Sea Control

The term, ‘Sea Control’, is an oft cited phrase that is used to justify all manner of ships and operations.  The problem with ‘Sea Control’, however, is that everyone who discusses it has a different idea of what it is.  Is it any wonder, then, that no two ‘Sea Control’ discussions draw the same conclusions?

 

Note:  This post is inspired by comments from many people, most recently reader ‘Lazarus’ who offered this comment that prompted me to think about ‘Sea Control’ definitions and what that might mean for ship/carrier designs.(2)  My thanks to all of you!

 

Here’s a few of the more common definitions/descriptions of Sea Control (SC):

 

ASW – This view sees SC as more akin to an anti-submarine, hunter-killer function.  It is an undersea, sea control concept and, as such depends on uncontested aerial dominance to be successful.  This concept typically envisions a helo-centric carrier with a few fixed wing aircraft added in for supposed air supremacy.  As a pure ASW task force, this has validity but the broader view of an ASW sea control group that also engages in other naval dominance activities is highly suspect given the lack of firepower.

 

Anti-Surface – This view envisions SC groups sweeping the oceans, looking for enemy naval forces and engaging them to eliminate the enemy’s navy.  This concept typically envisions a converted amphibious ship operating a fixed wing group of 1-2 dozen AV-8/F-35B aircraft.  Alternatively, a full Nimitz/Ford carrier has been mentioned as the SC element although this would seem to be simply a carrier task force.

 

Patrol – This view has the SC group ‘patrolling’ (whatever that means) around an area and presumably attacking whatever it comes across thereby establishing local dominance.  There is a suggestion in most such descriptions that the SC group would operate around the periphery of a conflict which, in turn, suggests that the main function would be almost tantamount to blockading and would be largely focused on anti-merchant shipping.  This concept typically envisions some kind of hybrid cruiser-carrier and requires total air control to be successful.

 

Convoy – This view envisions a small carrier operating as a convoy escort providing ASW and AAW protection.  This concept typically envisions using a WWII escort type carrier.

 

Nebulous – This is, honestly, the most prevalent view and is characterized by a lack of any specifics beyond the vague notion of establishing some sort of local naval dominance.  Proponents tend to be much more concerned with the type of sea control ship (usually a smaller, specialized carrier of some sort) rather than the actual use/mission.

 

 

SC enthusiasts have put forth ideas for ship designs and group compositions that cover a range of concepts including small, specialized escort carriers, dedicated ASW carriers, modified LHA amphibious ships, hybrid cruiser/carriers, and full size Nimitz/Fords.  Quite a range!  The range of ship concepts reflects the lack of a standardized definition of Sea Control and lack of a concrete mission/role.

 

How does the military define SC?  From Joint Publication 3-32,

 

Sea control may include naval cooperation and guidance for shipping, protection of sea lines of communications, air lines of communications, blockades, embargoes against economic or military shipping, and maritime interception operations (MIO). (1)

 

Well, that’s not very helpful.  That’s just a very vague definition of what a navy does and is much more focused on peacetime patrol operations than actual war.

 

 

 

Honestly, the only reasonable conclusion is that there is no such thing as sea control and that the phrase is just a buzzword used to justify someone’s idea of a hybrid carrier or small naval group – in other words, the phrase ‘sea control’ is used to describe equipment rather than a role or mission.

 

Well, before we give up on sea control, let’s give it some more thought.

 

If ‘sea control’ is legitimate then what are we controlling?  Most of the sea, most of the time, is empty.  There aren’t that many naval forces around.  Even in the Pacific in WWII, how many actual naval battles were fought?  Not that many.  That suggests that having a standing sea control group patrolling around a given area is generally pointless.

 

Of the entire Pacific Ocean in WWII, how often was any given square mile of water occupied by an enemy vessel?  I’d guess somewhere around 0.000000001% of the time.  Again, that suggests that having a standing sea control group patrolling around a given area is generally pointless.

 

Consider the WWII naval battles that did occur.  How many were a total surprise to both sides?  I’m guessing around none.  Given the highly predictable strategies on both sides and the intel from various sources (scouting, code breaking, coast watching, signal analysis, etc.), both sides were generally aware of where and when the other’s naval forces would appear.  On those occasions, task forces were assembled and sent to engage but, of course, that’s a short, specific mission, not sea control, at least not as the term is being discussed here.  Again, that suggests that having a standing sea control group patrolling around a given area is generally pointless.

 

Now, let’s consider the idea of a SC group lounging around some area in the general vicinity of, say, the first island chain during a war with China.  Given the ranges of today’s various anti-ship weapons, the density of various ISR sources, and the presumed weakness of a sea control group’s AAW defenses, is it really safe/wise for a lightly armed group to be loitering around a war zone?  There are many naval observers who doubt that even a full-fledged carrier group can survive in a modern war zone (they’re wrong but, I digress …).  If that’s true, what chance would a SC group have of surviving long enough to be effective?  Logically, then, a SC group would either have to operate so far from the active war zone as to be irrelevant or would be quickly detected and destroyed if operating near an active war zone.

 

 

Conclusion

 

Sea control, as a phrase, appears to be much like ‘littoral’ which was used to justify new ships for the Navy despite there not actually being any such thing as littoral naval requirements (see, “Littoral Warfare – Is There Such A Thing?”).  The phrase ‘sea control’ has no useful, valid definition and has no specific mission associated with it.  It is used to justify fanciful ship designs rather than describing a viable, bona fide mission or role.  In fact, there does not appear to be any readily identifiable and relevant mission or role that we could label sea control.  Further, historical evidence from WWII strongly suggests that there is no justification for a SC group regardless of what mission/role it would be attempting.

 

I just can’t give the concept any credence.

 

 

 

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(1)Joint Publication 3-32, “Joint Maritime Operations”, 16-Dec-2020

 

(2)https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2021/09/so-much-wrong-here.html?showComment=1631901113856#c9136375796920066069

Littoral Regiment Combat Team

The Commandant’s latest idea is Littoral Regiment Combat Teams (LRCT).  What is a Littoral Regiment Combat Team?  From a Marine Corps Times website article,

The new Marine Littoral Regiment will be comprised of roughly 1,800 to 2,000 Marines and sailors, but the final design of the new unit is still under consideration, according to MCCDC [Marine Corps Combat Development Command]. In comparison 3rd Marine Regiment is roughly 3,400 Marines and sailors. (1)

The LRCT is intended to operate inside enemy territory and enemy controlled waters.

The littoral regiment combat team is “designed to provide the basis for employing multiple platoon-reinforced-size expeditionary advance base sites that can host and enable a variety of missions such as long-range anti-ship fires, forward arming and refueling of aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of key maritime terrain, and air-defense and early warning,” MCCDC said in an emailed statement. (1)

This statement also indicates what size the small, secret sea control units will be: ‘platoon-reinforced-size’.  That’s right, Marine platoons will establish control of the seas.  No need for the Navy or large, powerful ships with crews of hundreds or thousands – a platoon with a few missiles can do the job.

This also suggests that the LRCT will have no function, itself, other than to provide the detachments for the platoon size sea control units.  It seems unlikely (to be fair, the Commandant’s entire scheme seems unlikely and yet …) that an entire regiment would be formed whose only purpose is to be broken up to provide penny packets of small units.  Will we see some further assignment of responsibility for the LRCT in the future?

Where did the idea of the LRCT come from?

The term came up in a panel discussion at the Surface Navy Association annual symposium in Arlington, Virginia, on Jan. 15, when Wise [Maj. Gen. Mark Wise, deputy commanding general of Marine Corps Combat Development Command] was answering questions about how the Corps would go about building new formations to fight better alongside the Navy. (2)

Is this the end of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) which has been the cornerstone of the Marines for decades?

In October 2019, Brig. Gen. Benjamin Watson said that the Corps was “no longer going to stick or take an uncompromising position on the sanctity of the MAGTF,” while speaking at the National Defense Industrial Association’s Expeditionary Warfare Conference in Annapolis, Maryland.

“If what is needed is a piece of the Marine Corps that is not organized like a MAGTF or a capability the Marine Corps can bring that is not a MAGTF, then we are not too proud to provide that,” he said. (2)

So, not only are the Marines dumping tanks, artillery, and mortars but also the MAGTF organization although the MAGTFs may hang on for a while as the transition to LRCTs occurs.

Just thinking out loud, here, but if all you need is a handful of platoon size units, how do you justify a Marine Corps of 180,000 plus all its equipment?  How many of these LRCTs do you need?  It seems like you can get quite a few platoons from just one LRCT.  There seems to be a real disconnect with this Commandant.  His stated vision is that a handful of platoons can win a war with China and yet he seems to want to keep a nearly full size Marine Corps.  Which is it, Commandant, a handful of platoons or a full Corps?  Are there still more secret plans coming?  And, if you want to maintain a full Corps, what responsibilities will the rest of the Corps have given that they have no tanks and little artillery?  It seems they’ll be limited to minor raids and very low end combat.  Again, it would be hard to justify a 180,000 man Corps with these kinds of limited missions.

A Chinese agent couldn’t inflict the damage to the Corps that this Commandant is doing. 

At some point, we’re going to see Marines start to vote with their feet and leave the Corps.  We’re going to wind up with a Marine Corps consisting of new recruits who have no clue and a handful of old-timers just riding out the last few years until retirement. 

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(1)Marine Corps Times website, “New Marine Littoral Regiment, designed to fight in contested maritime environment, coming to Hawaii”, Shawn Snow, 14-May-2020,

https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2020/05/14/new-marine-littoral-regiment-designed-to-fight-in-contested-maritime-environment-coming-to-hawaii/

(2)Marine Corps Times website, “New Corps formation: Marine littoral regiment may be how the Corps fights future battles”, Todd South, 29-Jan-2020,

https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2020/01/29/new-corps-formation-marine-littoral-regiment-may-be-how-the-corps-fights-future-battles/

Marine Defense Battalions

You probably recognize that the Marine Corps Commandant’s land-based sea control units are, essentially, just a repeat of the WWII Marine Defense Battalions (MDB) which were created in 1939 to defend island bases against Japanese invasions and to provide coastal defense for forward bases.  Eventually, 20 MDBs were formed and dispersed across dozens of island locations.  Despite the name, the MDBs were not, actually, battalions but were closer to regiments or companies in size.

MDBs used coastal artillery guns and anti-aircraft guns to carry out their mission.  From Wikipedia, a MDB 1939 table of organization and equipment (TOE) included: (2)

• HQ Company
• Service battery - Six platoons, each with a searchlight and aircraft sound locator
• Coast Defense Group - Three batteries, each with two Mark 15 5"/51 caliber guns
• Antiaircraft Group - Four AAA gun batteries, each with four mobile 3-inch M3 guns;  two AAA machine gun companies, each with 24 Browning M2 water-cooled .50-caliber machine guns on AA mounts;  two beach protection machine gun companies, each with 24 Browning M1917A1 water-cooled .30-caliber machine guns

Does any of this sound familiar?  Substitute missiles for artillery and you have, almost exactly, Commandant Berger’s island-based sea control units.

So, how did these MDBs fare in combat?  The short answer is that none succeeded.  Every island the Japanese attacked to start WWII, they successfully seized.  The only notable, momentary, success occurred at Wake Island where the 1^st MDB with 399 personnel (compare this to the Commandant’s vision of platoon size units) used six 5” guns to repel the first Japanese assault which consisted of 2 light cruisers, 6 destroyers, and 450 troops – a remarkably small assault force.  The Marine’s coastal artillery guns sank one destroyer.  F4F Wildcat aircraft sank another destroyer and the Japanese retreated.  Two weeks later, the Japanese returned with a heavier force and seized the island in just over one day.

At Guadalcanal, the MDB went ashore but did little.

[3^rd] Marine Defense Battalion protected the beaches within the Guadalcanal perimeter, but did little more than fend off infiltrators, since the main Japanese counterlandings were all away from the perimeter and unopposed. (4)

And so it went.

As WWII progressed, MDBs were assigned to bases across the Pacific where most languished and did nothing.  The majority of MDBs were eventually reclassified as anti-aircraft units when it became apparent that the Japanese were no longer capable of conducting assaults or naval attacks.

A summary of the MDBs and their WWII service can be found in the links below (2, 3).

So, recognizing the marked similarity between the MDBs and the Commandant’s sea control units, what lessons and conclusions can we draw from the WWII MDBs?

Marine Defense Battalion 5" Gun

Mission.  There is a distinct difference between the MDBs and the Commandant’s sea control units.  The MDBs were defensive and were intended to hold and defend bases whereas the Commandant’s units are not intended to hold territory but, rather, to exert sea control over the surrounding region.  Yes, one could argue that exerting sea control is a form of defense but that’s getting into semantics.  The salient point is that the MDBs could not retreat or move when faced with an enemy whereas the sea control units are, doctrinally, intended to relocate rapidly from place to place when threatened (we’ll ignore the impossibility of doing so for the sake of discussion).

Success and Size.  The MDBs had almost no success and the primary reason was that they were too small to accomplish anything.  An MDB consisted of the equipment listed above and a total of three or four hundred rifle troops.  The Commandant’s small sea control platoon size units are even smaller – much, much smaller.  The envisioned Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) would have a troop capacity of around 75.  That’s simply far too small to survive any type of attack.  The only hope the sea control units have of success lies in somehow being able to magically remain undetected while launching missiles or being able to instantaneously relocate to a new, hidden location, while, again, remaining undetected.  This seems decidedly unlikely.

Forward Basing.  A key difference between the MDBs and the sea control units is that the MDBs were deployed to islands and bases in waters that we controlled whereas the sea control units are envisioned to deploy to secret, hidden bases deep inside enemy waters.  As we’ve repeatedly pointed out, no one has yet explained how a painfully slow, non-stealthy, short ranged LAW will be able to penetrate deep inside enemy waters while remaining undetected.  It is worth noting that the MDB forward basing concept proved to be worthless with the MDBs either failing when exposed to enemy attack or sitting idle on islands that the enemy couldn’t reach because they were in waters under our control.

Secrecy.  The MDBs were not secret, hidden units.  Their existence and presence was well known to the enemy.  Operating units with large artillery guns in secret was not a reality then nor is our fantasy of secretly operating units with multiple, large missile launching vehicles a reality now.

Resupply.  At the outset of WWII, the MDBs that faced Japanese attack were fatally crippled by an inability to obtain resupply.  Wake Island was a notable example of this.  Notably, this resupply failure was in waters that we nominally controlled.  Again, this should tell us something about our ability to resupply sea control units operating from islands deep inside enemy waters – it isn’t going to happen.  The fantasy that we can resupply and support units inside enemy waters is just that:  pure fantasy.  To believe that slow, non-stealthy, supply ships will sail deep into enemy waters, undetected, is delusional in the extreme.

Conclusion.  The lessons of the MDBs are screaming at us and yet we’re ignoring them.  The effectiveness and survival of the sea control units depends on a ridiculous degree of fantasy-level stealth (from non-stealthy ships and equipment !) that didn’t exist in WWII and doesn’t exist today.  Despite these lessons, we’re converting the entire Marine Corps to this nonsensical mission and abandoning every other worthwhile combat capability.  Somewhere, a Chinese general is smiling as he crosses the USMC off his list of threats.

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(1)Wikipedia, “Marine Defense Battalions”, retrieved 12-May-2020,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_defense_battalions

(2)https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/npswapa/extContent/usmc/pcn-190-003133-00/sec15.htm

(3)http://www.ww2f.com/threads/usmc-marine-defense-battalions-early-in-pacific-war.47309/

(4)http://www.pwencycl.kgbudge.com/M/a/Marine_Defense_Battalion.htm

Berger's Amphibious Ships

Marine Commandant Gen. Berger has all but stated that the Marines are out of the large scale amphibious assault business.  However, he has also stated that he sees a future where the Marines will conduct small unit amphibious landings.  Note the use of the term ‘landing’ rather than ‘assault’.  An assault is, by definition, an opposed landing and requires a huge amount of support in the form of ships, aircraft, mine clearance, bombardment, and so on.  A landing, as Berger uses the term, refers to a clandestine penetration of a small amphibious ship to a remote location and the disembarkation of troops and supplies in an unopposed landing.

Setting aside the utterly ridiculous aspects of the Commandant’s vision (see, "Hidden Bases"), let’s focus instead on the amphibious ships (now called Light Amphibious Warship – LAW) that he envisions and has ordered the Navy to procure.  Breaking Defense website gives us the first glimpse at what these ships might look like.(1)

In briefing slides presented to the defense industry last month, the Navy said it plans to begin buying the 200- 400 ft. Light Amphibious Warships  ships in 2023, and it is looking for mature commercial designs that can carry a crew of 30 and travel 3,500 nautical miles. (1)

Hmm …   A 200-400 ft amphibious ship?  That sounds a bit small.  Just for fun, I’ve assembled a silhouette comparison of various amphibious ships set to a common scale so that I can visualize where this 200-400 ft amphibious ship fits in the amphibious world.  For comparison, I’ve represented the 200 ft and the 400 ft ships as just a generic RO/RO ship, scaled appropriately.  Take a look.

Wow!  I thought that amphibious ship sounded small but when you actually see it next to other amphibious ships you instantly realize that we’re talking really small !  At this point you begin to see just how small Commandant Berger’s dispersed units will have to be.  We’re talking not much more than platoon size and with very little accompanying equipment.  Go ahead, take another look at the graphic and really soak in the size differential between real amphibious ships and Berger’s ships.

The Drive website provides a few more specs on what is now being called the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW).(2)  Note that these values are minimum rather than maximum values but, realistically, they’re not going to increase much.

• Transit Speed  14 kts
• Troop Capacity 75

Unloading will, apparently, be by ramp, over the beach, as opposed to landing craft.

All right, let’s consider some of the aspects of this ship and concept that haven’t really been discussed by the Marines or in the press, to date.

Stealth.  In order to have any chance of penetrating into enemy territory and surviving, the ship needs to be stealthy to the maximum extent possible.  This is completely at odds with the Navy’s desire to acquire an existing design since none are sufficiently stealthy.  This concept requires stealth on the order of the Swedish Visby.  How that’s accomplished while still mounting many large cranes, ramps, and deck cargo handling equipment is a mystery.

Speed.  One of the keys to Berger’s concept is the ability to penetrate enemy territory very quickly.  Let’s face it, every minute spent near or in enemy territory is more chance to be spotted.  This dictates speed, speed, and more speed.  Again, this is the antithesis of traditional amphibious ship design and utterly at odds with the 14 kt transit speed specification.  Apparently, the enemy is going to be blind to this vessel so that it can make leisurely 14 kt cruises in and out of enemy controlled waters.  This represents and absolutely amazing  degree of self-delusion about the enemy’s complicity in their own destruction.

Range.  This should be an obvious requirement.  If we’re talking about penetrating into enemy controlled waters we need great endurance and range.  For example, the distance from Guam to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea is around 2300 miles or 4600 miles for the round trip.  Considering that the concept is for the small, secret sea control units to be able to quickly relocate, at a moment’s notice, it is obvious that the LAW has to remain with the land unit which requires extended endurance and range.

Obliviousness.  In order for this concept to succeed, the LAW has to remain with the land unit so that it can assist with instant relocations, as we just discussed.  This assumes that the enemy has zero ability to spot a non-stealthy amphibious vessel hanging around islands in enemy controlled territory.  The degree of obliviousness that the enemy must demonstrate for this concept to work is breathtaking.

Self-Defense.  An amphibious vessel sailing on a 14 kt leisure cruise through enemy waters just might have to defend itself (repeatedly) during the course of its cruise.  For example, the leisure cruise from Guam to the Spratly Islands will require 6 days during which it will be subject to detection and attack.  Unless we provide substantial Aegis (Burke) escorts, the likelihood of surviving the trip is nil.  Of course, this creates a vicious circle of logic.  The more escorts, the more likely the group is to be spotted but the fewer the escorts, the less likely the vessel is to survive the slow motion transit.

Since there has been no mention of escorts in this concept, as yet, we’ll assume that the vessel will be self-escorting which suggests a need for substantial self-defense such as ESSM, RAM/SeaRAM, and CIWS.

Conclusion

Even a cursory examination of this concept reveals that it has not been well thought out.  Well, actually, it hasn’t been thought out at all.  As I’ve repeatedly pointed out, the degree of cooperation by the enemy required to make this concept work is staggering and possible only in a world of total fantasy.

Commandant Berger would have us believe that a small, undefended, painfully slow, non-stealthy vessel is going to be able to penetrate deep into enemy waters to land very small units that will exert total maritime dominance for hundreds of miles around – all while totally undetected.  This is not a concept anchored in reality.  I don’t know what wargames the Commandant has been playing that lead him to believe this concept can work but it’s clear that Dungeons and Dragons has a firmer basis in reality than whatever games the Commandant has been playing.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Marine Commandant: Less A Second Land Army, More Light Amphib Ships”, Paul McLeary, 3-Apr-2020,

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/marine-commandant-less-a-second-land-army-more-light-amphib-ships/?_ga=2.202751505.1458028291.1585949453-1757035925.1542652267

(2)The Drive website, “Navy Wants To Buy 30 New Light Amphibious Warships To Support Radical Shift In Marine Ops”, Joseph Trevithick, 5-May-2020,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/33299/navy-wants-to-buy-30-new-light-amphibious-warships-to-support-radical-shift-in-marine-ops

Hidden Bases

The Marine Commandant, and many casual observers, are enamored with the idea of secret, hidden bases, deep inside enemy territory that host small numbers of F-35B aircraft that will rise out of the jungle, wreak havoc on the enemy, and then disappear without the enemy every having a clue where they came from.  The Commandant also envisions small units exercising sea control for hundreds of miles around using missiles (no clue where the targeting will come from but let’s table that and move on).  On the off chance that the enemy should begin to get an inkling of a base’s location, the Marine vision is that the base will instantly relocate and, once again safely hidden, continue to rain death and destruction on the hapless enemy.

ComNavOps has already roundly and soundly mocked and discredited this concept for a variety of reasons including :

• The impossibility of supporting and supplying bases inside enemy territory
• The implausibility of believing that a base can stay hidden
• The impossibility of sailing through enemy territory with impunity and invisibility to deposit Marines and aircraft at these hidden locations
• The near uselessness of a small number of aircraft in terms of any operationally benefit
• The impossibility of maintaining modern stealth aircraft at any useful degree of readiness in a remote, crude, island base given the impossibility of doing so during peacetime with unlimited parts, maintenance, manufacturer support, and perfect conditions
• The inability to target beyond the horizon

While all of the above is more than enough to discredit the concept, there is yet another consideration that renders this concept suspect and that is that the enemy might choose to do the exact same thing – and they’re a lot closer to these magic, hidden islands than we are!

If we have this absolutely brilliant idea to put small, hidden units on these islands to exercise sea control for hundreds of miles around, wouldn’t the Chinese have the same idea?  Being much closer to the islands – and already controlling many of them – wouldn’t it be easier for them to implement the idea?  When our ships attempt to penetrate to deposit their Marine sea control units wouldn’t the Chinese sea control units see them and destroy them since our ships will have, apparently, few escorts and little protection?  If we think our sea control units can see and destroy everything for hundreds of miles around, why wouldn’t we think the Chinese sea control units could do the same?  Or, is this just more of the military’s tendency to think that everything we do will work and nothing the enemy does will work and that the enemy will actively cooperate in their own destruction?  I’ve repeatedly documented this tendency to exhibit one-sided thinking on the part of the US military and the Marine’s sea control concept seems to be the latest manifestation of the phenomenon.

I suspect that Commandant Berger and many of the hidden, jungle base proponents out there would simply say, if the Chinese are already on an island then we’ll pick another island.  Well, if we can see the Chinese bases that easily, won’t they be able to see ours just as easily?  And, if that’s the case, there goes the entire ‘hidden’ aspect which was the only protection for the base.  If a small unit comes under attack, it will have zero chance of survival – that’s the problem with these penny packet distributions of small units (well, that’s one of the problems!).

Are We Going To Put a Ghillie Suit On An Entire Island?

Every time I hear or read about this island base / sea control concept, including from Commandant Berger, the discussion always starts with our forces already being established on the island and fully equipped.  No one ever explains how these forces will penetrate into enemy territory undetected and land their small units.  Also, no one ever seems to account for enemy activity and surveillance.  We’ll see everything around us but the enemy will never see us.  Amazing, isn’t it?

Force Design 2030

The Marine Corps, meaning Commandant Berger, has issued the force design document, Force Design 2030 (FD 2030), describing the changes that the Commandant intends to make.  I won’t bother reciting the litany of changes as they were documented in the previous post (see, "The Marine Corps Is Now Redundant").  Suffice it to say that the Commandant has decided to drop firepower in favor of maneuver and data.  Let’s analyze the document. 

The first thing that jumped out at me was the Commandant’s personal impetus for the radical changes he intends to make.  We are all shaped by our experiences and it is natural to wonder what experiences shaped this Commandant to the degree that he believes a wholesale remake of the Corps is called for.  Well, he lays out what motivated him.

That prioritization was the result of my direct participation in five years of naval and global war games while the Commanding General of I MEF, Commander of Marine Corps Forces Pacific, and Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration. Those war games helped shape my conclusion that modest and incremental improvements to our existing force structure and legacy capabilities would be insufficient to overcome evolving threat capabilities, nor would they enable us to develop forces required to execute our approved naval concepts. (1)

So, the primary driving force that shaped the Commandant’s views is five years of war games.  This leads to a couple of thoughts.

It would have been nice to see a nod to history as a driver/shaper of his views since he has no actual peer level combat experience to draw on.  Why not draw on the lessons of those who did experience peer combat?  Now, I’ve got to be fair and acknowledge that the purpose of the FD 2030 was not to detail the Commandant’s life story and all the things that have influenced him so he may well be a student of history, however, the military, today, seems not to study history and seems to have no desire to partake of the lessons of historical combat and, lacking a specific nod to history from the Commandant, I lump him into the same category.

War games are wonderful tools, however, they suffer from one huge weakness and that is that the value of the game is a direct reflection of the value of the opposing force that is programmed into the game.  In other words, garbage assumptions in … garbage results out (GIGO).  Unfortunately, the military has a reputation for unrealistic games with pre-ordained results.  Were the Commandant’s five years of gaming a series of well designed, accurate, open, free play exercises or were they the usual scripted, pre-ordained games?  Is the Commandant’s basis for overhauling the Corps founded on good war games or the usual GIGO games?

Troublingly, assuming that the Commandant wasn’t playing these war games by himself, why is he the only one to come to the conclusion that the Marines need to be radically overhauled?  Of all the game participants, he’s the only one who has come to that conclusion, at least publicly.  Did everyone else draw the wrong conclusions and only he drew the right one?  That’s possible but not likely.  You’ve got to wonder if the Commandant is the outlier.

Now, just because he’s the only one to reach his conclusion does not necessarily mean he’s wrong.  Having a solitary, contrary position in the face of institutional opposition is kind of the definition of a visionary.  However, it’s also kind of the definition of a lunatic.  So, which one is the Commandant?  I have my opinion and you can form your own.

Finally, my colleague over at SNAFU website raises the question of war games and asks how bad the results must have been to motivate the Commandant to embark on such radical changes?

The war games that led to USMC Force Design 2030 must have been awful...

War games obviously showed us getting smashed...or in a fight so hard that it stunned participants. (2)

SNAFU’s take on the war games is thought provoking, for sure, but there may be another explanation.  Instead of the games demonstrating that the Marines were ‘smashed’, I think it’s far more likely that the games demonstrated that the Marines, in their current form, simply weren’t needed and played no significant role.  That would, indeed, stun the Commandant because that would be a direct threat to the Marine’s relevance and budget slice.  A budgetary threat would induce a survival instinct reaction in any modern general and I suspect the Commandant’s restructuring response is more about restructuring the Marines to be budget relevant than to be combat relevant.  That the two may (or may not) go hand in hand is just fortuitous. 

Moving on …

One concern I’ve had from day one of the Commandant’s tenure is the degree of insularity that he has manifested.  This reshaping of the Corps is his and his alone.  He has actively discouraged and limited input from any other source than himself.  This breeds an inevitable “emperor’s clothes” mentality.  We see this demonstrated in the Commandant’s initial efforts:

Phase I focused on problem framing, began in July 2019, and centered on a small operational planning team (OPT) that worked directly with me to establish an initial visualization of the future force … (1)

Noteworthy is that the Commandant did not range out to seek input but, rather, concentrated inward with just a small group whose thoughts and actions he could control – ‘a small operational planning team that worked directly with me’. 

Another troubling aspect of the FD 2030 related to the suspect nature of the war gaming is the lack of actual exercises supporting the conclusions already drawn.

Limited experimentation has been conducted upon discrete elements of the future force utilizing approved naval concepts, to include some carefully constrained tests of the ability of the F-35B to operate and be sustained from austere, undeveloped landing sites.

A single, limited-objective experiment addressing aspects of the organization, training, and equipment of a Marine infantry battalion was conducted … (1)

So, suspect war games and limited and constrained real world exercises are the foundation of this radical change?  Does that seem wise?

To be fair, the FD 2030 acknowledges the need for further exercises.

We will need to conduct full-scale, empirically-based experimentation of the future force in realistic maritime and littoral terrain. (1)

Unfortunately, the course has already been set.  The Commandant has already begun the overhaul of the Corps and future exercises will be too late to alter the trajectory.  The exercises should have been conducted prior to committing to the overhaul, not after.  Again, this demonstrates that the Commandant has already made up his mind and done so with scant, reliable input from any source other than his own experience.

Berger notes that F-35 numbers are, as yet, unknown.

I am not convinced that we have a clear understanding yet of F-35 capacity requirements for the future force. (1)

I assume this means that the Commandant is not yet sure how many F-35s he wants.  This seems slightly at odds with his stated plan to reduce squadron numbers from 16 aircraft to 10 unless he’s possibly anticipating further cuts?

Berger goes on to state that ‘ground tactical combat vehicles’ will undergo further reductions not identified in the initial cuts.

Addressing land based anti-ship missiles which will become the focus of the Marine Corps under the Commandant’s plan, he had this to say,

This requirement is based on one of the more well-supported conclusions from wargaming analysis conducted to date. (1)

That Berger believes this to be one of the more well-supported conclusions from the war games suggests to me that the games were pre-ordained to produce this result.  The illogic of the concept would seem to be evident from any realistic war game so the strongly positive result suggests that the games were not realistic.

For decades, the Marines have been focused on a replacement for the venerable AAV and have finally settled on the ACV despite proclaiming that the era of amphibious assaults is over.  If amphibious assaults are a thing of the past, why does the Corps need ACVs?  The logical discontinuity, here, is breathtaking.  Berger, at least, seems to recognize this and states that Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACV) will be reduced by some unspecified number.

One fact from Berger’s document comes through with absolute clarity and that is his commitment of the Marine Corps to a concept of distributed operations (DO).  Addressing the notion of a redesigned infantry battalion, he notes,

We must conduct more live-force experimentation to ensure our proposed design results in a truly DO-capable force. (1)

His focus is unerringly on distributed operations.

Now, here is a breathtaking summary of uncertainty.

I am not confident that we have identified the additional structure required to provide the tactical maneuver and logistical sustainment needed to execute DMO, LOCE and EABO in contested littoral environments against our pacing threat. While not an afterthought by any means, I do not believe our Phase I and II efforts gave logistics sufficient attention. (1)

Berger acknowledges that the foundational sustainment of penny packet forces, in enemy territory, may well be inadequate.  This is exactly one of my primary objections to the concept.  Despite his doubts, he has already fully committed the Corps to the concept !!!!!!!  Essentially, he’s saying, I’m not sure this can work but we’re going to do it anyway.  This is not rational thinking.

What happens when Berger’s own commissioned study produces results he doesn’t like?  He responds, thusly,

The Phase II IPT seems to have produced an incrementally improved version of today’s 3-ship ARG/MEU. This vision falls short of our future needs. We cannot accept or accede to recommendations for incremental change or better versions of legacy capabilities … (1)

His own study produced a result he didn’t want so he’s ignoring it.  This man is accepting no outside input that is not exactly in line with his own thinking.  This is dangerous.

What does Berger need in the future to support his objectives?  For one, more war gaming.  However, it will be carefully controlled, pre-ordained gaming.

To further refine and develop our understanding of force design changes, I am directing the immediate implementation of an intensive program of iterative concept refinement, wargaming, analysis and simulation, and experimentation. I will be personally involved in and responsible for setting priorities and ensuring that necessary resources are made available for this effort. (1) [emphasis added]

It is clear that Berger is not going to allow any war game to produce a result that does not support his vision.

Summary

What makes analyzing this Commandant a challenge is that he’s not completely wrong.  If he were a total idiot then it would be easy to analyze his failings and write him off as a crackpot.  However, much of what he observes in the world and much of what he says is spot on.  His analysis of the challenges and shortcomings of the current Marine Corps force structure is largely correct.  Where he fails is in his solutions to those problems.  In other words, he sees the problem but fails in the answer.

Along with his recognition of China as the main threat, here’s some more examples of his observations that are absolutely correct:

“… an array of low signature, affordable, and risk-worthy platforms …”

“…create the virtues of mass without the vulnerabilities of concentration …”

“…foreign humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuations do not define us – they are not our identity.”

“There is no avoiding attrition. In contingency operations against peer adversaries, we will lose aircraft, ships, ground tactical vehicles, and personnel. Force resilience – the ability of a force to absorb loss and continue to operate decisively – is critical.”

If only his solution was as good as his analysis of the problem!

We’ve discussed the enormous degree of fantasy involved in believing that you can insert, supply, and operate sea control forces inside enemy territory without the enemy observing and destroying you.  I have yet to hear the Commandant explain how this can successfully happen.  In fact, he explicitly acknowledges that the logistical support for such operations is likely inadequate and yet he is fully committed to the concept.  This is not rational.

Commandant Berger comes so close to being exactly what the Marines need in a leader and yet he falls so far short of the right answer that he will ruin the Marines as a relevant, capable fighting force.

____________________________________

(1)”Force Design 2030”, Department of the Navy, Mar-2020

(2)SNAFU website, “The war games that led to USMC Force Design 2030 must have been awful...”, posted by Solomon, 28-Mar-2020,

https://www.snafu-solomon.com/2020/03/the-war-games-that-led-to-usmc-force.html

Implicit Recognition

We've noted the Chinese annexation activities in the South and East China Seas and strongly suggested that the US do something about it before it becomes a fait accompli.  Well, of all the possible options, the US opted for arguably the worst one.

As reported by USNI News website, a Navy destroyer made an Innocent Passage near Subi Reef (1).  As a reminder, Innocent Passage is a formal procedure which allows a foreign country to pass through the territorial waters of another country in a prescribed, non-threatening manner.  Thus, the Innocent Passage procedure is, at the very least, implicit, if not explicit, recognition of the other country’s territorial rights and claims.  Therefore, the Navy’s Innocent Passage near Subi Reef was implicit, if not explicit, recognition of China’s ownership and territorial rights to the reef.

Alternatively, the Navy could have done nothing which would have continued the status quo and preserved the US’ position that China does not own the artificial islands. 

Or, the Navy could have conducted a passage that did not conform with the Innocent Passage procedure thereby explicitly denying China’s claims.  This would have required nothing more than operating a radar, pointing a gun, performing some other extremely mildly threatening act, or simply stopping for a period of time.

Not only did we just acknowledge China’s claims thereby cutting the legs out from under our allies who also claim the features, but we set a precedent that China can now use against us in future actions.  In the court of public opinion, how can the US take any aggressive action in the future after having acknowledged China’s claims, without looking like the aggressor?  We just severely limited our options.

China started the process of illegal annexation of the area and we just backed their play.  You’ve got to hand it to the Chinese.  They’re playing hardball and we’re just fumbling around.

(1)USNI, “U.S. Destroyer Made an ‘Innocent Passage’ Near Chinese South China Sea Artificial Island in Recent Mission”, Sam LaGrone, November 2, 2015,

http://news.usni.org/2015/11/02/u-s-destroyer-made-an-innocent-passage-near-chinese-south-chia-sea-artificial-island-in-recent-mission

Sea Control Ship

One of the common suggestions that I encounter is the need for a sea control ship.  This is one of those concepts whose definition, and therefore capabilities and requirements, depends on the person bringing it up.  Everyone seems to have a different definition.

The original sea control concept was derived from the convoy escort mission and consisted of a helo carrier which would provide continuous ASW presence.  Around 14 helos on the ship would ensure that a couple were always airborne.

Sea control as often discussed today has evolved to include anti-surface and medium range anti-air in addition to the original ASW role.  Some even credit a sea control ship with a Marine complement for limited land operations.  The sea control ship most commonly described is a small hybrid carrier with a combination of fixed wing aircraft (Harriers, originally, and now F-35Bs) and helos with, perhaps, some AEW aircraft depending on who’s proposing the idea.

The Navy has experimented with the idea in the past.  The USS Guam was set up as a sea control vessel for a time.  Other countries have also experimented with the concept.  Notably, the Japanese have developed the helicopter destroyer (DDH) and the Soviets developed the Moskva class which combined a bit of a cruiser with an ASW helo carrier.

A sea control ship is one of those ideas that sounds good on paper but may not be worth it in reality. 

Let’s consider its function.  All sea control concepts seem to have ASW as the core function with the major capability being provided by helos.  Fair enough.  Now let’s think through the ship’s usage in a war against a peer. 

A helo carrier is not going to have much in the way of AAW protection other than RAM type short range self-defense weapons.  That means that in combat it would either need to be defended by more capable ships (a Burke, presumably) or relegated to peripheral combat areas that would not expect to see major enemy activity.

An escort is feasible but removes a highly capable vessel from other duty.  On the other hand, a Burke is, theoretically, ASW capable.  I say theoretically because Navy destroyers do not practice ASW enough to be proficient.  Still, a helo carrier and a Burke or two acting as a hunter-killer group is not a bad idea if we have enough Burkes to devote to this.  Presumably, this kind of group would be effective protecting approaches to other naval groups or attempting to deny known enemy submarine transit routes or operational areas.

Without an escort, a helo carrier would be relegated to peripheral activities such as protecting distant sea lanes or sitting on chokepoints.  Is this a worthwhile activity?  A carrier, even a smaller helo carrier is still very expensive to build, man, and operate.  If we think we can get enough benefit for the low risk then it would be worth it.  On the other hand, if the risk is low it’s probably because the possibility of reward is also low.

Finally, let’s look at the more modern definition of sea control.  Some people advocate a sea control vessel that is a jack of all trades.  It would have fixed wing aircraft (F-35B) and helos, anti-ship missiles, and at least medium range area AAW.  Frankly, I’m not sure what role such a ship would play in major combat.  It would be like an aviation frigate:  capable of lots of tasks but incapable of anything serious on its own.  It could operate with a carrier group but would be redundant since a carrier has its own ASW helos.  It could operate with an amphibious group but an amphibious group would always have a carrier supporting it so, again, it would be redundant.  It might be useful as a convoy escort which, of course, is what the modern frigate was intended to be.

Notional Sea Control Ship

Considering the various options and scenarios, it seems as if the Japanese DDH might be the best implementation of this concept.  If so, that’s not exactly the sea control concept.  Instead, it’s more of a focused ASW vessel.

The very idea of a sea control ship during war is on of those concepts that is appealing when considered in isolation but fails to stand up to rigorous analysis.  Proponents envision a sea control ship staking out a patch of ocean and then destroying enemy patrol craft and submarines.  Voila, a secured patch of ocean at a fraction of the cost of a carrier group! 

Now, let’s apply some analytical thinking to that concept.  Can a sea control ship fight an enemy destroyer similar to a Burke?  No.  That’s not even remotely realistic.  Can it fight fast attack craft (anti-ship missile boats/FAC)?  Under the right circumstances, possibly.  A helo, armed for anti-ship missions, can certainly defeat a FAC since very few FACs have any significant AAW capability.  However, the FACs generally far outrange the detection limits of a sea control ship’s sensors.  For example, the Chinese Type 022 (Houbei) missile boat carries C-80X anti-ship missiles that have a range of 60-200 miles, depending on the missile type.  A sea control ship’s onboard sensors would have an effective range out to the horizon (20 miles, say).  Of course, the ship’s helos could extend that range but every helo dedicated to surveillance is a helo subtracted from the ASW mission.

So, yes, if a sea control ship were willing to partially or completely sacrifice its ASW mission, it could detect and effectively attack FACs.  Of course, ASW is the foundation mission for a sea control ship so detracting from that mission is a risky proposition.

Now, what about when the sea control ship is detected by the enemy and faces aerial attack from aircraft and/or missiles.  The ship’s defenses would be limited to short range or point defense (RAM, most likely).  This is completely inadequate for AAW.  Some people argue for a sea control ship with a sizable fixed wing aviation component (F-35B, presumably).  Of course, once you upsize the ship to carry both a large helo and fixed wing component, you’re no longer talking about a sea control ship – you’re now talking about a nearly full size carrier which has been proven to be almost as costly to build, man, and operate as a supercarrier but without the full size carrier’s capacities and capabilities.  So, sticking with a small to moderate size sea control vessel, we see that it is completely vulnerable to air attack.  An escort, such as a Burke, could be provided but, again, that takes the Burkes away from their other high end tasks and negates the very rationale of the sea control ship which is that it can free up high end ships for high end tasks.  We could add VLS cells to provide a medium range AAW capability but, again, that increases the size of the ship for what would be a very modest increase in AAW.

What about ASW, the foundation mission for a sea control ship?  A sea control ship with a handful of ASW helos would be as effective as a surface ship can be and, in the right scenario, could be a useful and effective asset.  The problem is that helos are notoriously unreliable and high maintenance.  Thus, you need several helos in order to maintain a few in continuous operation.  That’s fine – inefficient but fine.  Such a sea control ship sitting atop chokepoints or transit routes could prove highly effective at controlling enemy submarine activity.  Recall, though, that in order to protect itself from enemy FACs the ship would have to dedicate several helos to surveillance which would not leave enough helos available for effective ASW.  Unless we postulate a very much larger ship (America class size), a sea control ship just can’t carry enough helos for both the surveillance/counter FAC mission and ASW, simultaneously.

All of this leads us to the conclusion that a sea control ship is not an effective or efficient concept for war unless we’re willing to dedicate one or more high end Burke escorts for its protection.  If we have sufficient Burkes then this becomes a viable concept.  If not, it isn’t.  This also suggests that a lesser Burke, say a modern frigate, might be a viable escort although the Navy currently has no plans to acquire a frigate.

Thus, the sea control ship, with ASW as its primary mission, is appealing in concept but fails when one considers the details of wartime employment unless a high end escort is provided.