The Real Aircraft Readiness Rates

I’m sure you all recall the memo issued by then Secretary of Defense Mattis in Sep 2018 that mandated that F-35 and F-18 aircraft would achieve readiness rates of 80% or greater by the end of 2019 (see, “You Will Comply”)?  How did that work out?  Well, in a miracle for the ages, less than 6 months after that memo was issued the Navy reported that Super Hornet readiness had jumped from the 50% mark, where it had been mired for several years due to parts shortages, personnel shortages, and other systemic problems, to as high as 76% despite all the same problems still existing.  Did that seem plausible?  Of course not.  Systemic problems don’t disappear in less than 6 months and huge backlogs of idled aircraft don’t suddenly become ready.  It was obvious that someone was playing reporting games and manipulating the data.

 

Still, the Navy continued to report high readiness rates, claiming to have exceeded the 80% mark.(2)

 

Here’s what I posted when the Navy announced their miraculous improvement:

 

Years of maintenance manpower shortages, higher than expected corrosion and problems, chronic spare parts shortages, depot backlogs, funding shortages, etc., all cured in less than 6 months by a single memo. 

 

Do you think readiness is unchanged and we’re just pencil-whipping and gun-decking the readiness reports?  Before you answer, consider all the Navy fraudulent statements and practices (lapsed certifications, acceptance trial waivers, fraudulent shock trial success claims, and hundreds of other examples) that we’ve exposed on this blog alone.  Now, let me repeat the question … Do you really think readiness surged that much in 5 months or less or is it unchanged and the Navy is just pencil-whipping the readiness reports? (1)

 

 

The GAO has now come out with a report on military aircraft readiness and it confirms what ComNavOps knew to be true – that the Navy was falsifying readiness reports.

 

The table below shows the GAO’s data for readiness of Navy aircraft during the 9 year period FY2011 - FY2019, inclusive.  GAO assessed readiness by comparing the aircraft’s mission capable rate (MCR) to the MCR goal established by the Navy.  Unfortunately, the MCR goals for each aircraft have been withheld from the GAO report as the information is considered sensitive.  Typically, MCR goals are on the order of 70%.

 

Note:  Mission Capable is the ability to perform any one of the aircraft’s notional missions.  This is the lowest possible form of readiness.  Fully Mission Capable is the highest level of readiness and the only one that we should be using – an aircraft is either ready to fly any mission or it is not ready.  MCR is often little more than the ability to take off and is of no use in assessing true combat readiness.

 

 

Aircraft	Number of Years Readiness Goal Was Met
F/A-18A-D (Navy)	1 of 9
F/A-18E-F (Navy)	0 of 9
F-35C (Navy)	2 of 7
F-35B (Marine)	1 of 7
F/A-18A-D (Marine)	0 of 9

 

 

 

 

Note that the Navy claimed that the Super Hornet readiness had exceeded 80% for the Super Hornet which would have likely easily surpassed whatever its readiness goal is.  Despite this, GAO, with access to real data, found that the Super Hornet never exceeded its goal. 

 

From the GAO report which addressed the SecDef Mattis memo and the Super Hornet and F-35 readiness,

 

We found that none of these aircraft had achieved the 80 percent mission capable  goal … (3, p.11)

 

The Navy publicly reported in late September 2019 that it had met the Secretary’s 80 percent mission capable goal for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler. Our analysis showed that mission capable rates generally did improve for these Navy systems over the course of fiscal year 2019, including meeting the 80 percent mission capable rate at particular points of time in fiscal year 2019. However, we found that none

of these aircraft achieved the mission capable goal when mission capable rate data were averaged for each day in fiscal year 2019. (3, p.12)

 

 

There you have it, the real readiness rates and they’re the same as they’ve always been – not ready!

 

 

 

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(1)Navy Matters blog, “You Will Comply”, 10-Apr-2020

 

(2)USNI News website, “Navy Surpasses 80% Aircraft Readiness Goal, Reaches Stretch Goal of 341 Up Fighters”, Megan Eckstein, 25-Sep-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/09/25/navy-surpasses-80-aircraft-readiness-goal-reaches-stretch-goal-of-341-up-fighters

(3)Government Accountability Office, “Weapon System Sustainment”, GAO-21-101SP, Nov 2020

LRASM – A Good Half of a Weapon System

The Navy has announced that the air launched AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) is operational on the F-18 Super Hornet.  This is very good news as it now provides the non- or semi-stealthy aircraft the ability to launch from long range which enhances the survivability of the aircraft (and decreases the need for stealth?  - what do you say to that, F-35?).  LRASM is a welcome replacement for the obsolete Harpoon. 

However, the LRASM is only half of a weapon system.  The other half is sensors.  As we’ve noted many times, the longest ranged weapon in the world is useless unless you can find a target from the same range as your weapon.

Hornet and LRASM

The LRASM is reported to have a range of 200-500 miles depending on what source you want to believe.  Currently, the Navy has very few sensors (none?) capable of survivably detecting targets at that range.

As a brief reminder, the LRASM is a stealthy anti-ship cruise missile based on the AGM-158B JASSM-ER.  The missile has a 1000 lb penetrating (whatever that means) blast fragmentation warhead.  It uses multiple sensors and modes to find targets which gives it reduced dependence on GPS guidance.

LRASM is designed to detect and destroy specific targets within groups of ships by employing advanced technologies that reduce dependence on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, network links and GPS navigation in electronic warfare environments. (1)

So, this is some good news but now the Navy needs to put some work into developing a long range sensor system that can effectively and survivably operate in enemy controlled or contested air space.  Only with such a sensor system can we get the maximum benefit of the LRASM.

_________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Next-Generation Anti-Ship Missile Achieves Operational Capability with Super Hornets”, Xavier Vavasseur, 19-Dec-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/12/19/next-generation-anti-ship-missile-achieves-operational-capability-with-super-hornets

F-35 vs. F-18 Stealth Comparison

Proponents and critics of the F-35 and F-18 bandy stealth claims back and forth despite the fact that there is almost no actual data on the subject.  Well, ComNavOps has no data to offer.  What, you thought I’d have some official, classified data to share?  What I do have is an interesting observation about the front aspect stealth of the two aircraft.  Examine the drawing below of the side-by-side, split frontal view of the F-18 and F-35.

Drawing credit listed below (1)

What jumps out?  It’s that the two are virtually identical !  Be honest now … without labels, how many of you can tell the two apart?

What does this tell us about their relative stealth?  Well, it suggests that the frontal stealth of the two airframes may not be all that much different.  Of course, there is more to stealth than just the shape although the F-35 claims to not use much in the way of exotic coatings to enhance stealth which suggests that shape is the F-35’s main source of stealth.  There may be materials of construction or internal shaping that also contributes to stealth but, if so, I’ve never seen a detailed listing or description of what degree of stealth they contribute.  No one who knows what the differences are is talking but this suggests they are far less than F-35 proponents claim, at least from the front which is the most important aspect since it’s the head-on, approaching profile that enemy radars will be seeing most of the time.

The biggest frontal aspect difference between the two aircraft is the external, pylon-hung weapons and fuel tanks on the Hornet.  Again, no one knows impact those have on the overall stealth.  Do they increase the Hornet’s radar cross section by 10%?  50%?  700%?  Again, anyone who knows, isn’t saying.

My takeaway from this visual comparison is that the two airframes are likely pretty close in frontal aspect stealth with the Hornet losing stealth as pylons/weapons are added.

Don’t get too wound up about this.  It’s not meant to be much more than an interesting observation.

____________________________

(1)Drawing prepared and presented by username=payload, 02 Aug 2015, 21:53,

http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=22&t=15013&start=240

Navy Orders Block III Super Hornets

The Navy has awarded Boeing a $4B contract for the production of 78 Block III Super Hornets (61 single seat ‘E’ models and 17 two seat ‘F’ models) to be built beginning in 2019 and deliver beginning in 2021. (1)  That’s $51M apiece so, presumably, that’s not the complete cost which indications are should be around $80M each.

As a reminder, the Block III Super Hornet includes the following enhancements:

• Enhanced stealth (2)
• Greater range (129 nm) (2)
• Conformal fuel tanks
• Larger weapons payload
• Longer lifespan (9000-10,000 hours) (2,3)
• Enhanced networking, satellite communications, and data links
• Block II IRST (Infrared Search and Track) (3)
• Advanced Cockpit Display (3)

Note that the Block III is not exactly the same as the Advanced Super Hornet (ASF).  The Block III lacks some feature of the ASF, notably additional stealth.

Upgraded Super Hornet

Boeing claims that within a decade the entire Super Hornet carrier fleet will be Block III aircraft. (2)

Note that in addition to providing longer range, the conformal fuel tanks also free up pylons for additional weapons carriage.

Minor structural changes will decrease the aircraft’s radar cross section (RCS). (5)  How that resulting degree of stealth compares to the F-35 is unknown.

Boeing will begin converting Block II Super Hornets to the Block III configuration, as well. (3)  Conversion cost will be on the order of “a few million dollars” per aircraft. (4)

The Navy plans to order additional Block III Super Hornets at a rate of 12 per year for 2022, 2023, and 2024.

Some observers see the Navy using the F-35C as the spotter due to its greater stealth and the F-18 as the shooter due to its greater weapons payload.  According to Sean Stackley, former Secretary of the Navy,

The Super Hornet has a lot of payload, and that’s a good complement to the F-35, which has stealth and sensors. (4)

Others disagree and note that the F-18 will have enhanced stealth and an IRST sensor allowing it to go toe-to-toe with front line enemy aircraft on its own.

One of the remaining problems is integrating the F-35 and the Super Hornet.  The F-35’s ‘stealthy’ communications method involves the Multi-function Advanced Data Link (MADL).  Unfortunately, no other aircraft includes that function so the F-35 can’t securely talk to anyone but another F-35.  The F-35 can, of course, use the standard Link 16 but that mode is more easily detected.  Boeing claims to be working on the issue.

While this is a positive step for naval aviation, the Hornet remains a sub-optimal aircraft for the Navy’s operational needs.  The war with China will require a very long range, very high payload, air superiority fighter and the Hornet is not it – nor is the F-35.

Rather than make the hard decision to terminate the F-35 and embark on a new, purpose designed long range, air superiority fighter that actually meets the operational needs, the Navy is just prolonging the mediocrity by polishing up the ill-suited Hornet.  Yes, it will now be a somewhat better ill-suited Hornet but it’s still an ill-suited Hornet.  This is the classic ‘lipstick on a pig’ scenario.

_________________________________

(1)USNI News, “Boeing Awarded $4B Multi-Year Deal for 78 Super Hornets”, Ben Werner, 21-Mar-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/03/21/42021

(2)USNI News, “Boeing Touts Block III Super Hornet’s Better Range, Improved Digital Connectivity to Fleet”, Ben Werner, 23-May-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2018/05/23/33808

(3)Sea Power Magazine website, “Navy Orders 78 Super Hornet Block III Strike Fighters”, Richard R. Burgess, 21-Mar-2019,

http://seapowermagazine.org/stories/20190321-Boeing.html

(4)Breaking Defense website,”Boeing’s Block III Super Hornet ‘High End’ Complement To F-35: Stackley”, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 6-Apr-2017,

https://breakingdefense.com/2017/04/boeings-block-iii-super-hornet-high-end-complement-to-f-35-stackley/

(5)DefPost website, “Boeing Receives U.S. Navy Contract for 78 F/A-18 Block III Super Hornet Fighter Jets”, 24-Mar-2019,

https://defpost.com/boeing-receives-u-s-navy-contract-for-78-f-a-18-block-iii-super-hornet-fighter-jets/

Combat Radius

So many discussions about aircraft include mention and claims about range.  Unfortunately, range is a very imprecise concept and range numbers are highly variable.  There’s an old saying in statistics that you can make the numbers say anything you want.  The same is true in discussions of range - you can get any range number you want by playing with the conditions. 

Let’s look a bit closer at the concept of range by looking at the specific example of an F-18E/F Super Hornet (SH).  In a recent post, a SH range figure was quoted and I expressed doubt and stated that it was a very optimistic number.  Let’s see why.

As a general prelude to this discussion, we need to agree on some terms. 

Range is, technically, the distance from one point to another – in other words, a straight line, one-way travel.  Carrier aircraft don’t generally do that.  Instead, they fly out, execute a mission task, and return to the carrier.  So, their “range” is actually a radius.  Thus, their maximum radius is half their maximum range. 

Unfortunately, many people use “range” and “radius” interchangeably.  For the rest of this discussion, we’ll attempt to use “range” as meaning a one-way, straight line travel and radius to mean an out and back trip. 

Now, let’s plunge right in and check the range and radius for the F-18E/F.  From the F-18E/F NATOPS Performance Data Manual, Specific Range Chart Fig. 5-37, Alt = 15,000 ft, Wt = 50,000 lbs, we get the following data.

Using the Optimum Cruise line at the median Drag Index gives

Speed = 456 mph

Fuel Flow = 6500 pph

Specific Range = 0.058 nm per pound of fuel

So, for a SH with a full internal fuel load of 14,400 lbs, that gives a range of (14,400 lbs x 0.058 nm per lb = 835 nm), radius = 417 nm

Calculated alternatively,

Flight time = (14,400 lbs / 6500 lbs/hr = 2.2 hrs)

Flight range = (2.2 hrs x 456 mph = 1003 miles or 872 nm), radius = 501 miles or 436 nm

We see, then, that the combat radius of the SH is about 420 nm at a cruise altitude of 15,000 ft and a weight of 50,000 lbs and using optimum cruise speed.  As a reminder, the recent post quoted the SH range figure as 450 nm.  Well, that’s almost exactly the figure we just calculated so that seems like a reasonable and valid range number, right?  Why did ComNavOps express doubt and claim it was extremely optimistic?

Well, here’s where the discussion breaks down.  The calculated range is for straight line cruising at the specified altitude, speed, and weight but how did the aircraft get to that altitude?  It didn’t just appear there.  It launched from a carrier using maximum thrust which consumes huge amounts of fuel.  It had to climb to altitude which consumes additional fuel over and above that needed to simply cruise.  So, in the real (operational) world, the fuel required to launch and climb to altitude has to be subtracted from the available fuel in our calculations.  How much fuel is that?  I have no idea – 20%, maybe?  A pilot would have to tell us or I would have to dig even deeper into the NATOPS manual.  The point is that the calculation assumes the aircraft starts at altitude and with a full load of fuel which is impossible.  So, the calculated range/radius must be significantly reduced.  That 420 nm radius now becomes 350 nm, maybe?

But wait, there’s more confusion.

The 420 nm radius assumes a straight line, unwavering, constant speed flight.  On a combat mission, aircraft don’t generally fly straight, level, and constant speed.  Typically, a combat mission will involve changes in direction to weave around known dangers (radar sites, enemy bases, etc.) and/or to approach from a direction other than straight on.  So, even if you could fly 420 nm in a straight line, if you throw in several course changes that take you off that straight line, you’ll consume additional fuel which has the effect of shortening the apparent radius. 

Further, on a combat mission the aircraft don’t fly at a constant speed or altitude.  They increase speed, especially near the target when they use fuel gulping maximum power.  They fly at different altitudes.  For example, a mission might consist of a high altitude cruise to the target, a low altitude approach, and a high altitude return cruise.  The altitude changes not only consume additional fuel but change the flight efficiency – lower altitudes are generally less fuel efficient.

So, the actual combat mission flight profile is going to consume additional fuel.  That 350 nm radius now becomes 260 nm, maybe?

Of course, if the aircraft expends ordnance at the target, the aircraft’s weight decreases which improves the fuel efficiency on the return leg.  Also, as fuel is burned, the aircraft becomes lighter, further improving fuel efficiency and that 260 nm radius becomes 290 nm, maybe?

So, we see that combat radius is totally dependent on the specific conditions of the combat mission.  The point is that the published range/radius is generally significantly unrealistic.  Nowhere is this more evident than in discussing the much-hyped and much-lied about F-35.  You know those ranges are works of fiction!

So, is that the end of the discussion?  No, not by a long shot!

The problem is further compounded by actual carrier aircraft operating procedures.  Aircraft don’t actually launch with a full load of fuel, go out, execute their mission, and return, all on one load of fuel.  Instead, the aircraft usually launch with a partial fuel load and top off over the carrier, after launch.  Additionally, they are often partially refueled during the return leg and/or at the carrier for recovery.  Making the issue more complicated is that fact that aircraft don’t usually take off and immediately begin flying straight to the target – they take off and marshal at some point waiting for the rest of the strike package to launch and assemble.  This waiting burns more fuel.  The assembly point may also include a partial refueling. 

So, what does combat radius refer to?  Is it the radius after having launched and refueled and factoring in a return refueling or two?  If so, then the combat radius can be any distance you want just by adding in more refuelings!  When the Navy cites a combat radius of xxx nm, do they mean the radius with the benefit of multiple refuelings because that’s what a typical mission consists of?

Carrier aircraft rarely fly “unrefueled” missions so citing an unrefueled radius is a combination of unrealistic, pointless, meaningless, and confusing.  Yikes!

So how do we usefully compare the combat radius of one aircraft to another?  We intuitively know that aircraft differ in their inherent “range” but how do we compare the differences?  Well, for practical purposes, we can’t.  About the best we can do is get our hands on flight manuals and extract specific range numbers (nm miles per pound of fuel) under a specific set of conditions.  This will give us directly comparable fuel efficiency numbers which will reveal which aircraft is more fuel efficient and from that we can infer, and calculate, actual combat radii.  But, even that isn’t the end of the story.

Different aircraft fly different types of missions.  An air superiority fighter flies a different mission and flight profile than a strike aircraft so trying to compare combat radius at a single, arbitrary set of conditions is pointless and unrealistic. 

Further, different aircraft have different fuel efficiencies under different conditions.  Some aircraft are optimized for lower level flight while others are optimized for higher level flight.  How do we compare those?  Again, we really can’t.  The best we can do is try to compare apples and apples.  We can’t meaningfully compare the combat radius of an A-10 low level close air support plane to the combat radius of a high altitude F-22 air superiority fighter.  We can, however, compare the F-35C to the F-18E if we specify the mission, weapons load, and flight profile – assuming we can get our hands on NATOPS flight data.

What’s the overall conclusion from this discussion aside from the realization that published range/radius values are virtually meaningless?  The conclusion is to assume the published range/radius numbers are maximum and unrealistic values that would only be obtained under unrealistic, non-operational conditions.  If you want an “actual” operational combat radius, take 60% of the published figure and you’ll be somewhere in the realm of an actual combat mission radius.

So, did that clear things up?  Yeah, I didn’t think so but it’s the best we can do.  Hopefully, it will at least allow you to more intelligently discuss combat “range” in the future and more realistically assess published values.

On a related note, this discussion makes the published range/radius values for the SH and F-35 all the more disappointing when compared to the actual Pacific theater requirements.  It also emphasizes the need for an operationally effective tanker.  Above all, though, it clearly points out the need to build aircraft that are inherently longer ranged.  When we're talking about thousand mile A2/AD zones, it quickly becomes obvious that the F-18 and F-35 are both woefully short on their useful combat radii.

Super Hornet Conformal Fuel Tanks

As the Navy is forced to get more service out of its F-18 Hornets, here’s a bit of simple technology that could add a surprising amount of capability to existing Super Hornets:  conformal fuel tanks (CFT).  The nice thing about the CFTs is that they don’t need to be 

Super Hornet Conformal Fuel Tanks Atop Wing and Fuselage

hung from pylons which use up available hardpoint attachments.  Instead, they are bolted to the airframe along the upper wing and fuselage.

“The CFTs sit atop the upper fuselage on either side of the central spine and run 24 ft. in length from the aft cockpit to the leading edge of each vertical tail. At 4.3 ft. wide at the broadest point, the CFTs hug the upper fuselage surface, rising to a maximum height of only 1.8 ft. just forward of the wing leading edge.” (1)

Just for fun, using the maximum dimensions gives an internal tank volume of

24 ft x 4.3 ft x 1.8 ft = 186 cu.ft. = 1389 gal = 9445 lbs (6.8 lbs per gal of JP-5)

For a pair of tanks, that gives 2778 gal or 18,890 lbs.

Using more realistic average dimensions gives an internal tank volume of

24 ft x 3.5 ft x 1 ft = 84 cu.ft. = 628 gal = 4270 lbs

For a pair of tanks, that gives 1256 gal or 8540 lbs.

In point of fact, the CFT’s are reported to carry 3500 lbs of fuel per tank (2) which agrees reasonably closely with our estimate of 4270 lbs.  So, 3500 lbs it appears to be.

The tanks apparently produce a slight decrease in overall drag.

“We knew it was essentially a zero-drag configuration and, although there was no content in the tanks, we could measure drag through fuel flow. We actually saw a little better performance, as it improves transonic transition.” (1)

“The CFTs add no drag to the aircraft at subsonic speed; at transonic or supersonic speeds they produce less drag than a centerline fuel tank …” (4)

The tanks weigh 870 lbs each, empty (1) and add 260 nm to the aircraft’s range and 130 nm to its combat radius for a total combat radius of 700 nm (3).  Combat radius claims are always suspect but that CFT’s add to the radius without using up hardpoints or requiring external fuel tanks is a significant benefit.

The tanks can be retrofitted to existing aircraft.

“The CFT …  is designed to be retrofittable for new-build aircraft. “The intent is to be able to install it in a shift,” says Walke [Bob Walke, Northrop Grumman F/A-18 programs director and chief engineer]. The CFT bolts onto the structure at three attachment points per side, which are designed to keep loads isolated from the rest of the structure and vice versa.” (1)

Development of the tanks was rapid.

“Northrop says the prototype units went from “napkin to first flight” in just 10 months. “The effort began in 2010 with low-level trade study work until 2012, when the decision was made to make a prototype happen quickly,” says Walke. Following a go-ahead in September 2012, the tank design was completed in January 2013, assembly began in May, delivery started in early July and flight tests on a leased F/A-18 were underway in August.” (1)

CFT’s supposedly offer a decrease in overall signature, enhancing stealth.

“The conformal fuel tanks are aerodynamically designed to help the F/A-18 have a lower detectability or signature. Boeing officials have said the conformal fuel tanks reduce the signature of the aircraft by over 50 percent.” (2)

“Enhancements to the aircraft’s radar cross section, including the EWP [enclosed weapons pod], produced a 50-percent improvement in its frontal low-observable (LO) signature.” (4)

I’ve read reports that suggest that the Super Hornet is the third most stealthy aircraft in the US inventory behind the F-22 and F-35.  I don’t know if that’s true and I’ve been unable to confirm it.

Conformal Fuel Tanks

So, a simple CFT adds range, decreases drag, decreases overall signature, can be retrofitted to existing Super Hornets, and is production ready (1).  Honestly, this improvement seems like a no-brainer.  I’m unsure why the Navy hasn’t moved forward with this.

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(1)Aviation Week website, “Upgrade Of F/A-18 Fuel Tank Gains Ground -

Conformal fuel tank attracts Navy interest as part of possible Super Hornet upgrade”, Guy Norris, Dec 16, 2013,

http://aviationweek.com/awin/upgrade-fa-18-fuel-tank-gains-ground

(2)Military.com website, “Navy Tests Stealth-Like Features for Super Hornet”, Kris Osborn, 15-Jul-2014,

http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/07/15/navy-tests-stealth-like-features-for-super-hornet.html

(3)Global Aerospace Solutions Website, “The F/A-18 Advanced Super Hornet”, James Wynbrandt, date unspecified,

http://www.abdonline.com/news-analysis/defense/the-fa-18-advanced-super-hornet/#.V79jHdTytxA

(4)ainonline website, “Boeing Pitches ‘Advanced Super Hornet’ For Future Threats”, Bill Carey, 15-Nov-2013,

http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2013-11-15/boeing-pitches-advanced-super-hornet-future-threats

Upgrade Versus New Design Example

Many discussions about aircraft, in general, and the F-35, in particular, wind up debating the merits of upgrades to existing aircraft versus new designs.  People wind up throwing around claims, for and against each option, with little data or facts to back them up.

For example, here’s a collection of reasons why we “can’t” upgrade existing aircraft.

• It would take just as long to do a major upgrade as to design a new aircraft.
• Upgrades won’t be as effective as a new design.
• It would cost as much to do an upgrade as a new design, if not more.
• We need to do new designs to support the industrial base.

What data is there that supports or refutes upgrades versus new designs?  Well, there’s not a lot of directly comparable data and what there is, is often subject to interpretation.  There is, however, one directly comparable, contemporary case study for us to look at:  the F-18 upgrade from the Hornet to the Super Hornet versus the new design F-35.

For starters, both actually happened and they occurred at about the same time.  Here’s a quick review of the chronology.

	Super Hornet	F-35
Contract Award	1992	1996
First Flight	1995	2006
Low Rate Production	1997	2007
Full Production	1997	waiting
Entered Fleet	2000	waiting

The Super Hornet entered the fleet 8 years from contract award and has been serving on the front line of carrier aviation for the subsequent 16 years. 

In contrast, after 8 years, the F-35 was still a couple of years away from its first flight and has yet to enter the fleet, 20 years after contract award!  It’s 20 years since contract award and we have yet to get any service from the F-35.

During those 20 years, and counting, the Hornet has evolved, gained capabilities, provided actual service, and an even more advanced design, the Advanced Super Hornet, has been developed by the manufacturer without cost to the taxpayer.  Even better, the Hornet accomplished all this at a tiny, tiny fraction of the cost of the F-35. 

In short, the Hornet has dropped bombs in combat.  The F-35 has simply bombed.

What is it that we’re waiting for from the F-35 that is supposed to make it so special?  Apparently, it’s the 360 degree sensing.  Had that been implemented and in operation 15 years ago, it might well have been special for that time.  Today, though, retrofits, add-ons, and pods are providing every aircraft with that capability to greater or lesser degrees.  In fact, the F-35’s EO/IR sensing is now considered to be behind the technology curve and will be solidly mediocre by the time the aircraft enters service in another five years or so (if then!).  This is what happens when a design, however good, takes 20-25 years to implement.  What was cutting edge technology when the design was first envisioned becomes pedestrian over [extended] developmental time.

What will be the result of the F-35 program when it eventually enters service?  The result will be an aircraft that is behind the technology curve, is matched or exceeded by enemy aircraft, is an ill fit for the intended mission (for the Navy, at any rate), and is rapidly approaching obsolescence.  The Navy is already looking for alternatives and the Air Force is already pushing the next generation aircraft. 

The F-35’s time came and went while it languished in development.

This is a clear case of the upgrade having proven to be the far superior path.  The latest Super Hornet provides 80% or so of the F-35’s theoretical capabilities and it’s been in service for 16 years.  I’d much rather have 80%, in service for 16 years than 100%, in service for zero years.

We talk about perfect being the enemy of good enough.  These two aircraft make up the poster for that saying.

This also illustrates quite clearly the wisdom of restricting non-existent technology development to the R&D realm.  Had we concentrated on the Super Hornet upgrade path and restricted the F-35 to R&D, we would have saved enormous sums of money, had an even more functional Super Hornet, and still could have had the F-35 if it ever pans out or we would have been willing to cancel the F-35 because it would have been just another R&D program that didn’t work out rather than a world wide jobs program that became too big to fail.

This kind of common sense wisdom is painfully obvious to most of us and it really speaks poorly of Navy leadership who not only made bad decisions but, unbelievably, continue to make the same bad decisions over and over again, in the face of all evidence that the decisions are wrong, regarding concurrency in production and the dependence on non-existent technology as the foundation of a production program.  Navy leadership is proving, on a daily basis, that they are truly incompetent on a scale that defies belief.

IRST

The Navy is developing an Infrared Search And Track (IRST) sensor as a means of producing passive, infrared target location and tracking with accuracy sufficient for weapon guidance.  This would be useful for combat while remaining “stealthy” and not broadcasting with one’s own radar and for operating in an electromagnetically challenged environment where normal radar operation is degraded.  The system is initially intended for the F-18 Hornet.

DOT&E has reported its assessment of the IRST in the 2015 Annual Report.

“The system tested in OA 1 [ed., Operational Assessment 1, conducted in 2014] could not detect and track targets well enough to support weapons employment in an environment that reflects realistic fighter employment and tactics.”

Disturbingly, the unit’s basic design criteria is questionable, according to DOT&E.

“The Key Performance Parameter (KPP) and the derived contract specification for detection and tracking describe only a narrow subset of the operational environments where the Navy will employ IRST. Meeting the KPP (with a narrow reading of the KPP requirement) does not ensure a useful combat capability.”

Who came up with the initial spec????

IRST Mounted in Nose of Fuel Tank

Despite this, the Navy granted approval to enter into Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP).  This is a growing trend in the Navy, to accept products that fail to meet specs or fail to demonstrate useful combat capabilities.  Why are we building and buying a product that is not yet useful?

IRST Fuel Tank Mount

All of that aside, an IRST ought to offer a much needed capability for very little impact on aircraft performance (the IRST is mounted in the nose of the centerline fuel tank so fuel/range will be slightly reduced).  This is just one more incremental improvement that will help keep the Hornet viable.  I just wish the Navy would complete development before entering into production.  This is concurrency, again, which will require the initial IRST’s to be remanufactured, eventually.

Update:  This is why the DOT&E is so important and why there is tension between the Navy and DOT&E.  The Navy is entering into LRIP even though DOT&E testing shows the IRST to be of very questionable combat value.  If DOT&E didn't exist, we'd never know about the problems until combat revealed them and the Navy would have already committed to full scale production of a marginally useful system.  Why the Navy insists on putting badly flawed and substandard systems into full production is beyond me.

The Navy Punts on UCLASS and Carriers

Well, the Navy has decided the role of the aircraft carrier for the next couple of decades.  Is it a deep strike platform using long legged strike aircraft whether manned or unmanned?  Is it an air superiority platform to carve out large swaths of airspace from enemy control in order to support Air Force deep strike bombers?  Is it an escort platform to protect Burke Tomahawk shooters as they sail to their launch positions?  All of these are potentially viable roles depending on the overall strategy being undertaken.  So, what’s the Navy’s choice?

Ahhhh …….   They punted.  They opted for none of the above.

As reported by Breaking Defense website, the Navy has decided that the UCLASS is dead.  In its place the Navy will pursue a non-stealthy, unmanned tanker, more Super Hornet E/F’s, and more F-35Cs (1).  ComNavOps has no problem with dropping the UCLASS.  I’ve doubted its feasibility and applaud the decision.  The problem lies with the other actions that the Navy is now committing to.  Let’s look a bit closer at what this means.

On the plus side, the Navy desperately needs a dedicated tanker.  Using Super Hornets, the front line strike fighter, as a tanker was an example of stupidity of monumental proportions.  At least now the 4-6 Hornets being used as tankers on each carrier will be able to return to being combat aircraft.

The decision to purchase more F/A-18E/Fs is a place holder decision.  It accomplishes nothing.  It doesn’t move the combat needle forward.  It’s just more of what we have.  The Hornets are a solid, capable aircraft at the moment but will become increasingly outclassed as China and Russia continue to produce new, top end aircraft.  Worse, the Hornet is short ranged and buying more just solidifies the air wing’s inadequacies, especially in the Pacific.

Buying more F-35C’s is doubling down on an already bad bet.  We’ve beaten this poor horse to death but the F-35 has neither the range to operate effectively in a thousand mile A2/AD zone, the weapon carrying capacity to fight other stealth aircraft, nor the maneuverability and combat characteristics to be an air superiority fighter.  To paraphrase, it’s a jack(ass) of all trades – bad at everything and good at nothing.  It’s a misfit for the roles that the carrier should be performing.

We’ll now have a carrier with an air wing that is short ranged, not very stealthy, can’t establish air superiority, and has no long range strike capability.  So what can the carrier do?  Well, that’s the $14B purchase price question for the Ford and subsequent carriers, isn’t it?

These capabilities describe a carrier and air wing that is limited to low intensity, third world operations.  In a high end fight against a peer, our carriers will be marginal contributors with this air wing.  This leads inexorably to the question, “Are carriers worth the cost, anymore?”  I can no longer say yes.

Well, that takes care of the problems but it’s easy to criticize.  What’s the solution?  What should the Navy have done?

The answer begins with the deep strike mission.  After all, strike is how you win wars.  The UCLASS two thousand mile, deep penetration, autonomous, super stealthy unmanned miracle aircraft is just a fantasy that is technologically unachievable, as yet, and would just have become the next F-35 – decades overdue, technologically failing, and utterly unaffordable.  So, where does that leave us?

There are only two sources of long range strike:  Air Force bombers and cruise/ballistic missiles.  We’re talking about the Navy’s role so that means cruise/ballistic missiles which, at the moment, means Burke and submarine Tomahawks with their barely adequate thousand mile range.  Thus, there is no high end combat strike role for the carrier.  That means the carrier exists to escort and protect the Burke shooters and to establish air superiority in support of the Air Force.  To do that requires a top end, long range, air superiority fighter.  Unfortunately, that is not the Hornet or the F-35.  Buying more Hornets and F-35s simply extends the lack of capability further into the future.

What should the Navy do?  The Navy should drop the F-35 and procure the Advanced Super Hornet (ASH).  That would at least move the combat needle forward a bit and provide a bridge to a new design air superiority fighter.  The ASH offers increased range, conformal tanks, improved stealth, better avionics and sensors, etc.  The bits of the F-35 and other aircraft that have been proved out, like radars, sensors, and weapons, can be incorporated into the ASH.  It doesn’t get us to an F-22-like performance but it improves on the Super Hornet and, unlike the F-35, is already available and nowhere near as expensive.  It buys time to develop a new design fighter while improving air wing capability.

Advanced Super Hornet

 A new design air superiority fighter should be akin to the F-22 but the main design emphasis has to be achievability.  Every function and capability must already exist.  Trying to develop a ship or aircraft that depends on non-existent technology is how we got the LCS, Ford, and F-35 fiascos.  Beyond that, the aircraft must have great range and a large weapon payload.  Payload is paramount given that we’ve already identified that shooting down stealth aircraft will require many missiles per kill.  Limited payload is one of the major weaknesses of the F-35.  As we’ve stated, stealth versus stealth air combat may well devolve into classic eyeball dogfights so maneuverability is mandatory.  In short, a new design air superiority fighter needs to be all the things that the F-35 isn’t. 

If we can stick to existing technology and maintain a sharp focus on the mission and nothing more, we should be able to field production aircraft in 5 years.  The reason the F-35 is taking so long is that its technology is non-existent.  The F-35 program isn’t trying to simply verify existing technology, it’s attempting to develop brand new technology while testing.  Of course that takes forever!

The unmanned tanker is fine if it can be procured cheaply.  That would offer valuable incremental experience in operating unmanned, presumably autonomous, aircraft on and around the carrier.

At the same time, the Navy needs to develop a supersonic, stealthy, longer ranged Tomahawk replacement and an intermediate range (2000-3000 miles) ballistic missile.

Finally, if the Navy thinks long range, unmanned strike aircraft are the way to go (and I have severe doubts about that), then they can work on it as a strictly research project.

A carrier that is only able to operate in low end combat is not worth the $14B price tag.  If the Navy won’t upgrade the air wing then we need to get out of the supercarrier business and revert to small carriers for handling the low end, “peacetime” tasks like plinking terrorist pickup trucks.

If the Navy wants to remain a credible high end combat force then it needs to understand the role of the carrier and being redesigning the air wing to support that role.

(1)Breaking Defense, “Good-Bye, UCLASS; Hello, Unmanned Tanker, More F-35Cs In 2017 Budget”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Feb 01, 2016,

http://breakingdefense.com/2016/02/good-bye-uclass-hello-unmanned-tanker-more-f-35cs-in-2017-budget/

Hornet Upgrades

As we’re all painfully aware, the F-35 has been in development for two decades and is still years away from front line service in any effective manner (notwithstanding the Marine Corps’ PR stunt proclaiming a fictional IOC).  The danger with such a protracted development is that by the time the aircraft reaches squadron service, its technologies may be obsolete.  Most of us recognize this danger and worriedly track Chinese and Russian aviation developments to see what capabilities they’ll have when the F-35 enters service.  However, there is another F-35 “enemy” whose technological capabilities should have been vastly overmatched by the F-35 but are rapidly catching up and may surpass the F-35.  Who is that enemy?  It’s the F-18 Hornet.  Yes, the lowly, basic, non-stealthy Hornet is rapidly gaining capabilities to rival or surpass the F-35. 

We know about the Advanced Super Hornet with conformal fuel tanks that would add 260 miles to the combat radius according to flight testing, enhanced stealth with a 50% reduction in frontal RCS, longer range, advanced cockpit avionics, and an enclosed weapons pod.  What else is being done to improve the Hornet?  Well, here are a couple of new technologies.

Harris Corp., Government Communications Systems Division, has received a $29M contract for the procurement of 138 Distributed Targeting System (DTS) kits for F/A-18E/F and EA-18G (1).   DTS provides enhanced targeting capability for the Super Hornet. It is part of the U.S. Navy’s F/A-18E/F Network Centric Warfare Upgrades program and the F/A-18E/F Flight Plan, which is intended to ensure that the Super Hornet remains ahead of emerging threats in coming decades.

DTS increases pilot and aircrew situational awareness and precision targeting when engaging air-to-ground targets, in part by using geo-registration technology.  Geo-registration technology compares images taken from tactical sensors with an onboard imagery database to produce highly accurate target coordinates.

From a Flight Global website article (2),

"The distributed targeting system allows you to self-generate GPS-quality mensurated coordinates onboard the airplane autonomously," Morley [Captain Frank Morley, Program Manager for the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G] says.

“That means that the Super Hornet will be able to use coordinates generated by its sensors, for example its Raytheon APG-79 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar or its Raytheon AN/ASQ-228 Advanced Targeting Forward-Looking Infrared (ATFLIR) pod, and compare that to a precise onboard imagery database to generate precise weapons quality coordinates.”

Now doesn’t that sound a lot like the F-35’s vaunted sensor fusion technology?  The biggest difference is that the DTS is being produced today rather than being just a never-ending developmental project.

In addition to the DTS, the Hornet has an Infrared Search and Track (IRST) sensor in the works.  IRST is a passive, long-range sensor that searches for and detects heat sources.  The system can simultaneously track multiple targets and provides air-to-air targeting capability.  Being a passive sensor, IRST does not give off radiation and is harder to detect as well as being immune to radar jamming.

“Meanwhile, the Boeing is about one year into a development program to field a new infrared search and track (IRST) pod that should be fielded on the Super Hornet fleet by late 2016, Morley says. Developed in conjunction with Lockheed Martin, the new sensor is an evolution of the Northrop Grumman F-14D Tomcat's AN/AAS-42 IRST camera. Boeing upgraded the Tomcat's camera technology for foreign F-15 sales, Morley says. The variant of the sensor that will be added to the Super Hornet is a further development of Boeing's F-15 developments.”

“For the Super Hornet, the USN opted for a podded-solution. A pod avoids retrofit costs, Morley says. An internal system would require modifications to the aircraft's outer mold-line and avionics hardware changes, which would require extensive testing. Nor does the USN need the pod for every mission, Morley says. The IRST is only required for air-to-air focused missions like fleet air defence or air superiority. As such, the USN will only buy about 170 pods, which it will use only as needed, Morley says.

One of the unique design features of the new IRST pod is that it is built into an external fuel tank. Because the aircraft's centerline station is the optimum position for the IRST pod, it has to take the place of the Super Hornet's ever-present drop-tank.

In order to preserve the Super Hornet's range, the USN opted to have the sensor built into the forward half of the fuel tank. That way, some two-thirds of the fuel is still available for use.” (2)

IRST completed its first flight aboard an F/A-18 Super Hornet in February.

Further planned upgrades also sound like the F-35 sensor fusion (2).

“…one of the most important planned capabilities will be better multi-sensor integration (MSI). The aircraft will eventually be able to correlate all of the disparate information generated by the radar, ATFLIR, electronic warfare systems and data-links into one clear tactical picture …”

A Global Aviation website report sums up the Hornet’s development (3),

“Other F/A-18E/F Super Hornet next-generation capabilities included in the flight plan are advanced fused sensors, Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar, Counter Electronic Attack (CEA), Distributed Targeting System (DTS), Multi-sensor Integration (MSI), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), IP-Based Linked Networks and advanced air-to-ground and air-to-air precision weapons operating on an open-architecture backplane.”

Again, the key difference between the F-35 and these Hornet technologies is that the Hornet’s are in production or nearly so and are being fitted to capable, combat ready aircraft.  By the time the F-35 is ready, it may find itself struggling to keep up with the Hornet rather than the other way around.

(1)http://www.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=5575

(2)Flight Global Website, “USN developing new Super Hornet upgrades”, Dave Majumdar, 28-May-2012

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usn-developing-new-super-hornet-upgrades-372392/

(3)Global Aviation Report, “Navy’s IRST System Successfully Completes First Flight Aboard F/A-18”, February 19, 2014

http://globalaviationreport.com/2014/02/19/navys-irst-system-successfully-completes-first-flight-aboard-fa-18/