LPD-25 Delivery Deficiencies

The San Antonio (LPD-17) amphibious assault ship class has been in production since the lead ship began construction in 2000.  Now, 21 years later, the bugs ought to have been long ago worked out and the manufacturer, Huntington Ingalls (HII) ought to be delivering polished, problem-free ships on a regular basis, right?  Well, here’s what an Oct 2020 Defense News website article noted from a GAO report about LPD-25, commissioned in 2014:

 

For example, the GAO found that 25 of the 58 systems required to be certified for deployment on LPD-25 were incomplete at the time of the ship’s delivery, and 14 were still incomplete when the ship was transferred to the fleet. Multiple systems were found deficient while the ship was in the fleet, including an advanced electronics system that “controls nearly all systems and equipment on the ship,” the GAO found.

 

“The system has experienced widespread performance failures and the Navy has been unable to repair the ship efficiently, including during the post-delivery period and after the ship was provided to the fleet,” the report found. “As a result, the Navy is in the process of looking at incorporating a new system.” (1)

 

 

I don’t know what the ‘advanced electronics system that “controls nearly all systems and equipment on the ship” ‘ is but it must be big and it must be important. 

 

That the Navy has been unable to repair the system is worrying and is yet another example of the trend of modern systems becoming too complex to operate and maintain and too complex to achieve their anticipated performance.  We’ve seen this with the fleet-wide degradation of Aegis.  Despite this trend, the Navy is continuing to pursue ever more complex systems in violation of both the K.I.S.S. principle and the common sense requirement that combat systems be as rugged, robust, and repairable as possible.

 

Equally worrisome is that the Navy is ‘looking at incorporating a new system’.  The Navy appears to be giving up on what is clearly a very important system.  This, too, is becoming a trend.  For example, the F-35 ALIS software system has been a debacle of sufficient magnitude that the military has given up on it and is trying to replace it.  Note that I am not arguing against giving up on failed systems but it is troubling that so many systems are advancing so far, only to be abandoned.  We need to identify failed systems much earlier in their development cycle instead of allowing them to become part of what should be mature production systems.  

 

LPD-25, San Antonio Class

The LPD-25’s problems are not isolated to one unfortunate ship of the class.  The INSURV inspection for USS Portland, LPD-27, noted,

 

On LPD-27, the Portland, the ship scored lower than any of the previous four ships over the past five years, with deficiencies in main engines, aviation, small boat handling, anchoring, generators and air search radar systems, the report found. (1)

 

Of course, the Navy doesn’t see any problems.  As Adm. Moore enthusiastically described it, the Portland is an amazing success.

 

Portland is the 11th San Antonio class Amphibious Transport Dock ship to be presented to the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) for acceptance. Acceptance Trials are conducted with INSURV and are intended to demonstrate a ship's readiness for delivery through a series of dock-side and underway tests and evaluations.

"The USS Portland is a well-designed ship that is going to increase our Navy and Marine Corps warfighting capability for years to come," said Vice Adm. Thomas Moore, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. "The material condition of the ship is fantastic, and the success she had during acceptance trials is a true testament to the men and women that built her." (2)

There you have it.  According to the Adm. Moore, LPD-27 is ‘fantastic’ and an unmitigated success.  It would appear that INSURV/NAVSEA didn’t get the memo from Adm. Moore about just how fantastic the Portland is.

 

Despite endless years of incomplete and damaged ships being delivered to the Navy, the Navy continues to accept these ships and does not require warranties from the shipbuilders.  Why even bother with issuing contracts since the shipbuilders have no intention of meeting the contract requirements and the Navy has no intention of holding them to the contract requirements?  We could save a lot of money by just dropping the charade and simply accepting whatever non-functional crap industry wants to deliver.  It’s what we do now, anyway, but we spend a lot of money negotiating contracts neither side has any intention of fulfilling so let’s stop pretending.

 

 

 

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(1)Defense News website, “US Navy inspections of Ingalls-built ships uncovered significant problems, report shows”, David Larter, Oct‎ ‎8‎, ‎2020

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/10/08/us-navy-inspections-of-ingalls-built-ships-uncovered-significant-problems-report-shows/

 

(2)http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/186111/future-uss-portland-%28lpd-27%29-completes-acceptance-trials.html

Partial Delivery - Total Obfuscation

Over the years of this blog, we’ve noted the rise in accounting games that the Navy has been playing to hide the true costs of weapon systems and the failures of quality and scheduling.  This trend has been accelerating with the Navy coming up with more and more schemes as Congress has attempted to exercise oversight.

One of the most egregious is the recent practice of accepting – and commissioning! – incomplete ships. 

The ship is contracted, delivery is made with substantial incomplete compartments, weapon systems, sensors, etc. and then the ship is completed during post-delivery availabilities.  Thus, the original construction contract only actually covered a partial ship.  Some or all of the additional funding needed to complete the ship comes from various non-construction account lines and, therefore, does not show up in the final ship cost.  This leads Congress and observers to believe that the ship is cheaper than it really is.

For example, the USS San Antonio (LPD-17), was delivered substantially incomplete.

The Navy accepted delivery of LPD-17 with about 1.1 million hours of construction work remaining to be done on the ship. This equated to about 8.7% of the total hours needed to build the ship, and (with material costs included) about 7% of the total cost to build the ship. (3)

Lest you think this was just a first of class issue,

The Navy accepted delivery of LPD-18 with about 400,000 hours of construction work remaining to be done on the ship. (3)

The carrier Ford was delivered with 367 unfinished compartments, among many other deficiencies. (5)

LCSes have routinely been delivered incomplete (see, “LCS Waiver Trials”).

This partial delivery practice started as a means to cover up delivery schedule failures and was used as needed.  However, the practice has proven so effective in misleading observers that the Navy has now formalized it as “phased delivery”. 

The first phase is the initial delivery of the incomplete ship.  The Navy has taken to referring to this as the Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) delivery.  That partial delivery is accompanied, in short order, by “hugely successful trials” (how can a trial be successful when the ship isn’t complete?) and then commissioning (how can a ship be commissioned when it is incomplete?). 

The second phase consists of one or more post-delivery / post-commissioning availabilities where the weapons, sensors, combat system, and whatnot are added and incomplete compartments are finished (well, some of them – there are reports that LHD-17, LCS, and Ford ships still have unfinished compartments).

For example, the Navy accepted delivery of the Zumwalt (DDG-1000) in May 2016 and commissioned the ship in Oct 2016.  Zumwalt was then transferred to San Diego for completion.  Among other work needing to be completed, BAE Systems received a contract to install Mk 57 peripheral launch cells (VLS), “combat systems”, sensors, combat system programming, and perform post-construction hull, mechanical, and electrical enhancements. (1,2)

Zumwalt - Good Enough, Call It Delivered - We'll Finish It Later

This practice has not gone unnoticed by Congress and they are not very happy with it.  Congress included language in the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act which prevents the Navy from claiming delivery of incomplete ships as battle force ships in the Naval Vessel Register.  Thus, the first two Zumwalts which the Navy has claimed count towards the battle force numbers have now been removed from the count.

The 2019 defense authorization bill clarifies what lawmakers tried to do two years ago related to Navy ship-counting, making clear that a ship cannot be included in the Naval Vessel Register’s list of battle force ships until it has been fully delivered to the Navy – and in the case of ships with a phased delivery, where the Navy takes custody of the hull but adds in the combat system or electronics later, that means the final delivery date.

So, upon passage of the bill, Zumwalt-class destroyers USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) and yet-to-be commissioned Michael Monsoor (DDG-1001) were taken off the battle force ship count and will not be added back on until they complete a combat system activation in San Diego. (4)

Congress had earlier attempted to put an end to the practice of counting incomplete ships from partial deliveries.

In the FY 2017 NDAA, lawmakers stated that the Navy should “deem ship delivery to occur at the completion of the final phase of construction,” and that all materials submitted to congressional committees should use that format, rather than including an earlier partial-delivery date. (4)

That should have ended the practice but, in typical fashion, the Navy ignored Congress’ wishes.

After the 2017 language became law, the Navy was required to use the full delivery date when reporting to Congress, but it was still entering ships – namely Zumwalt and Michael Monsoor – into the Naval Vessel Register upon HM&E delivery rather than final delivery. (4)

Hopefully, Congress has now gotten the message across to a Navy that believes itself above and beyond Congressional oversight and legislative authority.

Why does partial delivery and battle force counting matter to Congress?

The committee is concerned the variance in the Navy’s definition of ship delivery may obscure oversight of the program’s schedule, including whether or not a project has breached its threshold delivery date. … CVN-79 and the Zumwalt-class programs illustrate this practice. (4)

For lawmakers, the need to use a final delivery date instead of a partial delivery date also contributes to program oversight and accountability. (4)

The difference in time frame between the Navy’s attempt to include partial delivery ships in the battle force count and the final delivery is substantial.  For example, Zumwalt was accepted by the Navy in May 2016 and is not yet complete, 2 yrs and 3 months later and counting.

The Navy cites construction costs for the Zumwalt but those are only partial costs.  Over two years after delivery and commissioning, the Zumwalt’s construction costs continue to mount up but we’ll never see those costs cited.

Let’s be crystal clear about the practice of partial delivery.  It’s all about hiding costs from Congress, hiding schedule delays, hiding inept program management, and keeping funding flowing. 

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(1)https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/article/u-s--navy-awards-bae-systems--192-million-contract-for-work-on-new-ddg-1000-ships

(2)http://usszumwalt.org/author/zumwalt1000/

(3)Congressional Research Service, “Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement:

Background, Issues, and Options for Congress”, Ronald O'Rourke, March 16, 2011, RL34476,

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34476.pdf

(4)USNI News website, “Navy Battle Force Tally Dips By 2, After New Ship-Counting Rules Postpone Zumwalt Destroyers”, Megan Eckstein, 21-Aug-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/08/21/navy-battle-force-tally-dips-2-new-ship-counting-rules-postpone-zumwalt-destroyers

(5)Government Accounting Office, “Navy Shipbuilding”, July 2017, GAO-17-418, p.22

https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685799.pdf

DOT&E - LPD-17

The San Antonio, LPD-17, class amphibious ship has had a troubled and challenging history, to say the least.  The DOT&E 2013 annual report sheds light on the current status of the class.

The class consists of 11 ships, 9 of which are completed and 2 building.  The lead ship was completed in 2003.  At this point the class should be fully operational and working out any final bugs in the design.  The DOT&E report, however, paints a different picture.

The Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) revealed numerous, serious deficiencies that led DOT&E to evaluate the class as

“… not operationally effective, not operationally suitable, and not survivable in a hostile environment.”

The ship’s combat system, the Ship Self Defense System (SSDS), was found to have major problems which have yet to be corrected.  In fairness, the SSDS is problematic on all ship classes that it is installed on although the LPD-17 class seems particularly affected.

Reliability issues across many different systems continue to plague the class.

The enclosed mast which proved troublesome early on and almost led to the deletion of the feature in the earlier ships continues to be a problem.

Improvements and fixes that the Navy claims to have made have not been validated in follow-on testing (FOT&E).

DOT&E lists many other problems and you can read the report if have an interest in the details.  The salient point is that, now, ten years after the lead ship was completed, the class is still not deemed survivable in combat.  There’s just no excuse for this.  As has been repeatedly pointed out, the Navy is so focused on new construction that existing ships, however new, just don’t get the attention they need.  This is how you build a hollow Navy.

Concurrency - Building Without a Design!

The Navy has its share of problems.  Some, such as budget limitations, are imposed from the outside and are largely outside the Navy’s control.  Others are self-inflicted such as maintenance, manning, and training.

One of worst self-inflicted problems is that of concurrency.  This is a relatively new problem and is the practice of trying to build a ship or aircraft while also designing it at the same time.  For most of us, this is an instant head-scratcher which simply defies understanding.  Almost instinctively, we know that you must have a finished design prior to building.  Otherwise, how do you know what to build?  The short answer is that you don’t.  What happens is that you wind up having to rebuild sections of the ship/plane as the design changes.

For anyone who’s unsure what I’m describing, consider the example of building a car without a design.  You’re pretty sure there’s some basic things you need so you figure to get a leg up by starting the construction.  Unfortunately, part way through you decide that you want to place the engine in the rear instead of the front so you have to tear out the rear seats, re-design the back end to support the engine, reroute the various gas and electrical lines and then re-install the removed seats somewhere else.  In essence, you’ll wind up building the car two or three times over.  An expensive proposition, right?

Well,  that’s exactly what the Navy has been doing with the LCS, JSF (F-35), LPD-17, DDG-1000, and so forth.  The results of this approach have been nothing short of disastrous.



Anybody Know Where This Piece Goes?



The LCS has tripled in price with most of that increase due to the changing design.  Indeed, the changes still continue.  Here are some comments from the CRS April 2012 report on the LCS,

“The Navy started construction of LCS 1 and 2 without a stable design and has had to incorporate design and production changes into follow-on seaframes. When the LCS 1 and 2 construction contracts were awarded, the basic and functional design of each seaframe were respectively only 20 percent and 15 percent complete.” (2)



Designs that were only 20% and 15% complete at the start of construction?  So, that’s what, the keel that was designed and that’s about it?



Concurrency is not just a ship phenomenon.  The JSF suffers from concurrency, as well.  From the recent GAO report, comes this summary statement,

“Most of the instability in the program has been and continues to be the result of highly concurrent development, testing, and production activities.  …  In addition to contract overruns, concurrency costs of at least $373 million have been incurred on production aircraft to correct deficiencies found in testing. The manufacturing process is still absorbing higher than expected number of engineering changes resulting from flight testing, changes which are expected to persist at elevated levels into 2019, making it difficult to achieve efficient production rates. More design and manufacturing changes are expected as testing continues, bringing risks for more contract overruns and concurrency costs. Even with the substantial reductions in near-term production quantities, DOD still plans to procure 365 aircraft for $69 billion before developmental flight tests are completed.” (1)

This says that 365 aircraft will be purchased before testing has been completed to identify what changes are needed in the final design.  All 365 aircraft will need to be reworked to incorporate the changes and that will cost additional money to remove existing equipment and then add the new or modified equipment. 

So, we see that the practice of concurrency results in triple payments;  one, to build it the first time, two, to remove installed equipment to accommodate the changes, and three, installation of the new or modified equipment.  Can you think of a less efficient way to build something?  And it shows!  The cost of the LCS, LPD, JSF, etc. have ballooned beyond belief.  At what point and with what twisted logic did this seem like a good idea to someone in the Navy???

(1)   Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Joint Strike Fighter, Restructuring Added Resources and Reduced Risk, but Concurrency Is Still a Major Concern”, Statement of Michael J. Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, GAO-12-525T

(2)   Congressional Research Services (CRS), “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress”, Ronald O'Rourke, April 6, 2012

LPD-17 - Whose Fault?

LPD-17 - Unfinished Ship

The consensus among naval observers seems to be that the LPD-17 class is a flawed design complicated by shoddy workmanship by the manufacturer.  The list of problems is seemingly endless and all relate back to the poor quality of construction.  While admitting to some slight degree of responsibility, though not much, the Navy would have us believe that they were victimized by the manufacturer and are just as outraged as we, the taxpayer, are.

Consider this …  If you went to purchase a new car and were shown a vehicle that was only 90% complete would you buy it?  Of course not!  You’d refuse to pay until the car was complete and a test drive had proven that it was fully functional.  That’s just basic common sense consumerism, right?

Now consider the following from the Congressional Research Service report, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement:

Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke - Specialist in Naval Affairs, March 16, 2011.

“The Navy accepted delivery of LPD-17 with about 1.1 million hours of construction work remaining to be done on the ship. This equated to about 8.7% of the total hours needed to build the ship, and (with material costs included) about 7% of the total cost to build the ship.”

The Navy went car shopping and bought a vehicle that was only 90% complete!  1.1 million hours of construction left to go!  How is it that the Navy doesn’t understand what every consumer in America knows – you don’t pay for an incomplete and non-functional product.

Well, maybe the Navy made a mistake on the LPD-17, first of class.  Maybe they trusted the manufacturer and simply got burned.  Maybe the Navy was the victim and not a fatally stupid consumer.  Again, from the report,

“The Navy accepted delivery of LPD-18 with about 400,000 hours of construction work remaining to be done on the ship.”

So, having created an unacceptable situation by accepting an unfinished ship the first time, the Navy repeated process on the second ship.  In fact, the report goes on to document that the Navy accepted the third ship, LPD-19, also in an unfinished state.

Back to the opening sentence of this post.  Who is to blame for the LPD debacle?  It seems clear to me that the fault lies with the Navy.  Does this absolve the manufacturer of blame?  No, but no one forced the Navy to accept an unfinished ship.  Further, the Navy’s internal inspection group also accepted the ship with all its quality defects.  Again, while not absolving the manufacturer, that puts the responsibility squarely on the Navy.  We’ll cover the failed inspections in more detail in a subsequent post.

In summary, quite the opposite from what the Navy would have us believe – that they were a victim – we see that the Navy is 100% responsible for the LPD problems.  Keep this in mind as you read about the further misadventures of the LPD-17 class.