WWII saw the birth of the Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT) amphibious assault vehicle, known variously as the "amtrak", "amtrac", "alligator", or "buffalo", among other nicknames. The vehicle was the answer to the Marine’s need for a protected transport capable of traversing surf and coral. The development of an armored version with a 75 mm howitzer provided anti-infantry and anti-fortification firepower available in the initial assault wave. Later, a flamethrower capability was added.
The personnel carrying LVT was the forerunner to today’s standard Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV). Indeed, the AAV was initially designated the Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel-7 (LVTP-7).
We see, then, that during WWII, the LVT variants included transport, flamethrower, and armored “tank” versions. These developments were critical to the Pacific war island assaults and were impressive enough in their own right. However, after the Korean War, the LVT underwent yet another round of development resulting in an entire family of functional variants.
The base vehicle for the subsequent LVT family was the 35 ton LVTP-5. The variants, designed by Borg-Warner Corp., included (1),
LVTP-5 – personnel carrier rated for up to 35 troops (though not in practice)
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| LVTP-5 |
LVTH-6 – armored amphibian with fully stabilized armored turret housing a 105 mm howitzer with storage for 151 rounds plus an additional 150 rounds in the cargo hold, a 0.30 cal co-axial machine gun, and a 0.50 cal anti-aircraft machine gun
LVTH-6
LVTC-5 – command vehicle with extensive communications suite for battalion or regimental command; could send and receive on 7 channels and monitor 4; space for seating and map boards
LVTAA-1 – anti-aircraft vehicle fitted with the M42 Duster turret housing twin 40 mm Bofors; Note: It appears that the LVTAA-1 never entered production after prototype testing.
LVTR-1 – recovery vehicle with two winches, each capable of pulling 45,000 pounds, a welding rig, crane and other maintenance equipment (2)
LVTR-1
LVTE-1 – combat engineer and breaching vehicle with an angled blade plow for mine clearing that could clear a 12 ft wide lane to a depth of 16 inches; also included a top mounted, rocket-propelled demolition line charge launcher for mine and obstacle clearance
LVTE-1
The really noteworthy aspect of this bit of amphibious vehicle history is that we still need the same functions today! The absolutely astounding aspect of this bit of amphibious vehicle history is that most of the required functions are still unmet, today!
AAV
It is also interesting to note how little the base vehicle has changed. If we could simply, magically, transport these vehicles to our time, we’d find them quite welcome and useful. That illustrates how little improvement has occurred in amphibious assault – arguably, we have regressed since we now lack any kind of amphibious heavy firepower which we commonly had in WWII !
The AAV/ACV (ACV – Amphibious Combat Vehicle) that is currently being produced has barely changed, functionally, from its historical predecessors and lacks the various variants that are required for a fully functional amphibious capability. The Marines have discussed adding ACV command and 30 mm gun variants but nothing has happened as yet and budget constraints suggest that few, if any, variants will be produced.
This raises the larger question, are the Marines actually serious about amphibious assault? The statements, doctrine, acquisitions, and budget allocation present a very mixed bag of answers.
Statements by various Marine leadership claim that amphibious assault remains a core capability, that a line of AAVs assaulting the beach will never be seen again, that traditional assaults are a thing of the past, and that the AAV/ACV is vital for the Marine mission. An astounding bit of mixed messaging, for sure!
Doctrinally, the Marines/Navy call for a standoff distance of 25-50+ miles for an opposed assault. This suggests that the Marines are not serious about amphibious assault since they have no landing craft capable of conducting effective 25-50+ mile transits.
Marine acquisitions and budgets are heavily focused on the aviation – and now missile – side of things. The lack of importance attached to assault is evidenced by the decades spent meandering around the AAV replacement issue (recall the failed EFV?). Even now, with new ACVs being procured, the utter lack of amphibious firepower and anti-air capability is startling and sends the message that amphibious assault is not a priority and may not even be feasible (if so, why are the Marines even procuring ACVs?).
One final bit of evidence about the degree of likelihood and seriousness with which the Marines view amphibious assault is that the Marines have never conducted an exercise using their own doctrine of assaulting from 25-50+ miles – because they know it can’t be done with the capabilities they currently have. Further, there is no serious investigation of 25-50+ mile connectors being conducted. Recall any photo you’ve ever seen of Marine amphibious exercises. The AAVs are pictured coming ashore in neat rows with a giant amphibious ship parked just offshore so that the AAVs had a very short ride to the beach (barely getting wet in the process!). Great photo op but worthless training.
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| Amphibious Assault Exercise - note the proximity of the host ship |
If the Marines are serious about amphibious assault – and that’s a huge ‘if’ – they desperately need a complete family of vehicles identical in function to the post-WWII LVT family. If the Marines are not serious about amphibious assault, as the preponderance of evidence suggests, then they need to stop wasting money on ACVs which will never be used.
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(1)”Marines Under Armor”, Kenneth W. Estes, Naval Institute Press, 2000
(2)http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/1993/MAR_APR/ArmorMarchApril1993web.pdf , p. 13
