SSC Connector Update

It’s been awhile since we last checked in on the Navy’s LCAC replacement program, the Ship to Shore Connector (SSC) in Nov 2018 (see, “SSC Update”).  That program should be about wrapped up by now, right?  Let’s check the status.

 

 

Status

 

The Navy/Marines are pursuing an acquisition program of Ship to Shore Connectors (SSC) which are nearly identical replacements for the Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC).  As a reminder, the Navy has 72 existing LCAC with a payload capacity of 60 tons.  The Navy plans to acquire 73 SSC with a payload capacity of 72 tons.

 

Ship to Shore Connector, SSC

Nearly Identical LCAC

 

As described in the previous update (link above), an interesting new feature is the ability of the SSC to disembark vehicles directly into the water instead of on land.  Presumably, this is aimed at offloading AAV/ACV vehicles into the sea as a means of bypassing the standoff range problem for amphibious ships.  The SSC would bring the vehicles to within a few miles of shore and drop them into the water to continue to shore on their own while the SSC retires to safety.  Unfortunately, this is yet another example of concurrency with this feature having been added part way through production and needing to be back fit to earlier production craft.

 

The SSC costs $79M each, based on the FY22 Navy SCN budget documents.[1]  After an initial flurry, the purchases are being funded at a rate of one or two per year (none in 2020 !) with a total of 25 having been funded, so far.  Acquisition began with the first contract awards in 2015 to Textron (New Orleans, LA).  Now, seven years later, the acquisition ought to be about done and the SSCs should be in the fleet and smoothly functioning.  Unbelievably, however, the second SSC (101) was only delivered to the Navy on 27-Aug-2020, five years after contract award.  Seriously?  Five years to build a small craft that is a near twin to the existing LCAC? 

 

Despite a hopeful start to what ought to be a simple follow on to the LCAC, the SSC program has been plagued by problems which have caused multiple, long delays.  GAO identifies the start of the program as May 2009.  Delays have pushed IOC back to the end of 2022 or beyond.  That’s 13 years and counting for a simple evolutionary development of the LCAC.  That’s pathetic.

 

 

Problems

 

The main problem with the SSC is the gearbox – what is it with gearboxes and the Navy? – which is undergoing its third round of design changes attempting to deal with premature wear.  This is yet another example of the folly and cost of concurrent development and production.  Once the gearbox problem is solved (it never was on the Freedom class LCS and now they’re all being retired !), the solution will have to be expensively retrofitted to the SSCs already produced.  I don’t know why the Navy can’t grasp the idea of testing first, then production.  But, I digress …

 

In 2019, GAO noted,

 

… testing of Craft 100 (the test and training prototype craft) continues to pose challenges, and electrical system stability and command, control, communications, computers and navigation integration challenges must be resolved … [2]

 

More recently, cracking propeller blades have become a problem and solutions will, again, have to be back fit to already produced craft.

 

The program is pursuing two concurrent solutions to address cracking found on 10 of the 12 tested propeller blades when the crafts were loaded with weight as they would be during an amphibious assault.[3]

 

Seriously … blade strength???  Isn’t this past technology that we mastered long ago?  We’ve been making propeller blades of all types since before WWI.  Is this an example of trying to cut every possible penny out of a program and then we wind up with understrength items that have to be re-developed and retrofitted and wind up costing ten times the amount of any potential savings?  Penny wise and pound foolish?  Grumman used to have the right philosophy about physical strength and ruggedness … they overbuilt which earned them the nickname ‘Grumman Iron Works’.  There are plenty of places we can cut costs but the actual product should not be one of them.  Moving on …

 

 

Rationale

 

Given the Marine’s numerous public statements that they are out of the amphibious assault business, one can’t help but ask the blindingly obvious question, ‘why are we buying amphibious assault landing craft (or, for that matter, new amphibious ships and ACVs)?’

 

Given that the Navy is building LHAs without well decks and LPDs with less well deck capacity than the ships they’re replacing, again, one can’t help but ask the blindingly obvious question, ‘why are we buying amphibious assault landing craft?’

 

Possibly as a partial recognition of that logical disconnect,

 

In a briefing to Navy senior leadership, the program stated that it is considering reducing the total number of craft from 72 to 50. It is also considering updating the cost baseline, which the program indicated will likely result in a breach of statutory unit cost thresholds.[3]

 

And, if we’re out of the assault business and just need occasional administrative unloadings from amphibious ships then why not procure LCUs for 1/5 the cost?  The latest Navy budget documents put the cost of the LCU at $17M each[1] which would be a huge savings over the $79M SSC cost.

 

Speaking of cost efficiency,

 

The program stated that Textron has indicated in the past that eight craft per year are necessary to achieve economies of scale … [2]

 

However, as noted, we’re only procuring one or two per year due to the various ongoing problems and delays.  Between the very low production rate and the responsibility to fix interminable problems, Textron has to be losing money badly on this program.

 

 

Summary

 

So, despite an initial promising start to the program, things have bogged down badly, problems have arisen that are proving difficult to solve, concurrency has reared its head, and the manufacturer is likely losing money.  This has become another long, drawn out development program like the F-35 and, like the F-35, it is now obsolete before it is even fielded.  The Marines have dropped out of the amphibious assault mission, leaving this a craft without a purpose.  As we consistently see, protracted development is the mortal enemy of relevance.

 

 

_________________________________

 

[1]Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Justification Book Volume 1 of 1, Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, May 2021, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/SCN_Book.pdf

 

[2]Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, May 2019

 

[3]Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Jun 2021

LSD-41/49 Class and LX(R)

The Navy has designated the LPD-17 as the basis for the LX(R) (now designated LPD-17 Flt II) which is intended to replace the LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships.  The San Antonio LPD-17 class began with the LPD-17 and has continued through LPD-27 with LPD-28 and -29 being designated transition vessels to the LPD-17 Flt II which begins with LPD-30.  The Navy intends to build 13 of the ships.

LX(R) / LPD-17 Flt II

As a reminder, the LSD-41 (Landing Ship, Dock) Whidbey Island class, built in the 1980’s, was designed specifically to transport and launch LCAC vessels and has a capacity of four LCACs which is the most of any amphibious ship.(1)   It can also provide docking and repair services for LCACs and for conventional landing craft.(1)

In 1987 the Navy began construction on LSD-49 Harpers Ferry class which reduced LCAC capacity to two while increasing cargo capacity.(1)

Here’s a few basic specifications for the LSD-41/49 class. (1)  Note the LCAC capacities.

LSD-41/49 Specifications
	LSD-41	LSD-49
Length, ft	609	609
Beam, ft	84	84
Displacement, tons	16000	17000
LCAC Capacity	4	2

LSD-41 Whidbey Island Class

There are several questionable aspects to the LPD-17 Flt II program that warrant a bit of discussion.

Well Deck Size.  The LX(R) is intended as the replacement for the LSD-41/49 class.  The problem is that the LX(R) has a significantly smaller well deck than the LSD-41 class and can only carry 2 LCACs.  Here are the well deck dimensions for recent classes of amphibious ships (see, “Wither The Well Deck”).  Note the generally decreasing well deck sizes.

Amphibious Ship Well Deck Size
Whidbey Island LSD-41	440’ x 50’
Harpers Ferry LSD-49	220’ x 50’
Tarawa LHA-1	268’ x 78’
Wasp LHD-1	267’ x 50’
America LHA-6	none
San Antonio LPD-17	170’ x 50’

The decreased well deck and LCAC capacity represents a significant decrease in ship to shore amphibious capability which seems incongruent with the LSD/LPD’s main function of amphibious assault.  One can’t help but wonder what the Navy sees as the main function of the new LPD-17 Flt II since it clearly isn’t amphibious assault.

Cost.  Navy’s cost target for the LPD-17 Flt II is $1.8B (FY2019$) for the lead vessel, LPD-30, and $1.5B (FY2019$) for the follow on ships (2), however, LPD-31 is now estimated to cost a bit over $2.0B (5) so, as always, the Navy’s cost estimates are significantly understated.

Huntington Ingalls announced a sole-source $1.5B fixed price incentive contract for the lead ship, LPD-30, in Mar 2019.  As usual, this is only a partial cost and does not include advanced procurement funds already expended, Government Furnished Equipment, or post-delivery construction which is an ever-increasing portion and is intended to get around cost caps and make acquisitions seem cheaper than they are.  The true cost is likely $2B+.  Indeed, the Navy’s budget request documents show a cost of $1.7B without GFE or post-construction costs. (4)

As usual, the Navy is not pursuing responsible contracting practices and is doing everything it can to obscure costs.  From the CRS report,

The Navy plans to award sole-source contracts to Huntington Ingalls—the only shipbuilder of Flight I ships—for Flight II construction. Further, the program did not request a separate independent cost estimate for Flight II prior to awarding the LPD 30 detail design and construction contract. At the same time, the Navy identified no plans to establish a cost baseline specific to Flight II. Without this baseline, the Navy would report full LPD 17 program costs—rather than Flight II specific costs—constraining visibility into Flight II. (4, p.14)

Design Basis.  The Navy’s driving force for the ship design was the cost target rather than functionality or combat effectiveness.  As we have repeatedly stated, cost is a secondary consideration for warship design and cannot be the primary design factor.  No good ship was ever designed with cost as the primary design criteria.

From 1Q 2013 to 1Q 2014, the Navy claims to have conducted an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) with three alternatives considered:

• modified (reduced capability/reduced-cost) LPD-17
• brand new designs
• foreign design

Given the Navy’s documented half-hearted or non-existent AOAs for other ships, one can’t help but wonder about the rigor and validity of this AOA.  The LCS, Ford, Zumwalt, Burke Flt III, and new frigate never got rigorous AOAs.  They were either never performed or they were conducted for show with the outcome having been pre-determined.  Indeed, the selection of the modified LPD-17 strongly suggests that this was yet another example of a pre-determined AOA conducted purely for show.

Following are LX(R) design features compared to the San Antonia Class (3):

• half the medical spaces
• smaller hangar for stowing two MV-22 tilt rotor aircraft
• no composite masts
• two main propulsion diesel engines instead of four
• two spots for Landing Craft Air Cushion hovercraft or one Landing Craft Utility boat
• reduced troop capacity from 800 to 500
• reduced vehicle storage space
• enhanced command and control facilities

Competition.  According to the Congressional Research Service, as recently as May 2017, the Navy had publicly stated that a competition would be held between HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding of Pascagoula, MS, the builder of LPD-17 Flight I ships, and General Dynamics’ National Steel and Shipbuilding (GD/NASSCO) of San Diego, CA.  However, on April 6, 2018, the Navy announced that it would sole-source the design and construction of LPD-30 to HII.  Again, this suggests that the previously announced ‘competition’ was for show and that the builder had been pre-determined from the start.

CONOPS.  One of the major justifications for the LX(R) is the “requirement” to operate independently.  Of course, this is idiotic but that’s the Navy’s story and they’re sticking to it.  Under this concept, the 3-ship Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG/MEU) will routinely disaggregate and operate as independent ships, widely separated geographically.  This, the Navy/Marines claim, will increase flexibility and responsiveness.

The reality is that disaggregated ARGs have even less capability than the mathematical 1/3 capability that splitting them up into three parts would suggest.  For example, the LPD, when operating independently, carries less than a third of a MEU and almost none of the aviation assets.  Similarly, the larger LHA-6 America class, when operating independently, cannot land heavy equipment as they have no well deck.

The Marines state that a MEU is the smallest full-function combat unit.  Subsets of a MEU are, by the Marine’s own definition, incapable of effective combat.  So, what does the Navy/Marines want to do?  Why, split the MEU up and send the pieces off to distant points where they cannot act as a complete unit nor support each other!  Stupid on a shingle!

Commandant’s Vision.  All of the preceding was background for the real point of this post and that is to consider how the LPD-17 Flt II jibes with the Marine Commandant’s recent statements and documents which call for a movement away from the 38 amphibious ship and 2 MEB lift requirements.

It is worth noting at the outset that the LPD-17 Flt II was conceived long before the current Commandant took office.  Thus, it may be that the Flt II doesn’t fit his plans for the Corps, at all !

Commandant Berger has unilaterally and arbitrarily set the Corps on a radically different path, assuming he follows through on his early statements.  To be fair, there are, as yet, few details so much is speculation, at this point.  That said, Berger has been pretty clear that the Marines will move towards small, dispersed units using forward bases.  The question, then, becomes how does the Flt II fit into and support this concept, if at all?

On the one hand, the Flt II, with traditional well decks and LCACs may be considered a relic of the old way thinking which involved massed combat power and amphibious assaults and, thus, of little value in a small unit, dispersed, forward based type of force structure.  On the other hand, a Flt II, being significantly smaller than the large deck LHA/LHDs, might be quite useful in moving around and supporting small units.  Then again, the Flt II has very limited aviation capability which is a cornerstone of the forward base concept and the Marine’s recent push to become aviation-centric.  As I noted, without details about Berger’s plans, it is very difficult to pass judgment about the value of the Flt II in the new Marine concept.

If we take the Commandant at face value and assume that the Flt II is of limited value, it calls into question the reason for the entire Flt II program.  Should we immediately halt the program and move in a different direction?  Berger has suggested that the Marines will look to smaller, cheaper, more numerous vessels such as the JHSV or the Light Amphibious Warship (see, “Light Amphibious Warship Update”) for transport.  If that’s the case, we can build a lot of JHSVs for the cost of one Flt II and we should halt the Flt II program immediately.  At the very least, a pause in the LPD-17 program is warranted until the Commandant decides what ships he wants for his Navy.

_____________________________________

(1)Navy website,

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=1000&ct=4

(2)Congressional Research Service, “Navy LPD-17 Flight II (LX[R]) Amphibious Ship Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, R43543, Ronald O’Rourke, 3-Jul-2018,

https://www.defensedaily.com/wp-content/uploads/post_attachment/202101.pdf

(3)Wikipedia, “LX(R)-Class Amphibious Warfare Ship”, retrieved 10-Oct-2019,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LX(R)-class_amphibious_warfare_ship

(4)Congressional Research Service, “Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for Congress”, 10-Oct-2019

(5)Congressional Research Service, “Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for Congress”, 22-Jul-2020

LX(R) and LCAC

The LCS received intense scrutiny at its inception and that scrutiny continues to this day.  The Zumwalt, by comparison, has received almost none (baffling, huh?).  Somewhere in between is the LX(R).  Let’s take a couple of posts to look a bit closer at the LX(R).  We’ll start with just a quick peak at the LCAC carrying capacity of the LX(R).  This is just setting the stage for a few upcoming LX(R) posts and is not intended to be a deep analysis.  Read this post as a simple factoid, so to speak, that acts as a lead in to more posts.

The Navy intends to replace the LSD-41/49 class ships with a new LX(R) class.  One of the key differences between the old and new ships will be the well deck space and, in particular, the LCAC capacity.  Let’s take a closer look.

The LSD-41 Whidbey Island class dock landing ship is an 8 ship class with the ability to carry 4 LCACs or 5 LCACs if the cargo ramp is raised.  That’s 32 or 40 LCACs, total.

The LSD-49 Harpers Ferry class dock landing ship is a 4 ship class with the ability to carry 2 LCACs.  That’s 8 LCACs, total.

In total, the LSD-41/49 class has a capacity for 40-48 LCACs.

The Navy is planning to replace the 12 LSDs with 11 LX(R)s.  Each LX(R) will carry 2 LCACs for a total of 22.

So, the amphibious fleet will go from 40-48 LCAC capacity to 22.  That’s quite a drop for an amphibious fleet that is already sorely lacking sufficient ship to shore connectors.  Does that signal that the Navy/Marines are getting out of the amphibious assault business altogether, or that the Marines are betting on shifting from amphibious assault to vertical assault, or that they’re just idiots?  I have no idea what the official line of thinking on this one is.  For the moment, ponder this and we’ll take a closer look in a bit.

LSD-41 Class - 4 LCACs

LX(R) Class - 2 LCACs

Sneak peak:  There is actually another, more likely, explanation (although don’t discount the idiocy explanation!) which we’ll cover shortly.

Future Connectors - The Marine Corps View

As mentioned in the previous posts (see, "Out Of The Business"), CSIS hosted a Q&A session with BGen. William Mullen (1).  He covered several topics that are noteworthy and deserve some additional attention.

Mullen addressed the major limitation of the current connectors,

“Because the connectors we have, the LCACs, the LCUs, the Joint High Speed Vessel, none of those things will go into an unprotected beach.”

The consequence of that, according to Mullen, is,

“We have to have the ability to have that thing [connectors] bring us in to just outside small arms range and then get off it and swim ashore.”

That’s a major doctrinal statement there.  He’s saying that the Marines do not view the current connectors as survivable in an opposed landing, hence, the Marine’s focus on an armored amphibious vehicle (AAV/ACV/EFV/whatever).  You’ll note that this is somewhat at odds with the emphasis on aviation assault but that’s just one of many contradictory views the Marines currently hold.  If this is true, then the armored amphibious vehicle is the key to the Marine’s future (again, at odds with the aviation emphasis) and makes the decades long dithering over such a vehicle almost incomprehensible.

This statement from Mullen gives us the Marine’s view of an amphibious assault.  Connectors will transport armored amphibious vehicles to a point short of the beach and the vehicles will swim the rest of the way.  What this vision doesn’t allow for is the transport and landing of heavier assets like tanks and artillery, at least in the initial wave.  That makes the initial combat somewhat problematic and, at the very least, requires close co-ordination with Navy and aviation assets for the missing heavier punch.  Unfortunately, given the probable lack of air superiority in a contested landing against a peer, aviation support will probably be sporadic, at best, and naval support is doctrinally non-existent, at the moment.

Referring to connector alternatives, Mullen made sure to emphasize the importance of the traditional amphibious ship,

“Anything we do alternatively can’t replace any of those gray hulled ships.”

That sounds like a scripted Navy-Marine talking point!

Mullen noted that one of the significant differences between the Army and Marines is that the Marines have never used an armored fighting vehicle (AFV) whereas the Army has, in the form of the Bradley.  He gave no impression that a Marine AFV is under consideration and stated that Marines use armored vehicles as transport.  Again, a significant doctrinal point whose wisdom is highly debatable.

The Marines have requested that the LCAC replacement, the Ship to Shore Connector (SSC), be given the ability to launch AAVs or a similar vehicle while at sea rather than having to wait to get to the beach since the SSC is not going to land on a hostile beach.  That makes sense given the previous statements.

Mullen addressed a question about interim AAV upgrades and responded by stating that an upgrade program is in progress but won’t start “turning wrenches” until 2019.  I’m not an expert on combat vehicles but a relatively simple upgrade program requiring 5 years to even begin seems absurd.

The Marine’s plans for the near future seem to be centered on the ACV 1.1/1.2.  He stated that the ACV 1.1 would be purchased in small quantities to experiment with and then the 1.2 version would incorporate the lessons learned and constitute the bulk of the procurement. 

Mullen had this to say about the focus on the ACV over the AAV,

“Frankly, we had such problems with our AAVs in Iraq that we stopped using them outside the gate and we never even took them to Afghanistan.”

Well that’s interesting!



EFV/ACV - Key To The Future?



Mullen noted the relationship between aviation based assault and ground/amphibious assault.  He acknowledged that the aviation assets had only a limited ability to transport vehicles and then only in a permissive environment.  The difficulty in achieving a suitable permissive environment provides the rationale for the continued need for a ground/amphibious capability, according to him.

Addressing the general need for an AAV type vehicle, Mullen stated,

“To us, we see the ability to have an independent deployer that swims ashore without any connector as a service defining capability.”

Mullen addressed the connector issue shortcomings,

“With the route we’re taking, LCUs and LCACs probably aren’t going to be enough.  What else is there out there?  What else can be done?”

So, the Marines apparently recognize a serious shortcoming but are doing little about it beyond a few paper studies and investigations.  With such a significant problem, one can’t help but wonder why the Marines budget and focus is so skewed to the aviation side especially given the previous statement recognizing the vulnerability of aviation transport.

He went on to cite the JHSV with an at-sea ramp capability as an option that the Marines are requesting.  The JHSV would transport vehicles to just outside small arms range and discharge the vehicles into the sea.  Of course, the JHSV is built to purely commercial standards and operating it to just outside small arms range still leaves it squarely in rocket and missile range.  That’s a questionable use of the JHSV.

Of course, one could ask why, if the Marines see the combination of LCAC and LCU as insufficient, are we pursuing a simple replacement of the LCAC and a perhaps somewhat more capable LCU rather than far more capable and robust replacements that would be sufficient?

Responding to a question about the vulnerability of connectors to shore based missiles, Mullen noted that the Marines would operate with the Navy and Air Force who would suppress shore based anti-access (A2) fire.  However, he then went on to say that the Marines see their role as getting a “bubble” of capability ashore to aid in the counter A2 operation.  That’s fine, but there’s a Catch-22 at work:  how do the Marines get ashore to aid in the counter A2 operations if the counter A2 operations haven’t yet succeeded?  - and, if the counter A2 operations have succeeded enough to get the Marines ashore then their assistance in the counter A2 operations isn’t really needed.  He did not acknowledge that logical inconsistency.  He also cited the V-22 as aiding in getting the Marines ashore to help with the counter A2.  Again, he did not address the vulnerability of the V-22 to air defenses in a counter A2 environment.  I’m sorry but the Marines doctrine and concept of operations seems heavily dependent on wishful thinking!

Finally, although this was not his closing statement, it should have been.

“As the fiscal environment gets more constrained, we have to think harder.”

Please, Marines, think a LOT harder than you currently are!!

(1) http://csis.org/event/future-amphibious-connectors-getting-ship-shore, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Future Amphibious Connectors:  Getting From Ship To Shore”, Brig. Gen. William Mullen, Director, Capabilities Development Directorate, 15-Jul-2014

Amphibious Assault Attrition

We’ve been discussing the various aspects of Marine/Navy amphibious assaults with various opinions expressed about types of landing craft and the ability to sustain an assault via air, sea, or a combination.  However, the one aspect that we haven’t touched on is the most important one for an opposed assault and that is attrition.  While we may not anticipate a full blown D-Day type invasion, the fact is that even a mildly opposed assault will result in significant attrition of the transport assets.

One of our readers, GAB, pointed out that a MEU needs several hundred tons of supplies per day to sustain an assault.  I have not independently verified that figure but it sounds plausible and I have no reason to doubt it so, for the sake of discussion, let’s accept it as, say, 600 tons and that’s undoubtedly optimistically low.

Now, I don’t think anyone believes that an assault by a MEU can be sustained purely through the air.  If you do think so, run the numbers and you’ll see that it’s not possible.  So, for this discussion, let’s look at a beach landing since the water borne transports at least have the possibility of transporting enough supplies to sustain an assault.

The amphibious group that supports the MEU would typically consist of an LHD (Wasp class, 3 LCAC), LPD (San Antonio class, 2 LCAC or 1 LCU), and an LSD (Whidbey Island class, 4 LCAC) which provides a total of 9 LCACs.  The group also has 10 MV-22s and 4 CH-53Es available for transport.  Here’s the transport capacities.

10 MV-22 at 10 tons = 100 tons

4 CH-53E at 15 tons = 60 tons

9 LCAC at 60 tons = 540 tons

Total lift = 700 tons

We instantly note that the airborne contribution is quite limited compared to the waterborne contribution.  Nonetheless, the total lift is, indeed, capable of meeting our lift requirement of 600 tons per day.  But for how long?

Let’s assume our resupply “lifts” occur in perfect waves and we can manage three lifts per day.  Let’s further assume that attrition costs us one transport per lift.  What?!  No way!  Actually, yes way!  Hey, it’s an opposed landing.  The enemy knows that resupply is the Achilles Heel of the assault.  They’ll make every effort to cut the resupply.  One lost transport per lift may, in fact, be optimistic.  Remember, it doesn’t require a catastrophic kill to attrite the transport.  Simple damage that is eventually repairable down the road but renders the transport unusable in the short term is the same as a kill.  Further, the LCAC is, by all accounts, a finicky maintenance nightmare.  We’ll lose transports to simple mechanical failures in addition to combat losses.  Anyway, here’s what the numbers show using an LCAC cargo capacity of 60 tons.

Day 1, Lift 1, 9 LCAC = 540 tons

Day 1, Lift 2, 8 LCAC = 480 tons

Day 1, Lift 3, 7 LCAC = 420 tons

Total = 1440 tons = 2.4 days worth of supplies

Day 2, Lift 1, 6 LCAC = 360 tons

Day 2, Lift 2, 5 LCAC = 300 tons

Day 2, Lift 3, 4 LCAC = 240 tons

Total = 900 tons = 1.5 days worth of supplies

Day 3, Lift 1, 3 LCAC = 180 tons

Day 3, Lift 2, 2 LCAC = 120 tons

Day 3, Lift 3, 1 LCAC = 60 tons

Total = 360 tons = 0.5 days worth of supplies

So, in 3 days we’ve managed to get a little over 4 days worth of supplies ashore and now we have no more functioning waterborne transports.

The same type of effect applies to the airborne lift component except that it starts with a much smaller lift capacity.  I leave it to you to work through the math for the airborne component.  Also, we should expect a much heavier loss for the air transports given the lethality of Stinger/ZSU type defenses against slow, low helos. 

While the airborne transports will help stretch out the supply situation, the reality is that the bulk of the air assets will probably be employed moving troops around and ferrying supplies from the beach to the forward troops and will, thus, have a fairly minimal contribution to the resupply effort.

Now, this was absolutely not a combat simulation.  It was, much like the RAND air combat scenario, a simple exercise in numbers to demonstrate the potential impact of attrition on the sustainability of an assault.  You may argue about particular aspects but, unless you make ridiculous assumptions, it won’t change the results by very much.  Further, many of the assumptions were overly optimistic.  For instance, loss of the transport’s loads when they are “hit” was not factored in nor was any loss of supplies on the beach due to enemy artillery, mortars, missiles, or air attacks.  If you factor in a 10%-30% loss of supplies, the results just get that much worse, that much sooner.  Also, follow on transport of heavy equipment, as opposed to supplies, further eats into the resupply numbers.  Loss of an amphibious ship was not considered.

How many lifts per day can we get?  That depends on distance.  The farther off shore the amphibious force sits, the fewer daily lifts.  I estimated three per day.  Maybe it will only be two.  Maybe it will be four.  It won’t greatly affect the outcome.  The assault will stall out in a matter of a few to several days.

Every pre-conflict estimate of supply usage in history has been woefully underestimated.  I used GAB’s ballpark supply requirements but the reality is that much more would be needed.

The takeaway from this little exercise is that our concept of how an assault will go is ludicrously optimistic and basically assumes that the enemy will have no adverse affect on our assault.  For an unopposed landing that’s fine but even then we seem to have barely enough assets and cannot afford any mechanical losses.  For an opposed landing, our assumptions are badly flawed.  I don’t see how we can carry out even a moderately opposed landing with the resources and assets we currently have and the doctrine we currently use.

My contention, regardless of what the Marines might say or want to believe, is that the Marines are limited by lift and resupply constraints to being a low intensity, short duration, light infantry assault force.  While there’s certainly a use for that type of force, that’s a far cry from the traditional amphibious assault force and begs the question, what role will, or can, the Marines play in an all out, high end war?  The answer would seem to be, not much of a role.  The follow up question is, given the limited role the Marines seem able to play, can we continue to justify multi-billion dollar amphibious ships?

If you want to comment on this, do it with facts not general platitudes about how important Marines are.  Also, please note that this post is an observation about the current state of affairs rather than a statement of position on my part.  I’m neither supporting nor criticizing any particular amphibious philosophy.  I’m just trying to objectively assess the current capabilities.

A Better Amphibious Assault

ComNavOps just read a fascinating article on amphibious assault written by a recently retired Marine infantry officer with 29 years service and currently working as a professor at the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership of the U.S. Naval War College.  I don’t know enough to comment on the effectiveness or desirability of the specific suggestions but that’s not the point, here.  The point is that this is one of the rare articles I’ve come across that provides alternative thinking to the more-of-the-same approach that the Navy and Marines seem to have fallen into.  Regular followers of this blog know that ComNavOps is highly critical of the Navy/Marines lack of a coherent conceptual approach to amphibious assaults.  I encourage you to follow the link at the bottom of the post and read the entire article (it’s short!) and draw your own conclusions.  At the very least, the author’s credentials and experience confer an element of authority to his ideas that warrants serious consideration.

As a very brief summary, the author describes the shortcomings of today’s amphibious assault operations and offers three suggestions for quickly and economically improving our capabilities.

“First, procure Air-Supported Vessel (ASV) landing craft to conduct STSM for ground forces. Effects Ships International, a Norwegian builder, has plans for an LCU replacement that will “scream” to the beach at 50 knots, fully loaded, from hundreds of miles offshore.”

“Second, take advantage of the capabilities of the LCAC by having the Marine Corps build combat formations around the LAV-25 or similar mobile, armored combat vehicle instead of AAVs.”

“Finally, the naval services must reestablish the “vertical envelopment” capability that disappeared decades ago. The remaining two-thirds of the Corps should be equipped with vehicles that can be transported internally by the MV-22. American businesses already offer these highly capable vehicles off-the-shelf.”

This one is well worth the few minutes it takes to read. 

(1) War On The Rocks, http://warontherocks.com/2013/09/amphibious-ops-in-the-21st-century/ , David Fuquea, 17-Sep-2013

Amphibious Connector Update

Here's a quick supplemental update to our previous post on amphibious ship to shore connectors.

Defense Industry Daily (1) maintains an ongoing article about the Navy’s future Ship to Shore Connector (SSC) hovercraft landing vehicle.  The SSC appears to be a beefed up version of the venerable LCAC.  Interesting tidbits from the article include:

• Initial plans call for a build of 72 production craft
• Specifications cite a 25 mile delivery range
• Same length and beam as the LCAC
• Textron (New Orleans) has a $213M contract to produce the first craft.  The contract includes design and training among other things so this is not a representative production price.  The contract includes options for up to 8 hovercraft at a total contract price of $570M ($71M each) which gives a better idea of the production cost.



SSC - LCAC's Successor



Note that the original LCAC production run was 91 compared to the planned run of 72 for the SSC.  Does this reflect a decreased emphasis on waterborne delivery, a recognition of fewer well deck capable ships (LHA-6, for instance) in the future, or something else?  On the face of it, the smaller production run suggests less waterborne assault capacity but I’m unsure what the Navy/Marines reasoning is.  Yet another program we'll be keeping an eye on.

(1) http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Ship-to-Shore-Connector-the-USNs-New-Hovercraft-07460/#more-7460

Amphibious Connectors

An amphibious assault?  We all have the mental image of hulking amphibious ships lurking on the horizon and Marines storming the beach.  But how did the Marines get from the ship to the beach?  Well, a variety of ways, I guess, from the futuristic (though they’re actually getting quite dated!) looking Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) hovercraft to the ubiquitous Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) to helos and now MV-22 Ospreys among other means.  All of these vehicles can be collectively referred to as connectors.  Simply put, the connector is the transport between the ship and shore.

The connector has the potential to be both a potent enabler of the amphibious assault force as well as a  bottleneck and vulnerability.

As an enabler, the connector should be able to transport Marines and their gear quickly, safely, and, ideally, with a little bit of inherent firepower to provide some support at the point of landing.  The Marines should land in good physical shape and intimately integrated with their gear.  In other words, they should be landed in peak physical readiness for battle.

As a weakness, the connector represents a potential bottleneck if there are too few connectors to transport sufficient numbers of Marines and weight of gear in a given time frame.  Marines and gear sitting piled up on ship waiting around for connector transport are a recipe for disaster. 



LCAC



Similarly, the connector represents a possible vulnerability.  Just as naval tacticians recognize that it’s far better to shoot archers than arrows, so too would any enemy recognize that it’s far more efficient to kill loaded connectors rather than deal with landed Marines.  Unfortunately, current connectors are slow and unarmored for practical purposes relative to the modern missile age.

The current connectors are aging rapidly and most are only marginally suited for the modern battlefield.  The AAV has been serving since the early 1970’s.  The AAV’s long anticipated replacement, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is now a dead program with no other replacement in sight.  The LCAC entered service in the mid 1980’s and only 91 were built.  In addition, they’re large, slow (relative to missiles), attractive targets.    MV-22s are great for rapid transport of troops but can’t carry heavy gear.  The CH-53E heavy lift helo entered service in 1981 and airframes are being used up rapidly.  And so on …

All right, so the existing connectors are aging and ill-suited.  Can’t we just design new ones?  Well, therein lies the initial problem and the crux of this discussion.  What basic conceptual design is needed?  Do we need a traditional short range amphibious vehicle or do we need a very long range, way-over-the-horizon vehicle?  Are we doing traditional beachfront assaults or airborne, inland, maneuver warfare assaults? 



Cancelled EFV



The Marines tried to develop the EFV which is a short range beachfront assault vehicle despite the fact that both the Navy and Marines have stated that amphibious ships can’t survive within 50 miles of a defended beach due to the proliferation of shore launched anti-ship missiles.  In fact, for a decade or more, the Marines have embraced behind-the-lines, bypass-the-beach, maneuver warfare doctrine.  That being the case, why have they been fixated on the EFV?  Even now, with the cancellation of the EFV, they seem to be looking for yet another short range, slow, AAV-like replacement, suggesting a continued emphasis on short range beachfront assaults which is at odds with public statements regarding assault distances. 



On the other hand, the Navy is currently building a new class of amphibious ship (LHA-6) that doesn’t even have a well deck!  OK, so that means we’re going to be doing long range airborne assaults, right?  That’s fine except how do you transport M-1 Abrams tanks and all the other Marine combat vehicles and tons of gear and supplies by air?  The MV-22 can carry troops but not much more.  But wait a minute, didn’t the Navy just build an entire class of new LPD-17 class amphibious ships with well decks?  So, I guess we are doing beachfront assaults.

You see the problem?  I don’t think the Navy and Marines currently have a clear consensus on what type of assault operations they want to conduct in the future.  Of course, they could just opt to try and cover all possible scenarios but the cost of that would be staggering.

The Navy and Marines need to agree on how amphibious assaults will be conducted in the future and then start designing new connectors that complement that vision.

On a related note, here are some capacity/range figures for aerial connectors as cited in an NPS thesis (1).

MV-22

5 ton external, 50 nm range

10 ton internal, 100 nm range

CH-53E

18 ton external, 215 nm range

15 ton internal, 230 nm range

(1) Naval Postgraduate School, Thesis:  Cost Benefit and Capability Analysis of Sea-Base Connectors, Justin Dowd, Sep 2009, p. 17-18