Perception Is Reality

An anonymous reader (please, people, include a username at the end your comments so I can offer proper credit!) offered an interesting thought regarding lessons that could be learned from the Royal Navy (RN).  He observed,
 

… once naval forces stop generating usefulness and relevance to the countries [sic] population.... you soon stop having a navy big enough to matter..[1]

I understand this to mean that he believes that a citizenry will direct their resources (taxes and popular opinion) to those endeavors and organizations that it sees the greatest benefit from.  This is not terribly surprising, it’s just basic human nature and quite reasonable.  In this specific case, the population of the UK sees value in ‘things’ other than the RN or, at least, the RN ranks fairly low on the priority list in the minds of the citizens.
 
Most of the readers of this blog, almost by definition, would see a great value in a navy for their country, whatever country that is.  You wouldn’t be reading the blog if you didn’t, right?  So, how is it that the citizenry of the UK sees so little value in the RN?  Does the Royal Navy really offer no value to the people?
 
There are two factors at play, here.
 
1. True value
2. Perceived value
 
Among other purposes, a navy, any navy, ensures the security of its country’s shipping, provides persistent surveillance, presence, and confrontation against unfriendly encroachments, and stands as a ready force against enemy attack.  This ensures unhindered trade and enhanced economic fortune for the population.  This is the true value.
 
How could any population not see that as valuable and gladly provide resources for the establishment and maintenance of a naval force?
 
Well, that brings us to the perceived value.  There’s an old saying:  perception is reality.  That means that whatever someone believes to be real is what’s real to them.  If you believe that your navy isn’t doing anything worthwhile then that’s your reality regardless of the true reality.
 
Where does perception come from, if not from reality?  How is someone’s perception formed?  Well, it comes from many sources: one’s own experiences, media news sources (you can instantly see, here, the danger posed by a biased media that presents an altered reality as true reality, but, I digress), social networks, etc.  If those various sources are not constantly presenting and explaining the true value of a navy then the perception quickly becomes that the navy has no value.
 
I can’t address the UK situation specifically but I can note that the US Navy makes almost no effort to talk to the citizenry and present its accomplishments and value in terms that the average person can understand and relate to.  Instead, the Navy resorts to blocking the media, circling the wagons, hiding behind bogus classification labels, misleading Congress and, generally, looking down at the general population. 
 
The Navy’s actions off Yemen involving missile attacks and defense should be made into near-movie type adventures to be presented to the public.  The exploits of our fearless sailors, fighting off relentless missile attacks so that Americans can get their oil and goods should be the stuff of growing legend.  It almost doesn’t matter how precisely true the accounts are.  That’s not the point.  The point is to present the Navy’s value to the public.
 
Once upon a time, moviegoers were routinely treated to newsreel highlights of our armed forces.  We need to bring back the updated version of that on TV, streaming channels, social media, podcasts, influencers, etc.  We need to continuously show the public the value of the Navy.  If we do that, the Navy won’t have to beg Congress for ships, the people will do it for them.  If we do that, the recruiting problem will solve itself.
 
On the other hand, if we persist in hiding information, the people will have no idea what the value of the Navy is and the people’s attention and resources will be directed elsewhere … which is exactly what’s been happening for years, now.
 
On a related note, if the US is providing the security for global shipping, then what true value does the RN offer?  Why should the UK citizenry pay for a navy when the US is providing their security for free?  One could see this as a powerful argument for the US to stop providing global security which would, in turn force other countries to increase their naval forces to fill the gap and result in an increase in their true (and perceived?) value.  Thus, one could make the argument, it is in the UK’s best interest for the US to stop providing international shipping security.  Interesting perspective, huh?
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2024/12/open-post.html?showComment=1735387686167#c4809056757800113041

Commandant Berger - Lunatic or Visionary?

Recently ascended Marine Corps Commandant Berger has issued some documents that state that he is going to radically change the Marine Corps’ path away from its traditional mode of operation.  Instead of massed combat power and amphibious assaults, Berger envisions small, dispersed units operating from forward bases and engaged in aviation and sea control.  We’ve discussed the details in a previous post (see, “Commandant’sGuidance”).

To briefly review some of the key points from the Commandant’s Guidance document, the Commandant …

• has made clear that he is willing to eliminate legacy assets to achieve his modernization goals.
• is advocating abandoning the long standing 38-ship amphibious fleet and 2 MEB lift requirement.
• has made clear his intention to control and influence more of the naval side of things by assigning more Marine Corps forces to the Fleet and putting Marine Corps experts in the fleet Maritime Operations Centers.
• recognizes that China is our main threat.
• recognizes that our forward deployed forces lack the combat capability to deter our enemies and persist in a contested environment.
• advocates for an extensive role in land based, forward deployed, sea control.
• desires affordable and numerous amphibious vessels over a few exquisite, large amphibious ships.
• wishes to explore absorbing traditional Navy functions such as coastal / riverine forces, naval construction forces, and mine countermeasure forces.
• sees expeditionary bases as a foundation of future war.
• strongly advocates dispersal of forces (distributed operations).
• will eliminate all Marine Corps wargaming efforts except for the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. (1, p.18)

Here’s the problem with all this: it’s one man’s opinion and it’s an opinion that is not backed up by much experience (the concepts, not his personal service record) or experimentation and he’s brooking no professional disagreement or diversity of thought.  It’s his way or the highway and alternative thinkers are not welcome.

If he’s correct about his vision and path then he’ll drag the Marines into a better future in one, sudden convulsion.  On the other hand, if he’s wrong he’ll set the Marines back for decades to come.

So, which is it?  Is he right or wrong?

Well, there’s only two ways to know.  One, is to have a war and see if he was right.  Two, is to conduct extensive wargame experimentation before implementation.  The problem with the first way, war, is obvious – if he’s wrong, it will be too late to change.  The problem with the second way is that he has already decided to fully commit without supporting evidence and experimentation and the experimentation he’s going to conduct is, without a doubt, going to be pre-determined.  He’s basically stated that.  He’s already determined that the experimentation will support his vision and all that’s left is to tweak the ‘how to implement’ issues around the periphery.

In short, the Commandant is Adm. Rickover but with even more power.  He has the vision and everyone else can shut up and join him or leave the service.

There is much to like about the Commandant’s vision but there is also much to question.  As a general statement, I like his recognition of the current problems.  He has a much clearer grasp of the problems than any of his predecessors.  What I have trouble with is his general solution which is to embrace distributed, penny packet, expeditionary forces.  It is very difficult to see how scattered, small units and fantasy expeditionary bases are going to defeat a peer enemy.  Honestly, it seems like this is a budget grab and an attempt to remain relevant in a Chinese/Pacific war.

Let’s look a bit closer at a few of the specific issues that are questionable.

I don’t have any particular problem in abandoning the traditional big deck, amphibious fleet since I’ve stated repeatedly that I don’t see any strategic or operational need for amphibious assaults in any reasonable scenario.  While I agree with the movement away from large amphibious fleets, I completely disagree with where the Marine’s redirected emphasis seems to be going which is towards distributed, small units.  I’ve repeatedly posted about the folly of small units in a peer war so I won’t belabor it further, here.

Berger wants to eliminate legacy systems that have little or no “demand signal”. (1, p.15)  The flaw in this logic is that many (most?) high end, peer war systems have no “demand signal” outside of actual war.  A system or asset may be of no use in the peacetime, low threat operations and conflicts we typically engage in but might be critically important in a high end, peer war.  To eliminate those systems based on lack of ‘demand signal’ is potentially foolhardy and shortsighted.

There is a strong sense that Berger will ruthlessly eliminate any alternative thinking or disagreement.  For example, the elimination of all forms of wargaming other than the single Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory is troubling in that it certainly seems as if the intention is to stifle alternative thinking, experimentation , and dissent.  This single, strictly controlled wargame effort suggests that outcomes will be pre-ordained to support his theories and philosophies.

He essentially says that all communications must strictly adhere to his published decrees.  As he flatly states,

We must communicate with precision and consistency, based on a common focus and a unified message. (1)

I interpret this to mean that no alternative thinking or discussion will be allowed.  While I recognize the importance of unity and focus of effort, there is a very fine line between unity and suppression of thought.  If Berger’s approach is wrong, who will speak out? 

The Commandant has made clear that he is intent on injecting the Marines into the Navy’s business.  The Marines have recently been telling the Navy how to design ships, what type of ships are needed, and how to fight and it appears that Berger intends to not only continue this trend but formalize it by inserting Marine officers into the Navy command structure where and when he can.  The only thing more disturbing than this trend is the Navy’s apparent acquiescence to it.  Further, Berger’s comments about absorbing Navy functions into the Corps is worrisome in the extreme and, again, smacks of empire building.

Berger strongly supports forward, dispersed, expeditionary forces and bases.  This is a very questionable approach, as we’ve discussed in previous posts.  This concerns me more than anything else because it is the foundation of how the Marines will structure their forces and how they will fight.  If this is wrong – and I believe it is – then the entire Marine Corps is wrong.  This ties back to the wargaming and free discussion, both of which appear as if they will be rigidly controlled and regulated.  Without any alternative thinking, erroneous approaches become impossible to correct and this is the path I fear the Marines are headed down.

To summarize and repeat, there is much to like about the Commandant’s guidance but also much to be concerned about.  If Berger is right, the Marines have a bright future but if he is wrong the Marines are in for decades of problems and irrelevancy in a war.  The check and balance on this kind of revolutionary change in approach should be free and open wargaming and discussion but Berger seems determined to eliminate any dissenting voices.  This is extremely worrisome.

_____________________________________

(1)“Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps”, General David H. Berger, Issued July 2019

The Death of Navy Tradition

Navy Times website has an absolute must-read article on the death of Navy traditions.

Death of Navy Tradition

AAW - Hard or Soft Kill?

The Navy has been firmly committed to the hard kill option of the Aegis/Standard Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) system as the main line of defense against attacking planes and missiles.  Additional hard kill elements include a variety of shorter range missiles and guns such as RAM, SeaRAM, CIWS, and various rapid firing guns in the 3”-5” range.  A secondary, soft kill system of decoys and electronic countermeasures (ECM) is also used but has not been developed and upgraded with the same attention and priority as Aegis and the various hard kill components.  For example, the Navy’s main ECM system, the SLQ-32, is well behind the times, bordering on obsolete, and the Navy is only just now beginning to look at upgrading it.



SLQ-32 - Not Enough Love?



We see, then, that the Navy uses both hard and soft kill systems for AAW with an overriding emphasis on hard kill.  Is this wise?  What is the success rate of each?  Which is more likely to be successful against future threats?  Is the Navy pursuing the best course in AAW development?

We’ve already discussed the historical data regarding anti-ship missile attacks on passively defended (soft kill) vessels.  The data shows defensive success rates of around 80%.



Historically, there have been very few combat AAW missile launches so there is not much of a database to draw conclusions from.  The best data set that I’m aware of is from the Falklands War between Britain and Argentina.  During that conflict, at least 26 Sea Dart missiles were launched.  Wikipedia reports that of 5 missiles launched against helicopters or high flying, relatively slow aircraft, 4 hits were achieved.  By contrast, there were only 2 hits out of 19 launches against low flying aircraft.  The Falklands totals for the Sea Dart, then, were 6 hits out of 26 launches (23% success).  Wikipedia further notes that an unspecified number of launches were made without guidance in an attempt to break up low level attacks as a result of limitations of the missile system.  In addition, the Sea Wolf missile, designed for use against low level targets, achieved 2 kills in 8 launches for a 25% success rate, according to Wikipedia.

Note that the Falklands AAW actions were against planes, mainly, rather than missiles which are a much more difficult target.

To the best of my knowledge, Aegis/Standard has never been fired in combat in the AAW role so there is no direct data to examine.

We’ve also discussed from time to time that Aegis is such a complex system that it has fallen into a fleetwide state of reduced performance and readiness.  The Navy has had to implement special programs in an attempt to bring Aegis back up to standard but the system remains degraded across the fleet.  The complexity of the system largely precludes on-board repairs by the crew and, in fact, makes it virtually impossible for the crew to even spot degraded performance.

What do all of these bits and pieces tell us?

One obvious conclusion is that soft kill methods have a far better performance record than hard kill.  That’s probably not all that surprising given the difficulty of trying to guide an AAW missile on to an incoming, high speed, maneuvering target.  To be fair, that conclusion is drawn with no data input from the Aegis/Standard system.  Will Aegis perform markedly better than Sea Dart?  My guess, based on nothing, is that Aegis will perform better but nowhere near the 80% success rate demonstrated by soft kill systems.

Another point to consider is that any AAW system works best in a fully automatic mode.  Unfortunately, commanders are reluctant to operate that way for fear of unintended mishaps.  Indeed, there have been numerous such incidents.  For example, Sea Sparrow has fired on friendly ships during exercises and CIWS has fired on friendly chaff and helos with each example causing damage and casualties.  Contrast that to soft kill systems operating in automatic mode.  There is no danger.  Soft kill systems can be left on continuously, EMCON considerations not withstanding.

Further, consider the cost of upgrading the capabilities of hard and soft kill systems.  Hard kill systems require software upgrades, which are relatively easy to implement, and hardware (the missiles) upgrades.  The Navy has spent a great deal of money upgrading the Standard missile from Block 1 through the various versions to Block 6.  Soft kill system upgrades, by comparison, are almost exclusively software based, again relatively easy, and the hardware upgrades are far less expensive.  Thus, soft kill systems can be more easily kept up to date and responsive to the ever-changing threats.

Next, consider the real estate required for hard kill and soft kill systems.  Missiles and their launchers require enormous amounts of deck space and internal ship’s volume.   Soft kill hardware requires very little space.  The result is that the smaller the ship, the less hard kill defense capability it has.  To a large extent, soft kill systems are independent of ship size.

Finally, consider the danger that hard kill systems pose to themselves.  The missiles represent a source of internal explosions in the event of a hit on the defending ship.  Soft kill systems present little self-threat.

It’s clear, then, that soft kill systems offer historically superior performance, easier upgrade paths, can be operated more freely, require little space, and present no threat to friendly forces or the defender.  The Navy should be much more focused on soft kill systems than they currently are.

Why, then, is the Navy so focused on hard kills?  Well, for one thing, hard kills are dramatic, definite, and occur at some distance away from the defender.  Soft kills tend not to show a definite result until the missile has approached quite closely and passed the defender.  It’s a lot more reassuring to see missiles disappear at a distance!

What’s the takeaway from this discussion?  I’m not suggesting that the Navy abandon hard kill systems, so half of you can take your itchy fingers off the keyboard where they were preparing to lambaste me.  What I’m suggesting is that soft kill systems are part of a layered AAW defense, along with hard kill systems, but that they should be given much higher priority than they have historically received from the Navy.  As stated, soft kill systems are more effective, cheaper, easier to maintain and upgrade, and safer to operate.  You would think those characteristics would garner far more attention than they do.  C’mon Navy, pay attention to what works even if it isn’t the “sexy” approach.  Soft kill provides more bang for the buck – stop ignoring it!

Carriers - It's the Air Wing that Matters

I think we've all read the arguments for and against the carrier until we're tired of it.  However, all of the arguments, both for and against, have missed the most important point.  The carrier, itself, is irrelevant; it's what the carrier can do that matters.  And what is it that a carrier can do?  Well, obviously, it's to launch combat aircraft into battle.  I'm belaboring the point, you say?  Well, bear with me. 

It's the Air Wing the Matters, not the Carrier!

The value of a carrier is, of course, wholly contained in the air wing.  If the air wing were to become "devalued" beneath a critical threshold, the carrier itself would cease to have any reason to exist.  How can an air wing devalue?  Well, reduction in number of airframes, reduction in combat radius, or reduction in stores capacity would render the air wing less effective.

What few people seem to realize is that current air wings are around half the size of air wings from the '80s.  In 1981 the typical air wing had 5 squadrons (VF & VA) totalling 60 aircraft. These are the combat planes. The remaining helos, ASW, AEW, electronic warfare, etc. brought the total to around 92 planes.  Compare this to the current air wing which consists of 4 squadrons (VFA Hornets) totalling 44 combat planes and around 60-64 for the overall wing size.  Going further, the Navy has already announced that when the F-35 enters service, the squadrons will be reduced by 2-4 planes, each.  Note - WWII Essex class carried around 100 combat planes!

  

Less Capable Air Wings

Consider, now, the combat radius of the Hornet versus its predecessor, the A-6 Intruder.  The Intruder had a combat radius of around 1000 nm versus the Hornet C/D with around 200 nm and the E/F with around 300 nm.  The F-35 will have a radius of around 400 nm.

Finally, the stores capacity of the Intruder was 18000 lb versus the Hornet C/D of 13700 lb and the E/F of 17700.  The future F-35 will only have 3000 lb of stores capacity without resorting to external hardpoints and sacrificing stealth and range.

So, air wings are becoming less "valuable" with each passing year.  We appear to be headed for a point where the supercarrier's cost can't be justified due to the ever decreasing effectiveness of the air wings.

People who argue either for or against the carrier, miss the point that it's the air wing that's important, not the carrier.  Unfortunately, the air wings are getting steadily smaller and less capable.  As you make your arguments for or against the carrier, do it from the perspective of the air wing.  Thus, the question becomes, is the cost of a modern supercarrier justified to carry around 40 combat planes?  I'll leave it to you to decide that.

On a related note, the new Ford class is bigger than the Nimitz but will carry an air wing approaching half the size that the Nimitz first carried.  Am I the only one who sees a logical inconsistency here?

_______________________


For those interested in the numbers, here are the Air Wing sizes as of April 2012 as listed in the May 2012 issue of Proceedings.

CVW-1   44 combat / 58 total
CVW-2   46 combat / 70 total
CVW-3   45 combat / 66 total
CVW-5   46 combat / 67 total
CVW-7   44 combat / 59 total
CVW-8   44 combat / 70 total
CVW-9   44 combat / 75 total
CVW-11  44 combat / 67 total
CVW-14  46 combat / 55 total
CVW-17  44 combat / 59 total

The large variation in the totals is due to some Air Wings carrying an extra squadron of helos, for some reason. 

All Air Wings also embark 2 CODs (C-2A) when deployed but they aren't part of the wing.

LPD-17 - Whose Fault?

LPD-17 - Unfinished Ship

The consensus among naval observers seems to be that the LPD-17 class is a flawed design complicated by shoddy workmanship by the manufacturer.  The list of problems is seemingly endless and all relate back to the poor quality of construction.  While admitting to some slight degree of responsibility, though not much, the Navy would have us believe that they were victimized by the manufacturer and are just as outraged as we, the taxpayer, are.

Consider this …  If you went to purchase a new car and were shown a vehicle that was only 90% complete would you buy it?  Of course not!  You’d refuse to pay until the car was complete and a test drive had proven that it was fully functional.  That’s just basic common sense consumerism, right?

Now consider the following from the Congressional Research Service report, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement:

Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke - Specialist in Naval Affairs, March 16, 2011.

“The Navy accepted delivery of LPD-17 with about 1.1 million hours of construction work remaining to be done on the ship. This equated to about 8.7% of the total hours needed to build the ship, and (with material costs included) about 7% of the total cost to build the ship.”

The Navy went car shopping and bought a vehicle that was only 90% complete!  1.1 million hours of construction left to go!  How is it that the Navy doesn’t understand what every consumer in America knows – you don’t pay for an incomplete and non-functional product.

Well, maybe the Navy made a mistake on the LPD-17, first of class.  Maybe they trusted the manufacturer and simply got burned.  Maybe the Navy was the victim and not a fatally stupid consumer.  Again, from the report,

“The Navy accepted delivery of LPD-18 with about 400,000 hours of construction work remaining to be done on the ship.”

So, having created an unacceptable situation by accepting an unfinished ship the first time, the Navy repeated process on the second ship.  In fact, the report goes on to document that the Navy accepted the third ship, LPD-19, also in an unfinished state.

Back to the opening sentence of this post.  Who is to blame for the LPD debacle?  It seems clear to me that the fault lies with the Navy.  Does this absolve the manufacturer of blame?  No, but no one forced the Navy to accept an unfinished ship.  Further, the Navy’s internal inspection group also accepted the ship with all its quality defects.  Again, while not absolving the manufacturer, that puts the responsibility squarely on the Navy.  We’ll cover the failed inspections in more detail in a subsequent post.

In summary, quite the opposite from what the Navy would have us believe – that they were a victim – we see that the Navy is 100% responsible for the LPD problems.  Keep this in mind as you read about the further misadventures of the LPD-17 class.

AirSea Battle Failings



AirSea Battle Report from the CSBA

Much has been made about the AirSea Battle document produced by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.  For those of you who are only casually familiar with it, the AirSea Battle (ASB) describes the scope and impact of Chinese Anti-Access/Area Denial (AA/AD) capabilities and attempts to provide a battle strategy for countering it.  The document does a fairly nice job of the former by providing a fairly explicit description of Chinese capabilities, objectives, and methods and for this reason alone the ASB is worth reading.  Unfortunately, the ASB fails to deliver on the latter.  The battle strategy is deficient on two counts, one practical and one conceptual. 

Again, for those less familiar with it, the ASB’s strategy envisions a two stage process whereby the Chinese capabilities are sequentially countered and then methodically rolled back during a period of prolonged combat.  The rollback will allow the Navy to operate closer and closer to China (the location of most of the U.S. military objectives, of course) over time.  The rollback phase is deemed necessary since the U.S. military, and Navy in particular, have only limited range weapons and must achieve a certain level of “closeness” in order to employ their weapons.  This is, essentially a war of attrition.

Thus, the ASB’s first failing becomes apparent.  In a war of attrition, the side with the most, wins.  Setting aside the adverse public reaction to a war of attrition and the resulting lack of support, the U.S. military does not have sufficient numbers of planes, ships, weapons, or people to successfully engage in a war of attrition.  While the U.S. may maintain a technological superiority enabling it to achieve a favorable kill ratio, the end result will be depletion of U.S. forces to a point where “victory” becomes impossible. 

The U.S. military has recognized since WWII that mutual attrition is not a desirable strategy.  Every battle doctrine and strategy since then has emphasized selective concentration of forces, maneuver, stand-off engagement, and so forth for the express purpose of achieving victory without mutual attrition.  To return to a strategy of attrition, especially against a numerically superior enemy is both simplistic and impractical.

Besides, what’s the point?  Is the purpose of a rollback strategy of attrition to kill every person in China?  Of course not.  But what, then, is the point of the rollback strategy?  This question reveals the second and most serious failing of the ASB.  It does not define what victory is.  What end result or set of conditions constitutes victory?  A certain number of people killed?  A certain level of degradation of Chinese military capability?  A level of destruction of industrial capability sufficient to ensure that the Chinese military can’t be rebuilt within a given time frame?  A simple return to pre-war boundaries?  What? 

ASB itself seems to recognize its own failing to certain degree with the statement, “As a doctrine for the operational level of war, AirSea Battle should not be seen as a “war-winning” concept in itself.”  Fair enough but if the authors don’t see their own strategy as “war-winning” then what is its purpose?

Without a definition of victory the suggested strategy has no frame of reference against which to measure its value.  This is analogous to describing how to throw a baseball.  Interesting in and of itself but without knowing the context the value is limited.  Is the throwing for the purpose of playing catch in the backyard?  Playing professional baseball?  The answer will determine the intensity of the effort, the amount of time that should be spent learning the skill, and the ultimate degree of skill required.

So, too, with a strategy of rollback.  To what purpose is it being applied?  To what degree and level of completion must it be taken?  If we know the victory conditions we can begin to make assessments of the amount and type of weapons that will be needed.  Without the victory conditions we can only describe vague generalities about warfare – and that is exactly what the ASB winds up doing. 

Now, having criticized the ASB, let me turn around and briefly praise it for what it does well.  It presents a though-provoking description of Chinese objectives, strategies, and weapons.  It’s a good start for a further, serious discussion of the issue.  To be fair to the authors, the title itself recognizes this, “AirSea Battle, A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept”.  Unfortunately, too many people within the Navy seem to believe that ASB is a complete and finished work of strategy.  It’s not and I’m waiting for someone to take the next step and define victory and begin matching strategy and force structure to the victory conditions.  Hmmm…..  sounds like another post about to happen!

For those interested, here's the link to the actual AirSea Battle document.

LCS - Crippling the Future Fleet

Everyone has an opinion, whether good or bad, about the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and a lot of writing has been generated about it.  Let's set aside the debate about the number of weapons, cost, problems, etc., for the moment.  The LCS is here and, barring an unexpected change in Navy philosophy, will make up a significant portion of the fleet, in terms of numbers of hulls in the water.  What does that mean, though, in terms of impact on the future fleet? 

LCS-1, USS Freedom - Taking Over the Fleet?

For the sake of this discussion, let's assume that the Navy goes ahead with the full 55 ship construction run.  As of this writing, the official Naval Vessel Register (NVR) website lists the current fleet size as 283 ships which, at the moment, includes destroyers, carriers, cruisers, subs, amphibious ships, and some support and logistics vessels.  Of the total, 209 are actual combat vessels.  Consider, now, the impact of the LCS construction program on the combat capability of the future fleet.  If the number of combat vessels stays the same but the composition is adjusted to include 55 LCS, that means that a quarter of the fleet will be ships that have very limited weapons fits and are deemed non-survivable in a hostile enviroment (combat!) by the Navy's own admission.  Sure, we may still be able to claim to have a 300 ship fleet but 25% of it will be toothless compared to now. 

Of course, if budget concerns force continued early retirements so that the fleet shrinks even further then the proportion of LCS goes up and further decreases the fleet's combat capability.

This is the real problem posed by the LCS - it dilutes the combat capability of the fleet while allowing politicians and Navy leadership to claim that we have a 300 ship fleet.