Ship Defense

The Navy’s trend in ship design has been towards lighter and lighter built ships with less and less defensive capabilities.  Well, let’s step in and put a stop to that!  Since the Navy clearly doesn’t know how to design a ship with defensive capabilities, let’s do it for them.
 
We’re all familiar with the concept of a carrier group’s layered defense.  Aircraft provide wide ranging defense against search aircraft and provide the initial defensive layer against an attack.  Standard missiles offer the possibility of very long range intercepts.  Escort ships range dozens of miles out to provide extended ASW and AAW protection.  Medium range defense is provided by closer escorts and medium range defensive missiles.  Various missiles, electronic warfare systems, and CIWS provide close in defense.
 
Similarly, an individual ship’s defense should consist of more – much more! – than just Standard/ESSM missiles and one or two RAM/SeaRAM, as the Navy seems to believe.  A ship’s defense should be a multi-faceted, layered construct.  Let’s consider the individual components.
 
 
Outer Layer
 

• UAVs – small, stealthy, wide ranging UAVs providing passive aerial sensor coverage
• Standard Missiles – long range anti-air defense
• Passive Sonar – long range detection
• EO/IR – long range visual and infrared detection integrated into a 360 deg hemispherical sensor system
• ESM – very long range signals analysis (Outboard/COBLU and S-3 Shadow type sensing) providing detection and triangulation
• Stealth – do all the above without, in turn, being detected

 
Middle Layer
 

• EO/IR - medium range visual and infrared detection integrated into a 360 deg hemispherical sensor system combined with fire control
• ESSM – medium range anti-air defense
• EW/ECM – detection, jamming, spoofing, etc.
• Stealth – do all the above without, in turn, being detected

 
Inner Layer
 

• EW/ECM – point defense jamming, spoofing, etc.
• RAM/SeaRAM – close in anti-air defense
• CIWS – close in anti-air defense
• Decoys – integrated into Aegis
• Stealth – do all the above without, in turn, being detected

 
 
A few supplementary comments are warranted:
 
Sensors – 360 degree EO/IR with targeting capability (IRST) in addition to supplement and largely replace radar.  Such a system would involve far more than the current one EO sensor on ships today.  This would be several, perhaps dozens, of sensors each scanning a portion of the sky and acting as a single, integrated system.  During war, this may actually be the main sensor system so that the ship doesn’t have to radiate.
 
UAVs – This has been posted on previously.  Every ship should sail with several dozen small, stealthy, passive UAVs for establishing situational awareness.  These are cheap and expendable.  They must be stealthy.  It’s pointless to try to establish situational awareness if doing so gives away your own position.  We must be able to see without being seen.
 
Long range missiles – I hesitate to even include long range missiles as I believe their use will be quite limited, bordering on never.  No enemy is going to present high altitude targets other than ballistic missiles which are a special case.  So many people forget that long range missiles can only engage high altitude targets because of the radar horizon limitation.  Beyond the radar horizon, radar can only see targets at altitude. 
 
Close In – Attackers will get through.  It’s guaranteed.  Even in scripted exercises, they always do.  Every ship should have several to dozens of close in weapon systems instead of the nearly useless single (or no!) close in weapon on today’s ships.
 
Inner Layer - The inner layer has the most components and yet the Navy devotes the least amount of effort and resources to it.  The Zumwalt has no close in weapons.  The DDG(X) concept graphic has only two RAM launchers for close in defense.  The Burkes have only one CIWS.
 
EW/ECM is the most common and, historically, the most effective anti-air component and yet the Navy devotes very little attention or resources to it.  Even the current SEWIP upgrades are a limited effort, poorly executed.
 
Focus - So, what does the Navy focus its attention and resources on?  That’s right, the most expensive and least likely to be used component:  long range missiles.

LCS and Ford Self-Defense Untested

The LCS program problems are many and, generally, well known.  Still, there are aspects that are surprising even for this troubled program.  One such issue is the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) anti-air defense weapon for the Freedom class LCS.  The issue is that the RAM system has not been tested on the Freedom class and the Navy has decided not to conduct any tests.

 

Both LCS seaframes have limited anti-ship missile self-defense capability.  The Navy has not fully tested these combat systems and the Navy does not plan to conduct further air warfare operational testing of Freedom seaframes 1 through 15 in their current combat system  configuration. The Navy has accepted the risk of continued operation with a combat system that is not operationally tested. (1, p.190)

 

No tests – that’s worse than the WWII torpedo fiasco!

 

This may also partially explain why the Navy is trying to retire the first fifteen or so Freedom class LCS.

 

The DOT&E testing also mentions a vital issue that ComNavOps has harped on and that is performance of radars and missiles in the face of debris-filled skies during attempted intercepts.  To briefly summarize the problem, many people feel that ships can simply vomit forth dozens of missiles, simultaneously, at any single target.  The reality, however, is that only two missiles at a time can be effectively utilized because the explosions from the initial intercepts will fill the skies with radar-reflecting debris and hot (IR) sources and subsequent intercepts will be blinded.  DOT&E notes this problem in one of their LCS recommendations:

 

Correct the SSDS scheduling function to preclude interference with the RAM infrared guidance capability stemming from prior intercepts and warhead detonations. [emphasis added] (1, p.209)

 

The refusal by the Navy to conduct tests of the anti-air system is also seen in the USS Ford self-defense testing.  Significant problems were found with the ‘Slick’ 32 electronic warfare (EW) system, the SPY-3 radar, and the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC).

 

The Navy conducted developmental and operational tests on the Self-Defense Test Ship (SDTS) that revealed combat system deficiencies and limitations associated with the SLQ-32(V)6 electronic warfare system, the SPY-3 Multi-Function Radar (MFR), and the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). These deficiencies and limitations reduce the overall self-defense capability of the ship. The Navy has conducted only one of the four planned CVN 78 SDTS operational test events and has not resourced [funded] the remaining testing. [emphasis added] (2, p.123)

 

In June 2019, the Navy conducted one of the four planned CVN 78 operational tests planned for FY19 on the SDTS.  However, the remaining three tests are unlikely to be conducted in accordance with the DOT&E-approved CVN 78 data collection plan, the DOT&E-approved Capstone Enterprise Air Warfare Ship Self-Defense TEMP, and the DOT&E-approved SSDS TEMP. The Navy canceled one test event because they did not incorporate software changes required to conduct the test on the SDTS and the event was not resourced [funded]. The Navy delayed another test event due to poor SLQ-32(V)6 performance in developmental testing. The final, most challenging test event planned for 2QFY20 is not currently funded. The Navy may have to cancel the remaining delayed/unfunded events if they are not conducted before the MFR is removed from the SDTS; this removal is currently planned for the end of 2QFY20. If the Navy does not conduct all of the remaining events, testing will not be adequate to assess the operational effectiveness of the CVN 78 combat system. 

 

So, the Navy’s solution to finding problems is to stop testing.  Yeah, that sounds about right.

This is telling us that the Navy knows the ship self-defense systems have serious problems but, for reasons unknown, refuses to further test the systems.  Presumably, the reason is that the Navy knows that the system problems are serious and, at the moment, unsolvable, and further testing would only reveal more problems that the Navy already knows about.  In other words, from the Navy’s perspective, why spend money testing when you already know the results will be bad?  I have no problem with this scenario if the Navy is working to correct the problems.  Unfortunately, there is no evidence of that they are doing so.  In fact, the total cessation of funding suggests that the Navy is simply going to accept the problems and make no effort to fix them.

 

In addition to halting physical tests, the Navy has also halted its modeling efforts which were supposed to have taken the place of physical testing.

 

The Navy’s refusal to conduct anti-air tests also highlights the recent post about Intellectual Property rights and the problems the Navy has encountered in trying to acquire them (see, “The Navy and Intellectual Property”).  In an irresponsible attempt to cut costs, the Navy is attempting to shift from physical testing to modeling and simulation (M&S) but, in order to do so, they must have detailed design and engineering data and companies are frequently refusing to provide that.

The Navy has neither resourced nor conducted any air warfare test events against anti-ship cruise missile surrogates planned as part of the DOT&E-approved Enterprise Air Warfare Ship Self-Defense Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) or the LCS TEMP. The Navy’s Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems halted all work to develop a Probability of Raid Annihilation (PRA) M&S [Modeling and Simulation] suite of the combat systems in FY15 and has not yet restarted the effort. [emphasis added] (2, p.141)

 

DOT&E noted in its 2017 annual report that the Navy has halted funding for attempts to model the LCS combat system due to system component data rights being unavailable:

 

The Navy halted all work to develop a PRA M&S suite of LCS combat systems in FY15 because some combat system element models (e.g., radars) were not available. (1, p.190)

 

DOT&E noted in its 2019 annual report that the Navy has halted funding for attempts to model the Ford combat system due to system component data rights being unavailable:

 

The Navy has not resourced [funded] combat system testing on the lead ship or the modeling and simulation (M&S) required to support evaluation of the ship’s Probability of Raid Annihilation (PRA) requirement. (2, p.124)

 

 

Conclusion

 

The decision to drop physical testing in favor of modeling is purely a budget driven attempt to save money.  However, moving to a modeling approach to testing has run into the issue of intellectual property rights.  The Navy’s conflict with industry about intellectual property rights is complex and challenging.  Both sides have very valid concerns.  The Navy needs the data rights in order to conduct modeling and simulation but industry, quite rightly, has no desire to give away its hard-earned competitive advantages which is exactly what would happen.  Of course, if the Navy would show an ounce of wisdom, they’d return to actual performance testing and the data rights issue would be largely moot.

 

The result of all this is that Navy leadership is knowingly sending combat systems to the fleet untested.  That’s an obvious recipe for disaster when combat comes.  This violates the trust of the sailors under their command and constitutes dereliction of duty.

  

 

 

________________________________ 

(1)Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2017 Annual Report

(2)Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2019 Annual Report

Zumwalt Status Update

The Zumwalt has finally finished its combat system installation and activation and testing is currently taking place at Pearl Harbor.  At last, nine years after physical construction began, Zumwalt is nearly physically complete and functional.  To celebrate, let’s briefly recap the ship’s history and check its current status.  Here’s a timeline of the ship’s major events.

Event	Year	Comment
Laid Down	2011	Beginning of physical construction
Launched	2013
Delivery	2016	Delivered incomplete; Phase II of construction pending
Fake Commissioning	2016
Transit to Homeport San Diego	2016	Lost power due to water leak in lube oil; had to be towed
San Diego Fitting Out	2016	Phase II construction and initial combat system install
PR Cruise	2019	Public relations cruise and transfer to Pearl Harbor for combat systems installation
Combat Systems Installation and Activation	2019	Combat systems installation and testing at Pearl Harbor
Real Commissioning	2020	Commission granted by ComNavOps

So, nine years to complete the ship.  Hmmm …  How are we going to replace lost ships in a war?  We should be seriously examining our ship designs and asking why it takes nine years to build a ship.  But, I digress …

Let’s quickly review the ship’s status.

Weapons.  The major problem with the Zumwalt is that it has very little in the way of weapons which means it has only limited use in combat.  The ship’s main weapon, Advanced Gun System (AGS) - the weapon the entire ship was designed around – is non-functional due to cancellation of the only ammunition the gun could fire, the LRLAP round.  That leaves the ship with a total weapons fit of the following:

• 80x Mk57 VLS cells
• 2x 30mm machine guns

Note the complete absence of any point defense weapons like CIWS or RAM/SeaRAM.  This is not a ship that stands a good chance of survival in combat. 

Worse, we’ve discussed that the Zumwalt’s VLS cells have only limited capability because it doesn’t have the full Aegis combat system software.  Currently, Zumwalt does not have Tomahawk or Standard missile launch capability although the Navy requested funds from Congress to integrate the Tomahawk capability.(2)  What does that leave?  I guess the ship is a giant ESSM barge.

On the ‘plus’ side, the Zumwalt just conducted its first live fire of its 30 mm machine guns, only four years after being commissioned! (3)

You’ll also note that the Zumwalt has no offensive weapon capability since the guns are non-functional and Tomahawk missiles are not supported.  So, that leaves Zumwalt as a purely defensive ship whose self-defense system is also non-functional (see the next section).

Ship Self-Defense System.  Due to the lack of illuminators and the decision to delete half of the Dual Band Radar, the Zumwalt has no functional missile guidance system.  The Navy is currently trying to modify missiles with the Joint Universal Weapons Link to accept radar guidance from the SPY-3 but that, in turn, appears to be negatively impacting radar performance (see, “Zumwalt Self-Defense Problems”).  The upshot is that Zumwalt’s self-defense system is non-functional.

Crew Size.  Zumwalt, like the LCS, was designed for minimal manning with a crew of around 140 on a cruiser size ship with a displacement of 16,000 tons.  By comparison, the Burke has a crew of 320 and a displacement of 9200 tons.  As the LCS has demonstrated, minimal manning has been an abject failure in every respect.  When the lack of point defense is combined with the lack of crew for damage control the situation is even worse.

Ballistic Missile Defense.  Information on the Zumwalt’s BMD capability, or lack thereof, is sketchy and confusing.  The Navy has, at various times, stated that the Zumwalt is capable of firing the Standard missile family and is not capable of operating Standard missiles.  What this appears to mean is that although the VLS cells can launch physically launch a Standard missile, they cannot be guided because the ship lacks the Aegis combat system which provides the missile guidance.  Regardless of the physical ability of the ship to eject a Standard missile from the VLS cells, it appears that the ship has no BMD capability due to a lack of BMD software in its combat system.

Experimental Squadron.  For the moment, the Navy plans to use the Zumwalt as a test bed for an unmanned squadron of ships that will include the first four LCS, DARPA’s Sea Hunter, and the Zumwalts.(1)  Wow!  What a collection of misfits!

Stealth.  Supposedly the ship’s most important attribute, stealth, was going to allow the ship to sit close inshore and rain death on our enemies while remaining undetected.  Setting aside the fantasy level of thinking contained therein, even the stealth has been degraded.  While the first two ships were constructed with a resin-wood composite deckhouse that supposedly had special stealth characteristics, the third and final ship was built with a standard steel deckhouse.  What’s more, the final fitting of the ship reveals that non-stealthy platforms, masts, sensors, and antennae have sprouted on the ship like mushrooms and have, presumably, negatively impacted whatever stealth the ship may have had.

Note all the non-stealthy projections, masts, platforms, antennae, etc.

Summary

Well, there you have it.  That’s what a $25B+ program gets you – a ship with no offensive weapons, no functional self-defense, no point defense, degraded stealth, and a crew too small to fight the ship and execute damage control.

_____________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Navy Stands Up Surface Development Squadron for DDG-1000, Unmanned Experimentation”, Megan Eckstein, 22-May-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/05/22/navy-stands-up-surface-development-squadron-for-ddg-1000-unmanned-experimentation

National Interest website, “Drones Are Giving The Troubled Zumwalt Destroyer A Place In The Navy's Strategy”, David Axe, 2-May-2020,

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/drones-are-giving-troubled-zumwalt-destroyer-place-navys-strategy-149866

(3)MilitaryLeak blog, 21-May-2020,

https://militaryleak.com/2020/05/21/us-navys-uss-zumwalt-completes-first-live-fire-test/

Zumwalt Self-Defense System Problems

We all know the story of the Zumwalt debacle in which the Navy built a ship with a main weapon that, despite using an Army/NATO/world standard 155 mm caliber gun, was completely incompatible with any other artillery system and, when the unique munition for the Zumwalt gun failed in performance and demonstrated runaway costs, left the Zumwalt with no functional main weapon.  Well, it now appears that the Zumwalt’s firepower problems extend to its self-defense capability, as well.

According to the 2019 DOT&E Annual Report (1), the Zumwalt is experiencing severe problems with the ship’s self-defense system – severe enough to render the system nearly useless. 

The Navy has discovered severe problems during the DDG 1000 SDTS [ed. Self Defense Test Ship] events that will adversely affect the operational effectiveness of the combat system if not corrected.  Consequently, the Navy has put the test program on hold and is currently working to identify the root cause of these problems. (1)

The report does not identify the specific problem(s), presumably for security reasons.  However, the magnitude of the problems can be gleaned from the status of the self-defense testing program,

The Navy conducted 4 of the 10 DDG 1000 tests planned for the Self-Defense Test Ship (SDTS) (3 of 6 planned developmental tests, and 1 of 4 planned integrated developmental and operational tests). The Navy canceled one integrated test event and one developmental test event because of unacceptably low performance predictions. (1)

The fact that testing could not proceed even by the Navy’s demonstrably lax standards is incredibly damning.  We also know that Navy performance predictions are always excessively exaggerated so if their own predictions were too low to justify continued testing, they must have been truly horrible.  We’ve seen the Navy routinely push poor performing systems along in order to avoid jeopardizing funding so, again, the fact that the Navy would cancel tests suggests staggeringly bad performance and very serious problems.

As I said, the report does not specify the problems so we are left to speculate.  Just for fun, let’s try to reason out the problem, shall we?

As the report describes, the system consists of several components (1):

• Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) – The command and control architecture unique to Zumwalt.
• Multi-Function Radar (SPY-3) – The new X-band radar going on DDG 1000-class guided-missile destroyers and the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78).
• Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) – The tracker and sensor data fusion and distribution system.
• Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 2 (SLQ-32B(V)6) – The passive electronic sensor used to detect and identify hostile radars.
• Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block 1 with Joint Universal Weapon Link (JUWL) – The short-range missile interceptor used to defeat air threats at close-in ranges, and the system used for radar-missile communication and support.  Within the U.S. Navy, only the DDG 1000-class ships and the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) use ESSM with JUWL.
• Standard Missile 2 (SM-2 Block IIIAZ) with JUWL – The unique Zumwalt variant of SM-2 used to defeat air threats at longer ranges.
• MK 57 Vertical Launch System (VLS) - The DDG 1000-only vertical missile launcher variant.

So, presumably the problem lies with one or more of the components on that list.  Let’s consider the likelihood of each component being the problem (or part of it).

Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) – This is just the ship’s internal network and it’s been installed on various ships/classes for some time and has functioned without notable problems.  This seems very unlikely to be the problem.

Multi-Function Radar (MFR/SPY-3) – The radar is untested.

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) – This has been around for many years and has been installed on many platforms.  It is very unlikely to be the problem.

Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 2 (SLQ-32B(V)6) – This has been a separate developmental effort and has been reported to have some typical developmental problems but nothing all that severe.  The system has been in development for some time and its issues are well known and would not likely trigger surprise cancellation of the Zumwalt self-defense program.  In addition, it is independent of the active defenses.  This is almost certainly not the problem.

Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block 1 with Joint Universal Weapon Link (JUWL) – ESSM has been around for some time, has been extensively test, by Navy standards, and has reportedly performed well.  It is highly unlikely that the missile, itself, is the problem.  However, the guidance data link appears to be brand new and untested.

Standard Missile 2 (SM-2 Block IIIAZ) with JUWL – SM-2 variants have been around for some time and have been extensively tested, at least by Navy standards.  It is unlikely that the SM-2 is the problem.  However, the guidance data link appears to be brand new and untested.

MK 57 Vertical Launch System (VLS) - The VLS has not been extensively tested but, other than failure to launch, would be unlikely to cause severe problems and a systematic failure to launch issue would, undoubtedly, have been noted and reported before now since it would be too big and obvious a problem not to be publicly noted and reported.  Further, a launch failure does not fall into the category of predictable performance problems which the report refers to.  Therefore, this is not the problem.

So, what did that little analysis leave us with?  The only candidates for problems are the SPY-3 radar and the JUWL guidance link.  Either could be a likely source of predictable failure. 

As you may recall, the Zumwalt was originally supposed to have the Dual Band Radar (DBR) which consists of the SPY-4 (S band) volume search radar and the SPY-3 (X band) horizon search radar.  The SPY-4 was deleted from the Zumwalt design as a cost saving measure.  As a result, the SPY-3 was to be reprogrammed to selectively perform volume search or (and?) its intended horizon search function.  The functionality was to be operator selectable.

It seems quite plausible that the intended modifications to perform volume search have proven to be problematic.  The volume search was not intended, not designed into the SPY-3, and has had an extremely abbreviated development and testing schedule.  It is reasonable to believe that now that Zumwalt is undergoing actual combat system tests, the previously untested radar is demonstrating poor performance.

The other problem candidate, the Joint Universal Weapon Link, is also a plausible trouble source.  Again, it is unique and untested.  However, weapon guidance links are relatively straightforward communication technologies and relatively easy to correct, one would think.  So, this is certainly a possible problem point but seems much less likely than the SPY-3.

The other potentially problematic aspect to the JUWL is the mechanism of transmission.  Assuming the SPY-3 is being used to transmit the JUWL guidance commands, it is possible that the demands of the simultaneous dual guidance/tracking functions are not working together correctly.  If so, this again leads us back to a flawed SPY-3.

Therefore, the logical conclusion is that the Zumwalt is experiencing severe problems with the SPY-3 radar.

Ominously, the SPY-3 is also installed on the Ford which has not yet tested its combat systems.  More problems to come for the Ford?

Zumwalt SPY-3/4

If all of the above speculation is correct, there is even worse news.  The Navy has been testing the SPY-3 on the Self Defense Test Ship (SDTS) but is planning to remove the SPY-3.  From the DOT&E report,

The Navy plans to remove the SPY-3 radar and TSCE computer equipment on the SDTS at the end of 2QFY20. (1)

Whatever problems the SPY-3 has, the Navy’s best hope of solving them lies with exercising the SDTS with the SPY-3 installed.  Removing it may greatly hinder or totally prevent diagnosis and correction of the problem(s).  Removing the SPY-3 does not seem prudent or wise but when has the Navy ever been accused of wisdom?

The poor Zumwalt program can’t seem to catch a break, can it?  Aside from the complete failure of its main weapon system, it’s had problems with power generation/distribution (which was supposed to be a strength of the design), ship handling concerns in certain seas, and now its self-defense system is useless.  Think about it, though – is it really bad breaks or is it just a very bad design concept showing its inherent and utterly predictable problems and failures?

We’ll be keeping an eye on this one.

_________________________________

(1)Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, “FY2019 Annual Report”, 20-Dec-2019, p.159-60

ESSM Distributed Lethality

We’ve talked repeatedly about how the US military is abandoning high end, heavy combat in favor of low end “combat”.  While much of the most obvious examples of this trend are within the ground combat community, the Navy is following the same path.  For example, the Navy retired an entire class of Perry frigates and replaced them with an almost non-combat-capable class of LCS. 

We’ve also discussed the absence of critical and logical operational and tactical thinking that plagues the entire military.  We’ve shown that the military has abandoned strategic thinking and is no longer capable of devising sound strategic plans.

Finally, we’ve discussed the myopic focus on technology at the expense of operations and tactics.

Now, the latest issue of Proceedings shows us another example illustrating these trends (1).  Cdr. Lukacs suggests converting the Navy’s amphibious ships (the LXX vessels) into anti-surface warfare (ASuW) ships using the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) controlled by the Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) combat software program.

For starters, let’s set aside the fact that the SSDS has been plagued by problems and, according to DOT&E’s annual reports, can’t even properly perform its intended defensive purpose.  Problems include poor sensor placement, legacy sensor integration issues, target detection and identification issues, weapon employment and guidance issues, and ESSM performance issues.  Thus, the author wants to begin modifying the SSDS to perform offensive warfare before the system’s primary function is even working – but we’ll set that aside for the purpose of this discussion.

Moving on, the author proposes utilizing the ESSM for offensive warfare.  The proposed list of candidate ESSM offensive warfare ships includes carriers and all amphibious ships.  Certainly, the ESSM can be used to hit a slow moving target (a ship) with the proper software modifications.  The question, though, is whether this is a good idea and a worthwhile use of time and limited funds, given all the other problems the Navy faces.

Let’s start with the missile, itself.  The RIM-162 ESSM is 12 ft long, 10 in. diameter, and weighs 620 lbs.  It has an 86 lb blast fragmentation warhead with a proximity fuze.  Guidance is provided by mid-course datalink and terminal semi-active radar homing.  Speed is Mach 4 and range is 27 nm.  The missile costs around $1.5M.

As best I can interpret it, the 86 lb warhead is not 86 lbs of explosive but, rather, the total weight of the warhead which is mainly the “fragmentation” component.  The actual explosive weight is some fraction of the total.  Note that I may be misinterpreting this and some reader may be able to shed more light on this.

The first thing to look at in assessing an anti-surface weapon is lethality.  A 0.50 cal. machine gun, for example, despite having a high rate of fire, has almost no lethality in the anti-ship role.  The ESSM, being a fragmentation weapon, has limited lethality.  Shrapnel can disable topside electronics but has very little lethality against a ship.

Even the Standard missile, which has an anti-surface mode, is considered a marginal anti-ship weapon and the ESSM is a much smaller, less capable anti-ship weapon than that.  As the author states,

“While possessing only a fraction of the range and carrying one-third the warhead of the SM-6, …”

So, the ESSM is somewhere between ineffective and marginally effective in terms of lethality.  The obvious question, then, is why pursue it?  Well, in continuing the author’s statement, above,

“While possessing only a fraction of the range and carrying one-third the warhead of the SM-6, this missile is nonetheless fast, maneuverable, …”

So, the author views the ESSM’s speed and maneuverability as positive attributes of an anti-ship weapon.  I agree.  However, the missile’s maneuverability is designed to allow it to engage incoming missiles.  It has no maneuverability in an anti-ship mode – it flies straight at the target.  It has no terminal evasive maneuver capability.  Possibly some kind of terminal evasion routine could be programmed into the missile but that would require a new developmental effort and raises questions like whether the missile could maintain communications links and target lock.  The missile was designed to bore straight in at the target (incoming missile) while maneuvering just enough to achieve intercept.  It was not designed for evasive maneuvers.  Thus, the author’s contention that the missile’s speed and maneuverability are positive attributes is only half right.  The speed is a benefit but the maneuverability does not apply in the anti-ship role.

ESSM - Offensive Weapon?

The lack of terminal evasion capability renders the missile susceptible to the target ship’s defenses.

So, the ESSM is marginally effective in terms of speed and maneuverability.  The obvious question, then, is why pursue it? 

The next question to look at in assessing an anti-ship weapon is range.  The reported range of the ESSM is 27 nm.  Of course, that’s the range against an aerial target and it assumes a viable means of target detection and designation.  Remember that the author proposes installing the ESSM on carriers and amphibious ships, neither of which possess any particularly useful long range surface radar.  Thus, the effective anti-ship range is probably around the radar horizon, perhaps 15-20 miles.  Is this useful, tactically?  As the author puts it,

“If, however, an SSDS-equipped HVU [High Value Unit] had its own ASUW capability, when an enemy combatant appeared on the horizon, the HVU could counter that ship herself, instead of retreating to safer waters or diverting her aircraft from their critical missions.  The ship would simply take care of the enemy and continue with the critical mission at hand, reducing the demand for escorts.”

The lack of tactical thought in this statement is stunning.  If an enemy ship “appears” on the horizon, our ship is probably already sinking.  Even if not, and a completely surprise encounter has occurred, the tactical reality is that a carrier or amphibious ship will be facing an enemy warship.  To believe that an amphibious ship with a handful of non-lethal ESSM missiles is going to “simply take care of the enemy” is ludicrous.  Our amphibious ship is going to simply sink. 

Hey, if we had the ESSM on our amphibious ship and could inflict some minor damage on the enemy before we sink, why not do it?  The reality is that the time, effort, money, and ship’s deck and internal volume that would be consumed by mounting an ESSM launcher is not justified by the remote possibility of inflicting some minor damage in an incredibly unlikely scenario.

Let’s not let the aircraft carrier part of this go unnoticed.  The author proposes mounting ESSM on carriers.  If a carrier is surprised by an enemy ship appearing on the horizon, one has to ask where the carrier’s aircraft have been.  The likelihood that none of the dozens and dozens of daily aircraft sorties (not to mention the E-2 Hawkeye) would have noticed an enemy ship slowly approaching the carrier during the previous day or two is vanishingly small.  This is just an absolutely illogical proposition.  This demonstrates a total absence of tactical and logical thinking.

The author proposes not just using the anti-ship ESSM in a self-defense role but using the ESSM equipped ship in an active offensive role.

“If every LSD, LPD, or LX(R) were armed with an NSSM or ESSM launcher, those ships would instantly be more relevant and could be employed offensively before and after they delivered Marines ashore.”

The author is proposing to use amphibious ships in an active offensive role before they deliver their Marines.  So, he would have us risk a multi-billion dollar ship and the entire Marine complement to go ship-hunting with a near sensor-less, short ranged, non-lethal ship and missile????  The best case scenario for this is that the amphibious ship finds a target, inflicts some minor damage, and then is sunk with the entire Marine complement.  The likely case scenario is that the amphibious ship is sunk before it can accomplish anything.

Even using a multi-billion dollar ship to go ship-hunting with a near sensor-less, short ranged, non-lethal missile after delivering its Marines is stupid and near suicidal. 

Finally, let’s consider the overall scenario.  The author proposes arming the carriers and amphibious ships with anti-surface ESSM against the possibility that enemy ships “appear” on the horizon.  How likely is that?  During war, carriers and amphibious ships will always be in groups escorted by rings of Aegis destroyers and cruisers and patrolling aircraft.  No enemy ship is going to “appear” on the horizon.  If they do, it means they’ve shot their way through all the escorts and aircraft.  An enemy ship or force powerful enough to do that isn’t going to be even momentarily bothered by a handful of ESSM missiles and will have already sunk the carrier and amphibious ships from well beyond the horizon.  There is no realistic scenario in which a single carrier or amphibious ship will be surprised by an enemy ship appearing on the horizon.  Again, this is a complete absence of tactical thought.

The author states,

“This is the exciting implication of distributed lethality taken to its logical conclusion.”

No, this is the complete absence of intelligence, logic, and tactical thought taken to its logical conclusion.

Honestly, I can’t believe the author is even in the Navy.  Sadly, he’s not alone in this kind of total absence of operational and tactical thought and blind pursuit of the next “gee-whiz, look what we can do” technology.  For instance, one or more commanders in the Navy had to have approved the author’s article and, at the very least, found it reasonable.  The Navy is raising officer-idiots with no fundamental understanding of operations and tactics. 

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(1)USNI Proceedings, “Setting the Defense on the Offensive”, Cdr. John A. Lukacs IV, Nov 2016, p.38

Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS)

Here’s a little-known system that is critical to Navy ship survivability and yet is struggling to achieve effective and reliable operation – the Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS).  SSDS is intended to be the self-defense weapons control system for all carriers, amphibious ships, and LCS.  The system comprises software and networking which links existing, legacy sensors to existing and new weapons.  Supported weapons include, notably, Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM).  In concept, any sensor or any weapon can be added to the system through software modifications.

In their 2011 Annual Report, DOT&E stated the following.

“… the ability to effectively complete the self-defense mission against the types of threats for which the overall system was designed has not been successfully demonstrated. In addition, reliability problems further degrade the ships’ ability to complete this mission.”

 

ESSM - Part of a Troubled System



Several ship classes including the LPD-17 and CVN-68 carriers have been evaluated as unable to meet their self-defense requirements.  This doesn’t mean that the system is totally inoperable, only that aspects of the threat spectrum can’t be reliably countered, as yet.  For instance, the report describes the CVN-68 problems,

“The CVN-68 ship class combat system has several problems that keep it from successfully completing the ship self-defense mission. Specific problems include deficiencies in weapon employment timelines, sensor coverage, system track management, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SeaSparrow Missile System performance, as well as deficiencies with the recommended engagement tactics provided for use against multiple ASCM threat classes.”

 

One of the common and continued problems is that the physical placement of some of the legacy sensors has proven to be sub-optimal, leading to detection difficulties in some scenarios. 

One of the major issues identified in the report is a lack of realistic threat surrogates which will allow meaningful testing.  This is a several year, standing criticism/recommendation to the Navy from DOT&E.  We’ve covered this general issue in multiple posts.  I find it disturbing that year after year the Navy somehow finds the funds to build new ships but makes little or no attempt to field realistically performing threat drones so as to test and develop the self-defense systems that will keep the new ships afloat.  The Navy’s internal priority is new construction at the expense of maintenance, training, testing, and so on.  Navy leadership has their priorities completely ass-backwards and they desperately need to wake up as Adm. Harvey urged in his farewell note to the fleet.

DOT&E issued a classified report to Congress on the SSDS program in March of 2011 describing details of the problems.

This is one of those posts about which I have no meaningful analysis beyond the Navy’s scrambled priorities.  Consider this simply interesting information that is worth keeping an eye on because it is the backbone of so many ships.