Our Future Warfighting Concept in Action

Apparently, two ships attempting transit of the Strait of Hormuz were attacked by Iranian small boats.
 

The captain of ‌a tanker said it had been approached by two Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps gunboats that fired ‌on the vessel.[1]
 
A container ship was also hit by gunfire … [1]

The vessels turned back and no injuries or significant damage was reported (so why did they turn back?).
 
What is the significance of this?  The significance is that it’s the future of our military/Navy and it’s not looking good.  This should be eye-opening and shocking for those idiots who are developing our future warfare concepts.
 
What is the foundation of our future warfare concepts?  It’s regional (if not world wide!) sensor networking resulting in total situational awareness with the sensor network intimately linked to weapons.  Nothing exists without us being aware of it and destroying it.  To be fair, the military doesn’t actually talk about destroying things when it describes our future warfare concepts.  I added that part.  The military talks about total awareness somehow, in some undefined way, giving us an advantage by rendering the enemy “confused” and that will gain us victory without any explicit mention of firepower.
 
The regional sensor network will be comprised of all manner of sensors from ships, aircraft, satellites, etc.  We will blanket the region and we’ll see everything.
 
The Middle East, and the Strait of Hormuz, in this case, is a clear example of the regional sensor network concept being applied against a third rate enemy over a very small region.  This should be as dominating an effect as is possible to get.  Iran has no sensor countermeasures.  No jamming.  No signal disruption capability.  No reported cyber attack capability.  Nothing to hinder our sensors or the regional network.  Our networked sensing should be flawless.  Perfect.  Omniscient. 
 
So … how did Iranian boats manage to attack two merchant ships and return safely to wherever they came from?  How did we not see them?  How did we not kill them seconds after they emerged from wherever they were hiding?  For that matter, how could they hide from our all-seeing, all-knowing, regional sensor network?  These are not some kind of uber-stealth vessels aided by sophisticated electronic warfare equipment.  These were some Iranians in a speedboat sailing around, pretending to be a navy – the equivalent of Boy Scouts pretending to be an Army.  The Navy claims to be able to spot periscopes at vast distances ... but not speedboats racing around confined waters?
 
The Strait of Hormuz is not the vast Pacific Ocean.  It’s a very small area and we should be able to blanket it with sensors.  That’s the whole idea of our regional sensor network.  How much more challenging will this be when we attempt it across, say, the entire first island chain when we fight China?  That’s thousands of miles and millions of square miles.  How’s that going to work if we can’t even successfully execute the concept over a tiny strait against an unresisting enemy?  And we’re basing our entire future warfare concept on this?  Yikes!
 
Hand in hand with the sensor issues, where was the firepower component?  Where were the patrolling P-8s, Triton, helicopters, ships, F-35s, drones, etc?  Where were the escorts providing protection for the merchant ships?  It’s not as if there are currently hundreds of merchant ships lined up bow to stern, transiting the strait.  It’s just a few odd ships sporadically making the attempt.  Shouldn’t we be keeping an especially close eye on them to ensure their successful passage for public relations purposes, if nothing else?  Shouldn’t we have vaporized those Iranian boats the moment they appeared?  Shouldn’t we have had firepower ready and waiting when the merchant ships radioed a warming call for help?  Could it be that we did see the boats and just had no firepower available to destroy them?  That’s pure speculation on my part and there is absolutely no indication that we ever saw the boats.
 
No matter how you attempt to spin this, it’s a very bad look for the US and a gut-level warning for our supposed military leaders who are crafting a military concept predicated on networked sensors.  We’re in trouble.
 
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “Iran Navy Warns Hormuz Shut Again; Ships Report Gunfire”, 18-Apr-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/strait-of-hormuz-iran-navy-oil-tankers/2026/04/18/id/1253365/

Armored Sensors

One of the arguments against armor on ships is that the ship’s sensors can’t be armored and allow for an easy mission kill so what’s the point of any armor?  This train of thought is illogical and idiotic but that’s not the point of this post so …
 
It is taken as an article of faith that ship’s sensors can’t be armored.  How could they be?  If they’re armored, the sensors will be blinded, right?  As we do with so many widespread beliefs, let’s examine this and see if it’s really true.
 
Where do we always start when examining anything?  That’s right: history, of course!  What can history tell us about sensors and armor?
 
 
Land combat
 
Historically, sensors, meaning eyeballs and optical aids, were protected by placement behind trees, rocks, walls, bunkers, etc.  This was highly effective armor (armor being any object or material that protects the sensor).  The sensor needed only a tiny opening in the armor to observe the relevant field of view.  A mere slit or hole was sufficient to allow the sensor to function.  If the observer wanted hemispherical sensing then he merely turned around and “re-aimed” the sensor, poking a new hole in the armor, if necessary.  We see, then, that sensors have always been ‘armored’ and their field of view unimpeded by the armor.
 
 
Tank sensors
 
Tanks offer a specific and more applicable example.  Tank sensors, originally eyeballs and optical aids but now including infrared, low light, radar, laser rangefinders, etc., are embedded inside heavy tank armor with, again, small openings aimed at the field of view.  Many tank sensors are able to rotate to allow the sensor to cover large arcs or 360 degree fields of view.  Alternatively, many tank optical sensors (eyeballs) have armored, reflective/mirrored observation blocks arranged in a circle around hatches thus providing 360 degree observation and alleviating the need to stand up in the hatch to observe the surroundings.  In addition, most tank sensors can be sealed with armored covers when not directly in use thus making the sensors highly survivable.  Finally, some sensors are duplicated around the tank so as to provide continuous 360 degree coverage (active protection radar systems, for example).  Thus, tank sensors are both physically armored and ‘armored (made survivable)’ by duplication while allowing unimpeded sensing.
 
As seen in the photo below of an Israeli Merkava tank, the optical sensor is protected in an armored box-like housing with a closeable shutter to completely protect the sensor.  The optical sensor needs only a small vertical slit opening to function.
 
Also visible is a small radar array for an active protection system.  The array face is not armored but the location ensures that the array is protected on the back and sides by the bulk of the armored turret while being able to scan the 120 degree or so field in front of it.  Thus, siting the sensor next to an armored structure (the turret) provides ‘neighborly’ protection regardless of whether the sensor housing itself is armored.  On a ship, this suggests that sensors could be similarly mounted near/next to other armored structures and gain indirect armor protection.
 

Merkava Optical Sensor with Shutter and Slit Opening,
Note Radar Array at Far Left

 
 
Ship sensors
 
WWII large caliber naval guns included armored, optical rangefinders as part of the structure of the turrets.  These were typically housed in the ‘ears’ that stuck out from the rear sides of the turrets.
 

Note the armored ‘ears’ sticking out the sides
 of the turret near the back which housed
the local, optical rangefinder components

 
Larger guns also used armored directors.  The Iowa class battleships, for example, used a pair of Mk38 directors.
 

As built, all three turrets on the Iowa class had 25 power, 46 foot (14 m) rangefinders, with Stereoscopic Mark 52 used in Turrets II and III and Coincidence Mark 53 in Turret I. The Mark 52 weighs 10,500 lbs. (4,763 kg) and cost about $100,000 US during World War II. Near focus for the Mark 52 is 5,000 yards (4,570 m) and the maximum range is 45,000 yards (41,150 m). Mark 53 was a coincidence type with a special astigmatic lens which allowed it to range in on a single point source, such as a searchlight.[1]

While lacking a reference for an exact armor description and thickness for the Mk38 battleship fire control director, US Naval Weapons notes:
 

The principle of protection for fire control may be noted;  the main battery fire controls, and particularly the main battery rangefinders, were all under armor, consistent with the armored protection of the main battery itself.[3]

This suggests that the rangefinder shared the turret’s armor of 9-19 inches.
 

Mk38 Director

Even the secondary directors were armored.  The Iowa class 5” secondary mounts were controlled by 4x Mk37 secondary fire control directors.
 

The Director was enclosed in a Shield made of 3/4 inch thick armor plate that rested on a Carriage at the bottom of the Director. The Carriage turned on roller bearings in the Roller Path on the Base Ring. The Base Ring was attached at the top of a 9 foot 4 1/2 inch diameter, 14 foot 3 inch high cylindrical Barbette of 3/4" thick specially treated steel armor plate. The mating surface of the Barbette was machined in place, after installation on the ship, to be parallel to the Turret and Mount roller paths to minimize alignment differences between the rotation axes that could affect aiming accuracy. A 22 inch diameter internal cable tube hung from the bottom of the Carriage to carry cables to the ship below. Beneath this was another 22 inch dimeter cable tube fixed to the O5 Level deck. Below this was a 31 1/2 inch diameter Director Tube of 3/4 inch thick steel that descended to the Third Deck to carry the cables down to Gun Plot.[2]

Mk37 Director

 
We see from this description that rotating, armored sensors were a common item on ships.
 
When radars were added to the directors, the radars were, of course, not armored.  Their locations, high atop the superstructures did provide a measure of protection from shrapnel but the exposed radars were susceptible to damage.  This vulnerability was mitigated by duplication;  multiple directors greatly increased the odds on director survivability.
 
On a more modern note, the Swedish Visby class corvette incorporates a retractable navigation radar.  Visby’s superstructure is not armored but there is no reason why it could not be and then the radar would be protected within the ship’s structure until needed.
 
Another example of hidden, protected sensors is the San Antonio (LPD-17) class which has its sensors enclosed in a composite mast.  The mast enclosure is not armored but does prove that sensors can be enclosed given a suitably emission-transparent surrounding material.
 
 
Ship Weapons
 
While not sensors, modern weapons have been armored or hidden from exposure without compromising their performance.  For example, the defunct Advanced Gun System (AGS) on the Zumwalt had its gun barrel hidden inside a stealth housing from which it would elevate when in use.  Similarly, several warship designs have placed missile rack launchers behind and below elevated ship sides (in a “pit”, essentially) which could easily be armored.
 

Ambassador MkIII - note missile launch 
racks in 'pit' amidships

Discussion
 
It is clear from history that sensors have commonly been protected and armored by various means without impeding the sensor’s function.  That’s just common sense.  Firepower without sensors is nearly useless so it makes sense to protect and armor the sensors, if at all possible.  It is only in recent decades that we’ve stupidly abandoned armor and protection for our weapon sensors.
 
It is clear that there is no reason why sensors can’t be housed inside armored enclosures, one way or another.  Let’s consider our current sensors. 
 
The common US Navy sensor is the flat panel radar array.  There is no reason why panels can’t be equipped with armored shutters that can slide into place when the sensor is not in use. 
 
The America class LHA uses SPS-48/49 radars but they serve no real purpose since the LHAs will always be accompanied by Burke class escorts with their Aegis SPY panel radars.  A smaller TRS-3D/4D would be perfectly appropriate for the LHAs and could easily be mounted inside rotating and/or retractable armored enclosures.
 
Ship mounted Infrared and optical (IR/EO) sensors are small and readily lend themselves to tank-like armored enclosures with small, shuttered openings for their field of view.  The sensors can be either fixed and mounted at multiple points around the ship to provide hemispherical coverage or mounted inside rotating armored cylinders for complete coverage.  Retractable mounts would be equally effective.
 
So, with a combination of armored covers, retractable sensors, rotating armored enclosures, and tank-like enclosures we could easily armor our sensors, preventing cheap mission kills from simple shrapnel.  This would be a major step towards keeping our ships fighting while taking hits – a presumed goal of every WARship design.
 
 
 
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[1]http://navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_16-50_mk7.php
 
[2] https://www.okieboat.com/Gun%20Director.html
 
[3]Norman Friedman, US Naval Weapons, Naval Institute Press, 1985, ISBN 0-87021-735-6, p.36

LRASM – A Good Half of a Weapon System

The Navy has announced that the air launched AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) is operational on the F-18 Super Hornet.  This is very good news as it now provides the non- or semi-stealthy aircraft the ability to launch from long range which enhances the survivability of the aircraft (and decreases the need for stealth?  - what do you say to that, F-35?).  LRASM is a welcome replacement for the obsolete Harpoon. 

However, the LRASM is only half of a weapon system.  The other half is sensors.  As we’ve noted many times, the longest ranged weapon in the world is useless unless you can find a target from the same range as your weapon.

Hornet and LRASM

The LRASM is reported to have a range of 200-500 miles depending on what source you want to believe.  Currently, the Navy has very few sensors (none?) capable of survivably detecting targets at that range.

As a brief reminder, the LRASM is a stealthy anti-ship cruise missile based on the AGM-158B JASSM-ER.  The missile has a 1000 lb penetrating (whatever that means) blast fragmentation warhead.  It uses multiple sensors and modes to find targets which gives it reduced dependence on GPS guidance.

LRASM is designed to detect and destroy specific targets within groups of ships by employing advanced technologies that reduce dependence on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, network links and GPS navigation in electronic warfare environments. (1)

So, this is some good news but now the Navy needs to put some work into developing a long range sensor system that can effectively and survivably operate in enemy controlled or contested air space.  Only with such a sensor system can we get the maximum benefit of the LRASM.

_________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Next-Generation Anti-Ship Missile Achieves Operational Capability with Super Hornets”, Xavier Vavasseur, 19-Dec-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/12/19/next-generation-anti-ship-missile-achieves-operational-capability-with-super-hornets

Open Ocean Ship Detection

There is a misguided and incorrect belief among some military observers that ships are a relic of a bygone era – doomed to be instantly found and sunk in any war.  The belief is that ships cannot hide from modern surveillance systems such as satellites and radar – that every ship will be instantly detected the moment it puts to sea and continuously tracked until it is sunk, presumably moments after leaving port.

Is this true?  Can ships be flawlessly detected and tracked?  Well, the US Navy certainly seems unable to detect and track giant commercial cargo ships before colliding with them.  However, that’s not the kind of detection and tracking we’re talking about.  We’re talking about finding ships at sea somewhere in the middle of an immense ocean – ships that don’t want to be found.

I’ll state the reality flat out: finding a ship in the ocean is a very difficult task and tracking it is even harder.  Now, what evidence do we have to support that statement?

You’ll recall the Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, a Boeing 777-200ER, that took off from Kuala Lumpur on March 8, 2014 and flew into the South China Sea toward Vietnam and then Beijing and completely vanished and has, thus far, eluded all search and recovery efforts.  It was flying at an altitude of 35,000 feet.  The aircraft was emitting a transponder signal in addition to being tracked on flight control radars.  As the aircraft entered Vietnamese air control, it disappeared from radar and transponder tracking.  Although it vanished from tracking, it did not immediately crash.  Instead, it appears to have radically changed course and flew for several more hours, untracked. (1)

The aircraft eventually crashed, of course, and the crash location should have been easily pinpointed but the reality was that aircraft appears to have been nowhere near its believed crash location.  A large, non-stealthy aircraft, flying at high altitude in the Indo-China region should have been as easy a tracking exercise as there is and yet the aircraft managed to vanish and fly for several more hours, undetected and untracked.  What does that suggest about our ability to track small, stealthy aircraft, perhaps flying at very low levels and taking advantage or terrain or weather conditions to intentionally evade detection?  What does that suggest about our ability to track stealthy ships, partially obscured in wave clutter and hidden to varying degrees by weather?

A similar incident occurred with an Indian Air Force An-32 which vanished from radar on 22-Jul-2016 over the Bay of Bengal.  Extensive searches for a month turned up no sign of the aircraft.  Again, a large, non-stealthy aircraft, making no attempt to hide, managed to vanish completely.

These examples involved large, high flying aircraft which were not only making no attempt to hide but carried transponders to expressly enhance the ability to track them and yet each vanished without a trace.

Let’s look at some different evidence.

You’ll recall the supposed Oct 2016 Yemen missile attacks against the USS Mason, a Burke class destroyer?  The Mason reported several missile attacks over a period of a few days.  Despite the most sophisticated air surveillance radar and sensors in the world, along with the sensors of other nearby ships and other regional surveillance assets, no other ship or asset reported detecting missiles and the Navy was unable to say whether the Mason’s surface to air missiles, fired defensively, actually hit anything.  Further, the Navy was unable to say what happened to the attacking missiles.  All this led us, in this blog, to conclude that there was no attack (see, “YemenMissile Attacks”).  If the combined sensors of multiple ships and the regional sensors in the area couldn’t even definitively state that an attack had, or had not, occurred or what became of the various missiles, how do we expect to track ships and aircraft with flawless, omniscient accuracy? 

There is also the now legendary example of the Cold War carrier group that parked off the coast of Russia and operated for several days without being detected despite extensive efforts by the Soviets. (2)  If the Soviets, no slouch in the surveillance department, couldn’t find a carrier group off its coast, how will we track modern, stealthy ships?

Let’s consider some other aspects of the detection challenge. 

How about those giant, hulking ships that the Navy keeps running into?  Sure, you’d say that wasn’t a detection issue as much as it was a failure to recognize the available data and act on it.  An alert, better trained crew would have seen the ships coming.  Fair enough.  Now, let me ask you … when we go to war will both sides have only bright, alert, well trained people or will they have loads of tired, stressed, and insufficiently trained people?

How about the Vincennes incident where an airliner was clearly recognized by the data but the crew ignored or misinterpreted the data?  Just having a functioning sensor is not the end of the detection question.  You also need people who can correctly interpret the data.  Maybe, somewhere in the reams of satellite photos, there’s a shot that vaguely shows the ship you’re searching for.  Unless a person (or computer) sees the photo and recognizes it for what it is, you missed it.

We see, then, that there is a detection chain.  You need a capable sensor, a capable analyst (human or computer), and you need to act on what’s found and do so in a timely manner.  That ship that you found in a week old satellite photo is long gone.

Radar operators at Pearl Harbor detected the incoming Japanese attack planes but didn’t recognize what it was and didn’t tell anyone.  The sensor worked but the analyst and communication links in the detection chain did not.

War is an endless series of missed and misinterpreted data.  That’s what the ‘fog of war’ is.  Sure, our modern systems can generate far more data than ever before but that’s just far more data to miss and misinterpret.  Our sensor data has grown immensely more voluminous but our analytical abilities have not.

Consider every terrorist act ever committed.  In the post-incident investigation it always turns out that we had enough data to have identified and prevented the incident but we failed to correctly interpret and communicate.  Every time.  Every single time.  The issue is not the amount of data, it’s the interpretation and analysis of the data.

The evidence is quite clear.  Our ability to find and track ships at sea is quite limited, for a variety of reasons.  Now, add in the inevitable destruction of surveillance satellites in a peer war and the task of finding and tracking ships at sea becomes even more difficult.

Ships remain what they have always been: hard to find.

____________

On a related note, this is why the dreaded Chinese Carrier Killer DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile is pure media hype and a complete non-threat.  The Chinese have no ability to find carriers at sea.

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(1)The Atlantic website, “What Really Happened To Malaysia’s Missing Airplane”, July 2019,

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/07/mh370-malaysia-airlines/590653/

(2)Navweaps website, “How To Hide A Task Force”, Andy Pico,

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-031.php

The Next Cruiser and Mini-Hawks

Here’s a bit of news that has the potential to be something good for the Navy … or astoundingly bad.

RAdm. Ronald Boxall has intimated that the ship that replaces the Ticongeroga class cruisers won’t be a cruiser. (1)  What?!!!  That’s just crazy talk!  Well, grab your bilge keel and steady out for a moment and let’s see what he’s talking about.  Here’s the actual quote,

“People are always asking: ‘What’s the next cruiser?’ ” Boxall said. “What I’m telling you is that it might not be a cruiser. What we are looking for is what do we need our surface ships to do at the big level, what do we need to do at the small level and what do we need to do with unmanned because it is a different Navy out there.”

Um, okay …  Is it just me or does that sound like typical Navy buzz-talk that sounds good and means nothing?  Yeah, it does.  Let’s go just a bit further, though, before we write this off as typical Navy garbage.

“The hull Boxall described incorporates the surface force’s emphasis on off-board sensors that radiate and target with active sensors, while using passive sensors on the ship to avoid detection.”

Okay, now we’ve got something and, amazingly, it’s something that ComNavOps can get on board with.  The idea of off-board sensors which allows the host ship to remain silent is excellent.  Of course, the devil is always in the details and the article presented none.  However, when has the lack of details ever stopped ComNavOps from analyzing?  Since the Navy isn’t offering any details and, indeed, likely has none, ComNavOps will offer his own so that we can discuss the concept.

Recall that one of the tactics of carrier E-2 Hawkeye operations is to move well off from the carrier’s location and radiate while the carrier remains silent.  Thus, the carrier gains the benefit of radar awareness while remaining hidden.  In a very similar fashion, if a surface ship could send “mini-Hawkeyes” out to sense the surroundings while remaining electromagnetically quiet (EMCON), that would be a tremendous advantage.

What, you ask, is a “mini-Hawkeye”?  Well, that’s the devil rising from the details, isn’t it?  So, a “mini-Hawkeye” would have to be some type of unmanned, small, cheap sensor in order to effectively accomplish the task.  Let’s look at the “mini-Hawkeye’s” (mini-hawk) characteristics and see if the characteristics lead us to a description.

Size – A surface ship is not a carrier and even the biggest have very small flight decks.  So, a mini-hawk would have to be small – small enough to operate from a surface ship and small enough to be stored in large numbers on a ship.

Numbers – Related to size is numbers.  These sensors are likely to have a high attrition/loss rate so each ship needs to be able to store and operate large numbers.  In fact, one could easily imagine scenarios in which the mini-hawks are sent on intentional, one-way missions so as to extend the sensor range.

Cost – Given what we just said about small size and large numbers, it is obvious that the cost must be cheap.  Think of these mini-hawks as akin to sonobuoys and you’re beginning to approach the right conceptual ballpark.

Speed – There is a requirement for speed in order to get out to the sensing station in a useful amount of time.  A ship cannot afford to wait for hours while an unmanned sensor slowly makes its way out.  This largely rules out underwater (UUV) or even surface (USV) drones because they just can’t get on station quickly enough to be useful.  In other words, the mini-hawks must be aerial devices – UAVs of some sort.  Now, there is a potential use for UUV mini-hawks when the scenario allows for a more leisurely deployment of the sensor net.  Monitoring a chokepoint, for example, or dropping some UUV mini-hawks in one’s wake to check for trailing ships or aircraft.  UUV mini-hawks would not, however, be the main sensor.  UAV mini-hawks would be the main sensor.

While a degree of speed is useful, excess speed is pointless.  I’m thinking around 70-100 mph would be sufficient to get on station in a timely fashion without excessively impacting the size and cost.

Field of View – The mini-hawk must have a useful sensor field of view (FOV) – as large a FOV, as possible, in fact.  This is elementary.  Of course, it’s also contradictory with the requirement for small size!  One way the FOV can be maximized is altitude.  The higher the sensor, the farther the range of it FOV, within the inherent limits of resolution of the sensor.  This again argues for an aerial mini-hawk rather than a UUV or USV mini-hawk.

One thing to keep in mind is resolution.  We’re looking to detect ships and aircraft – fairly large objects.  That we can’t distinguish the number of rivets on a ship is unimportant.  Thus, the sensor can trade resolution for sensor range and FOV.

Range – We’re not looking for thousand mile range.  Our anti-surface weapons are limited to a range of 60 miles (Harpoon), 100 miles (Naval Strike Missile), and, possibly, out to 200+ miles (LRASM).  Thus, the mini-hawk only needs to be able to go a maximum of 150-200 miles – less, actually, depending on the range of its sensors.

Sensor – The obvious choice is radar, however, any kind of sensor could be potentially useful depending on the situation.  Thus, either interchangeable sensors are needed or, given the cheapness and numbers that we’ve already discussed, alternate versions of mini-hawk, each with its own type of sensor, are needed.  The sensors can include radar, IR, optical (recall our Tomcat discussion?), and any other sensor that might prove useful.

Tactical Application.  Here is how I envision the mini-hawk being used.  The host ship operates a steady stream of mini-hawks in all directions but, presumably, concentrated and oriented towards anticipated threat axes.  The mini-hawks would operate around 150 miles out and, typically, offset from the host ship’s course.  Multiple mini-hawks operating at differing distances and offsets to either side of the host ship’s course would further cloud the host ship’s location.  The mini-hawk would maintain constant, real time or reasonably semi-real time data communications.  What the exact form of the communications is, I’ll leave to the comm. experts.  The concept is that the host ship is provided with at least a semi-real time situational awareness of its surroundings without itself having to radiate.

On occasion, if the host ship needs a longer range “picture” the mini-hawks can be sent on one-way missions which would double the range.  One-way missions would also allow potential real time targeting updates during engagements.

Communications - The obvious challenge in this concept is the security and reliability of the communications, as I’ve repeatedly harped on.  Here is where I have to leave the discussion open ended.  I’m assuming some type of line-of-sight comm. method, possibly involving a relay UAV, but if we can’t assure our communications then the entire concept falls apart.

How, you ask, does this differ from the comm. issues I’ve raised for the Navy’s proposed vast all-encompassing network?  Well, for starters, the scope is far less.  This requires only one-directional (from mini-hawk back to the ship), fairly short range (200 miles or so), directional (the ship’s location is known), line-of-sight, narrow bandwidth, burst transmissions.  With these limited requirements, I would hope we can construct a functional comm. system that can operate in an electromagnetically challenged environment.  Contrast that to the Navy’s omni-directional, wide (huge!) bandwidth, continuous, ocean spanning, network comm. requirements and you instantly see that the Navy’s network comm. requirements are massively greater which translates to massively more susceptible to disruption.

Operation - Small UAV mini-Hawks would, ideally, be tube launched (VLS launch system?) or portable catapult launched (like the Scan Eagle) and recovered via a flight deck net.

So, taking all the above into consideration, we get a pretty good picture of what a mini-hawk would be:  small, cheap, short/moderate range, easy launch/recovery.  This sounds very much like a Scan Eagle or something similar.

As a design starting point, the Scan Eagle offers some attractive characteristics that closely fit our requirements.

Scan Eagle Specifications (2)
Length, ft	5
Wingspan, ft	10
Empty Weight, lbs	35
Endurance, hrs	24+
Ceiling, ft	19,500
Max Speed, kts	80
Cruise Speed, kts	50-60
Payload, lbs	7.5

Scan Eagle UAV

Before anyone starts trying to describe why a Scan Eagle won’t work, note that I said the Scan Eagle offers a design starting point, not a final, perfect product.  I’m not even going to entertain comments about the Scan Eagle’s deficiencies so don’t bother.

Interestingly, according to Wiki, the Royal Australian Navy tested a Scan Eagle with a Sentient Vision Kestrel Maritime ViDAR high resolution digital video camera that is claimed to be able to cover 13,000 square nautical miles over a 12-hour mission (3).  Extremely small, light radars (NanoSAR B/C and the like) are also being developed specifically for small UAV use. (4)

In typical Navy fashion, they have the glimmer of a good idea – offloading sensors – and, as we’ve seen in other posts, are going to screw it up by turning it into a massive, ill-suited, unaffordable program of highly sophisticated, non-existent, unmanned vessels instead of keeping the concept simple, affordable, and based on existing technology.  Indeed, the Navy has already described a set of unmanned surface vessels of large size and complexity so they’re already well on their way to screwing up a simple concept!

On a closely related note, ComNavOps’ fear is that the Navy’s idea of the next cruiser is a ‘distributed ship’ that breaks a capital (cruiser) ship’s functions into multiple, separate smaller vessels, both manned and unmanned.  For example, one vessel, already suggested by the Navy, would be an unmanned sensor craft.  Another would be the shooter (small scale arsenal ship) and yet another might be a manned command and control vessel.  Of course, what this really does is needlessly and foolishly complicate the situation and produce a series of vessel, each almost defenseless, individually.

________________________________

(1)Navy Times website, “Navy’s cruiser replacement won’t be a cruiser, says surface warfare chief”, David B. Larter, 9-Jan-2018,

https://www.navytimes.com/digital-show-dailies/surface-navy-association/2018/01/09/surface-warfare-director-cruiser-replacement-wont-be-a-cruiser/

(2)https://www.insitu.com/images/uploads/pdfs/ScanEagle_SubFolder_Digital_DU032817.pdf

(3)Wikipedia, retrieved 20-Dec-2016,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_Insitu_ScanEagle

(4)https://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/print/volume-29/issue-8/technology-focus/sensor-payloads-for-unmanned-vehicles.html

Norwegian Frigate Sinking Lessons

We previously discussed the collision and sinking of the Norwegian frigate Helge Ingstad (see, “Sensors – What Good Are They?”) and noted that it was yet another example of the demonstrably inherent flawed thinking that networks and data will allow us to prevail in future wars.

Now, we see the Helge Ingstad sinking demonstrating another of ComNavOps’ recurring themes – that we’ve forgotten how to design ships for combat.  The initial report from the Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) has been released and pins the cause of the flooding and sinking on flawed watertight design features and construction.  The cause of the collision, itself, is another subject.

The initial damage and immediate flooding was not enough to sink the ship but the flawed design allowed adjoining, undamaged compartments to quickly flood resulting in the ship rapidly sinking.  From the report,

The AIBN has found safety critical issues relating to the vessel's watertight compartments. This must be assumed to also apply to the other four Nansen-class frigates. It cannot be excluded that the same applies to vessels of a similar design delivered by Navantia, or that the design concept continues to be used for similar vessel models. The AIBN assumes that its findings are not in conformity with the required damage stability standard for the Nansen class frigates. 

To start with, flooding occurred in three watertight compartments on board 'KNM Helge Ingstad': the aft generator room, the orlob deck's crew quarters and the stores room. There was some uncertainty as to whether the steering engine room, the aftmost compartment, was also filling up with water. Based on this damage, the crew, supported by the vessel's stability documents, assessed the vessel as having 'poor stability' status, but that it could be kept afloat. If more compartments were flooded, the status would be assessed as 'vessel lost' on account of further loss of stability. 

Next, the crew found that water from the aft generator room was running into the gear room via the hollow propeller shafts and that the gear room was filling up fast. From the gear room, the water then ran into and was flooding the aft and fore engine rooms via the stuffing boxes in the bulkheads. This meant that the flooding became substantially more extensive than indicated by the original damage. Based on the flooding of the gear room, it was decided to prepare for evacuation. 

The AIBN considers the vessel's lack of watertight integrity to be a safety issue relating to Nansen-class frigates …  (1)

So, what lessons can we learn from this incident?

Helge Ingstad

Combat Design.  Providing water tight seals for propeller shafts and machinery is something that has been known and mastered for many decades.  Let’s face it, this is basic watertight integrity 101.  This is the kind of thing that should have been locked in around the end of day-one of the ship’s design effort.  I have no idea how Norway goes about designing its ships but, clearly, no one with sufficient expertise reviewed the design.  In the US Navy, I’ve stated that we need to reconstitute our lost in-house design expertise to prevent exactly this kind of occurrence.  Whether it’s carrier weapon elevators that don’t work, LCS bridge wings that were overlooked, LCS galvanic corrosion prevention that was omitted, or electromagnetic catapults that act as giant locating beacons for the enemy, we utterly lack the ability to critically, thoroughly, and correctly evaluate ship designs.  We must regain our in-house design expertise and reclaim the design responsibility from industry.

Testing.  This incident also illustrates another of ComNavOps pet themes and that is inadequate testing.  Someone, somehow, some way, should have been able to identify this weakness during the ship’s various tests and trials prior to acceptance.  Clearly, if testing is inadequate to identify a fatal design flaw then the testing is flawed and worthless.  The Navy’s NavSea (Naval Sea Systems Command) has been accepting incomplete and non-functional ships for far too long.  NavSea needs to be disbanded and replaced with an independent testing group like Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E).  The evidence is overwhelming that NavSea, being in the chain of command, cannot be counted on to perform its duties correctly and with integrity.

Awareness and Technology.  This is yet another in a string of incidents that prove, conclusively, that technology is not the answer to situational awareness.  The Helge Ingstad had an impressive list of sensors and yet ran into a giant, slow moving tanker.

Foreign Myth.  There is a large and vocal school of US Navy (and US military, in general) observers who believe, without any proof other than manufacturer’s claims, that all foreign ships and equipment are superior to their US counterparts.  The Millenium gun reputation, for example, has taken on near-mythical proportions despite zero evidence of its performance in any meaningful test scenario or actual combat experience.  The mere fact that it’s foreign seems to be its only claim to fame.

This also exposes the related claims that the US military-industrial complex is corrupt and incompetent.  Well, let’s be fair – they are!  However, foreign companies are, as a group, no better.  Navantia is not an American company and yet appear to be incompetent naval designers along with whatever other problems they may have.  I know nothing about the workings of Navantia so I can’t comment further.

In short, while the grass may always seem greener in foreign countries … it’s not.

Risk.  The entire Norwegian surface combat navy consisted of five Nansen class frigates.  Each was a modern and, on paper, impressively capable ship for a frigate.  Exactly the kind of frigate so many US Navy observers (and the Navy, itself!) desperately want.  Any now, with a single incident, the Norwegian Navy has lost 20% of its entire surface combat fleet.  Had their fleet been broken up into smaller, cheaper, numerically greater, more specialized ships, the impact would have proportionally much less.  I’m pretty sure that Norway is not rushing to replace this ship and, likely, never will.  This is the personification of why concentration of capability in a single platform is a mistake.  Yes, the temptation to cram as much capability as possible into every ship is strong, especially for smaller navies, but it is a mistake.

US Frigate.  Ominously, the AIBN issued a safety warning strongly suggesting that the entire Navantia ship line may suffer from the same watertight integrity design flaws.  Navantia is the parent design company for the General Dynamics Bath Iron Works frigate offering in the US Navy frigate competition.  The parent design is the F100 Bazan class.  The US Navy needs to look very closely at the design to ensure that the flaws are not repeated for the Navy’s frigate offering.  Unfortunately, given the complete absence of in-house expertise, I don’t know how the Navy can evaluate the Navantia design.

Western Trends.  Warships were once built to be as rugged and tough as possible.  WWII history is replete with examples of warships that absorbed immense amounts of damage and kept fighting – often surviving the encounter.  Today, the West has forgotten those lessons and bought into the myth of sensors, networks, and data in place of firepower and toughness.  We need to abandon our current direction and recommit to designing warships that can laugh at damage and keep fighting.  

To those who would counter that nothing could survive a collision with a giant tanker, WWII would beg to differ.  Ships were hit with multiple torpedoes and bombs, struck mines, and, indeed, suffered some huge collisions and yet stayed afloat and kept fighting.

As with the US Navy’s McCain and Fitzgerald collisions and various groundings, the Norwegian Helge Ingstad incident offers a wealth of lessons if only we’re willing to learn from them.

 

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(1)Accident Investigation Board Norway,

https://www.aibn.no/Marine/Investigations/18-968

Sensors - What Good Are They?

We’ve previously noted that the US military has gone all in on sensor networks and unmanned vehicles as the basis for its Third Offset Strategy which is intended to provide the US with a military advantage over its enemies.  We’ve also noted the Navy’s commitment to distributed lethality which also depends on regional sensor networks to provide targeting to roving ships with a few anti-ship missiles.  Further, the entire basis of the F-35’s hoped for ‘superiority’ is sensor fusion and situational awareness (it’s sure not air combat maneuvering!).

Unfortunately, we’ve also noted that the entire concept of sensor and data networks is inherently flawed.  Non-enemy induced network crashes, sensor failures, UAV communications link failures, and GPS failures are commonplace.  Add to that wartime cyber attacks, jamming, GPS disruption, electronic countermeasures, electronic spoofing, false signal injection, etc. and the prospects for successful sensor and data networks is dismal – and yet we’re betting everything on exactly this.
Are we being overly pessimistic?  Well, consider,

• The Russians have been giving an object lesson in electronic warfare in the Ukraine and Syria.  US commanders have acknowledged that the Russians have disrupted and ‘disabled’ our dedicated electronic warfare EC-130 aircraft over Syria.

• Iran is believed to have disabled and captured US UAVs.

• US Navy unmanned underwater vehicles routinely wander off due to communication’s loss, never to be seen again.

• Despite having inertial navigation systems and GPS, the Aegis cruiser Port Royal managed to run aground in well known, well charted, home waters.

• Despite GPS and extensive regional sensors, two US Navy riverine boats became lost and wandered into Iranian waters and were captured.

• The Vincennes shot down an airliner despite having continuous, unhindered radar contact.

• Despite the most advanced naval sensors in the world, the Navy has been unable to determine whether any of three separate attacks on a Burke class destroyer off Yemen actually occurred.

• Despite the world’s most advanced radar, sonar, and electro-optical sensors two Burke class destroyers managed to collide with large, slow, non-stealthy commercial ships.

The examples are nearly endless.

Now, as has been recently and widely reported, the Norwegian Nansen class frigate Helge Ingstad (F313) has collided with an oil tanker and been beached to avoid sinking.  The ship has essentially capsized and is laying on its side on the beach.

The Nansen class frigate possesses a multitude of advanced sensors of various types including,

• SPY-1F 3D multi-mode radar
• Reutech RSR 210N air/sea surveillance radar
• Sagem Vigy 20 Electro-optical
• MRS 2000 hull mounted sonar
• Condor CS-3701 ESM/ECM

Despite this impressive array of sensors which should have provided unparalleled situational awareness, the ship managed to collide with a tanker. 

On a related note, yet another modern ‘warship’ has been nearly sunk by a single ‘hit’ – not exactly a tribute to modern warship design, is it?  But, I digress …

The empirical evidence is overwhelming.  Our vaunted sensors and networks do not work at anywhere near the claimed levels.

Our sensor and network systems are simply not reliable.

They don’t work.

And yet, we’re betting our military future on them working flawlessly and doing so in the face of a vast array of countermeasures.

The reasons for failure are many and varied and not all of the failures are due purely to the sensors and networks.

• Comm. links fail (UAVs being lost)

• Networks spontaneously fail (we’ve all experienced this at work or in the military)

• Maintenance shortages cause degraded sensors (the Aegis system being a prime example)

• Human action based on sensor data is inherently flawed (Vincennes)

The overall conclusion is that we can’t count on sensor and data networks and we can’t count on having situation awareness – and yet that’s exactly what we’re betting our military future on.  It’s also worth noting that all of the examples of sensor and data network failings are peacetime examples when everything should work perfectly.  How much worse will our situational awareness be during war?

Now, having said all that, I’m certainly not suggesting that we should abandon sensors and networks.  What I’m saying is that we should acknowledge the inherent limitations and tendencies to fail and not bet our military future on them.  Instead, we should use them as adjuncts to basic technologies (binoculars or sextant, for example) and common sense (post lookouts!).  We should train to function without sensors, to any great extent, and then we’ll be pleasantly surprised when they do, occasionally, work.  We have to break our mindset of dependence on sensors and networks and learn to stick out heads out the porthole and look and reason for ourselves.

We also need to recognize that data, alone, is useless in war.  We need firepower to destroy whatever we see.  Failing that, we’ll have the most perfect awareness in history of the enemy that kills us using low tech, indiscriminate, area bombardments.  For all its impressive development of electronic warfare capabilities, the Russians have not neglected to also develop impressive families of armored vehicles, advanced cluster munitions, treaty busting cruise missiles, very long range air-to-air missiles, advanced torpedoes, etc.  They understand that, ultimately, firepower wins wars.