Thursday, October 26, 2023

Armored Sensors

One of the arguments against armor on ships is that the ship’s sensors can’t be armored and allow for an easy mission kill so what’s the point of any armor?  This train of thought is illogical and idiotic but that’s not the point of this post so …
 
It is taken as an article of faith that ship’s sensors can’t be armored.  How could they be?  If they’re armored, the sensors will be blinded, right?  As we do with so many widespread beliefs, let’s examine this and see if it’s really true.
 
Where do we always start when examining anything?  That’s right: history, of course!  What can history tell us about sensors and armor?
 
 
Land combat
 
Historically, sensors, meaning eyeballs and optical aids, were protected by placement behind trees, rocks, walls, bunkers, etc.  This was highly effective armor (armor being any object or material that protects the sensor).  The sensor needed only a tiny opening in the armor to observe the relevant field of view.  A mere slit or hole was sufficient to allow the sensor to function.  If the observer wanted hemispherical sensing then he merely turned around and “re-aimed” the sensor, poking a new hole in the armor, if necessary.  We see, then, that sensors have always been ‘armored’ and their field of view unimpeded by the armor.
 
 
Tank sensors
 
Tanks offer a specific and more applicable example.  Tank sensors, originally eyeballs and optical aids but now including infrared, low light, radar, laser rangefinders, etc., are embedded inside heavy tank armor with, again, small openings aimed at the field of view.  Many tank sensors are able to rotate to allow the sensor to cover large arcs or 360 degree fields of view.  Alternatively, many tank optical sensors (eyeballs) have armored, reflective/mirrored observation blocks arranged in a circle around hatches thus providing 360 degree observation and alleviating the need to stand up in the hatch to observe the surroundings.  In addition, most tank sensors can be sealed with armored covers when not directly in use thus making the sensors highly survivable.  Finally, some sensors are duplicated around the tank so as to provide continuous 360 degree coverage (active protection radar systems, for example).  Thus, tank sensors are both physically armored and ‘armored (made survivable)’ by duplication while allowing unimpeded sensing.
 
As seen in the photo below of an Israeli Merkava tank, the optical sensor is protected in an armored box-like housing with a closeable shutter to completely protect the sensor.  The optical sensor needs only a small vertical slit opening to function.
 
Also visible is a small radar array for an active protection system.  The array face is not armored but the location ensures that the array is protected on the back and sides by the bulk of the armored turret while being able to scan the 120 degree or so field in front of it.  Thus, siting the sensor next to an armored structure (the turret) provides ‘neighborly’ protection regardless of whether the sensor housing itself is armored.  On a ship, this suggests that sensors could be similarly mounted near/next to other armored structures and gain indirect armor protection.
 
Merkava Optical Sensor with Shutter and Slit Opening,
Note Radar Array at Far Left
 
 
Ship sensors
 
WWII large caliber naval guns included armored, optical rangefinders as part of the structure of the turrets.  These were typically housed in the ‘ears’ that stuck out from the rear sides of the turrets.
 
Note the armored ‘ears’ sticking out the sides
 of the turret near the back which housed
the local, optical rangefinder components

 
Larger guns also used armored directors.  The Iowa class battleships, for example, used a pair of Mk38 directors.
 
As built, all three turrets on the Iowa class had 25 power, 46 foot (14 m) rangefinders, with Stereoscopic Mark 52 used in Turrets II and III and Coincidence Mark 53 in Turret I. The Mark 52 weighs 10,500 lbs. (4,763 kg) and cost about $100,000 US during World War II. Near focus for the Mark 52 is 5,000 yards (4,570 m) and the maximum range is 45,000 yards (41,150 m). Mark 53 was a coincidence type with a special astigmatic lens which allowed it to range in on a single point source, such as a searchlight.[1]

While lacking a reference for an exact armor description and thickness for the Mk38 battleship fire control director, US Naval Weapons notes:
 
The principle of protection for fire control may be noted;  the main battery fire controls, and particularly the main battery rangefinders, were all under armor, consistent with the armored protection of the main battery itself.[3]

This suggests that the rangefinder shared the turret’s armor of 9-19 inches.
 
Mk38 Director


Even the secondary directors were armored.  The Iowa class 5” secondary mounts were controlled by 4x Mk37 secondary fire control directors.
 
The Director was enclosed in a Shield made of 3/4 inch thick armor plate that rested on a Carriage at the bottom of the Director. The Carriage turned on roller bearings in the Roller Path on the Base Ring. The Base Ring was attached at the top of a 9 foot 4 1/2 inch diameter, 14 foot 3 inch high cylindrical Barbette of 3/4" thick specially treated steel armor plate. The mating surface of the Barbette was machined in place, after installation on the ship, to be parallel to the Turret and Mount roller paths to minimize alignment differences between the rotation axes that could affect aiming accuracy. A 22 inch diameter internal cable tube hung from the bottom of the Carriage to carry cables to the ship below. Beneath this was another 22 inch dimeter cable tube fixed to the O5 Level deck. Below this was a 31 1/2 inch diameter Director Tube of 3/4 inch thick steel that descended to the Third Deck to carry the cables down to Gun Plot.[2]

Mk37 Director

 
We see from this description that rotating, armored sensors were a common item on ships.
 
When radars were added to the directors, the radars were, of course, not armored.  Their locations, high atop the superstructures did provide a measure of protection from shrapnel but the exposed radars were susceptible to damage.  This vulnerability was mitigated by duplication;  multiple directors greatly increased the odds on director survivability.
 
On a more modern note, the Swedish Visby class corvette incorporates a retractable navigation radar.  Visby’s superstructure is not armored but there is no reason why it could not be and then the radar would be protected within the ship’s structure until needed.
 
Another example of hidden, protected sensors is the San Antonio (LPD-17) class which has its sensors enclosed in a composite mast.  The mast enclosure is not armored but does prove that sensors can be enclosed given a suitably emission-transparent surrounding material.
 
 
Ship Weapons
 
While not sensors, modern weapons have been armored or hidden from exposure without compromising their performance.  For example, the defunct Advanced Gun System (AGS) on the Zumwalt had its gun barrel hidden inside a stealth housing from which it would elevate when in use.  Similarly, several warship designs have placed missile rack launchers behind and below elevated ship sides (in a “pit”, essentially) which could easily be armored.
 
Ambassador MkIII - note missile launch 
racks in 'pit' amidships


Discussion
 
It is clear from history that sensors have commonly been protected and armored by various means without impeding the sensor’s function.  That’s just common sense.  Firepower without sensors is nearly useless so it makes sense to protect and armor the sensors, if at all possible.  It is only in recent decades that we’ve stupidly abandoned armor and protection for our weapon sensors.
 
It is clear that there is no reason why sensors can’t be housed inside armored enclosures, one way or another.  Let’s consider our current sensors. 
 
The common US Navy sensor is the flat panel radar array.  There is no reason why panels can’t be equipped with armored shutters that can slide into place when the sensor is not in use. 
 
The America class LHA uses SPS-48/49 radars but they serve no real purpose since the LHAs will always be accompanied by Burke class escorts with their Aegis SPY panel radars.  A smaller TRS-3D/4D would be perfectly appropriate for the LHAs and could easily be mounted inside rotating and/or retractable armored enclosures.
 
Ship mounted Infrared and optical (IR/EO) sensors are small and readily lend themselves to tank-like armored enclosures with small, shuttered openings for their field of view.  The sensors can be either fixed and mounted at multiple points around the ship to provide hemispherical coverage or mounted inside rotating armored cylinders for complete coverage.  Retractable mounts would be equally effective.
 
So, with a combination of armored covers, retractable sensors, rotating armored enclosures, and tank-like enclosures we could easily armor our sensors, preventing cheap mission kills from simple shrapnel.  This would be a major step towards keeping our ships fighting while taking hits – a presumed goal of every WARship design.
 
 
 
______________________________
 
[1]http://navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_16-50_mk7.php
 
[2] https://www.okieboat.com/Gun%20Director.html
 
[3]Norman Friedman, US Naval Weapons, Naval Institute Press, 1985, ISBN 0-87021-735-6, p.36

36 comments:

  1. Another compelling and logical recommendation that seems so obvious (when you lay it out like this) that it is shocking that we don't armor sensors (anymore).

    I would love for someone to take your recommendations and bring them to life in a more detailed, holistic way using one of the ships from the "Fleet Structure" tab. AAW Escort perhaps. Include armor thickness for areas and components, number of sensors (search, directors, passive), crew size and accommodations, etc. And actually mock up what it could look like, dimensions and all. Images are powerful! Giving people a chance to SEE what could be would give these ideas more traction.

    I confess I don't know that I would have the expertise to do this right. Or the time. But someone should do this! Show us what a dedicated AAW Escort should be!

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  2. The army protects their sensors on armored vehicles because they expect them to be in combat and get hit.

    The navy doesn't because....I got nothing.

    Lutefisk

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    1. I think Lutefisk nails it, tankers expect to be hit, no matter how good the tank, there's always a counter measure taken by the enemy, the tank advantage never lasts, its always in a state of evolution and back and forth between tank and anti tank....Navy doesn't expect anything to get past Aegis, SMs and Phalanx so why bother with armor?

      Delete
  3. ComNavOps, you also alluded to redundancy. The old battleships expected to be hit. You mentioned multiple radars. Backing that up were the heavily armored primary and secondary optical gun directors. The data fed to rugged (I believe mechanical) analog computers protected deep inside the armored citadel to provide firing information for the main guns. And if all that failed, the turrets themselves had their own director optics to aim and fire their guns independently.

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    1. Another possibility would be a system designed to rotate replacement sensors out from under armor when the primary is damaged. I totally stole this idea from Keith Laumer's Bolo book series.

      Delete
    2. "replacement sensors out from under armor when the primary is damaged."

      Obviously, trying to store, say, an SPS-48/49 internally in the event of damage would be a challenge but it could work for smaller sensors. The larger point is that there are so many things we can do to make our ships true WARships instead of the glorified cruise ships they are. We just aren't prioritizing combat over comfort and convenience. That's nearly criminal on the part of the Navy.

      "Bolo book series"

      I've read and thoroughly enjoyed them!

      Delete
    3. It Should be possible to build a Phased Array radar to be more damage resistant by spreading the array elements over a larger area, and modifying the software to allow for opperation with some elements missing. This would result ing a gradual degradation of performance, rather than being knocked out by a single hit.

      Delete
    4. "more damage resistant"

      This is exactly what the current RMA claims to accomplish. However, they, and you, overlook that damage to a module is only one way a radar can be incapacitated. Far more likely is damage to the single power, comm, or cooling lines servicing the entire radar. Damage one of those and the entire array is incapacitated regardless of whether any array element has been damaged or not.

      Regarding module degradation, this has been claimed by the manufacturer but never tested, as far as I know. Do I need to cite all the claims that have proven false when ultimately tested or operated in the real world?

      Delete
  4. I'm not seeing how any of these armoring mechanisms are transparent to radar. We can't use our radars when the armor shutters are up because the radar beams will bounce off the metal of the armor. This is fine for emcon, but during combat we need the radar up so we can see - unless we want to use frigates with SPY radars as sacrificial pickets to feed us radar picture (is that why Constellation has an AAW radar?).

    I guess I'm not seeing the difference or benefit from the current status quo. It would be helpful if the thinking behind this could be explained further.

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    1. My understanding is that the shutters/covers/etc would only close at the last possible moment before the impact of a missile. They would then open back up immediately to continue the fight.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    2. Yes, armouring big billboard radars is quite hard. Not impossible, but hard. Armouring tank radars is much easier, since they're only required to work at quite short ranges.

      If you use metal armour that radar can't see through, you have to be able to extend and retract that armour quite quickly, to allow the radar to be used to defend against missiles. The mechanism for doing that is going to be heavy, as is the armour itself, and much of that weight needs to be high up, which is bad for ship stability. There are also nasty consequential problems: if one of your radar armour systems is damaged and can't be retracted (a) that radar panel is out of action until the armour system is fixed and (b) retracting the opposite panel's armour is really bad for stability.

      Things like that, plus armour advocates' lack of "respect" for the wonderfulness of AEGIS, is probably why armouring radars is held to be impossible.

      Building large survivable radars seems to require (a) composite armour that doesn't totally block radar signals the way metal armour does and (b) radars that are made from lots of independent elements that don't need the kind of precise alignment that a SPY-1 does, or can self-align rapidly after being damaged. The SPY-6 is a step towards that, although I don't know if it can self-align.

      I don't know if anyone is developing composite armour suitable for radars, but Kevlar-reinforced polymers seem like a starting point for that.

      Delete
    3. "I'm not seeing how any of these armoring mechanisms are transparent to radar. "

      They're not. As I explained in the post, the concept is to armor the sides/back and, depending on type of sensor, some of the front. This provides a minimal opening for the signals to be transmitted and received while protecting the bulk of the unit. You either rotate the housing to obtain complete coverage or install multiple, fixed units around the ship to provide complete coverage (as is currently done with panels).

      Alternatively, the panels can have armored shutters that drop into place when needed.

      I'm repeating the post so if you have any more specific questions, let me know.

      "which is bad for ship stability. "

      No it isn't. It's just one of many design considerations. We built all of our WWII ships with armored extensions and equipment rising well above the main deck and yet our ships didn't spontaneously capsize. It's all about fundamental design. You'll recall that I've criticized today's overly large, heave, and pointless superstructures? Simply reducing those would free up large quantities of reserve stability for armor.

      "if one of your radar armour systems is damaged"

      Not an issue. Since any retraction system would be co-located with the sensor, any battle damage to the retraction mechanism would, in all likelihood, incapacitate the sensor itself, too. Therefore, not a concern.

      "doesn't totally block radar signals"

      You seem to believe that I'm describing a system of armor that allows radar signals to pass through. To the best of my knowledge, there is no such material.

      What I'm describing is a system for the use of sensors that allow them to be armored WHEN NEEDED. For example, the main SPY radar panels are used for long range engagements. That's fine. When the engagement reaches terminal range (CIWS/SeaRAM), the main panels serve no purpose and can be shuttered while the CIWS and SeaRAM, with their self-contained radars, take over the engagement. When the terminal threat ends, one way or the other, the main panels can uncover and resume their longer range functions, if needed.

      Is this clearer?

      Delete
    4. "you have to be able to extend and retract that armour quite quickly,"

      No, you don't. As I described in a reply above, the concept of operations is not one of a radar enclosure 'flicking' open and shut every few seconds. The main radar operates continuously until the range closes to terminal engagement and then it closes until the terminal threat is over. That doesn't require instantaneous opening/closing.

      We can open magazines, transport missiles through a deck and load them onto an arm launcher in about 7 seconds. Dropping a shutter into place seems less challenging than that and that time frame seems perfectly adequate.

      You seem to be laboring under the 'can't armor sensors' paradigm and looking for reasons why it can't be done instead of seeing how it can be done. I've described exactly how this can work so no need for the paradigm, now!

      Delete
    5. Radomes are often made from Kevlar, which depending on thickness, does give you some splinter protection.
      Kevlar is used inside armoured vehicles as spall protection.

      Delete
    6. If I'm not mistaken, a modern destroyer also uses ESSM for missile defense up to fairly short ranges. So you can't cover up the SPY-1 and just let the CIWS take over.

      Delete
    7. "If I'm not mistaken, a modern destroyer also uses ESSM for missile defense up to fairly short ranges. So you can't cover up the SPY-1 and just let the CIWS take over."

      If there is an ability to protect the SPY-1 with armor at the last moment, maybe the navy should re-think how they integrate the various layers of missile defense.

      Maybe the SeaRAM and Phalanx should take over at some point.

      Lutefisk

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    8. ESSM doesn't require SPY panel radars. Any radar can suffice. A much better arrangement would be for Burkes to have a small TRS-4D or something similar. This would provide backup for the main radars and would be easy to armor in an enclosure or retractable housing.

      Delete
    9. "maybe the navy should re-think how they integrate the various layers of missile defense."

      The Navy should re-think many things!

      Delete
    10. The SPY-6 (v)2 (Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar) could be used as the back up radar for the Burkes. The SPY-6 (v)2 has the same detection ability as the current SPY-1 radar with the added benefit of using the same radar modules as the larger SPY-6 (v)1 radar. (37 modules times four fixed faces vs 9 modules rotating)
      The ability to repair the back up radar with modules from the main radar may be useful in times of crisis.
      MLW

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    11. "SPY-6 (v)2 (Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar) could be used as the back up radar for the Burkes."

      The Burkes are already overloaded and lack sufficient power and cooling to support the required radar in the Flt III. We've had to downsize the requirements. Given those hard limits, where would you envision adding 3-4 additional SPY-6 to the Burkes already top heavy superstructures and where would you envision getting the power, cooling, etc. to operate them?

      Ships are a zero sum game meaning they're completely filled. If you add a piece of equipment then you have to remove something to make room for it. What would you remove to make room for an additional radar set?

      Delete
    12. The SPY-6 radar comes in many versions (v)1 is for flight III Burkes (37 modules fixed x 4), (v)2 is the enterprise surveillance radar for Nimitz carriers and amphibious assault ships (9 modules rotating), (v)3 enterprise surveillance radar (Fixed) for Ford class carriers ( 9 modules fixed x 3), (v)4 is for flight IIA Burkes (24 modules fixed x4)
      The SPY-6 (v)2 is the much smaller rotating radar that uses only 9 radar modules. Each module is 2 x 2 ft on its face so the radar itself is slightly larger than 6 x 6 feet. It is similar in size to the TRS-4D which you advocated for in your previous post.
      "A much better arrangement would be for Burkes to have a small TRS-4D or something similar. This would provide backup for the main radars and would be easy to armor in an enclosure or retractable housing."
      The benefit of using the SPY-6 (v)2 is that is uses the same radar modules as the larger fixed radar.
      Since it is a back up radar there will be no problem powering it since the primary radar will not be in use and drawing power.
      I would mount it directly to the superstructure similar to how the the TRS-4D is mounted on the LCS.
      As to the trade off in mass I don't know what would be most appropriate. What were you going to get rid of when you suggested the TRS-4D as a back up radar?
      MLW

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    13. "smaller rotating radar that uses only 9 radar modules"

      Ah, I see. My misunderstanding. That's fine.

      Delete
  5. "Kevlar"

    To me, an obvious choice is kevlar.

    I don't think that anyone is talking about armoring against a direct hit on a radar by a missile.
    But blast wave and shrapnel is completely reasonable.

    Kevlar is strong enough to do the job.
    It is also light enough to be up high on the ship.

    Lutefisk

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    1. "I don't think that anyone is talking about armoring against a direct hit on a radar "

      Correct. Unless it's a battleship, the intent is not to laugh at 2000 lb armor piercing weapons but to protect against cheap kills from shrapnel, pressure waves, and near misses.

      So many people try to claim that since no known armor can protect against a supernova exploding, there's no point to any armor and that's just stupid. Armor is meant to shrug off certain types of weapons and mitigate the damage from other types.

      Delete
  6. I think this may be especially important going into the near to intermediate future, when ships may be faced with swarming drones, perhaps even autonomous ones with no communication link to be jammed.

    Numerous small, hence hard to see, drones may well overwhelm Aegis and some may reach the ship. They probably can't carry big enough warheads to threaten the ship as a whole, but they can certainly mess with un-armored sensors, thus blinding the ship and creating a cheap mission kill.

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    1. "ships may be faced with swarming drones"

      A good application for naval guns with air burst munitions. A 5" gun should be able to handle a swarm with minimal effort.

      Delete
    2. "A 5" gun should be able to handle a swarm with minimal effort."

      I have to disagree. Note that the drones in the swarm don't all have to come from the same direction. In fact, they could come from all directions at once. How can a 5 inch gun rotate quickly enough to handle that whole swarm with "minimal effort"?

      I do agree that guns with air burst munitions are a good approach (at least potentially) but you'd need a whole bunch of them. Maybe a number of 30 or 40 mm guns (can those do air burst munitions -- not sure?) might be better.

      Delete
    3. "I have to disagree."

      Well, let's do what this blog always does ... let's look at the data. According to NavWeaps, the current 5"/62 gun has a rate of fire of 16-20 rds/min. Let's use the lower figure to be conservative. In addition, the train rate is 30 deg/sec.

      Let's suppose a swarm is detected 5 miles out and approaching at 80 miles per hour (1.3 miles/minute - a reasonable spec for a small drone). That means they'll arrive in 3.8 minutes.

      In that time, a single 5" gun will get off (16*3.8 = 60 shots).

      For a large gun/shell (5", relative to a small drone) firing burst munitions against a very slow, non-maneuverable drone, that should be nearly one shot equals one kill (more if the drones are clustered). So, that suggests that, with those circumstances, a single ship can handle a swarm of around 50 drones (to allow ten misses from the 60 shots).

      If we factor in the CIWS, it should be able to handle an additional 20 or so drones as it should be a 1-2 sec burst per target.

      We'll ignore any contributions from 20 mm remote weapons.

      Thus, a single Burke should be able to handle something on the order of 70 small drones simultaneously.

      If the drones are detected further out, the ship gets more shots and could handle 100+ depending on detection range. Aegis claims to be able to see a mosquito at a thousand miles (the Navy actually did claim to be able to see insect swarms over Libya during the Tomcat's shootdown incident!). It would seem reasonable to suspect a detection range much, much further than 5 miles.

      One might also contemplate where in the world 50+ drones would come from that a ship wouldn't already be aware of? Given the exceedingly short range/endurance of small drones and the even shorter comm/control range, the drone source/launch point would have to be quite close to the ship. That's not possible in the ocean. A ship cruising near land could face such a threat, I suppose but, presumably, such a ship would be quite vigilant and have plenty of warning.

      Do you still disagree? If so, present some facts to support your belief.

      Delete
    4. "60 rounds"

      No. 16-20 rounds per minute is the rate when fed by the automatic loader, which has a capacity of 20 rounds. After that, it would be slower. Not sure how much slower.

      "even shorter comm/control range,"

      Well, I DID mention that in the relatively near future they could be autonomous. Therefore no communication and control needed.

      I'd also point out that the 5" gun does not have 360 degree coverage. Since it would be partially blocked by the superstructure. And since some ships are replacing CIWS with the Rolling Airframe missile, that won't always apply.

      I do agree that it's not likely a problem deep at sea during wartime. But it could be a problem in littoral areas, as you mentioned. Or potentially during one of those coercive close in incidents that the Chinese like to perform during "peacetime".

      Delete
    5. "automatic loader, which has a capacity of 20 rounds."

      As I understand it, that IS the sustained firing rate. The gun is fed from the loader drum and the rounds are automatically replaced as used, as shown in the BAE sequence of operations description in the manufacturer's data sheet.

      "Conventional ammunition handling is achieved by a single hoist/ram/fire/eject sequence in which the semifixed load is handled as a single unit. The Mk 45 can achieve a firing rate of 20 rounds per minute with these types of ammunition."

      "5" gun does not have 360 degree coverage"

      It has around 270 deg coverage and as targets are sequentially destroyed, the ship would turn to unmask as needed.

      To repeat, a drone swarm is no threat to a ship under any reasonable scenario.

      Delete
    6. "As I understand it, that IS the sustained firing rate"

      Well, I just don't know. I got my info from Wikipedia, which of course is not absolutely golden but, for technical things that aren't politically wrought, often comes fairly close to the truth. Here's what they said:

      "The gun mount features an automatic loader with a capacity of 20 rounds. These can be fired under full automatic control, taking a little over a minute to exhaust those rounds at maximum fire rate. For sustained use, the gun mount would be occupied by a six-person crew (gun captain, panel operator, and four ammunition loaders) below deck to keep the gun continuously supplied with ammunition."

      Wikipedia did not specify a firing rate when the gun crew is active.

      Several other sites (military.com and navy.mil) said pretty much the same thing.

      There's no particular a priori reason why the firing rate with manual loading should be identical to the rate with the auto loader, but I suppose it's not impossible.

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    7. "To repeat, a drone swarm is no threat to a ship under any reasonable scenario."

      Well, I can think of one, and I'm not even an expert.

      We've agreed that ships in blue water are probably not at much threat.

      We've also agreed that there MAY be more of a threat in littoral regions.

      But how about the ultimate littoral region: when the ship is in port. Ultimately, ships always end up in port.

      There, a drone swarm doesn't need enemy ships or aircraft. A few commandos or terrorists could launch it. Obviously they can't carry a whole drone swarm worth of drones on their backs, but they could either drive up with a truck (near, not at, the port) or perhaps sneak the drones into an abandoned (or maybe even secretly rented) building over time. These types of drones likely won't threaten the ship as a whole, but they can mess with the sensors, leaving the ship blind and therefore mission killed.

      In port, the ship can't really use its guns to defend itself. You can't go firing a 5 inch heavy gun in all directions in port, due to collateral damage.

      One might say it's the port's job to defend the ship in this case. And that might even make sense if the port is a US naval base. But Navy ships call at all kinds of ports all over the world, and we probably shouldn't assume a high level of security at all of them.

      I didn't originally intend my comment to start an argument. I originally just wanted to support your suggestion that we ought to have armor for our sensors.

      I still think we should have armor for our sensors. In fact, given this potential, I think we might want to have the sensors covered by armor whenever the ship is in port.

      Delete
    8. "A few commandos or terrorists could launch it."

      Come on, now. We have to be at least mildly realistic when we talk about these things. During war, borders are shut down and surveillance is stepped up. It would be very difficult for an enemy agent to enter the country and assemble a drone swarm near a military base. Wouldn't you think we'd notice someone entering the country with fifty drones? I would assume that bases would be conducting surveillance on surrounding areas exactly for the reason of identifying and preventing attacks. There is little threat to bases in the US.

      During war, we won't be calling at "all kinds of ports all over the world". We'll only use ports in countries and areas firmly under our control. For example, I would highly doubt that we'd make a port call in Yemen, where the Cole was attacked. We'd use Guam, Pearl Harbor, maybe bases in Japan, etc. - all safe and secure as can be reasonably done.

      Let's say that, despite all reasonable logic and precautions, an enemy manages to assemble one drone swarm aimed at a ship in port. At best, it accomplishes some minor damage to a single ship. In the context of war, this is insignificant.

      This is simply not a significant threat.

      Further, you've already identified the counter to this and that is base defense. It is the responsibility of the base, NOT THE SHIP, to conduct defense while a ship is in port. The base would, presumably, conduct intensive monitoring of the surrounding areas, have CIWS, laser, microwave, and other anti-drone weapons in abundance, have powerful land based jamming and electronic countermeasures against drones (small drones simply don't have any useful hardening against electronic counter-measures).

      Drones are simply not a threat. The only remotely realistic aerial drone threat would be during peacetime in a volatile region near land (Iran). In that scenario, yes, the enemy could get close enough with the requisite drones to initiate an attack that might succeed. Of course, that would be the start of a war and even Iran is not stupid enough to start a war over the prospect of achieving a mission kill against a single ship.

      There's not problem with considering theoretical scenarios but, at some point, you have to give a nod to reality. So, yes, in theory a drone swarm could appear overhead a ship in some unexplained way and cause some damage but the reality is that can't occur in any real world, reasonable scenario.

      Delete
    9. The listed ROF is for ammunition in the carousel. 20rpm is feeding one round to the next and the lower rof is likely switching from one ammunition type to another at a different part of the carousel. Sustained rate of fire is potentially slower as it depends on how quickly the loaders manually restock the carousel

      Delete
    10. Do you have any documentation to support your statements or are you just guessing? The loader drum stocking is automated, not manual.

      From the BAE product brochure:

      "The Mk 45 Mod 4 system has a mixed ammunition load capability that allows for simultaneously carrying up to nine different projectile/fuze/cartridge case types in the loader drum. All nine ammunition types are available for instant access and loading to the gun for fast reaction to changing mission requirements. Replenishment is automatic, as rounds are made available from the lower loading station."

      There is no manual involvement noted.

      The loader drum is serviced by automated load and strikedown tubes fed from the magzine. The only manual involvement is stocking the magazine itself during replenishment operations.

      I have searched extensively and found no separate, lower ROF for the 5"/62 gun. Again, do you have documentation?

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    11. To be fair with the drones swarming a vessel in a harbor, the USS Cole was bombed in a harbor. In a near peer war this would of course be unlikely, but against insurgent forces in an asymmetric war this doesn’t seem unreasonable. But I also think that this is nothing that ships need to be specifically designed for to survive, as it’s a too unlikely scenario. And even if this seems like more of a procedures and port defense problem, then a ship design problem.

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