Amphibious Shell Game

As we know, the Navy considers ship maintenance to be a low priority task and even that may be underestimating their disinterest in maintenance.  I truly believe that the Navy’s philosophy is that the quicker the ships wear out, the sooner the Navy can justify new ships to Congress thereby securing – or, dare they hope … increasing? – their budget slice.  The astounding part of this is that the demonstrated lack of interest includes ships the Navy actually wants: surface warships. 
 
Worse than the lack of interest in maintenance, there is a major chunk of the fleet that the Navy doesn’t really want and that is amphibious ships.  They offer nothing for the Navy; they’re purely to mollify the whining of the Marine Corps to Congress.  Thus, the Navy has even less interest in providing maintenance for amphibious ships.  Here’s some notes from a GAO report, as described in a Breaking Defense website article.[1]
 

Half of the Navy ships the Marine Corps would use to make amphibious assaults are in “poor condition,” and some of the vessels have been unavailable for operational or training use for years at a time, according to a pointed new watchdog report.[1]
 
… the report found that as of March this year, nine of the Navy’s 10 dock landing ships were in “poor material condition,” as were five of the seven amphibious assault ships and two of the 13 amphibious transport docks.[1]

Am I being fair and factual in suggesting that the Navy has little interest in amphibious ships and even less interest in maintaining them?  Well, let’s see what the report has to say.
 

The report notes several factors that contributed to the problem, including “challenges with spare parts.” But a summary of the report also noted that in order to “save money, the Navy proposed early retirement for some ships and cancelled critical maintenance on them.[1][emphasis added]

Here’s another damning tidbit.
 

The Navy partially concurred with the GAO recommendation that the Navy update its amphibious ship depot maintenance policy “to clarify that, absent operational needs, the Navy should not cancel depot maintenance for amphibious ships proposed for divestment that have yet to reach the end of their expected service life.”[1]

This demonstrates that the Navy has been cancelling depot maintenance for operational ships merely because they’ve been put forward for early retirement.  This is a self-fulfilling prophecy type of situation.  You propose a ship be retired early so you halt maintenance on it.  Then, after a few years you report that the ship needs to be retired early because it would cost too much to bring it up to maintenance standards.  Quite a racket, huh?
 
How does the Navy justify this blatant failure to properly maintain active ships?
 

… the Navy said it’s currently “prohibited by law” from modifying vessels destined for the boneyard, and waivers to do so have a narrow timeline. “However, the statute permits normal Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) work within the five-year window prior to a ship being removed from service. The Navy will schedule this work, including depot-level repair as necessary, to maintain the ship in operational condition.” It also noted the Navy Secretary may grant waivers for that statute in the “national security interests” of the US.[1]

Note the use of waivers?  Those keep cropping up in all types of deplorable situations, don’t they?  And yet we keep handing them out like candy.
 
The Navy clearly has no interest in amphibious ships and uses every machination they can think of to avoid spending maintenance money on them.  This is criminal mishandling of the taxpayer’s investment.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense website, “Half of Navy’s amphibious fleet in ‘poor condition,’ some ships out for years, GAO warns”, Lee Ferran, 3-Dec-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/12/half-of-navys-amphibious-fleet-in-poor-condition-some-ships-out-for-years-gao-warns/

Assault Carrier

Over the course of the blog, many commenters have suggested using the big deck LHA/LHD (LHx) as baby carriers.  We’ve discredited this notion in terms of traditional carrier operations (see, “LightningCarrier”) due to the limited size of the air wing and the complete lack of ability to operate E-2 Hawkeye AEW, tankers, and E/A-18G Growler EW aircraft that are crucial to combat effective air operations.
 
Other commenters have suggested using supercarriers for ground support to make up for the complete absence of naval gunfire.  This is a non-starter as the role of the carrier in an amphibious assault is interdiction of enemy strikes and reinforcements and the proper place to do that is hundreds or thousands of miles from the assault site.  It is suicidal folly to ‘tie’ a carrier to one location which is what would be required for a carrier to provide direct ground support for an amphibious assault.  And, lest we forget, we also lack a true ground attack naval aircraft.
 
However, the possibility exists that a dedicated, small, assault carrier could be useful in supporting amphibious assault operations.  Well, wait … don’t we already have ground support carriers in the form of our big deck amphibious ships (LHA/LHD)?
 
Yes, we do, but not effectively.  Consider, currently, the aviation component of an assault is housed on the LHx ships of which we only have a few (9 total LHA/LHD) and they have very limited air wings.  A typical LHx air wing consists of:

 

That’s a limited capability mix that lacks the number of aircraft to be effective in any of its roles.  Six strike aircraft can’t provide effective ground support, a dozen tiltrotors can’t transport a useful number of troops and gear, and four heavy lift helos can’t provide rapid, efficient heavy equipment transport.  Like most mixes, the air wing is a compromise that can do a little bit of everything but nothing well and ‘nothing well’ is not how you succeed in combat.  We’ve thoroughly analyzed the shortcomings of the LHx as regards aviation (see, “Aviation Amphibious Assault Ships”)  and provided the rationale for splitting off aviation from assault (see, “Separate Aviation FromAmphibious”) so I won’t belabor it any further, here.
  
The LHx came about because the Marines, institutionally terrified of being abandoned by the Navy (the Guadalcanal legacy) tried to combine the functions of both a carrier and an assault transport and, not surprisingly, managed to construct an unaffordable monstrosity that places too many eggs in one basket while performing neither function well.  So, why don’t we try separating the two functions into dedicated ships, each optimized for their role?  We previously discussed dedicated attack transports (see, “Attack Transport - APA”).
 
Having established the problems with an LHx and the rationale for separating the aviation and assault functions, let’s now consider what a dedicated amphibious assault aviation support ship (an assault carrier) would conceptually look like.
 
Focus – Separating the aviation component from assault allows us to eliminate the transport function leaving the carrier able to focus on ground attack/support.  This is crucial for a ship that will, hopefully, be substantially smaller than a full size carrier.
 
There is no need for transport helos.  They’re inefficient at their function and they’re non-survivable over a battlefield as amply demonstrated in Vietnam, Soviet Afghanistan, US Afghanistan, and elsewhere.  If we really think we need helos for some limited aspect of logistics support, we can easily provide a dedicated transport/cargo helo carrier by converting a merchant ship.
 
Aircraft – This is key to determining what an assault carrier would look like.  The choice of aircraft will determine the size and characteristics of the carrier.
 
Stealth aircraft are not needed and, indeed, stealth is largely useless when providing close range ground support (CAS).  The enemy can see you and the main threat is guns (ZSU-ish weapons) and small heat seeking, Stinger-type, shoulder launched anti-air missiles.  Radar stealth offers no benefit against either of those threats.
 
What is needed is an aircraft with the best possible combination of the following characteristics:
 

• Inexpensive so that appropriate numbers and replacements can be procured
• Armored for maximum airframe and pilot survivability
• Redundant and manual control systems enabling the aircraft to absorb tremendous amounts of damage
• Minimal IR signature to mitigate the main threat of Stinger-type missiles
• Minimal complexity which allows for easy repair/maintainability for excellent availability rates and combat damage repair
• Low maintenance per flight hour
• High sortie rates
• Excellent low speed maneuverability
• Minimal carrier operating requirements such as no, or simple, catapults and arresting gear
• Maximum number of weapons (hard points) as opposed to payload weight maximums.  In CAS, it’s far more useful to have a large number of weapons rather than a high payload weight.  To illustrate, it would be far more useful to have an aircraft with, say, ten weapon stations (hard points), each rated for a 500 lb bomb (5000 lb total payload) than an aircraft with four weapons, each rated for a 2000 lb (8000 lb total payload).

 
Having identified the desirable aircraft characteristics, let’s consider some candidate aircraft.
 
F-35B - The F-35B is often touted as a CAS aircraft but, in reality, is ill-suited for the ground attack/support role.  It is a large, fuel hogging, maintenance intensive, complex, non-damage resilient, limited hard point aircraft with staggeringly atrocious availability rates.  In addition, it is hideously expensive to procure and operate.
 
A-10 - The A-10 has many of the characteristics we’d like such as armor, redundant/manual flight controls, low maintenance, high sortie rates, and 11 weapon stations.  Of course, a naval version of the A-10 does not exist and would have to be developed.
 
F-16 – The F-16 is fairly maneuverable at moderately lower speeds but has only 6 (possibly 7?) weapon hard points and, like the A-10, does not exist as a carrier variant.  It also lacks any useful ground sensors, is unarmored, and lacks rugged, redundant controls.
 
A-1 Skyraider - A candidate you might not think of is the prop driven A-1 Skyraider.  It is incredibly simple (compared to a jet), free by current standards, easily maintainable and repairable (a wrench and duct tape), armored, highly maneuverable at low speeds, has very high availability rates, has 15 weapon stations, and can use simple catapults and arresting gear.  Further, it is a carrier aircraft and would need no development, whatsoever!
 
It is clear that high performance jets are not desirable for the aviation support role.  The best match to the desired aircraft characteristics is the A-1 Skyraider!  This, then, is the conceptual basis for an assault aircraft.  Having determined that, we can now focus on the design of the ship, itself.
 
Air Wing – Having chosen a conceptual aircraft, we now need to decide how many aircraft are needed in the air wing.  The answer, of course, is ‘as many as possible’.  Well, that’s not very helpful.  A better answer is that the number of aircraft is derived from a combination of factors such as the resultant carrier size/cost, combat effectiveness, dispersal of risk, etc.  A reasonable answer would seem to be somewhere in the neighborhood of 40 aircraft.  More than that and the carrier gets too large and costly.  Less than that and combat effectiveness drops precipitously.
 
Carrier – The first determination is whether we need a straight deck or angled deck.  Ideally, we’d like a straight deck, operated like WWII carrier, with no catapults and simple arresting gear.  If we could launch B-25’s off a Yorktown class carrier, I’d like to believe that we could design a Skyraider type aircraft that could launch unassisted.  Elimination of catapults would greatly reduce mechanical and utility (steam or electric) requirements which reduces the size and cost of the ship.  Assuming we can do this, we’ll be able to use a straight deck design which, again, reduces the size and cost of the ship.
 
As a point of reference, the US Navy WWII escort carriers were around 500 ft long and 10,000 – 20,000 tons with air wings of 30+ aircraft.  That seems like a good conceptual starting point for a design.
 
If we can keep the cost low enough, we can afford to build the carriers in sufficient numbers and be able to replace the inevitable losses of a vessel that is purposely placed in harm’s way.
 
The final consideration in this discussion is the fact that I don’t think there’s a strategic or operational need for amphibious assaults so the entire discussion is moot.  However, if we did want to maintain an amphibious capability, an assault carrier would be a step in the right direction though ultimately pointless without lots of large caliber naval guns.

Iwo Jima Class LPH and Vertical Assault

The Iwo Jima class carrier was the first purpose built vertical assault (helicopter) amphibious ship.  In this post, we’re going to take a look at its original design rationale, abilities, and limitations and examine whether those have remained relevant today.
 
Here are some basic specifications for the seven ship class, built in the 1960’s: 

Iwo Jima Class LPH

The amphibious assault helicopter carrier (Landing Platform, Helicopter - LPH) traces its origin back to a 1946 Marine Corps study on the effects of atomic weapons on amphibious assaults.[1]  Marine leadership, 

… concluded that a few atomic bombs could easily destroy the concentrated shipping and also the beachhead of any classical amphibious assault.[1]

As described by Friedman[1], the Marines settled on the helicopter as the means to achieve physical dispersion of both ships at sea and troops on land.  The greater range of the helicopter would allow the host ships to more widely disperse and would allow the troops to land at more widely dispersed locations thus avoiding the concentrations that an atomic bomb would easily destroy.
 
Their decision was strongly influenced by the belief that helicopters would quickly and markedly advance in capabilities (range, speed, lift capacity) – a belief that turned out, disappointingly, to be only partially met.  Friedman goes on to describe some of the helicopter development issues which is, itself, a fascinating topic but outside the scope of this post.  I encourage you to read it yourself, if you’re so inclined.  It’s well worth the time.
 
The Marines, while eagerly adopting the helicopter as the assault transport vehicle also recognized the vulnerability of the helicopter on the battlefield.  Regarding helicopter transport capacity, 

Even larger helicopters were proposed, but the Marines were reluctant to adopt one that could lift many more than twenty men in view of the high vulnerability of individual craft.[1][emphasis added]

The Marines recognized that concentrating greater numbers of troops in a vehicle that was inherently non-survivable would be a mistake.  In comparison, today’s MV-22 transport is rated for 24-32 troops which raises the concentration of risk issue that the Marines were afraid of.  To be fair, most sources state that the MV-22 troop capacity is not actually achievable in real world applications.
 
What did helicopter assault mean for overall requirements?  The Marines were focused on division-strength assaults, 

The Marines concentrated on the requirements of a divisional assault, which were considerable. For example, a January 1951 study envisaged lifting 10,000 men and 3,000 to 4,000 short tons of material.  Total lift, then, would be 520 HRSs [ed. Sikorsky H-19] or 208 HR2Ss, which in turn would require, in the former case, 20 escort carriers with 20 helicopters each, accommodating 150 to 200 tons of cargo, 500 to 600 assault marines, and a 200-man helicopter squadron.[1]

This focus on division level assaults was a far cry from our current MEU/ARG (3-ship Amphibious Ready Group) and disaggregated ARG which employs the three ships of the ARG separately.  Of course, in the event of a genuine assault operation, multiple MEU/ARGs would aggregate to form MEBs (Marine Expeditionary Brigade) and MEFs (Marine Expeditionary Force) although these aggregations are never exercised and constitute a theoretical capability, only.  Further, with the elimination of tanks, reduction in artillery, elimination of heavy mortars, and lack of anti-air vehicles it is highly debatable that MEBs/MEFs are even combat effective anymore.
 
The Marines also considered the tactical usage of the helicopter, 

Tactically, the Marines considered a flight of ten helicopters best for effective control, so that helicopter carriers were generally designed to accommodate multiples of that unit.[1]

We see then, that the Marines of the time were focused on getting large numbers of helos/troops on the ground quickly as opposed to our current concept of slow, drawn out, one-at-a-time MV-22 landings due to the 250 ft aircraft-to-aircraft separations and immense cleared areas required for landing.
 
To their immense credit, the Marines didn’t just come up with wild ideas and implement them without any proof of concept - as we do today - they conducted actual exercises.  For example, 

… May 1948, 8 helicopters from the Palau simulated a full helicopter attack of 184 aircraft flying from six CVEs, to lift a complete regimental combat team which would seize a strategic crossroads inland of the beach.  … each HRP [Piasecki HRP tandem rotor helicopter] carried six passengers about ten miles from the carrier under heavy fighter cover.[1]

Note the use of fighter cover.  The exercises were tactically realistic as opposed to the unrealistic, set piece theater performances we call exercises today.
 
Following tests, the WWII escort carrier USS Thetis Bay was converted for helicopter operations to further test out the concept.
 
At that point, the Marines seemed fully committed to helicopter assault.  A Sep-1954 report stated, 

… over the next ten to fifteen years most existing attack cargo and transport (AKA and APA) ships would be replaced by helicopter carriers.  “This will be occasioned by the VTOL aircraft becoming the principal means of placing personnel ashore under assault conditions.  Supporting personnel and heavy equipment will still be landed by water-borne means but the majority of assault troops will be air-landed.”[1]

Ultimately, a new design LPH, the Iwo Jima class, was built along with several Essex class conversions.  The purpose-designed Iwo Jima class, not surprisingly, offered several significant advantages over the Essex conversions.  Even so, the design was not without its flaws, 

The amphibious force commanders criticized the Iwo Jima design for its “complete lack of landing craft, so that it is of doubtful utility under non-flying conditions and must depend on other types with landing craft to give it an over-the-beach capacity.[1]

This flaw eventually led to the development of the LHA design which incorporated both aviation and  a well deck to support waterborne landing craft.  Interestingly, we have returned to exactly the original flawed design with the new America class variants which have no well decks.
 
 
Discussion
 
Let’s examine several aspects of the original vertical assault concept that birthed the LPH.
 
Rationale
 
As noted, the original rationale was dispersal of ships and troops in response to the threat of atomic bombs.  The original Marine thinking was dominated by the fear of atomic warfare.  With the advent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), that is no longer a concern.  Any use of atomic weapons would immediately escalate the war to a global nuclear war and eliminate the need for a localized amphibious assault.  In other words, no one is going to bother with an amphibious assault while waging a global nuclear war.  Thus, the original rationale is no longer valid and yet we have not modified our current thinking to account for it.
 
Strengths
 

• Helos allow the rapid transport of troops from a greater distance than waterborne landing craft.
• Troops can be delivered to safer or more strategically beneficial locations rather than to a central troop/beach concentration although safer locations also imply less operationally relevant and useful.
• The greater range of the helos allows greater separation of the helicopter carriers.

 
Limitations

• Bad weather may ground aviation.
• Lack of waterborne landing craft prevents any other means of assault.
• Helo assault is limited to troops and light cargo.  Heavy equipment, tanks, armored vehicles, etc. cannot be transported by air.
• Helos are extremely vulnerable to even modest anti-air defenses.
• Helo carriers have very limited wave transport capacity.  For example, 20 helos per wave x 15-20 troops per helo = 300-400 troops per wave and that’s just troops, no equipment.  It would require 5-7 waves, over many hours or multiple days, to get the full troop complement ashore and that assumes no helo attrition.  The reality is that any reasonable helo attrition would likely result in a portion of the troops never getting ashore and certainly not in a timely manner.
• Limited by the need/availability of suitable cleared landing sites; such sites can be reasonably anticipated by the enemy and become fire traps as demonstrated in Vietnam.

 
Sustainment

The original Marine leadership was focused on division level assaults.  What they failed to address was sustainment.  While simply moving troops ashore is easy (ignoring the extreme vulnerability of the helicopter and the potential lack of suitable landing sites), sustainment via helicopter is not.  In fact, it is impossible.  The logistic supply demands of a division in combat are staggeringly huge and the cargo carrying capacity of a helicopter is vanishingly small.  This remains an unexplained – and hand waved away – weakness in today’s various vertical assault concepts (helos, MV-22, well deck-less LHAs, etc.) as well as the Commandant’s dispersed, hidden, platoon size missile shooters concept.  It is not possible to sustain an assault using helicopters.
 
 
Summary
  
The original rationale for the LPH and vertical assault was dispersal due to the threat of atomic weapons.  As, discussed, this is no longer a valid concern.
 
It is noteworthy that the original Marines identified significant weaknesses in the concept including the extreme vulnerability of helos to anti-air defenses and the absence of waterborne landing craft as an alternative.  Other weaknesses included the inability to transport heavy equipment, the limited number of troops that can be transported per wave, and the impossibility of sustaining an assault using vertical transport.
 
We see, then, that vertical assault is an inherently flawed concept that was justified only by the extreme atomic threat.  With no realistic atomic threat today, one has to ask why we’re still pursuing the flawed vertical assault concept?
 
Where does this leave us today?  For starters, we’ve begun repeating the original mistakes such as the absence of waterborne landing craft in the early variants of the America class LHA.  Additional problems include the extreme vulnerability of vertical landing aircraft to anti-air defenses, first noted by the Marines back in the original concept development.  In fact, the threat to helos has increased markedly over the years with the advent of small, portable, shoulder launched, heat seeking, anti-air missiles of the Stinger type.  Vertical landing aircraft are simply not survivable over a defended battlefield as has been repeatedly demonstrated in the real world (Vietnam, Soviet Afghanistan, US Afghanistan, etc.).
 
The inability to transport heavy equipment by air continues, today, and is a serious weakness in the concept.  This limitation relegates any assault to a light infantry effort only and makes the enormous cost and resources dedicated to such a limited capability highly questionable.
 
The need for secure, cleared landing sites has only gotten substantially worse with the advent of the MV-22 which requires enormous cleared areas and huge separations between aircraft to the point that a massed assault is simply not possible.  Landings will have to be a very slow, one-at-a-time affair that is ideal for enemy defensive fire sequentially focused on each landing aircraft in turn.
 
Despite clearly and correctly identifying the inherent flaws in the vertical assault concept, Marine leadership pushed ahead with vertical assault in the belief that the atomic threat was more significant than the known weaknesses.  One can only speculate whether the Marines would have adopted vertical assault if there had been no perceived atomic threat.
 
With no realistic atomic threat today, one has to ask why we’re pursuing an inherently flawed concept?
 
Worse, we have taken the concept and reduced it from a full, divisional level effort and capability to a light infantry effort with no supporting tanks, armor, artillery, heavy mortars, or mobile anti-air vehicles.  Is the staggering cost to build and operate 30+ amphibious ships worthwhile to deliver light infantry ashore?
 
It would seem that vertical amphibious assault is an example of inertia.  The helo assault was established and continues just because it exists.  It exists because it exists.  We need to re-examine this 1940’s era concept in light of the known flaws and, especially, modern defenses which have rendered helos even more vulnerable than they were originally.  The cost/risk to benefit ratio does not support continued vertical assault.
 
 
 
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[1]Norman Friedman, “U.S. Aircraft Carriers, An Illustrated Design History”, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1983, p.359-370.

Ships With No Purpose

The Marines have stated publicly and repeatedly that they are out of the amphibious assault business.  Let’s set the wisdom of that aside and just look at what that means for the Navy.

 

From the Navy’s official current ship count, the fleet consists of 220 combatants (carriers, surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships) in the ‘Active in Commission’ category.[1] 

 

 

Combatant Type	Number
Aircraft Carriers	11
Surface Combatants	110
Submarines	68
Amphibious Warfare Ships	31

 

 

If we’re truly out of the amphibious assault business, as the Marines say, that means that 31 of the 220 combatant ships in the Navy – that’s 14% of the combatant fleet - have no purpose. 

 

If we subtract the 22 LCS which have no viable combat capability, that leaves a fleet of 198 combatants and that means that 16% of the fleet has no purpose.

 

That’s a lot of operating cost, personnel, and resources being devoted to ships that have no purpose.

 

And we’re continuing to build more amphibious ships!

 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

[1]https://www.nvr.navy.mil/NVRSHIPS/FLEETSIZE.HTML

Lightning Carrier

The notion of a lightning carrier keeps coming up.  So many people are enamored of this 'lightning carrier' concept without really understanding its capabilities or limitations.  I guess it’s time to examine this concept.

 

So, what is a lightning carrier?  For this discussion, the concept refers to the use of a big-deck amphibious ship operating an all fixed wing, F-35B, air group.  An example would be an America (LHA) or Wasp (LHD) class amphibious ship with an air wing of around 18-22 F-35B. 

 

Alternatively, though less common, proponents envision an amphibious ship with a ski ramp and arresting gear allowing the ability to operate F-18 Hornets.  However, this variation on the concept is simply not feasible and we’ll address that a bit further on.

 

Any discussion of a lightning carrier must start and end with the air wing.  In fact, the term ‘lightning carrier’ really means ‘lightning air wing’ because a carrier, any carrier, is its air wing.  With that in mind, let's review some of the limitations and constraints of a lightning air wing.

 

 

Lightning Air Wing

 

-The F-35B would operate at half the range and payload of an F-35C which is, itself, inadequate for the Pacific theater.  F-35 fanboys won’t accept this but it was clearly stated in an interview with the Ford program manager and documented in an older post.[1]  The range/payload limitation, alone, is reason enough not to pursue lightning carriers!

 

-A lightning carrier cannot operate a tanker aircraft and the lack of a tanker only emphasizes the aircraft’s lack of range.  Even if a tanker could magically be added to the air wing it would take away a combat aircraft slot from an already meager air wing.  It is possible to take off light on fuel and refuel after take off from some other, unspecified tanker source but there is no way to take off light in weapons and load more in the air!

 

-Similarly, the lack of an E-2 Hawkeye (AEW) precludes effective air wing control, combat direction, and situational awareness.  It has been proposed that a V-22 could be equipped with a radar as a substitute, however, any AEW V-22 would be a poor man's version of an E-2, at the very best.  It would have a smaller, less powerful radar - whatever type that would be - with resultant shorter effective sensor range which would, necessarily then, place it closer to danger to achieve the required detection and discrimination.  It would lack the room for sufficient consoles, computers, communications gear, and operators for the battle management function which is the true purpose of an E-2.  It would lack the endurance to provide long term coverage.  In short, it would be nearly useless in a high end combat scenario.  It is this same lack that renders the British carrier and air wing nearly pointless for anything other than very low end, low threat work.  Even if a V-22(AEW) were developed, each one added to the air wing would remove a combat aircraft.

 

-The above also applies to electronic warfare (EW) aircraft although it is, at least, possible to imagine an EW version of the F-35B being developed someday.  Of course, an F-35B(EW) would, again, eliminate a combat aircraft slot.

 

-We’ve previously demonstrated, in multiple posts, that a carrier needs to retain around two dozen aircraft for self/group defense.  Given that a lightning carrier can only accommodate around twenty aircraft, what does that leave for offensive operations?  Nothing!  At best, the carrier can barely defend itself and without AEW, EW, and tanker aircraft, not even that.  A lightning carrier would exist only to defend its existence which is pointless.

 

-Now, consider a lightning carrier with a theoretical maximum of 20 F-35B.  Now, add two AEW-modified helo/V-22 and two tankers of some unspecified sort.  That’s four aircraft added to the air wing which means four F-35B combat aircraft have to be subtracted.  That leaves a usable combat component of 16 F-35B.  Is that a useful combat component?  Is it worth operating – and risking – a $4B ship, 1000+ crew, and several escort vessels just to operate 16 F-35B aircraft with limited range and payload?

 

  

Lightning Carrier

 

We’ve examined the air wing.  Now, let’s take a look at some characteristics of the ship, itself.

 

-With no cats or arresting gear, half the deck is dedicated to landing spots.  Below is a photo of the USS America during an Oct 2019 Navy experiment in which the ship was operated as a lightning carrier.  Note the jam-packed deck that contained only 13 F-35Bs and note that half the deck is consumed by the landing spots which are kept clear for normal or emergency landings.

 

USS America Oct 2019

-Some have postulated a ski ramp on an amphibious ship in order to operate F-18s.  Boeing claims that an F-18 can launch from a ski ramp although the conditions of launch (weight, weapons, etc.) are unknown.  Boeing tested the concept from a land based mock up of a ramp as shown in the photo below.[2]  The maximum weapons load that I’ve seen in photos of the tests show two small bombs.  The internal fuel load of the aircraft is unknown.

 

Hornet Ski Ramp Test

Boeing conducted F-18 ski ramp take offs as a preliminary to possible sales of the aircraft to India.

 

A ski-jump launch may well impose a penalty in terms of the payload the jet can take off with, but Boeing says it has conducted multiple tests with different, undisclosed, kinds of payloads.

 

According to the company, these tests “show that the Super Hornet would do well with the Indian Navy’s Short Takeoff but Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) system and validate earlier simulation studies.”[3]

 

Note that Boeing carefully omits any information about payloads which is, undoubtedly, due to the fact that the ski launch requires reduced payloads/fuel.  If it did not, Boeing would be loudly and proudly trumpeting the fact … but they’re not.

 

A ramp might, at least, enable the use of EA-18G (EW) aircraft but could they take off from a ski ramp with a full load of EW pods?  That’s unknown.  Regardless, every EA-18G means one less combat aircraft from an already very small air wing.

 

Ski ramps take up huge amounts of deck space and, in the case of operating F-18s, would also require conventional arresting gear which, without an angled deck, prohibitively ratchets up the danger factor of recovery when the inevitable bolter occurs straight down the deck and into the aircraft parked and operating forward.  Danger aside, the combination of ski ramp and arresting gear would consume ¾ of the available deck space which would severely reduce the number of embarked aircraft.

 

In fact, from visual estimation, I’m fairly sure that a ski ramp and arrested landing area could not fit on an America/Wasp class ship given that they are around 200 ft shorter than a conventional carrier and do not have angled decks.

 

Below is an overhead schematic of the USS America with my wild estimates of the area needed for a minimal ski ramp and arrested landing area.  In fact, the ski ramp area is probably too narrow for safe take offs.  It should probably be the width of the bow.

 

Lightning Carrier Ski Ramp and Arrested Landing Gear Area

 

For comparison purposes, here’s a photo of an Indian carrier (932 ft long, overall) with both a ski ramp (the entire bow!) and an angled recovery (almost the entire midships and stern!).  There is simply not much room left for parking the air wing.  Indeed, the air wing is only 26 MiG-29K plus some helos and that’s for a carrier that is nearly the size of a US supercarrier.

 

Indian Carrier - Note Ski Ramp and Angled Deck Arrested Landing Area

 

-An unmodified amphibious ship could operate a maximum of 18-24 aircraft.  The largest amphibious ship, USS America, intentionally designed for maximum fixed wing capacity, can only operate 22-24 aircraft according to the Navy.  Any other amphibious ship will have even less aircraft capacity.

 

-An amphibious ship could be modified and rebuilt to operate larger numbers of aircraft but it would require a true rebuild of the ship involving large scale structural changes such as removing bulkheads to create hangar space, reinforcing other areas to compensate for the removed bulkheads, creating new compartments for aircraft maintenance and parts storage, creation of new magazines for added weapons storage, likely construction of additional munitions elevators, creation of additional aircraft control and communication compartments, a greatly enhanced hangar fire suppression system, and so on.  In other words, it would be hideously expensive, with costs likely rivaling or exceeding the original purchase.

 

 

Opportunity Cost

 

So many people are fixated on the idea of comparing our carriers to some other country’s carriers or some multiple number of other country’s carriers and proclaiming that if we have more naval aircraft then we are somehow superior.  Well, unless some country or countries challenge us to a one-on-one carrier match, it’s utterly irrelevant how many carriers or aircraft we have compared to someone else.  What matters is how our overall military force compares to an enemy and, within that context, how our carriers contribute to that overall force and to our overall military strategy (you know … assuming we had one).

 

The relevant question, then, is does a lightning carrier with its acquisition/conversion cost and operating cost of a crew of a thousands plus a dozen or so escorts justify the meager contributions of twenty or so  significantly limited aircraft and, more importantly, could the cost of this contribution be more effectively spent on any of dozens or hundreds of alternatives?  This is the opportunity cost.  Could the immense operating cost of a lightning carrier group buy us more and better overall military firepower in some other form?  For example, for the operating cost of a lightning carrier group, we could buy untold numbers of cruise missiles, or we could significantly harden multiple forward bases, or we could buy umpteen thousands of tanks, or many dozens of dedicated minesweeper ships, or  … the list of alternatives is nearly endless.

 

One of the arguments put forth for the conversion of amphibious ships into lightning carriers is that, if we’re getting rid of them anyway because of the Marine’s refocusing on small, hidden, forward bases - and there is no evidence of that, yet - then we could, at least, get some stop-gap use out of them as lightning carriers until they’re retired instead of retiring them early.  Again, this is an opportunity cost issue that goes back to the operating cost for a very meager capability.  Early retirement would free up a lot of operating cost funds that could be applied to any number of other weapon systems, each demonstrably more effective than a handful of limited aircraft.

 

 

Supplementing CVNs

 

Another argument for lightning carriers is that, while they are not equal to a conventional carrier, they could supplement conventional carriers by adding their small numbers of aircraft to the CVNs carrier group and the CVN can, in turn, cover the shortcomings of the lightning carrier. 

 

Good grief, NO!  A limited, constrained 'carrier' added to a CVN doesn't enhance the CVN, it pulls down the overall capabilities of the CVN group.  This would be analogous to adding a high school basketball player to a professional team.  The high school player doesn't add anything to the pro team, he pulls the overall effectiveness of the pro team down.

 

By having to split and further spread the CVN's AEW, EW, and tankers to cover the shortcomings of the lightning carrier, the overall effectiveness of the CVN is diluted and decreased.  At best, the handful of limited capability aircraft on the lightning carrier can defend their own carrier.  The lightning carrier would, as we previously noted, exist to defend its existence … the self-licking ice cream cone.

 

 

Amphibious Support

 

While a lightning carrier offers little to the high end air/strike war, it can offer a potentially useful short range strike capability in support of amphibious operations.  Twenty or so F-35Bs operating in support of ground combat could prove somewhat useful although, again, the limited payload and inability to carry some of the larger munitions internally (2000 lb munitions, for example) limit the usefulness.  High end ground combat requires constant ‘artillery’ support and aircraft, any aircraft, can only provide that support sporadically and in very small quantities.  Still, the concept offers some degree of usefulness although at an enormous operating cost.  Think about how many self-propelled artillery vehicles could be purchased for the operating cost of a lightning carrier!

 

 

Conclusion

 

Despite the enthusiastic support of so many naval observers, a rational examination of the lightning carrier concept clearly demonstrates that the combat capabilities of the carrier and its air wing are so minimal that it is not worth the operating cost.  More damning is the opportunity cost associated with the concept which shows that we could acquire far more combat capability, in any number of alternate forms, for the operating cost than can be supplied by the lightning carrier and air wing.

 

It seems clear that the limited combat capability makes the lightning carrier appropriate for only low end, low threat operations which then takes us right back to the opportunity cost issue.  It’s not even suitable for peacetime patrol type operations because we categorically refuse to use force during routine peacetime operations.  That being the case, there’s no point having a carrier and aircraft around because we won’t use them.

 

Unfortunately, despite the enthusiasm so many people have for the concept, it just can’t be justified.  It brings too little combat capability for far too great an operating and opportunity cost.

 

 

 

______________________________________

 

[1]https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2020/03/ford-design-considerations.html

 

[2]https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/26767-super-hornet-shows-ski-jump-off-carrier-ramp-india

 

[3]https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/38324/watch-a-super-hornet-launch-off-of-a-ski-jump-during-testing-aimed-at-the-indian-navy

Why Are We Building Another LHA?

The Marines have publicly stated that they are out of the amphibious assault business (so why are they buying ACVs?  But, I digress …).  The Commandant has designed his own, personal, slow, defenseless, light amphibious warship (LAW) that will somehow transport troops and supplies deep into enemy waters while remaining undetected.  The new Marine war plan is to use small units to launch missiles at ships and, in some unspecified way, to conduct anti-submarine operations and sink subs.

 

With that in mind, it would seem that neither the Marines nor the Navy has any use for the multi-billion dollar big deck amphibious assault ships like the America class LHA and the San Antonio LPD and yet the Navy is continuing to build them.  For example,

 

LHA-8 was laid down Mar-2019 and is currently under construction at Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) in Pascagoula, Mississippi with delivery expected in 2024.

 

And,

 

The FY 2022 budget requests $68.6 million to support a future America class landing helicopter assault amphibious (LHA) ship. (1)

 

The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act, the military’s main budget, is currently being marked up and Congress appears to be adding funding for the America class LHA, LHA-9, to the shipbuilding budget.  HII received a $107M contract for LHA-9 long lead items in Apr-2021.(2)

America Class - Don't Need 'Em But Still Building 'Em

 The Marines don’t want them.  The Navy can’t use them.  They’re hideously expensive to build and operate. 

 

So  …  why are we building more LHAs?

 

This is the kind of head-scratching nonsense that makes me wonder if a lobotomy is a requirement for flag rank.  It certainly appears so.

 

 

 

_________________________________

 

(1)Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2022 Budget, p.2-5

file:///F:/Report%20-%202022%20Budget%20Highlights.pdf

 

(2)https://defbrief.com/2021/04/20/hii-gets-107m-for-us-navys-fourth-america-class-amphibious-assault-ship/

High Speed Transport

Here’s a topic that was inspired by reader “Jjabatie” in the “Buckley Vs. Constellation” post.

 

As we know, the Marines have come up with … how can I put this somewhat politely? … an ill-conceived concept to insert small units onto far forward bases and shoot missiles at passing ships while also hunting subs.  The key to this scheme is a new class of … how can I put this somewhat politely? … ill-conceived Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) ships that are small, slow, not particularly stealthy, and have no defenses.  The idea is that these LAWs would transport troops and supplies to, and between, various islands while making round trips for resupply … all while China remains oblivious (from laughter, one presumes).

 

Okay, this concept is idiotic but there is a historical antecedent at least for the type of small transport that the Marines describe and one whose characteristics would much better serve the concept.  I’m talking about the WWII high speed transport.

 

In WWII, with a need to move smaller units of troops between islands, some destroyer escorts were converted to high speed transports (APD). 

 

From Wikipedia,

 

APDs performed arduous service. They transported troops to beachheads, served as escorts for transports and supply vessels, conducted anti-submarine patrols and survey duties, operated with Underwater Demolition Teams and commando units, performed messenger and transport duties, conveyed passengers and mail to and from forward units, and were involved in minesweeping operations.

 

Typical of these ADPs were the 90+ Buckley and Rudderow class conversions. 

 

USS Bowers (DE-637 / APD-40);  Buckley class APD conversion;

note 5" gun forward and landing craft in davits

 

As an example, in the Buckley conversions, the superstructure was enlarged to house some 160 troops.  This provided a useful degree of both troop and cargo transport capacity while also retaining a useful defensive and ground support capability.  The Buckley’s weapons fit was changed to: (1)

 

• 1x 5-inch/38 dual purpose gun
• 3x twin 40mm gun
• 6x single 20mm gun
• 2x depth charge tracks
• 3x torpedo tubes
• 8x K-gun depth charge launchers

 

Thanks to their 5” gun (upgraded from a 3” gun!), the APDs could provide a degree of fire support for their embarked troops.

 

Of course, the ships retained their inherent speed and maneuverability.

 

Notably, the APDs typically carried four LCVPs (Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel) in davits.

 

The destroyer history website lists the following specs: (1)

 

Troop capacity: Officers:  12; Enlisted: 150.

Troop accoutrements:  4x LCVP landing craft; 6x 1/4 ton trucks; 2x 1 ton trucks; 4x ammunition carts; 4x pack howitzers.

Ammunition:  6,000 cubic feet.

General cargo:  3,500 cubic feet.

Gasoline:  1,000 cubic feet.

 

 

Compare the WWII APDs with the Marine’s LAW (see, “Berger’s Amphibious Warships”, “Light Amphibious Warship Update 1”, and “Light Amphibious Warship Update 2”) and we see that the APD specs put the LAW to shame in every conceivable way.  If the Marines insist on pushing ahead with their idiotic scheme, an APD type vessel would make far more sense.

 

 

 

__________________________________

 

(1)https://destroyerhistory.org/de/apd/

F-35 On Carriers? Sorry, Can't Use 'Em

When the USS Ford was being built, we all assumed, quite logically, that the ship would be able to operate the F-35 which had been around for twenty years or so, in various stages of development.  The timing was looking about right – the carrier and the F-35C would both be ready about the same time.  Well, in yet another disappointment for the Ford, it turns out that the carrier wasn’t actually built to operate F-35s.  No, this is not an April Fools post or some ComNavOps comedy piece.  This is real.  The Navy’s newest carrier can’t operate the F-35.

 

As it turns out, most of the Navy’s carriers and amphibious ships (LHA/LHD) can’t operate the F-35. 

 

Yes, the F-35C can take off and land on the carriers but the ships lack the communications, data integration, and maintenance facilities to fully utilize the supposed capabilities of the F-35 – those much hyped surveillance capabilities.  Without the proper comms and data handling facilities on the carriers, the F-35 can collect data but can’t effectively relay it to the carrier and allow the carrier to make use of it. 

 

On a related and stunning note, the US Navy has almost no ability to transfer F-35 engines to carriers.  The Ford is the only carrier that has the equipment to receive an engine.  The MV-22 has demonstrated the ability to transport a single engine to a carrier but this can only be done over very short distances.

 

As far as the amphibious ships, none can land the F-35B due to its excessive exhaust heat which damages the flight deck unless it has been specially modified.  You’ll recall that even the new USS America was unable to operate the F-35B, as the ship was built.  It had to be modified with special deck heat treatments, thermal and structural modifications to compartments immediately beneath the flight deck, and relocation of equipment in the path of the F-35B’s downward landing exhaust in addition to numerous communications and data handling facility installations and modifications.  Yes, America, the ship that was purpose built for the F-35B was unable to operate the F-35B without extensive and expensive modifications.

 

In fact, of 11 carriers and 33 amphibious ships, currently only 4 amphibious ships can fully operate the F-35.(1)  The lucky four are listed below.

 

• USS Essex
• USS Makin Island
• USS America
• USS Wasp

 

Even with the modifications, the F-35B can only land on a couple of limited spots.  For the America, the F-35B can only land on spots 7 and 9.(2)

 

It is worth noting that none of the supercarriers can operate the F-35.

 

The USS Bonhomme Richard, LHD-6, which recently suffered a massive fire that burned out of control for several days, would have been the fifth ship altered to operate the F-35.  The Bonhomme Richard is now, officially, being scrapped.

 

So, for those of you who envision air armadas of Navy F-35s sweeping the skies clear of enemy aircraft, that vision is still a long way in the future because we only have four amphibious ships that can even operate the F-35!

 

It is worth noting that the modifications required to operate the F-35 require many months and hundreds of millions of dollars to install (I assume the F-35 proponents are dutifully adding that to the cost of the F-35?).  It is not a capability that can be quickly installed when needed.  It will take decades to bring the current ships up to the standard required to handle the F-35.  If a war were to start today, we’d be limited to four amphibious ships operating our F-35s.

 

What is all this telling us?  What lessons are being demonstrated (and ignored!)?

 

• In our pursuit of technology, we created an aircraft too complex to even communicate with our carriers.
• Concurrency kills.
• Even the modified ships have only a limited F-35 operating capability and, in the event of battle damage, we might lack the ability to operate the aircraft due to damage to the couple of specific landing spots.
• In pursuit of the big, expensive, flashy toys, we’re ignoring the mundane support and infrastructure needed to even fully operate the toys.

 

 

 

Just a reminder … When the F-35C reaches squadron service, the Navy is planning to reduce the squadron size from the current 12 aircraft to 10, further shrinking the already shrunken air wings.  The F-35 is the gift that keeps on giving!

 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

(1)Breaking Defense website, “USS Bonhomme Richard Heads For Scrapyard After Devastating Fire ”, Paul McLeary, 30-Nov-2020,

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/11/uss-bonhomme-richard-heads-for-scrapyard-after-devastating-fire/

 

(2)Jalopnik website, “Navy Builds Ship For F-35, Ship Needs Months Of Upgrades To Handle F-35”, Tyler Rogoway, 13-Apr-2015,

https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/navy-builds-ship-for-f-35-ship-needs-months-of-upgrade-1697523492

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