas – essentially, they act as a buffer zone or ‘moat’ around the mainland.  The Chinese are clearly working toward becoming a global naval/military force but this suggests that they are not there, yet, and that their current focus is defensive.

There is also some suggestion that the Type 22 has a shore bombardment role in support of amphibious operations in addition to the anti-ship role. (1)  If true, this would give the Chinese a small, stealthy, hard to hit fire support vessel – a capability that would be unmatched in the world.

It is difficult to talk about the Type 22 without comparing it to the American LCS.

The obvious conclusion is that this is one version of what the LCS could have been.  The LCS tried to be and do everything and failed to be or do anything.  Had the LCS concept been more focused, the Type 22 is one version of what might have been – a small, lethal, stealthy, fast, focused, anti-surface craft cheap enough to be acquired in large numbers and operate in massed squadrons.

The US Navy talks incessantly about distributed lethality.  Unfortunately, the LCS is a poor fit for the distributed lethality concept.  Further, many observers and some naval officers have talked about the LCS as a modern PT boat.  Again, this is utterly ridiculous, for reasons we’ve previously discussed.  The irony is that the Type 22 actually fills the role of a modern PT boat and distributed lethality asset quite well.  Again, this is a version of the LCS that could have been.

A Type 22 swarm attack against a US carrier group would be unstoppable although it is difficult to imagine how such a swarm would even get close enough to launch an attack.  ‘Swarm’ in this scenario is radically different than the Iranian type swarm.  In this case, it would amount to a long range missile swarm as opposed to a short range rocket attack.  That said, I don’t believe the Chinese view the Type 22 as a viable carrier attack asset although if the chance presented itself …

In summary, the Type 22 appears to be a defensive, A2/AD asset intended to prevent US naval entry into the S/E China Seas.  Its stealth, cheapness, and numbers make it the distributed lethality asset that the US Navy wants but has failed to develop.  This is the distributed threat that will ‘confuse and complicate’ our operational and tactical thinking just as we hoped that distributed lethality ships would confuse Chinese naval commanders.  The difference is that the Chinese actually have a suitable vessel for distributed lethality operations whereas we do not. 

The Type 22 is also a good representation of the Hughes concept of small, distributed naval forces – a concept that ComNavOps disagrees with, at least, for the US – and, again, ironically, it is the Chinese that have developed it.

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(1)https://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/1433

Chinese Amphibious Capabilities

In our recent post about the Chinese Type 075 LHD (see, “Chinese Type 075 LHD”), the discussion turned (okay, I nudged it towards) to the role of Chinese amphibious forces and the need for major amphibious ships and forces.  As we examine Chinese amphibious capabilities, it is wise to note that air force and naval power can deny an enemy access to territory but only ground forces can seize and hold territory.  Thus, the ultimate purpose of amphibious forces is to seize and hold territory.  Yes, they can conduct raids, rescues, embassy security, and other missions but the main mission is seizing territory.  This is the lens through which to view Chinese amphibious capabilities.

With that in mind, it is important to recognize the purpose of China’s amphibious forces as opposed to the US.  We are tempted to compare the raw numbers of ships and Marines and conclude that China is only a minor amphibious threat.  This conclusion, however, fails to grasp the purpose behind China’s amphibious force (as well as their amphibious force growth rate!).  Remember that the US has military commitments and presence all over the world.  Whether that’s wise is a subject for another time.  It means, though, that the US has amphibious forces in the Middle East, Pacific, or anywhere else at any given moment.  Also, the US operates far from home waters. 

In contrast, the Chinese amphibious force operates only in the very localized home waters of the recently annexed South and East China Seas.  Whereas the US needs several amphibious groups to cover all its potential commitments, the Chinese only need one or two to cover their limited region. 

Because of the distances involved and the time required to prepare for, and deploy to, the areas of concern, the US is compelled to maintain a force of 30+ amphibious ships in order to provide a constant forward presence of two or three Amphibious Ready Groups.  In contrast, the Chinese amphibious force is based in their home waters and can almost instantly transition between maintenance, training, and deployment as desired.  Thus, they do not need the 30+ ships of the US amphibious force in order to accomplish the same degree of ‘forward’ presence.

We also need to understand the missions that the Chinese amphibious force is intended for.  The US amphibious force, while theoretically capable of a wide range of missions throughout the combat level spectrum, is intended for major assaults during high end combat.  That we can’t actually execute that mission is irrelevant for this discussion.  In contrast, the Chinese amphibious force is not intended to conduct major assaults against the US.  The Chinese amphibious force is intended to support their low end annexation efforts against the various territories surrounding the South and East China Seas.  This does not require the 30+ amphibious ship fleet of the US.

It is also important to understand that China views military-enabled territorial expansion as perfectly legitimate and acceptable.  In other words, their amphibious force is intended to be used whereas the US force is intended, ideally, to be an unused deterrent.  Even unused, there is a difference.  China’s amphibious force is intended to intimidate as opposed to the US intention of deterrence and, increasingly, humanitarian assistance.

Chinese Amphibious Light Tanks

As we contemplate a map of the East and South China Sea regions and the pattern of expansionist behavior of China, it is clear that it is only a matter of time until China begins knocking on the doors of the various small countries bordering the E/S China Seas.  When China knocks, standing right behind the smiling Chinese face at the door will be the amphibious force, ready to kick the door in if they don’t get what they want.

I think this leads to another aspect of Chinese amphibious operations philosophy and that is the use of overwhelming force.  I strongly suspect that the Chinese have observed the US example/lesson of the use of overwhelming force as exemplified by Desert Storm and the various Iraq/Afghanistan operations.  They’ve seen that the best results are obtained when the attacker has massively superior power.

We’ve seen hints of this in recent Chinese actions.  They send three ships when one is sufficient.  Their interactions with Vietnam, Philippines, and others are executed with vastly superior force when possible.  I think this is an operational tendency that is going to become more pronounced as their naval assets increase in number.  Thus, the Chinese may view a full up amphibious ship and amphibious group as desirable for actions that the US would be content to use a single, lesser ship or group for.

Finally, it is important to note that while the anticipated US opponents are peer or near-peer enemies which would require large amphibious forces to attack with, the Chinese anticipated opponents are far less capable.  While China’s eventual goal is to confront the US, toe to toe, the nearer term use for their amphibious force is against second or third rate militaries such as Vietnam, while they expand and consolidate their periphery around the South and East China Seas.  Thus, for the near to moderate future, China does not require as large an amphibious force as the US because their opponents are far less powerful and capable.

We see, then, that the US and Chinese amphibious forces have very different reasons for existing.  With this understanding, we can now better assess the Chinese amphibious force rather than just, simplistically, comparing it by the numbers to the US amphibious force.

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The link below (1) offers an excellent summary of Chinese amphibious capabilities although the article is strongly pro-Chinese/anti-American.

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(1)South Front website, “Military Analysis: Chinese Amphibious Capabilities”, Brian Kalman, 10-Mar-2016,

https://southfront.org/military-analysis-chinese-amphibious-capabilities/

Sortie Rate and Response Time

Note: while the principles are universal, the following discussion is focused on a war with China.  Russia is simply not much of a threat and the various options in a war with Russia are nearly boundless due to the availability of the entire European continent.

We’ve discussed forward basing and closely tied in to that is the concept of aircraft sortie rates.  The problem is that most of our bases are so far from the anticipated operational areas that we are sortie rate limited due to distance.  For example,

• Distance from Guam to the center of the South China Sea is a bit over 2000 miles
• Distance from Guam to Taiwan is a bit over 1700 miles
• Distance from Whiteman AFB (Missouri), the home of the US B-2 bomber fleet, to the center of the South China Sea is around 8400 miles
• Distance from Kadena AFB (Okinawa) to the center of the South China Sea is around 1130 miles

For these cases, at a cruise speed of 300 mph, a round trip sortie time is a minimum of

• Guam – South China Sea = 13.3 hrs
• Guam – Taiwan = 11.3 hrs
• Whiteman – South China Sea = 56 hrs
• Kadena – South China Sea = 7.5 hrs

Throw in aerial refueling time, non-linear waypoints, some loiter time at the target, etc. and those sortie times increase by 25%-50%.  The result is clear.  For Guam, in a Chinese war, you get one sortie per day and that’s assuming no unusual maintenance delays due to battle damage or even routine mechanical failures.  Even Kadena only provides two sorties per day, if no significant maintenance is required between flights.  For the B-2 bomber fleet, you get one sortie every three days, at best.

Okay, if those distances are too great for useful sortie rates, what distance would be acceptable?

In order to have useful sortie rates for fighters or strike aircraft, we need no more than 6 hr sorties – and that’s pushing it.  Even 6 hr sorties means 3 hr transit times and that length of time sitting in a cockpit begins to degrade pilot performance due to physical discomfort.  A much better sortie time would be around 2 hrs with 1 hr transit times.

At a cruise speed of 300 mph, a 6 hr sortie translates to 900 miles distance to base while a 2 hr sortie translates to 300 miles distance to base.  Examine the map below and note the red rings which are centered on the South China Sea.  The inner ring represents a 300 mile radius and the outer ring shows 900 miles.  A base that can support useful sortie rates must lie inside the 900 mile ring and, preferably, around the 300 mile ring.  It immediately becomes apparent that there are very few basing options within that area.

Okay, this is looking bad but we kind of knew this so what’s the point of this post?

Well, there’s another closely related aspect to sortie rates that is rarely discussed and that is response time. 

When a naval group in the South China Sea gets in trouble and calls for air support from Guam, it’s going to take over half a day to get there and that’s if the aircraft launch the moment they get the request.  Realistically, by the time they prep the aircraft, set up tanker schedules, plan the mission, etc. it will be around a full day before help can arrive.

There are only two solutions to response time.

1. Move the responder closer to the area of interest.
2. Maintain a constant stream of responders in/over the area of interest so that there will always be a responder available.

Let’s look a bit closer at these two options.

Move Closer.  Moving a base closer is difficult.  As the US found in WWII, there simply aren’t that many possibilities.  Worse, unless we’re willing to seize territory from neutral countries, such as Philippines, our basing options are quite limited.  Some of the Japanese islands would be suitable but gaining basing rights is, again, potentially problematic.

Closer basing also carries with it the greater likelihood of attack and the US has shown no desire or capability to actively defend an operational base.  The specter of trying to operate, maintain, and repair delicate, finicky F-22/35s while absorbing cruise/ballistic missile hits is daunting, to say the least.  As a reminder, we lost many aircraft on the ground at Guadalcanal due to Japanese attacks.  It’s one thing to lose F4F Wildcats that were a dime a dozen but it’s another thing, entirely, to lose $100M F-22/35s on the ground.

Closer basing can also be obtained by using mobile bases, meaning aircraft carriers and battleships.  The disadvantage in this is the inherent limited endurance which will manifest itself as munitions limits.  This can be overcome by a combination of robust at-sea replenishment and planned rotations of fresh ships while exhausted ships retire and replenish.  The other obvious problem with this is that the locations of the ships eventually become predictable and the risk, especially from submarines, increases.

Battleships (or any form of naval gunfire support) are, of course, the epitome of timely and effective response time assuming they are within range of the area of interest.

Constant Stream.  Given the transit distance and resulting very short loiter times in the area of interest, maintaining a steady stream of aircraft would be challenging, to say the least.  The sheer number of aircraft required to maintain a constant, say, dozen aircraft in a single area of interest would be on the order of several dozen, at least.  To put it in perspective, to maintain a dozen F-22s over Taiwan or the South China Sea from Guam would require at least half our total F-22 fleet – and given the historically demonstrated low availabilities, that’s probably extremely optimistic!

What is evident from this discussion is that the US is in a fundamentally disadvantageous position as regards basing.  There are options to deal with this but no easy ones.  We need to face the reality, make our choices, and begin preparing. 

We've Been Warned

ComNavOps dislikes and avoids repeating other websites and blogs.  My goal is to add value to news via insightful analysis.  Sometimes, however, a blog offers something that is simply too good not to repeat.  Such is the case, today.

I’ve stated repeatedly that China is looking to expand not only out to the first island chain but well beyond, including, eventually, world domination.  Many people scoff at that – probably the same people who several years ago scoffed at the notion that China would capture the entire South China Sea – but history and China’s own words fully support my view.

Cdr. Salamander’s blog offers this quote from Captain Liu Zhe, the commander of China’s aircraft carrier.

“We firmly believe that the farther away from the territorial sea, the more secure the motherland will be behind, the world peace will be more of a guarantee.”

This is flat out stating that China is planning to expand past the first island chain.  We’ve already seen the first indications of China moving on the second island chain.  China has begun to set up its rationale for continued expansion by making claims on Japanese territory, preparing to establish a base on Scarborough Shoal, conducting state sponsored emigration to the Philippines with the goal of annexing the island nation when the population tilts sufficiently Chinese, and exploring the “validity” of second island chain claims in various academic and political writings.

In fact, taking the Captain’s statement to its logical conclusion, the only distance sufficiently far away from the motherland to absolutely guarantee China’s security is total global control which is exactly what I’ve stated is China’s ultimate goal. 

China is like President Trump.  You may agree or disagree with the President but you have to acknowledge that he is doing exactly what he said he would do.  We may not like what China is saying but they are doing exactly what they’ve said they would do.  They’ve said they’ll continue to expand so why would we think they won’t continue to do so?

As Cd. Salamander stated, we’ve been warned.

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(1)cdr salamander blog, “Keeping an Eye on the Long Game: Part LXVIII”, 6-Mar-2017,

http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2017/03/keeping-eye-on-long-game-part-lxviii.html

War Short of War

How long has ComNavOps flatly stated that we are at war with China (and losing)?  How long has ComNavOps advocated a much more robust, confrontational response to Russia, China, Iran, and NKorea (see, "Island Showdown")?  How many times has ComNavOps stated that our policy of appeasement is only encouraging further aggression? 

Well, it appears that the military is beginning to come to the same realizations, if far later than they should have.  Breaking Defense reports on the conclusions of a high level military meeting that took place in April at Quantico. (1)

“China and Russia are outmaneuvering the US, using aggressive actions that fall short of war, a group of generals and admirals have concluded. To counter them, the US needs new ways to use its military without shooting, concludes a newly released report on the Quantico conclave. The US military will need new legal authorities and new concepts of operation for all domains — land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.” (1)

One of the problems is that the US military, and government in general, do not recognize the kind of actions being undertaken by our enemies as war.

“Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Joseph Dunford, has publicly warned that our adversaries don’t abide by our doctrine, with its clear distinction between war and peace and its tidy phases of escalation. The American military operates in phases, with Phase 0 being peace (officially, “shaping” the environment) and so on. Traditionally, actions other than war are just that to the US and do not merit a military response, let alone a kinetic one.” (1)

““We’re stuck,” Freier [Nate Freier, a researcher at the Army War College] told me [Freedberg]. “We are still institutionally and culturally stuck in this five-phase model of operations. Our adversaries certainly aren’t.” (1) [emphasis added]

For example, using intimidation, harassment, and just plain ignoring international laws and treaties, China has accomplished a de facto annexation of the entire South and East China Seas, and done so masterfully, while the US simply stood by and watched, unable to recognize the “battle” that was occurring or do anything about it.

We need to recognize that we ARE at war whether we want to be or not.  That we’re at war is no longer even a question.  The only remaining question is how to respond.

Freier describes this kind of non-kinetic war as a sine wave of competition. 

“As tensions go up and down, you always have two goals in mind. “You’re trying to impose costs on the opponent and, at the same time, offer off-ramps to the opponent for de–escalation.”

Freier makes two good points: first, is that we must constantly be imposing costs on our enemies and, second, that we must offer face saving escape outlets for our enemies so that they don’t feel backed into a corner.

Thus far, our competitive responses have been rigid and limited because we have no official response policy for this type of war.  For example, Freedom of Navigation exercises are a laughable joke that has had absolutely no effect on China’s annexation of the East/South China Seas but we don’t really have any other options or, at least, none that we’re willing to use. 

We need to apply some creativity and come up with additional, more effective responses.  The corollary to this is that the responses must hurt our enemies, in some fashion, and that the responses WILL increase tensions (the rise portion of the competitive sine wave).  We need to recognize and accept the increase in tensions – the escalation – and understand that it is not us who are escalating but our enemies whose actions have forced our actions.  The policeman who shoots a bank robber with hostages didn’t escalate the situation, the bank robber did when he robbed a bank and took hostages.  The U.S. has not yet come to grips with this.  Everything we do is run through the filter of NOT escalating which is another name for appeasement and appeasement has a 100% failure record in history.

Freier offers this further insight,

“Every ship that sails, every advisor that goes abroad to train allies, every unit that participates in exercises, needs to be part of a larger plan to demonstrate US resolve and capability, Freier said.”

He’s absolutely right and this is the Chinese way of war – the entire country and all its activities are focused on national goals.  War isn’t just the purview of the military, it’s the responsibility of every aspect of our government, private sector, and culture.  War is fought with every tool, not just the military.

Freier continues,

“The ultimate goal isn’t just to respond to what the Chinese and Russians are doing in the grey zone, he told me. It’s to force them to respond to what we’re doing in the grey.”

He could not be more right.  The U.S. needs to retake the lead in managing world affairs including managing the war with our enemies that is currently ongoing.

He concludes,

“The United States has to become less rigid in its view of military operations.”

Unfortunately, while Freier sums up the problem quite astutely, he offers no concrete solutions.

The key aspect to this entire discussion is that we must first accept the sine wave of competition and that tensions will escalate.  What did you expect?  It’s a war, after all.

Once we accept and embrace the escalation and increase in tensions we can begin to formulate effective responses that ALLOW for escalation and heightened tensions.  If our enemies aren’t comfortable with increased tensions then they can dial back their actions.  The responsibility for increased tensions is not all on us.  The responsibility for the increased tensions at the bank is not the police, IT’S THE BANK ROBBER!

We need to make Iran and Russia pay a price for harassing our units.  When a Russian jet makes a pass too close to our ship, let’s “accidentally” eject a chaff cloud or decoy in their flight path.  When Iran sends a drone too close to our carriers let’s just shoot it down and then plead ignorance – that’s the beauty of UAVs, there’s no one to get hurt and they offer good opportunities to make a decisive statement.

We need to build our own artificial island base in the South China Sea.  China has set the precedent so let’s follow it and make them respond to us.

We need to flood the South China Sea with ships and let’s be aggressive with them.  Here’s your presence mission.  This is what China has done.  Let’s make it physically difficult for them to build or resupply an island base.  A few dents in the hull are well worth it.

Let’s start isolating and herding Iranian small boats that harass our ships.  Let’s physically cut them off from retreat, surround them, board them, seize everything not welded down, and make it clear that the days of running around like irresponsible children are over.  We have high speed riverine patrol boats (you know, the ones that Iran seized) so let’s start using them productively.

Let’s start using our electronic warfare capabilities to make life difficult for enemy ships, boats, and aircraft.  Let’s jam communications, lock on fire control radars, initiate electronic counter measures, etc.  It’s not like we’ll be giving away any secrets by using the equipment.  Russia and China probably have all our specs, already.

Let’s make sure that any Russian or Chinese intercepts of our high value aircraft are met with our own fighters and let’s fly aggressively.  Let’s also disrupt their version of GPS (GLONASS or whatever they use) and see if their pilots can find their way home.  We should be sending Growler EW aircraft along with high value aircraft as escorts and let’s turn them loose to disrupt Russian intercepts.  Let’s send the message that there are no free intercepts anymore.

Let’s build a base a mile from the Chinese base in Africa.

I can go on with an endless list.  The point is that there are a lot of actions we can take short of direct combat if we just develop the will and courage to do so.  We also need to pursue all available economic, diplomatic, academic, and other measures to impose costs and pain but those discussions are outside the scope of this blog.

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(1)Breaking Defense, “Russia, China Are Outmaneuvering US: Generals Recommend New Authorities, Doctrine”, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 15-Jun-2018,

https://breakingdefense.com/2018/06/russia-china-are-outmaneuvering-us-generals-recommend-new-authorities-doctrine/

Freedom of Navigation - Trump Version

We’ve previously noted that the infrequent Freedom of Navigation (FON) actions by the US Navy in the South China Sea have done more harm than good, legally, by serving to reinforce China’s claims of sovereignty.  The actions were carried out as “innocent passage” which is a prescribed method (see the UNCLOS documents for the exact procedure) for warships to pass peacefully through the waters of another country.  By conducting the FON actions as innocent passages, they served to bolster China’s claims since innocent passage can only be applied to another country’s territorial waters.  Thus, the US was implicitly recognizing China’s claims.  Alternatively, some FON actions were conducted at greater than 12 miles from any disputed islands or lands which, again, bolsters China’s claims of sovereignty. 

Had the US wanted to dispute China’s sovereignty claims, the FON actions should have studiously avoided following innocent passage procedures or observing the 12 mile territorial limit. 

Interestingly, the Navy has just recently executed a FON action near Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands that explicitly ignores the innocent passage procedures.

“A U.S. destroyer sailed within six nautical miles of a Chinese artificial island on Wednesday in the strongest challenge of hotly debated Chinese claims in the South China Sea, USNI News has learned.

Around 7 P.M. EST on Wednesday (7 A.M. Thursday local time), USS Dewey (DDG-105) passed within six nautical miles of the Chinese installation on Mischief Reef in the Spratly Island chain, several U.S. officials confirmed to USNI News

The guided-missile destroyer operated normally and did not conduct the transit under the rules of an innocent passage – the restrictions that allow a warship to pass through another country’s territorial waters with no notice.

The ship was within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef for about 90 minutes zig-zagging in the water near the installation. At one point during the operation, the ship’s crew conducted a man overboard drill, a U.S. official told USNI News.” [emphasis added] (1)

This is good news in a minimalist sense.  At least this FON did no further legal damage.  Presumably, this change in policy is due to the new Trump administration.

On the other hand, this kind of FON serves no concrete purpose if the other side, the Chinese in this case, choose to ignore it.  It does not hinder development of artificial islands or bases.  It does not blockade any Chinese actions.  It does not lodge an official protest with the UN.  It does not establish a “counter-island” developed and controlled by the US.  In short, it does nothing but offer a silent, unspoken, token, symbolic protest in the mildest manner possible.

Previous FON actions have clearly done nothing to dissuade China from their expansionist policies and actions in the South and East China Seas.  FON actions, even this type, accomplish nothing but ratcheting up tensions.  We need to either back out of the area and concede the South and East China Seas as Chinese territories or begin taking concrete, productive actions along the lines we’ve discussed in previous posts and comments.

As a reminder,

“Unlike other Chinese artificial islands in the South China Sea, the Mischief Reef installation isn’t subject to overlapping territorial claims from any other country and is built on a low-tide elevation, as determined by the 2016 Hague tribunal ruling on Chinese claims in the South China Sea.

Under the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention [UNCLOS], a low-tide elevation cannot be claimed as the territory of any country and does not command a territorial sea.”

China, you’ll recall, is a signatory to UNCLOS and, therefore, bound by it’s rules and regulations.  Despite this, China is actively violating several aspects and provisions of the agreement.

Setting aside the myriad political and economic actions that we could and should take, the following actions, which cover a range of intensity, should also be considered.

• Close, high speed passes to attempt to cause wake damage to island facilities
• Blockade of islands and bases
• Physical hindering of resupply ships
• Physical disruption of, and interference with, reclamation vessels
• Covert disruption of island facilities (SEAL missions)
• Electronic jamming of island communications

China is clearly on a militaristic expansionist path.  It is only a matter of time before China and US come to blows.  One can make a pretty compelling argument that it is better to do it now while China has not yet gained complete parity/superiority than to wait and do it under even less favorable circumstances.

If we’re not going to contest the South and East China Seas then we need to cede the area and retire from the region, diffuse tensions, and save the wear and tear on our ships and aircraft.  Of course, if we’re going to do all that, one can also reasonably ask why we need ships and aircraft.  We can cede entire regions without the use of our military!

Our policy of token resistance is having no positive effect whatsoever.  We need a new geopolitical and military strategy for the region.

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(1)USNI News website, “U.S. Warship Came Within 6 Miles of Chinese Artificial Island in Toughest Challenge Yet to Beijing South China Sea Claims

”, Sam LaGrone, 25-May-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/05/25/u-s-warship-came-beijing-south-china-sea-claims

China War - Taiwan Seizure

I’m on record as saying that the first act in any Chinese War will be the seizure of Taiwan.  Why is that?  Well, two reasons:

1. Taiwan has long been a sore point for China.  Taiwan belongs to them, in their view, and its “hostage” status to the West (the US) is an affront to China’s national pride.  China has vowed to reclaim Taiwan, the only question being when.  If China is going to enter a war anyway, it may as well seize Taiwan in the process even if Taiwan is not the main purpose of the war.

2. Taiwan is too close to China for the Chinese to allow it to possibly be used as a military base of attack on China.  Thus, Taiwan must be seized at the outset of hostilities.

So, having recognized the fact that Taiwan will be the first objective (in terms of land seizure) of any war, how will China go about accomplishing it?  ……  I have no idea but for the sake of filling up some post space, why don’t we speculate.

If you had decades of time to plan for the seizure of a major piece of land, and an island to boot, how would you go about it?  Ideally, you’d slowly secure surrounding pieces of land so that once you initiated the seizure of your target, you’d already have fully equipped bases surrounding the target and protecting your invasion force.  Does this sound familiar?  The Chinese have seized various islands in the surrounding first island chain and militarized them.  Where islands are not physically available, the Chinese have built artificial ones.  You’ve got to give them credit for some outstanding creativity and initiative.  Would we have thought to build artificial islands?  I doubt it and, if we did, we’d have subordinated our military needs to ecological concerns, the welfare of coral reefs, the protection of endangered species, and abandoned the idea.

Instead, the Chinese have constructed numerous bases to the south of Taiwan with the Paracels and Scarborough Shoal protecting the area to the south and the Spratleys protecting approaches to the South China Sea in the far south.

Further, China is moving to co-opt the Philippines into their sphere of influence via a combination of state sponsored emigration, veiled threats, and political maneuvering.

China is also looking to seize and construct island bases to the north and east of Taiwan in the Senkaku and Ryukyu Island groups.

“Chinese authorities in the spring of 2013 brazenly challenged Japan’s sovereignty of the islands with a concerted campaign that included an article in a magazine associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; a widely publicized commentary in People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s flagship newspaper and therefore China’s most authoritative publication; two pieces in theGlobal Times, the tabloid controlled by People’s Daily; an interview of Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan in the state-run China News Service; and a seminar held at prestigious Renmin University in Beijing.

At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to affirm that China recognized Okinawa and the Ryukyus as Japanese.

The close timing of events indicated these efforts had been directed from the top of the Chinese political system.

Over the last decade, Beijing has been moving in on Okinawa step by step, almost island by island. It has regularly dispatched its ships and planes to the Senkaku Islands, often entering sovereign water and airspace, in a campaign to wrest from the Japanese those small and uninhabited specks in the ocean. The provocations around the islets, which China first claimed in 1971 and now calls the Diaoyus, spiked upward in 2012 and then noticeably declined the following year.” (1) [emphasis added]

Here’s the statement from PLA General Luo Yuan.

“’Let's for now not discuss whether [the Ryukyus] belong to China, they were certainly China's tributary state,’ Luo said in an interview with China News Service. ‘I am not saying all former tributary states belong to China, but we can say with certainty that the Ryukyus do not belong to Japan,’ he added, in comments translated by the South China Morning Post.” (2) [emphasis added]

To understand the geographical and, therefore, military perspective, the Senkaku Islands lie about 100 miles to the northeast of Taiwan.   The Ryukyu Island chain begins about 100 miles to the east of Taiwan and arcs to the northeast up to the Japanese mainland.  The two groups of islands would form natural barriers and military strongpoints isolating and shielding any Chinese military actions involving Taiwan.

The presence of the surrounding island bases allows the Chinese to seize Taiwan without worry about US counterattacks.  The island bases represent the line in the ocean that the US must cross in order to come to the aid of Taiwan.  We must be willing to engage and destroy Chinese territory just to get to Taiwan.  There’s a major difference between going to Taiwan’s aid and destroying Chinese sovereign territory.  Will we be willing to destroy Chinese territory?  I suspect not.  For all practical purposes, the seizure of the first island chain and the construction of bases has sealed Taiwan’s fate.  For all those Chinese apologists who tried to argue that the islands were of no value and not worth contesting, there’s your answer.

The islands also present a speedbump in the road to aiding Taiwan even if we want to.  The time and material required to neutralize the surrounding islands are likely to be enough to allow China to consolidate its seizure of Taiwan and present the US with a fait accompli.  It’s one thing for the US to come to the aid of an ally that is actively resisting attack but it’s another to step into a situation in which the attack is over and the invasion has been accomplished.  The latter requires a good deal more fortitude on the part of the US and may present an insurmountable threshold for the US geopolitical calculation.

So, not only do the island bases represent a “line in the ocean” that we would hesitate to cross, they also represent a significant speed bump in the path of our response – one that would render the attempted rescue moot.

Even if war with China never comes, the slow and steady seizure of surrounding island bases (or construction of artificial ones) will eventually put the Chinese in a position of being able to dictate their desires to Taiwan under threat of blockade.  The geopolitical implications of this are obvious.  China can simply “starve” Taiwan into submission and reunification.

Viewed from a military strategy perspective, China’s actions in the South and East China Seas are not only understandable but logical and predictable.  We simply need to acknowledge the reality and choose our response.

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(1)The Daily Beast website, “Now China Wants Okinawa, Site of U.S. Bases in Japan”, Gordon Chang, 31-Dec-2015,

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/12/31/now-china-wants-okinawa-site-of-u-s-bases-in-japan.html

(2)The Guardian website, “China lays claim to Okinawa as territory dispute with Japan escalates”, Justin McCurry, 15-May-2013,

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/15/china-okinawa-dispute-japan-ryukyu