F-35 Readiness Failure Due To Parts Shortages - GAO

We know readiness rates for all US military aircraft are poor and the F-35 is certainly doing its part to keep readiness low.  A new GAO report cites a full mission capable rate for the F-35 of 27% for the period of May-2018 to Nov-2018.  The minimum rate, established via specification, is 60%. (1)  

Why does a brand new aircraft like the F-35 have such shockingly low availability?  According to GAO, the major reason is spare parts shortages.

During the report period, Department of Defense (DOD) had a repair backlog of about 4,300 F-35 parts. (1)  Let’s do some simple math, there are around 380 F-35s in existence as of 10-Apr-2019, according to Wiki.  That works out to an average backlog of 11 parts per aircraft.  No wonder nothing’s flying!

So, lack of parts is the major reason why only one out of four aircraft are fully mission capable.  That leads one to wonder why a brand new aircraft needs so many spare parts?  Wasn’t this aircraft sold, in part, as a low maintenance aircraft that would perform its own predictive maintenance analyses (ALIS) to further reduce already low maintenance time?  That seems to have not panned out along with nearly every other promise about the F-35.

Wait, though, it gets worse.  GAO also offers this absolute gem about to spare parts.

DOD purchases certain sets of F-35 parts years ahead of time to support aircraft on deployments, including on ships. But the parts do not fully match the military services’ needs because F-35 aircraft have been modified over time. For example, 44 percent of purchased parts were incompatible with aircraft the Marine Corps took on a recent deployment. (1) [emphasis added]

Seriously???!!  44% of the parts were incompatible with the aircraft in the field?!  This begs two questions:

• What idiot thought buying spare parts years ahead of time was a good idea when the aircraft is still undergoing development?  This is exactly why you don’t do concurrent development and production.  Because of concurrency, we’re still designing the aircraft even while we’re building it.  Of course the current aircraft parts requirements won’t match a parts purchase from years ago.


• Why would you take incompatible parts on deployment?

Side journey:  IOC (Initial Operating Capability) was supposed to be declared only when a fully equipped unit had all the aircraft, pilots, maintainers, parts, and support services required.  All three services have declared IOC for their respective F-35 variants and yet, apparently, none of them can keep the aircraft mission capable.  What did they do … assemble one set of spare parts for the twenty minutes it took to declare IOC and then pass the set on to the next service for the next IOC declaration?  ‘Cause, it’s clear that none of the services have enough parts to actually operate their aircraft fleets.

GAO also addresses parts costs.

In addressing these challenges, DOD must grapple with affordability. The Air Force and Marine Corps recently identified the need to reduce their sustainment costs per aircraft per year by 43 and 24 percent, respectively. (1)

Despite recognizing that sustainment costs would be critical, they knowingly purchased spare parts sets that contain 44% incompatible parts.  Let me say it again, this is why you don’t do concurrency.

Well, at least we know what parts we have and what ones we need, now, thanks to the magic of ALIS, the automated semi-intelligent, telepathic, clairvoyant, all-knowing, all-encompassing, predictive software that controls every aspect of the world wide F-35 sustainment network … at least, that’s how it was sold to us.  However, according to GAO,

DOD has spent billions of dollars on F-35 spare parts but does not have records for all the parts it has purchased, where they are, or how much they cost. For example, DOD is not maintaining a database with information on F-35 parts the U.S. owns, and it lacks the necessary data to be able to do so. (1)

Another failure for the Pentagon and the F-35 program.  Another lie told to us.

At some point, it’s no longer good enough to say, don’t worry, we’ll eventually fix the problems.  At some point, it’s time to punish people for incompetence on a scale that defies belief.  That time has long since arrived.

____________________________________

(1)Government Accounting Office, “F-35 Aircraft Sustainment”, April 2019, GAO-19-321

More Austere Forward Operating Base Nonsense

We’ve totally debunked the austere, forward operating base concept for the F-35 and yet there are still people who believe it’s viable.  Well, we’ll just keep beating it down.  Here’s the latest proof that it can’t work.  Defense News website reports that low observability (LO) features, meaning stealth, account for half of all production quality defects on the F-35. (1)

Examples of stealth related defects cited in the article include,

• Holes drilled too big
• Dings
• Small deviations in panel alignment
• Scratches to the LO coating
• LO coating overspray or misapplication

Do you understand what that list of defects means?  Those are incredibly minor problems that commonly occur, indeed, are almost unavoidable, when performing mechanical/maintenance work on machines and yet they’re enough to impact the stealth of the aircraft.

Do you understand what else that list means?  Those are defects that are occurring in a pristine, carefully controlled environment with highly trained technicians who have access to all the tools and parts they need.  It’s the best possible world for working on the aircraft and yet the defects are still occurring.  What’s going to happen when the aircraft is sitting out on some austere field with shrapnel flying around, insufficient parts, people under the gun (literally) to maintain and patch up aircraft?  When LO coatings are applied and before they can dry they’re covered in dirt, bugs, and debris?  When no one has the time or tools to align panels to micron accuracy?  When an aircraft has holes in it from shrapnel and someone has to rivet a patch on?

After a couple of days, that stealthy F-35 is going to look like a 747 airliner on radar!

Consider this telling and damning statement,

“Speaking to reporters at Lockheed’s media day on Monday, Jeff Babione acknowledged that low observability, or LO, capabilities in particular are posing a challenge to the company.”

If achieving LO is a challenge in the quiet, calm, pristine, factory with highly trained technicians equipped with all the tools and materials they need, it’s going to be impossible in muddy, humid, debris filled bases with clouds of dirt and debris kicked up every time an aircraft lands or takes off.

The Lockheed spokesman just basically said that the fantasy of an austere, forward operating base is just that: a fantasy. 

We are not going to be operating a couple of F-35’s, rising silently out of the jungle to wreak havoc.  The logistics are impossible.  Base defense is impossible.  Maintenance is impossible.  LO preservation is impossible.  Aircraft availability will be 25%.  And the list of impossibilities goes on.

Give up the fantasy or admit that you also believe in unicorns.

______________________________________

(1)Defense News website, “Stealth features responsible for half of F-35 defects, Lockheed program head states”, Valerie Insinna, 6-Mar-2018,

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/03/06/stealth-features-responsible-for-half-of-f-35-defects-lockheed-program-head-states/

F-35 And Dogfighting

The shilling for the F-35 is absolutely breathtaking in its scope and inaccuracy.  “Experts” of all varieties are regularly trotted out to talk up the aircraft and explain why it is the greatest flying machine ever built or that likely ever will be built.  Careful analysis invariably demonstrates the falsity of the claims.

Recall the Marines declaration of IOC after a stunningly successful operational test?  Of course, after we read the DOT&E report we found out that the mission availability rate was 50%, at best, and the evaluation relied on spare parts and even spare aircraft being flown onto the ship during the test.

We have the Red Flag exercise in which the military claimed the F-35 achieved a 10,000:1 kill ratio or maybe it was only 20:1.  When you’re making up numbers, it doesn’t really matter what they are, does it?  Of course, we have no actual data and conditions upon which to assess the validity of the claim and given the history of lies associated with this aircraft, I flat out don’t believe the claim.

Rather than tediously list all the exaggerated claims that have been made and disproved, let’s just skip ahead and look at the latest.  SNAFU website gets the credit for the heads up on this story about F-35 dogfighting which was posted on Business Insider website (1).

“But according to retired US Marine Corps Maj. Dan Flatley, who helped design the training syllabus for F-35 dogfights, the F-35's lackluster performance against legacy jets had more to do with old habits of the pilots and a weapons system in its infancy rather than anything wrong with the F-35 concept itself.”

Right off the bat, let’s note and acknowledge that Maj. Flatley is as biased as it is possible to be.  Anyone who helped design the training syllabus for the F-35 has a huge stake in the game and a clear bias.  However, let’s also be fair and recognize that merely having a bias does not mean that what he has to say is wrong.  What it means is that what he has to say has to be taken with a huge grain of salt until proven.  So, moving on …

The problem, according to Flatley, is not the aircraft but the bad habits of the highly trained fighter pilots.  Now that sounds like an excuse for a poor aircraft.  Again, though, to be fair, any weapon system has to be used to its strengths to be effective.  The Major, then, appears to be saying that the F-35 is not a dogfighter, which confirms the well known “secret” that we’ve heard for some time, but that it can be an effective aerial combatant if flown to its strengths.  Okay, let’s accept that for the moment and keep going …

“If you try to fight it like a fighter it isn’t, you’re going to have terrible results,” Flatley said of the F-35.”

“Flatley stressed that dogfighting, where the close range diminishes the F-35's stealth and sensor fusion advantages, is certainly not the purpose of the Joint Strike Fighter … “

Again, confirmation of the well known “secret”.

And now, the key part where Flatley explains how the F-35 can effectively engage in aerial combat.

“Unlike dogfighters from World War II, the F-35 mainly focuses on flying undetected while using its array of fused sensors to paint a clear picture of the threat environment for miles out and to engage with targets before they're ever seen.”

According to Flatley, the F-35’s aerial combat role is to be a sniper around the periphery of a battlefield – unseen but seeing all that is around it and sniping unsuspecting enemy aircraft who will never know what hit them.  I have no problem with that, whatsoever.  In fact, it’s kind of the ideal goal of aerial combat – to achieve that 6 o’clock position and gun down the enemy before they know you’re there.  Of course, with modern missiles, the 6 o’clock position isn’t necessarily required but it conveys the concept.

Do you see the problem – two problems, actually – with this concept?

The first problem is that the concept assumes that the F-35 can remain far enough away from the aerial battlefield to remain undetected and yet still be able to see all enemy aircraft.  If the enemy has nothing but early legacy aircraft, this will work and work wonderfully.  MiG-21/23/25/27’s will be toast, without a doubt, as will early Sukhois.  However, what happens when recent legacy aircraft that are semi-stealthy are in the air?  Modern, updated, late series MiGs and late variant Sukhois are moderately stealth, highly maneuverable, hard to detect, and harder to kill.  What happens when those aircraft don’t stand out like radar beacons and the F-35 doesn’t see all of them or has to move closer to the battlefield to get viable returns and images?  And – you can anticipate this coming – what happens when the F-35 encounters peer stealth fighters like the Russian T-50/PAK FA and Chinese J-20/31 on the near future battlefield?  What happens when the F-35 can’t see the enemy aircraft or, at least, no better then enemy aircraft can see the F-35?  In fact, enemy aircraft seem somewhat more advanced in IRST capability so they may actually possess the detection range advantage over the F-35!  How does the F-35 concept work when the F-35 can’t see the enemy aircraft?  The short answer is, it doesn’t!

“As exciting as dogfights are, it's been decades since a US jet engaged an enemy in a turning dogfight, and the F-35's design reflects that new reality.”

That leads us directly to the second problem which is, how many times, now, has the era of the dogfight been declared dead?  The first few times, it was over due to the advent of missiles.  Of course, that proved to be wrong and we had to scramble to relearn how to dogfight.  Now, dogfighting is over due to stealth.  Is it?  Or, will we wind up having to relearn how to dogfight, yet again?  When two stealth aircraft meet in combat and neither can reliably lock missiles on the other, the combat will, inevitably, devolve into a close range, guns-only, high-g, turning dogfight.  Recent anecdotal evidence from exercises suggest that this is exactly what happens.  Now, you have no choice but to dogfight and, according to Maj. Flatley, the F-35 is extremely ill-equipped to do that.

What happens when you can’t see the stealthy enemy but he, with his superior IRST, can see you and the F-35 is now the hunted?  Again, you’re going to be forced into a dogfight for which the F-35 is not designed and not capable.

Let’s put this in terms we can all understand.  Can an F-35 employ the peripheral sniping concept against another F-35/22, successfully?  If not, then the F-35 is a failure on the future aerial battlefield and is relegated to fighting only older legacy aircraft.  That’s a hideously expensive aircraft to be able to engage only older legacy aircraft.  Heck, we have F-15/16/18s that can already do that!

Had the F-35 made it to squadron service ten or twenty years ago, as intended, it would have been successful as an aerial sniper because there were no enemy stealth fighters.  Now, however, that advantage has been squandered due to the obscenely long development time of the F-35 and the near future battlefield is going to be populated by stealthy and semi-stealthy enemy aircraft.  The F-35’s design combat concept is already obsolete.  Once again, our unwise assumption that technology makes dogfighting a thing of the past will prove disastrous in combat.

Ironically, Major Flatley, in his attempt to praise the F-35, has told us all about the failing of the F-35. 

__________________________________

(1)Business Insider website, “Here's why the F-35 once lost to F-16s, and how it made a stunning comeback”, Alex Lockie, retrieved 19-Apr-2017,

http://www.businessinsider.com/f-35-vs-f-16-15-18-lost-beaten-flatley-comeback-2017-4

F-35 or Next Generation?

Consider the following seemingly unrelated points – or maybe they are related?

• The F-35 won’t be fully combat ready for several more years, if even then.  When ready, the F-35 will only be a mediocre aircraft with much of its technology obsolete or easily matched by other aircraft due to the extremely protracted develop period.

• A few lessons have been learned even by the military.  The Air Force has stated publicly that they have no interest in initiating another multi-service aircraft project.  The Navy has strongly suggested that an overemphasis on stealth may be inappropriate. 

• The next generation fighter has been under conceptual development for a year or more.

• We just recently discussed the concept of a five year development/production cycle and found it to be achievable if certain rules were rigidly followed.

Do you see the connection and the logical conclusion?

If we should be able to develop an aircraft and have it production ready in five years and the F-35 is still five-plus years away from being combat ready, logic suggests that if we terminated the F-35 today, we could still have a combat ready, useful, next generation aircraft ready in the same time frame as the F-35 or even a bit sooner.

Of course, the key is the definition of “next generation”.  If we do as we’ve been doing and try to make the next generation aircraft an anti-gravity, invisibility, laser armed, telepathic controlled fantasy wonder weapon then, no, it can’t be ready for production in five years.  But, if we thoroughly understand the aircraft’s mission, narrowly focus on just that role, use only existing technology, define our requirements well, insist on no change orders, limit the aircraft to just the Navy, and manage the project as I’ve described in previous posts (see, "Five Years or You Didn't Know What You Wanted") then there’s no reason we can’t have a formidable, reasonably priced, combat ready aircraft in five years.

We can still pursue the fantasy technology but only in the R&D world, not in production.

Think about it.  We could have a carrier combat aircraft that is superior to the F-35 in production in five years.  The F-35C will probably not be fully combat ready in five years and, even if it is, it won’t be suited to what the Navy really needs.

“… what the Navy really needs.”  That’s the next key, isn’t it?  It’s clear that the Navy doesn’t even know what it needs because it hasn’t got a guiding strategy that would tell it what kind of aircraft is needed.  Recognizing the Navy’s inability to define what it needs, ComNavOps has obligingly told the Navy what it needs.  The Navy needs a long range air superiority fighter and a long range attack plane with the fighter being the top priority.  Of course, there’s no reason the Navy can’t develop both aircraft simultaneously.  We’ve done it in the past and we can do it again by following the guidelines I’ve laid out.  That’s not really the point of this post, though.

The point of the post is that in the same time frame we’re looking at getting the F-35C combat ready, we can have a new and superior aircraft in production – one whose technology isn’t already obsolete after two decades of development.

ALIS in Wonderland

ALIS (Autonomic Logistics Information System), the software that controls the F-35’s maintenance, parts, and mission planning, is the heart and soul of the F-35 as we’ve been told repeatedly.  Of course, it’s also been a monumental failure so far.  An anonymous commenter alerted me to this latest bit about the system.   Thanks for the heads up!

“And now, in a surprising twist, General Bogdan is saying ALIS is not really critical after all, insisting the F-35 can fly without it for 30 days.” (1)

Follow the link below and go read the article.  It’s short but packed with goodies.  There’s nothing I can add that the article doesn’t already cover quite nicely.  Check it out.

_____________________

(1)Project On Government Oversight, “F-35 Chief: Critical Logistics Software Not Really That Critical”, Dan Grazier, 20-Apr-2016,

http://www.pogo.org/straus/issues/weapons/2016/f-35-chief-critical-logistics-software.html

F-35 Engine Cost Update

Here’s some data on the F-35 engine cost. 

“United Technologies Corp., Pratt & Whitney Military Engines, East Hartford, Connecticut, is being awarded a $1,038,074,689 modification to the previously awarded advance acquisition contract for the Lot IX low-rate initial production F-35 Lightning II Propulsion contract (N00019-14-C-0004) for the Air Force, Navy/Marine Corps, international partners and foreign military sales (FMS) customers.  This modification provides for components, parts and materials associated with the procurement of 28 F135-PW-100 conventional take-off and landing propulsion systems for the Air Force; six F135-PW-600 propulsion systems for the Marine Corps; and four F135-PW-100 propulsion systems for the Navy.  In addition, this modification provides for seven each F135-PW-100 and F135-PW-600 propulsion systems for international partners, as well as 11 F135-PW-100 spare propulsion systems for FMS customers. This modification further provides for three spare propulsion systems and one trainer propulsion system for the Air Force.” 

That adds up to,

50 F135-PW-100 conventional take-off and landing propulsion systems

13 F135-PW-600 propulsion systems for the Marine Corps

3 spare propulsion systems

1 trainer propulsion system for the Air Force.  

The total is 67 engines at a cost of a little over $1B.  That’s a price of $15.5M per engine.

The announcement says that this is a modification to a previously awarded contract.  It’s unclear from the announcement whether this is additional money added to the previous contract or a stand alone purchase for this price.  Thus, the minimum cost is $15.5M and it may be higher.  I’m not sure how to interpret this.

Some more contract history.

“In October 2013, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) awarded a $1.1 billion contract to Pratt & Whitney for the sixth lot of F135 engines. The contract was for 38 engines, including 18 F135-PW-100 engines for the F-35A, seven F135-PW-400 engines for the F-35C, and six F135-PW-600 engines for the F-35B. On October 14, 2014, the DoD awarded Pratt & Whitney a $943 million contract for the seventh lot of engines (36 units).” (1)

So, that’s $28.9M apiece for 38 Lot 6 engines and $26.2M for 36 Lot 7 engines.

________________

(1)Aeroweb website, http://www.bga-aeroweb.com/Engines/PW-F135.html

F-35 Tidbits

Here’s a quick update on the F-35, courtesy of GAO (1).

Software.  First, a refresher on the F-35 software development.  Software is being developed and delivered in blocks with each block adding new capabilities and moving the aircraft closer to full operation.

1&2     A  Training

2B       Initial Warfighting Capability;           Marine IOC

3i         Extension of 2B;                                Air Force IOC

3F       Full Warfighting Capability;              Navy IOC

Engines.  Engine reliability is still a major issue.

“Data provided by Pratt & Whitney indicate that the mean flight hours between failure for the F-35A engine is about 21 percent of where the engine was expected to be at this point in the program. The F-35B engine is about 52 percent of where the engine was expected to be at this point.”

Look at those percentages.  That is some awful reliability!  Who’d have thought that the B version would have the more reliable engine?

Cost.  As of Dec 2014, GAO reports the total program cost estimate as,

Development             54.9B

Procurement              331.6B

Unit Cost                    $159M per aircraft

So there you have it.  With all the proclamations about $80M aircraft, the actual unit cost is $159M.  That’s a little different than what the program managers and LM are telling us, huh?

Concurrency.  This is a stunning bit.  We’ve thoroughly documented that the practice of concurrency (production of an item while it’s still being designed and tested) inevitably adds cost as products have to be reworked multiple times to fix and modify problems uncovered during testing.

“As of June 2014, DOD estimated that at that point about $1.7 billion in funding was needed to rework and retrofit aircraft with design changes needed as a result of test discoveries.”

$1.7B required for concurrency corrections??!!  The report doesn’t state how many aircraft are affected but let’s say there are 100-200 that have been produced or are in production at this point that are affected, so that works out to around $9M - $17M per aircraft for concurrency fixes.

Is that the end of the concurrency costs?  Well, no.

“… with more complex and demanding testing ahead and engine reliability improvements needed, it is almost certain that the program will encounter more discoveries.”

So, the concurrency costs will continue to add up.  I hope the F-35 supporters add these costs into the production costs as they make their claims about how cheap the F-35 is.

Finally, bear in mind that this aircraft hasn’t even come close to working through all its test points.  There are lots more problems to come.

(1)GAO, “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter”, Apr 2015, GAO-15-364

A Simple Upgrade?

Here’s a contract item for software upgrades to the F-35 that just stuns me.

Lockheed has been given a $17.6M contract to upgrade TWO F-35s to software Block 3F.  Work is to be completed by Sep 2021.

Are you kidding me??!  Almost $18M to upgrade software?  For two aircraft?  You plug in a jump drive and click on Copy or whatever the equivalent is in a military computer.  Ten minutes and you’re done.  The programming costs are already covered by the main F-35 contracts.  This is just the upgrade when the new block is ready.  Maybe they need a new hard drive or chip or something but those cost hundreds of dollars not millions.

Here’s the actual quote from the government website.

“Lockheed Martin Corp. …is being awarded a $17,599,996 not-to-exceed delivery order (550302) against a previously issued basic ordering agreement (N00019-14-G-0020).  This order provides for the procurement of retrofit modification kits and associated engineering installation services in support of the Block 3F upgrade of two F-35A aircraft for non-Department of Defense (DoD) participants.  Work will be performed in Fort Worth, Texas (90 percent); and Baltimore, Maryland (10 percent), and is expected to be completed in September 2021.”

The other baffling aspect of this is the completion date.  Sep 2021?  Why is a contract being issued six years prior to the need?  Couldn’t the government hold onto the money and earn some interest?

We’re just spraying Lockheed with the money hose!

Pencil Whipped

You’ve all heard about the Marine’s recent operational assessment of the F-35B, the results of which formed the basis for the Commandant’s recommendation to declare Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the aircraft.  You’ve also heard, here and elsewhere, that the assessment was barely able to achieve 50% aircraft availability.  What you haven’t heard is the rest of the story.  It’s far, far worse.

You’ll recall that the Michael Gilmore, DOT&E, the Pentagon’s weapon tester, wrote a memo describing the assessment in which he noted the lack of aircraft availability.  You can follow the link at the bottom of the post to see the actual memo (1).

Note:  Thanks to reader AltandMain for the link.

Let’s look a bit closer at what else was in the memo.

For starters, despite the Marines calling it an operational test (Operational Test One was the Marine’s title), Gilmore points out that it was not an operational test.  He presents a long list of reasons why it was not a valid operational test in any sense of the word (his assessment, not mine).  Let me sum up his reasons by saying that it’s clear that the aircraft involved in the test were not operationally representative nor were the conditions surrounding the test.  You can read the particulars yourself.

The memo documents in great detail, on a day by day, mission by mission, and aircraft by aircraft basis the availability issues that plagued the exercise.  What has not been reported but is documented in the memo are the additional factors that in a real world operation would have made the availabilities even worse.  Because the assessment was not an operationally realistic one, many of the aircraft systems that were or became inoperable were ignored.  In an actual operational setting their failures would have resulted in additional “downs”.

Of the six initial aircraft for the test, one had to be replaced part way through due to a fuel system maintenance issue that could not be fixed.  Again, in an actual operation, that aircraft would have been permanently unavailable (or, at least unavailable for an extended period).  Instead, the aircraft was replaced with a fresh one – certainly a distortion of the availability data!

Here is a summary of the daily aircraft operations and availabilities.  The memo describes the operations and specific availabilities in complete detail.  Again, follow the link to read the details.  Remember, there are 6 aircraft that should be fully mission capable each day.

May 18 – fly aboard six aircraft;  1 Not Mission Capable (NMC)

May 19 – daytime carrier qualifications;  1 NMC

May 20 – day/night carrier qualifications;  3 NMC

May 21 – day/night carrier qualifications;  4 NMC, 1 Partial Mission Capable (PMC)

May 22 – day/night carrier qualifications and misc training;  4 NMc, 1 PMC

May 23 – tactical training;  3 NMC

May 24 – tactical training;  4 NMC, 1 PMC

May 25 – tactical training;  2 NMC, 1 PMC

May 26 – media demo and replacement aircraft swap;  4 NMC, 1 PMC

May 27 – tactical training;  2 NMC

As you can see, the availabilities were poor and would have been poorer if many of the system failures hadn’t been ignored.  The stated 50% availability would have been on the order of 20% if this had been a real operation or real operational assessment.  Only one aircraft managed to fly each day throughout the exercise.  This is grim – all the more so for aircraft that were undoubtedly carefully selected for good performance and tweaked prior to the assessment.  Even this summary, grim as it is, does not convey all the failures.  Some aircraft were unavailable for scheduled missions but were eventually fixed in time to be counted mission capable by the end of the day.  Again, worse than presented.

Beyond availability, there were other problems, some not previously reported.

The flight mission data from the cockpit multi-function displays (MFD) and helmet mounted displays (HMD) were found to require large amounts of time to download.  The MFDs required 1 hour of download per hour of recording while the HMD required 4 hours of download per hour of recording.  It was noted that those kinds of time frames would adversely affect mission sortie rates.  I have no idea what the technical issue is but in the commercial world we can transfer gigabytes of data in moments.  This kind of problem seems incomprehensible.

Communications were also an issue.  Link 16 comms to the carrier were generally unworkable with the F-35 and carrier unable to send or receive target tracks.  Comms between aircraft were occasionally troublesome, also.  The memo notes that comms were not the focus of the exercise and the pilots did not write up the problems for maintenance – another example of potential aircraft “downs” that were not taken into account.

Radar and Electro-Optical systems were generally considered positive despite minor problems that should not be present after two decades of development and impending IOC.

Numerous problems were noted relating to the Autonomic Logistic Information System (ALIS).  Workarounds had to be deployed to transfer maintenance data.  Data files were found to be missing, corrupted, or incorrect.

Many more problems were cited in the memo although, to be fair, many were of the “to be expected” variety resulting from first time operations at sea.

Remember that this demonstration was carried out with extensive contractor support and ready access to shore based spares and equipment - conditions that would not be present in either a real operation or a real operational assessment.  Again, the availabilities would have been even worse without these aids.

Overall, the memo paints a far more serious and damning picture of the F-35’s readiness for operations than the Navy led us to believe.  Frankly, it’s baffling that the Marines would conclude that this was in any way a successful demonstration of the F-35’s readiness for IOC.  Calling this a successful demonstration is pencil whipping of the highest order!

So, if the demonstration wasn’t a valid operational assessment and the aircraft resoundingly failed from an availability perspective, what was the purpose of the "test"?  It’s pretty clear that it was intended as a media justification for declaring IOC regardless of the outcome.  Since it was not a valid test, nor even a DOT&E sanctioned test, there were no criteria and, thus, no possibility of failure.  The demonstration was just an exercise in justifying a predetermined decision to declare IOC.  My last shreds of respect for the Marine Corps as an institution are flying out the window.  We all had high hopes for the new Commandant but those hopes have been crushed with this demonstration.  Very disappointing.

[Update:  I see that the excellent Snafu website has a similar post up.  Rest assured that this is just coincidence and/or great minds thinking alike!  Go here to see his article:  Snafu]

(1)http://www.pogoarchives.org/straus/2015-9-1-DoD-FOIA-ocr.pdf

F-35 - Even Better Than We Believed!

We all knew the F-35 was an impressive war machine but it turns out that we didn’t know just how impressive it really was.  We thought it was simply the best 5^th generation aircraft in the world but it turns out that it’s even better than that because it’s also a 4^th generation aircraft!!!!!  That’s right.  It can transition between 4^th and 5^th by loading bombs on external pylons.  I can see you’re flabbergasted and disbelieving.  No aircraft can do that, you’re thinking, but it’s true.  This one can.  USNI News website is reporting this amazing capability (1).  Here’s a quote from Lt. Gen. Jon Davis, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation.

“No other airplane can go from fifth to fourth and back to fifth again. I’m buying pylons for the airplane.”

There you have it.  By adding external pylons to the F-35 we gain the entire 4th generation capability in addition to the already amazing 5th generation wonders the aircraft contains.  You’re asking, though, how will this affect our enemies and ourselves?  Gen. Davis describes exactly how this new capability will make our enemies and us feel.

“I think for our adversaries will be quite worrisome, for us should be a source of great comfort.” 

Great comfort!  Yes, yes, that's exactly what I feel when I think of the F-35.  He nailed it. 

But wait, there’s more!

The F-35 has been at the center of debate about close air support (CAS) with proponents (well, actually only the Air Force) and critics debating whether the F-35 could be an effective CAS aircraft.  Well, it turns out the AF was right and the critics were wrong.  The F-35 is not only suited for CAS, it’s optimized!!!

“The pylons optimize the F-35B for close-air support …”

An optimal CAS aircraft and all thanks to the pylons, those amazing pylons.

It’s a shame that they couldn’t hang pylons on, say, the A-10 to optimize it for CAS. 

Is there any way the F-35 could get any better?  No, you say?  It’s not possible, you say?  Well, I hesitate to even mention this for fear of giving away what may possibly be or become a top secret F-35 capability but if the canopy was removed for a flight and a machine gun was mounted to the rim for the pilot to operate by hand, the F-35 would be a 1^st generation aircraft.  That’s right, we’d have an aircraft that could transition between 1^st, 4^th, and 5^th generation.  Truly, no other aircraft in the world would have that kind of capability set.

All right, you’re thinking this is another of ComNavOps famous humor pieces.  Well, sadly, it’s not.  This is real.  Follow the reference link and read the article for yourself.  The quotes and the content are real and come from the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation just as I’ve stated.  Yes, the mocking tone of the post is mine and the 1^st generation bit was added to emphasize how ridiculous the hype on this aircraft has gotten.  And that’s the real story in this post. 

The hype surrounding this aircraft is out of control and the fact that the Marines feel the need to put out this kind of marketing pap tells me that they’re feeling the heat for declaring a demonstrably unready aircraft (50% availability during the trial period!) cleared for IOC.  If your product is so bad that you have to resort to made up attributes extolling a capability (pylons) that existed in WWI, you have a problem.  This Marine General has made a laughingstock of himself and the Marines.

As I said, I wish this was a humor piece but it’s not.  This is really sad.

Hey, I’m going to further risk national security and let you readers in on another amazing F-35 secret.  Program managers are developing round, rolling, rubberish things to place on the bottom of the landing gear.  They call them wheels (I think that’s how you spell it – not sure, it’s new technology) and, supposedly, it will give the F-35 unparalleled ground mobility.  Gen. Davis and I are on the same page.  The F-35 is an awesome machine.

USNI, “Davis: F-35B External Weapons Give Marines 4th, 5th Generation Capabilities in One Plane”, Megan Eckstein, August 13, 2015,

http://news.usni.org/2015/08/13/davis-f-35b-external-weapons-give-marines-4th-5th-generation-capabilities-in-one-plane

Hornet Upgrades

As we’re all painfully aware, the F-35 has been in development for two decades and is still years away from front line service in any effective manner (notwithstanding the Marine Corps’ PR stunt proclaiming a fictional IOC).  The danger with such a protracted development is that by the time the aircraft reaches squadron service, its technologies may be obsolete.  Most of us recognize this danger and worriedly track Chinese and Russian aviation developments to see what capabilities they’ll have when the F-35 enters service.  However, there is another F-35 “enemy” whose technological capabilities should have been vastly overmatched by the F-35 but are rapidly catching up and may surpass the F-35.  Who is that enemy?  It’s the F-18 Hornet.  Yes, the lowly, basic, non-stealthy Hornet is rapidly gaining capabilities to rival or surpass the F-35. 

We know about the Advanced Super Hornet with conformal fuel tanks that would add 260 miles to the combat radius according to flight testing, enhanced stealth with a 50% reduction in frontal RCS, longer range, advanced cockpit avionics, and an enclosed weapons pod.  What else is being done to improve the Hornet?  Well, here are a couple of new technologies.

Harris Corp., Government Communications Systems Division, has received a $29M contract for the procurement of 138 Distributed Targeting System (DTS) kits for F/A-18E/F and EA-18G (1).   DTS provides enhanced targeting capability for the Super Hornet. It is part of the U.S. Navy’s F/A-18E/F Network Centric Warfare Upgrades program and the F/A-18E/F Flight Plan, which is intended to ensure that the Super Hornet remains ahead of emerging threats in coming decades.

DTS increases pilot and aircrew situational awareness and precision targeting when engaging air-to-ground targets, in part by using geo-registration technology.  Geo-registration technology compares images taken from tactical sensors with an onboard imagery database to produce highly accurate target coordinates.

From a Flight Global website article (2),

"The distributed targeting system allows you to self-generate GPS-quality mensurated coordinates onboard the airplane autonomously," Morley [Captain Frank Morley, Program Manager for the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G] says.

“That means that the Super Hornet will be able to use coordinates generated by its sensors, for example its Raytheon APG-79 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar or its Raytheon AN/ASQ-228 Advanced Targeting Forward-Looking Infrared (ATFLIR) pod, and compare that to a precise onboard imagery database to generate precise weapons quality coordinates.”

Now doesn’t that sound a lot like the F-35’s vaunted sensor fusion technology?  The biggest difference is that the DTS is being produced today rather than being just a never-ending developmental project.

In addition to the DTS, the Hornet has an Infrared Search and Track (IRST) sensor in the works.  IRST is a passive, long-range sensor that searches for and detects heat sources.  The system can simultaneously track multiple targets and provides air-to-air targeting capability.  Being a passive sensor, IRST does not give off radiation and is harder to detect as well as being immune to radar jamming.

“Meanwhile, the Boeing is about one year into a development program to field a new infrared search and track (IRST) pod that should be fielded on the Super Hornet fleet by late 2016, Morley says. Developed in conjunction with Lockheed Martin, the new sensor is an evolution of the Northrop Grumman F-14D Tomcat's AN/AAS-42 IRST camera. Boeing upgraded the Tomcat's camera technology for foreign F-15 sales, Morley says. The variant of the sensor that will be added to the Super Hornet is a further development of Boeing's F-15 developments.”

“For the Super Hornet, the USN opted for a podded-solution. A pod avoids retrofit costs, Morley says. An internal system would require modifications to the aircraft's outer mold-line and avionics hardware changes, which would require extensive testing. Nor does the USN need the pod for every mission, Morley says. The IRST is only required for air-to-air focused missions like fleet air defence or air superiority. As such, the USN will only buy about 170 pods, which it will use only as needed, Morley says.

One of the unique design features of the new IRST pod is that it is built into an external fuel tank. Because the aircraft's centerline station is the optimum position for the IRST pod, it has to take the place of the Super Hornet's ever-present drop-tank.

In order to preserve the Super Hornet's range, the USN opted to have the sensor built into the forward half of the fuel tank. That way, some two-thirds of the fuel is still available for use.” (2)

IRST completed its first flight aboard an F/A-18 Super Hornet in February.

Further planned upgrades also sound like the F-35 sensor fusion (2).

“…one of the most important planned capabilities will be better multi-sensor integration (MSI). The aircraft will eventually be able to correlate all of the disparate information generated by the radar, ATFLIR, electronic warfare systems and data-links into one clear tactical picture …”

A Global Aviation website report sums up the Hornet’s development (3),

“Other F/A-18E/F Super Hornet next-generation capabilities included in the flight plan are advanced fused sensors, Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar, Counter Electronic Attack (CEA), Distributed Targeting System (DTS), Multi-sensor Integration (MSI), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), IP-Based Linked Networks and advanced air-to-ground and air-to-air precision weapons operating on an open-architecture backplane.”

Again, the key difference between the F-35 and these Hornet technologies is that the Hornet’s are in production or nearly so and are being fitted to capable, combat ready aircraft.  By the time the F-35 is ready, it may find itself struggling to keep up with the Hornet rather than the other way around.

(1)http://www.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=5575

(2)Flight Global Website, “USN developing new Super Hornet upgrades”, Dave Majumdar, 28-May-2012

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usn-developing-new-super-hornet-upgrades-372392/

(3)Global Aviation Report, “Navy’s IRST System Successfully Completes First Flight Aboard F/A-18”, February 19, 2014

http://globalaviationreport.com/2014/02/19/navys-irst-system-successfully-completes-first-flight-aboard-fa-18/

What Might Have Been

What Might Have Been

An anonymous reader recently made a comment suggesting that the “B” model of the F-35 should have had different requirements and capabilities than it currently does.  Though he didn’t explicitly state it, the implication was that those differences would have led to a cheaper aircraft that would have been fielded sooner.

Note:  The reader commented anonymously.  I’d love to give proper credit which is why I encourage everyone to offer at least an informal username in the body of the comment text.

This is an intriguing idea and got me thinking about what the “B” should have been.

Let’s start with the most obvious consideration: the “B” is strictly for the Marines (I’m looking only at US application, now).  That means that, by definition, it’s not intended for air superiority, carrier group defense, deep strike, or maritime reconnaissance.  It’s intended for Marine ground support.  In other words, it’s intended to operate over a land battlefield.  That means that it doesn’t need exceptional speed, huge range (it will operate in close proximity to land forces), high degrees of stealth, exceptional maneuverability (I guess it achieved that one!), or 360 degree sensor fusion (let’s face it, that’s an A2A requirement).

What it did need was survivability to operate over a battlefield.  That survivability could take the form of armor, like the A-10, reduced size, reduced IR signature, enhanced ECM, redundant controls, and a moderate degree of stealth.  Stealth is only marginally useful in this role since the immediate low level battlefield threats are more IR and visual.

Another requirement should have been precision organic targeting.  Depending on external laser spotting, for example, is a very iffy proposition in high end combat.  The ground troops are going to be far too busy and pressured to conduct leisurely laser spotting.  The aircraft would need whatever onboard laser, IR, or visual targeting capability that could be had.  The ability to find and designate targets with minimal guidance from ground troops would be critical.

Hand in hand with onboard targeting should have been downward directed ISR.  Sensors designed to find and identify enemy troops, vehicles, armor, and artillery would be highly beneficial and would allow the aircraft to not only engage targets but guide friendly troop movements and strategy.  The ability to independently assemble a fairly comprehensive picture of the ground battle would be key.  JSTARS and similar aircraft have some of this capability so it’s not a total reach of fantasy.

All of this requires maximum endurance (time over target).  The ability to loiter and develop a ground picture and remain available for ground troops is paramount.  Passing overhead once at Mach 17 is nowhere near as useful as being able to loiter and develop an understanding of the ground situation and monitor changes over time.  That type of understanding would be of great benefit to the ground commander – perhaps more beneficial, even, then weapons on target.  This requirement further suggests consideration of a two seat aircraft allowing the backseater to develop the ground picture and coordinate with ground forces without having to be distracted by actually flying the aircraft.

Finally, the “B” should have had a significant weapons payload.  The weapons should have been a combination of high volume, suppressive fire like rockets as well as precision missiles like Hellfire and small guided bombs.

So, what does this give us when we assemble these requirements in one package?  It suggests that the F-35B should have been a fairly basic and straightforward airframe, possibly a two seater, possessing moderate stealth, great endurance, maximum IR signature reduction, armor and redundancy, and average speed and maneuverability.  It should have featured ground-directed sensing systems and the ability to interface with ground commanders.  Weapons should have been plentiful (maximum use of hardpoints since stealth would not be an emphasis) with a combination of precision and area suppressive munitions.  It should have had no emphasis on A2A beyond self-defense.

In short, the F-35B should have had far more in common with the A-10 than with the current F-35B.

F-35B Not As Ready As Reported?

The Marines are preparing to declare operation readiness for the F-35B.  Their confidence is buoyed by the testing in May of six aircraft aboard the Wasp.  Testing was roundly declared an unrivaled success.  Come to find out, though, that there were some problems.

A memo from Michael Gilmore, DOT&E, reported by Bloomberg, describes maintenance problems during the test period that reduced readiness rates to around 50% (1).  According to Gilmore,

“…aircraft reliability was poor enough that it was difficult for the Marines to keep more than two or three of the six embarked jets in a flyable status on any given day.”

This poor reliability occurred despite the maintenance crews having ready access to spare parts from shore (something that won’t happen on a deployment) and “significant assistance” from Lockheed and sub-contractor personnel.

So, under absolutely ideal conditions with all aircraft tweaked up for the test, access to spares beyond the norm, and with significant manufacturer assistance,  the F-35 still struggled to achieve 50% readiness. 

“Six F-35Bs, … were available for flights only half of the time …”

And the Marines are going to declare the F-35 operational?

(1)bloomberg.com, “Lockheed F-35’s Reliability Found Wanting in Shipboard Testing”, Anthony Capaccio, July 28, 2015 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-28/lockheed-f-35-s-reliability-found-wanting-in-shipboard-testing

F-35 Magic Helmet

Defense Industry Daily website reports that Lockheed Martin received a $101.3M contract for production of 383 F-35 magic helmets (1).  That’s $256,000 per helmet.  It’s not clear from the contract announcement whether that is the total cost for the helmets or an incremental modification (2).  Previous estimates had put the helmet cost at $400,000 each.

Regardless, pilots, do not misplace your helmet!

The helmet, you’ll recall, is supposed to provide the magic that fuses all the F-35’s sensor data and allows the pilot to have 360 degree vision.  Of course, the helmet has been under development for a couple of decades and still has problems.  Hey, what do you want for a few hundred thousand dollars each?

(1)https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/f-35-lightning-the-joint-strike-fighter-program-2012-07501/

(2)http://www.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=5583

F-35 Austere Basing - It's Over!

Navy Times website reports that the Navy has announced that NAS Lemoore will be the focal point for the F-35’s operation and introduction into the fleet (1).  The website article contained some very interesting statements.  Read the following very carefully and then we’ll discuss the implications.

“One thing is for sure, an F-35C squadron will have what Douglass [Cmdr. Brian  Douglass, F-35C project officer on the staff of Strike Fighter Wing, Pacific] called a few more enlisted maintainers around. Currently, an F/A-18E squadron has anywhere between 226 and 234 sailors assigned. An F-35C squadron will include 245 to 250 sailors.

Most of the extra maintainers are due to the planned creation of a completely new maintenance shop for each F-35C squadron. It will only be responsible for maintaining the outside of the aircraft and will be manned by aviation structural mechanics.

The skin of the F-35C is designed to deflect radar and make it tougher to see by potential enemies. This stealth capability is so important that there will be a complete new shop in the squadron, manned by sailors with special training and skills to maintain it.

‘The low observability of the F-35C is considered a weapons platform and that's going to be a huge mind shift for us to treat the exterior of the airplane and the maintenance with such care,’ Douglass said. ‘It's not that we don't care for the exterior of our aircraft today, but this is on a totally different level, and we want to keep it pristine, because that's part of the weapons capability. That's why we procured this airplane.’ “

Did you catch the reference to the manning increase of around 20 personnel for each F-35 squadron?  Recall - what does the Navy claim is the biggest challenge it faces regarding budgets?  The answer is personnel costs.  In their attempt to address this critical issue (their view, not mine) the Navy has designed the LCS, Zumwalt, and Ford with crews that are hugely undersized and totally inadequate for combat and damage control.  Despite being willing to risk the loss of major combat vessels in a bid to decrease manning costs, the F-35 squadrons will increase maintenance manning by 20 people per squadron!  You’ll recall that the F-35 was supposed to have a magical, telepathic, all-knowing maintenance program (ALIS – Autonomic Logistics Information System) that would decrease maintenance manning requirements.  Instead, we see that the F-35 will require 20 more maintainers per squadron.

Did you also catch what those extra maintenance people would be doing?  External stealth maintenance!  I thought the F-35 was supposed to be relatively maintenance free as regards its external skin.  I guess that wasn’t true.

Now, think about the implication of the stealth maintenance requirement.  This is going to upset a lot of people so brace yourself.  This admission that the F-35 is going to need large numbers of highly specialized and exquisitely trained extra maintainers just for the stealth aspect means that the fantasy dream that many F-35 supporters have of operating a few F-35s from hidden, disbursed, austere bases is totally unachievable – a complete fantasy.  Note the key sentence from the article’s quote,

“It's not that we don't care for the exterior of our aircraft today, but this is on a totally different level, and we want to keep it pristine, because that's part of the weapons capability.”

Note the phrase, “totally different level”, and the word “pristine”.  These are not achievable by a few mechanics taking care of planes in an austere jungle base.  I have severe doubts that this “totally different level” of maintenance is even achievable in a carrier’s hangar.

Now, there’s nothing surprising about any of this.  Did we really think that the F-35 was somehow going to get by with casual, low tech maintenance performed by a cigar-chomping, roadside mechanic with a pipe wrench when the F-22 requires near-surgical operating room precision and cleanliness to maintain?

Supporters, this is the official death knell of the austere basing concept.  Embrace it. 

Increased manning costs and the end of the austere basing concept (not that it was ever realistic) - the F-35 is the gift that keeps on giving.

(1)Navy Times, “NAS Lemoore prepares for F-35 arrival, more F/A-18s” Mark D. Faram, May 10, 2015

http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2015/05/10/naval-air-station-lemoore-prepares-for-f-35-arrival-more-fa-18s/70975432/