Asymmetric Warfare Against the Chinese

A reader recently offered his opinion that the US has no hope of achieving victory in a war with China due to China’s overwhelming superiority in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity.  I’m not going to cite the reader’s comment as I have no wish to embarrass him.  Besides, his view is shared, to varying degrees, by many people so he’s hardly unique.  Is he correct?  Is America doomed?  Let’s examine this view.
 
For starters, the reader’s assumption of China’s overwhelming superiority is incorrect, in many ways, but for the sake of this discussion, let’s stipulate that he’s exactly right – that China does, indeed, have overwhelming superiority of technology, numbers, and industrial capacity.  It would seem, then, that the US, indeed, has no hope of victory.  After all, those are the main determinants of victory in any war, right?
 
Or are they?
 
Let’s start where we always do … history.  Let’s look at some recent examples.
 
Vietnam – The US enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and yet lost the war.
 
Afghanistan (US) - The US enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and yet lost the war.
 
Afghanistan (Soviet Union) - The Soviet Union enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and yet lost the war.
 
Korea - The US enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in technology, numbers (at least until the Chinese entered the war), and industrial capacity and yet could only achieve a stalemate.
 
Without a doubt, technology, numbers and industrial capacity are important, especially in a conventional war, but, clearly, history proves that there are other, more important, factors that can overcome technology, numbers, and industrial capacity.  What are those factors? 
 
 

• Will – First and foremost is will.  Determination.  The absolute unwavering desire for victory and nothing less.
• Victory Conditions – One sure way to lose a war is to enter into it without a clear idea of the end state (total victory, one assumes).  The US has violated this requirement repeatedly since WWII.  Indeed, a very strong case can be made that the US has not had a clear idea of victory conditions in any conflict it’s entered since WWII.
• Commitment – Hand in hand with will is the willingness to do whatever is required to win.  This means not allowing the enemy sanctuary across some border, not holding back out of fear of collateral damage or casualties, not scrubbing target lists to see which ones will play well on the public relations stage, and not giving a damn what the rest of the world thinks.  If you’re serious enough to enter a war, the only ‘good’ outcome is total victory as quickly as possible using whatever means necessary.
• Training - Training can overcome a lot of other disadvantages.  A properly trained man with a knife can beat a man with a machine gun.  We have hollow forces, currently; China's level of training is unknown.  We need to be trained to the peak of effectiveness. 
  
• Brutality – Part of the commitment to war is the commitment to the brutality of war.  The US has been far too squeamish about war since WWII and, thus, unable to wage war efficiently, meaning brutally effective.  I recall a small uproar of protest amongst the population during Desert Storm when it was revealed that the US bulldozed trenches and buried Iraqi soldiers alive.  Killing is killing.  It’s not our job to gently cradle enemy soldiers while we wait for them to die of old age.  Our job is to kill as efficiently as possible.
• Simplicity - Simplicity trumps complexity in battle.  Complex equipment that won’t function in the stress of combat, can’t be maintained, and can’t be repaired is of no use.
• Decentralization – A decentralized command and control structure can only help during war.  It reduces confusion and eliminates a vulnerable center of gravity.

 
 
In every example conflict cited above, the loser violated one or more (generally all!) of the factors just described.
 
So, can the US win a war with China even with the stipulation that China possesses superior technology, numbers, and industrial capacity?  Of course we can!  However, it requires unwavering determination, crystal clear victory conditions, and total commitment. 
 
There is yet another factor that can offset superior technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and that is unconventional strategy and tactics.  Ukraine has amply demonstrated this with their unmanned assets, among other developments.  The Chinese used human wave attacks.  The North Vietnamese / Viet Cong used all manner of unconventional tactics.  The Taliban used IEDs and hid amongst the civilian population.  And so on.
 
Some people refer to this as asymmetric warfare and often use it as an excuse as to why a seemingly superior country lost to an inferior one.  Is asymmetric warfare some kind of magic solution?  Let’s consider it.
 
Let's start by dispensing with the silly notion that asymmetric war is somehow a different kind of war. It's not. War is war. Asymmetric simply means the enemy used different tactics than you did and, more often than not, asymmetric is used to try to explain away how you managed to lose to an inferior force.
 
So, recognizing that war is war, we now note that technology is not only NOT a guarantee of victory, it is often a detriment. For example, Germany's focus on ever more exquisite tanks to the detriment of just plain good tanks produced in large quantities cost them valuable time and resources. Thus, Vietnam and Afghanistan are not some kind of special war for whom the constants of war do not apply. They are war and the enemy conducted their war better than we did.
 
As an aside, readers, you might benefit from reviewing Vietnam, Korea, Desert Storm, Afghanistan, and more and try to identify which factors were truly deciding in the outcomes. You'll be surprised.  Ours is not the only way to wage war and, arguably, might be the least effective, depending on circumstances! Figure out why.
 
During a discussion of asymmetric war, and in response to the examples of Vietnam and Afghanistan and others, an anonymous reader made the comment,
 
"Afghanistan and Vietnam were asymmetrical, counterinsurgency operations, so are not analogies to what we would face with China."
 
Again, sticking with our stipulation of China possessing superior technology, numbers, and industrial capacity, and keeping in mind the other factors that impact victory, what does that suggest for a US strategy? A student of warfare, might look to history and postulate that the US could and should fight exactly the kind of asymmetric war that the reader dismissed as not being applicable! Perhaps the US should identify asymmetric operations and tactics that would enable it to succeed despite being hopelessly outclassed by the Chinese in every conceivable way?
 
How could the US do this? What kinds of asymmetric tactics could the US use that might succeed? Well, for example, instead of attempting a toe-to-toe slugfest of army against army, perhaps the US should emphasize the use of small, special forces units to destroy Chinese oil and gas pipelines in Russia (*gasp* we can't put troops inside Russia! that would violate international law! ... well, that's why they call it asymmetric; you'll recall that the NVietnamese used Laos and the Taliban didn’t hesitate to cross into Pakistan?) thereby imposing a total sea AND LAND blockade of a critical resource.
 
Another example might be that instead of going toe-to-toe with the magnificent, all-powerful, Chinese navy, perhaps we could emphasize our still formidable advantage in submarines to destroy their fleet and systematically launch cruise missile attacks on every Chinese port, airfield, and base on the Chinese mainland - basically, guerilla warfare using sub-launched cruise missiles! Done correctly, this kind of attack would be almost undetectable and unstoppable.
 
And so on.
 
Asymmetric is not a special category of war that transcends the constants of war.  It is merely a set of tactics and operations that your/our military doesn’t normally use.  If we think China truly has superiority of technology, numbers, and industry then perhaps we should be looking at implementing asymmetric tactics ourselves.  If we took this approach, it would, of course, require a different force structure, doctrine, and tactics and would require intense training to become proficient … none of which we’re doing.
 
China is beatable.  What we need to do is decide how we want to go about it and start getting serious about equipping and training for it.

Shiny New Aircraft or Dirty Old Mines?

USNI’s website has an article about the next generation Navy aircraft that prompted a few thoughts.  The article discussed several of the options that the Navy is considering (1).  Here’s a couple of tidbits,

“Under the Navy’s vision for its Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) battle network, an individual platform would not necessarily need to have a full suite of sensors—rather it could rely on off-board data. Data-linked information from another platform in the air such as the Northrop Grumman E-2D or at sea like an Aegis cruiser or destroyer could provide targeting information or even guide a weapon launched from a platform like a future F/A-XX.”

“... Rear Adm. Mike Manazir, the Navy’s director of air warfare, told USNI News that the F/A-XX would carry missiles, have the required power and cooling for directed energy weapons and sensors target the smallest radar cross-section targets. Manazir also said the F/A-XX family of systems might incorporate the use of cyber warfare capabilities at a tactical level—which the Navy is currently exploring.”

What do these have in common?  They’re incredibly advanced concepts that propose non-existent technology.  We’ve thoroughly discussed the pitfalls in initiating programs based on non-existent technology:  schedule slippages, cost overruns, quantity reductions, and technology failures. 

Oh good grief, ComNavOps is going off on another rant about program management failure.  We get it, already.  Haven’t we read enough about this?  Well, relax.  We have read enough about that (for the moment!) and we’re going in a different direction for the rest of this.

What occurs to me is that the Navy is pouring an enormous amount of effort into its combat aircraft (whether wisely directed or not is an issue we’ll set aside for another time).  The article discusses the Navy’s interactions with industry to try and capture the best technologies.  Numerous studies are being conducted to define the aircraft’s requirements.  Further, the level of technology being contemplated for this program is mind-boggling (again, we’ll set aside the problems inherent in that).  Let’s assume, for sake of discussion, that it all works perfectly and the Navy produces a reasonably priced plane that can network, interface, shoot thousand mile weapons using some other platform’s sensor data, mounts lasers and railguns, is totally invisible to any enemy sensor, requires no maintenance, and can be optionally manned or unmanned.  Wow!  What an achievement!  No enemy could stand up to that combat force.

Of course, a single diesel sub with a couple of torpedoes could sink the entire airwing.

Of course, a single mine could sink an entire airwing.

You see the problem?  The Navy is so focused on the ultra-high end technology toys that they’re failing to see the weak links in the overall naval warfighting machine.  When you’re putting the bulk of your effort and resources into the very high end and ignoring the lowly mine or submarine that can destroy it all, you’ve lost sight of the overall picture.

Where’s the equivalent emphasis on MCM?  Our current MCM capability has atrophied almost to the point of non-existence.  What new mine detection technology have we developed (don’t say unmanned – that’s the same old technology, just remotely controlled;  great from a safety perspective but still the same old technology)?  Where’s the push for new MCM technology development?  What new focused MCM platforms are we developing?

Where’s the equivalent emphasis on ASW?  Our Burkes are woefully undertrained for ASW.  We have no focused ASW platform.  To be fair, the SSN fleet should be a potent ASW force although I have no idea whether their level of training is compared to what it once was during the height of the Cold War.  I suspect it’s dropped off but I don’t know that.  What new ASW technology advances have we made?  Where’s the push for ASW research?  What new ASW platforms are we developing?

Let’s be fair, here.  There have been some minor improvements or, at least, attempts at improvement.  The LCS was a well-intentioned attempt at MCM and ASW, although it failed miserably.  The P-8’s multi-static sonobuoy system is an attempt at improving detection although it is currently non-functional and its actual benefits (as opposed to manufacturer’s claims), if any, have yet to be demonstrated.

You get the idea.  The amount of effort and resources being poured into advanced aircraft design and procurement dwarfs the amount going into MCM and ASW by a staggering margin and yet it is the lowly MCM and ASW capabilities that will determine whether the airwing can even survive long enough to get to the fight and stay in it.  The Navy is focused on the glittering toys and ignoring the down-in-the-bilges capabilities that will safeguard the new toys.

(1) US Naval Institute, "Navy Taps Industry in Quest For Next Generation Fighter", Dave Majumdar, September 10, 2014,

http://news.usni.org/2014/09/10/navy-taps-industry-quest-next-generation-fighter

Asymmetric Advantage

The general media has gone to great lengths to point out, correctly, that many of our potential enemies have or are pursuing asymmetric advantages.  Mines, small boat suicide attacks, small boat swarms, fast attack missile boats, intermediate range ballistic missiles, small and quiet non-nuclear subs, and so forth.  What isn’t discussed is the fact that the US possesses, or could develop, asymmetric advantages of our own. 

Our two biggest conventional advantages are technology and money (current budget problems notwithstanding!).  These can be leveraged into asymmetric advantages.  What kinds of asymmetric advantages?  Well, this is where the imagination can go wild.  For the sake of brevity, I’d like to nominate one particular area that few other countries or non-state actors can match and that would provide disproportionate advantages for us.



Underwater Glider UUV



In real estate it’s location, location, location.  In war it’s recon, recon, recon.  Where’s the enemy and what are they doing?  If you know that, the battle gets a whole lot easier.  Call it intel or surveillance or recon or whatever, the ability to monitor the enemy is a priceless advantage.  Of course, the Navy already has many systems for collecting intel:  submarines, satellites, electronic signal intercepts, and so on.  To a greater or lesser extent those systems all collect information from a distance or, in the case of subs, put themselves at risk to get up close.  Why not develop systems that can get extremely close and have little risk of detection?  Well, in fact, the Navy is working on just such systems in the form of unmanned vehicles, both aerial and subsurface.



Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are solidly into their development curve and offer well known and powerful surveillance capabilities as demonstrated over today’s battlefields.  They do have a few disadvantages or limitations such as being fairly detectable, if one wishes to look for them, they have relatively limited range and endurance, and they are susceptible to control signal disruption.  These issues are undoubtedly being addressed.

Let’s look a bit further at Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs).  By comparison to UAVs, UUVs are in their infancy.  The Navy and industry are currently developing a variety of UUVs and there is no point attempting to describe specific systems.  Conceptually, UUVs offer the potential to retain many of the advantages of UAVs while avoiding some of the limitations.

UUVs, by their very nature as underwater vehicles, are extremely difficult to detect.  Consider how hard it is to detect a full size submarine and how much harder it must be to detect something a fraction of that size.  Once deployed in their operating area, UUVs can provide very close range surveillance of ships, mines, subs, harbors, coastlines, water conditions, geography, etc. with little risk.

Various technologies are being explored which may allow UUVs to operate almost indefinitely, thereby overcoming one of the limitations of UAVs.  Solar power, wave regeneration, thermal recharge, ionic recharge, etc. are all methods that offer the possibility of extremely long endurance.  Consider the advantages inherent in a UUV that can loiter for days or months, undetected, and providing continuous monitoring of an area.



Undetectable and Long Endurance



As the imagination expands a bit, the possible uses for UUVs are almost limitless.  Imagine being able to attach small shaped charges to an enemy ship in its own harbor, or being able to have a small UUV attach itself like a limpet to a ship or submarine to provide continuous tracking, or, with some lead time, mapping out a minefield.  The possibilities are endless!

Of course, there are associated problems.  Underwater communications is challenging.  It does no good to collect information if it can’t be transmitted.  Remote underwater control is even more difficult, bordering on impossible over any significant distance.  UUVs would largely have to operate autonomously.  Still, as with UAVs, these problems can be solved over time.

UUVs offer a potential asymmetric advantage that is extremely powerful and well worth continued intense development.  Few other countries and no non-state groups can either utilize or counter this technology.  The Navy would do well to commit significant resources to developing this potential advantage.