Ukraine-Russia Naval War

So many people want to read miraculous changes in the future of naval warfare into Ukraine’s success with surface drones and anti-ship missiles.  Is this the case?  Is the future of naval warfare being rewritten as we speak?  Or, are false conclusions being drawn and propagated?  Let’s examine the situation and see what conclusions we can draw.
 
We’re going to focus on the Ukrainian attacks against the Russian fleet but it should be noted that, in terms of a Ukraine-Russia naval war, the Ukraine navy, such as it was, was completely eliminated at the opening of the war.  Thus, the war has not been as one-sided as media portrays it.
 
Following are some factors, characteristics, and considerations of the naval war.
 
Russian Ineptitude.  It cannot even be questioned that Russia has been stunningly inept in their operations, putting vessels in dangerous situations, and failing to protect their harbors or ships with any degree of competence.  The Moskva, for example, assuming it was actually sunk by Ukrainian actions, appeared from photos to have its air defense radars in fore/aft standby positions rather than actively scanning.
 
It is also clear that Russia did not grasp the magnitude of the threat until somewhat recently and did not, therefore, have proper and effective defensive weapons or tactics.  This is also a condemnation of modern warship design with its lack of short range defensive weapons.
 
 
Geography.  The Ukraine-Russia conflict is somewhat unique in that the naval incidents are taking place in a relatively very small, constrained area.  This geography permits Ukraine the fantastic good fortune of not having to search very far for targets and not having to transport their weapons very far.  Contrast this with the prospect of a naval war between China and the US which would be spread across unimaginable distances extending at least a thousand miles beyond the first island chain and, quite likely, encompassing far away areas of conflict in Africa, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and elsewhere.  Short range drone surface vessels would be nearly useless across those kind of distances.
 
The unique geography also allows Ukraine to wage the naval war without actually having any ships!  The constrained area of conflict allows Ukraine to stage and launch weapons from nearby land sites.  Again, in a China-US war, this would rarely, if ever, be the case for either side although the Marines seem to think they’ll dominate the Chinese navy from a few hidden bases.  I won’t bother ridiculing that wishful, fantasy notion any further. 
 
In an open ocean naval war, lacking land based drone launch points, some type of drone transport ship would be required to closely approach the target and no one is going to allow an enemy (or unidentified) ship to approach without being sunk.  Thus, ship launched surface drones seem an impossibility.
 
 
Effectiveness.  The Ukraine surface drones get a lot of frenzied hype in the general press but how effective have they actually been?  While solid information is difficult to come by, it appears that only one major ship, the guided missile cruiser Moskva, has been sunk along with, possibly, a couple small patrol boats.
 
As best I can determine, here is the list of sunk or damaged Russian ships:
 

The obvious conclusion is that for all the attacks and effort by Ukraine, very little actual damage has been done.  The one notable success, the sinking of the Moskva, is actually not a confirmed attack by Ukraine.  I’ve read theories that the sinking was the result of a drone surface vessel, anti-ship missiles, or a shipboard mishap on the Russian’s part.
 
The remaining couple of sinkings were minor tugs or patrol boats with the remainder of attacks producing unknown degrees of damage.  In terms of overall damage to the Russian fleet and resulting impact on the conduct of the war, the Ukraine efforts have been nearly insignificant.  Compare these meager results to the hundreds/thousands of vessels sunk in WWII.
 
It is also noteworthy that most of the Russian ships sunk or damaged were unarmed and defenseless which, again, speaks to Russian operational failures in putting defenseless vessels in harm’s way.
 
The Russians clearly either do not grasp the concept of defensive escorts or are unable to execute the concept properly and effectively.
 
A final question regarding effectiveness is what the success rate has been?  How many hits have been achieved compared to the number of attempts?  The media generally only reports a successful hit on a Russian ship.  We have no idea how many attacks have been unsuccessful.  Of course, given the minuscule cost of drones or small anti-ship missiles, if one can occasionally sink a major warship, the number of unsuccessful attacks is almost irrelevant.  Still, it would be informative to know the success rate.
 
 
Conclusion
 
One obvious conclusion is that the naval war is not really a naval war, at all.  It’s more closely akin to a navy versus land war with the Russian navy operating near and against the land and Ukraine trying to repel or neutralize the Russian maritime forces.  In essence, it’s the age old ‘ship fighting a fort’ scenario!  Russia is attacking Fort Ukraine from the sea.  That bit of near semantics aside …
 
Due to geographical considerations, if nothing else, it is impossible to imagine a Ukraine style drone war being even slightly successful in a China-US war.  Given a largely open ocean campaign, neither side would have recourse to land launched drones.  Anti-ship missiles are, of course, another story but that takes us to targeting which is an undeniable and, thus far, unsolved problem for both sides.
 
It is also difficult to imagine that either the US or China would be as inept as the Russians have been.  US naval doctrine heavily emphasizes layered defenses and escorts.
 
In short, it is difficult to imagine that the Ukraine-Russia naval war heralds any earth-shaking change in the future of naval warfare.
 
 
 
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[1]USNI News website, “A Brief Summary of the Battle of the Black Sea”, Heather Mongilio, 15-Nov-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/11/15/a-brief-summary-of-the-battle-of-the-black-sea

When the Gloves Come Off

-A Predator UAV launches a Hellfire missile at a terrorist.
-A Ukraine unmanned surface drone attacks a Russian ship.
-A drone drops a grenade on Russian troops.
-A Russian base in Syria is attacked by a drone swarm.
-A US base in Syria is attacked by drones.
-Unmanned drones are being developed as ‘wingmen’ for manned aircraft.
-Turkey has built a UAV carrier and various unmanned aircraft to equip it.
-Russian UAVs attack Kiev.
 
 

The future of warfare seems clear and it’s all about unmanned assets, right?  The various conflicts around the world are proving the value of unmanned assets in combat every day, right?
 
Before we jump feet first into the deep end of the unmanned combat pool, let’s take note of one tiny, almost insignificant, detail that no one seems to be paying any attention to:  all the unmanned combat that supposedly proves the worth of unmanned assets is taking place in low intensity combat situations.
 
Many of you are already pounding out replies, screaming that the Ukraine-Russia conflict is anything but low intensity.  Thousands of artillery shells are being fired every hour.  How much more high intensity can you get?  Well, I’m sorry but you’re wrong.  The Ukraine-Russia war may be wasting using lots of artillery shells but the overall conflict is decidedly low intensity for a variety of reasons.  Neither side is fighting with any operational or tactical expertise.  The Russian air force is almost absent.  Top of the line Russian armor seems to have been withheld from combat.  Ukraine doesn’t have an air force.  There’s no naval combat.  Neither side is using electronic warfare to any great extent or effect.  Neither side is using concentrated armored divisions in maneuver warfare.  Neither side is exhibiting any semblance of joint warfare.  Infantry forces appear to be content with occupying whatever territory they have rather than conducting intelligent offensives.  The Ukraine-Russia conflict is much closer to WWI trench warfare than the WWII European combat of an all-out, high intensity war. 
 
I’ve made my point.  You can agree or disagree but I’m not going to entertain a debate about the intensity of the Ukraine-Russia war.  Be forewarned.  Moving on …
 
Other low intensity conflicts include Afghanistan, Iraq/Iran, anti-terrorist actions, Israel-Hamas, Syria, Yemen, and many others.  It’s not even debatable that these are low intensity.
 
So … low intensity.  How is this relevant to unmanned combat?
 
Low intensity, by definition, means that combat forces and effects are artificially limited, often severely so.  Avoidance of collateral damage takes precedence over achievement of military objectives.  Rules of Engagement (ROE) actively and intentionally limit the application of force and kinetic effects.  In short, the engaged force is fighting with one (or both!) hands tied and is only able to apply a fraction of its available capabilities.
 
The continuous Israeli conflicts with Hamas are an example of self-imposed ROE restrictions that, with occasional periods of reduced restrictions, severely hamper combat effectiveness.
 
The US conflict in Vietnam was another example of a low intensity conflict in that the US unilaterally limited its use of force.  Enemy forces were granted sanctuary across the Vietnam-Laos border.  North Vietnam was allowed to freely resupply via Haiphong harbor.  Hanoi was generally off-limits.  And so on.
 
The US anti-terrorist effort in Afghanistan was a low intensity conflict with terrorists allowed to escape into the sanctuary of Pakistan.
 
The battle against ISIS was decidedly low intensity as avoidance of collateral damage was the primary objective.
 
Let’s now consider the case of a true, high intensity conflict in which the ‘gloves come off’ and the engaged forces are free to use all of their capabilities (excepting nuclear, of course).  How does this impact unmanned asset combat use and effectiveness?
 
Sanctuary – As noted in the examples, sanctuary is one of the most ludicrous artificially imposed constraints imaginable.  Unmanned assets require a safe, calm, quiet location to prepare, maintain, launch, and control the assets … a sanctuary of some sort.  Once the concept of sanctuaries is eliminated, overwhelming force can be applied to the source of unmanned assets rather than trying to fight those assets individually, as they attack.  If the enemy is given no sanctuary, his ability to employ unmanned assets is drastically decreased.
 
Cost Ratio – turned loose, why not use a Standard missile to shoot down a UAV if it protects a multi-billion dollar ship?  Sure, we’d prefer to use a low cost method to stop a drone but when protection becomes more important than the defensive cost, a Standard missile (or ESSM or RAM) makes a very effective anti-UAV weapon.
 
Collateral Damage – Who cares if that unmanned asset is near a civilian structure?  Destroy it and ignore the collateral damage.  Unmanned assets lose a lot of effectiveness when they can’t ‘hide’ among non-combatant people and structures.
 
Pre-emptive Strikes – In low intensity conflicts, forces are often reduced to defensive stances.  In a high intensity conflict there is no need to sit on the defensive and, indeed, every reason to attack.  Rather than wait for the enemy to attack with unmanned assets, wipe out that base where the unmanned assets are being built, stored, and operated from and the unmanned threat vanishes.  Constant offensives will hinder the enemy’s ability to pause long enough to assemble and operate unmanned assets.  Unless co-located with some other type of heavily defended facility, an unmanned base would likely be an easy, highly vulnerable target requiring a minimum of missiles or artillery to eliminate.
 
Electronic Warfare – Currently, as best we can tell, the US keeps its electronic warfare capabilities under wraps.  In an all-out, high intensity war those capabilities get fully utilized and unmanned assets will be severely disrupted, I suspect.
 
Identification – In high intensity combat, you no longer care about identification.  There’s only ‘yours’ and ‘not yours’ and no one cares about identifying the ‘not yours’.  If it’s ‘not yours’, kill it.
 
 
Conclusion
 
A major part of the reason why unmanned assets are enjoying some success around the world is because they’re being used in very restricted conflicts where the defenses are constrained by hindering ROEs. 
 
Let’s also be honest and acknowledge that another reason for unmanned successes is that the defenders have largely been fairly inept and/or ill-equipped to deal with them.  This would not be the case for the US, one hopes.  We have plenty of effective weapons to deal with unmanned assets even if some of them would not be considered cost-effective.
 
It’s difficult to imagine unmanned assets having much success against a US or Chinese military that is fighting with the ‘gloves off’.  When the gloves come off in high intensity combat, unmanned assets will be found to be a minor, niche asset, at best.
 
So, imagine the US military operating with no restrictions and every capability in play.  Can you really see unmanned assets presenting any real threat?  Of course not!  Now, turn that imagination around.  If unmanned assets would present no real threat to us, do we really think they’ll present any real threat to China?  Again, of course not!  So, why are we so myopically fixated on unmanned assets if we don’t believe they can be effective in high intensity combat?
 
We need to pause our headlong pursuit of unmanned assets and take a serious look at how effective they can be in high intensity combat.  An honest assessment will leave us wondering why we’re pursuing unmanned technology.
 
Note:  I’m not advocating dropping all unmanned work.  Unmanned assets can certainly be useful in low intensity scenarios which is, after all, the bulk of the military’s efforts.  However, we cannot allow low intensity assets to filter into our high intensity combat doctrine and tactics.

Amphibious Assault Size

Our peacetime paradigm has led us to believe that war is a small affair:  a few ships, a company of soldiers, a platoon with a few missiles (according to the Marines!), a carrier and a couple of escorts, etc.  We’ve forgotten the immense scale of effort that a true war requires.  Let’s take a look at historical amphibious assaults from WWII and remind ourselves of the size of the effort required for success.
 
 
Guadalcanal - 11,000 troops initial assault, 1^st Marine Div, plus 6,000 additional men from various battalions over the next few weeks;  initial force proved too small and required additional Marine and Army reinforcements
 
Tarawa/Makin - 35,000 troops, 36 transports, 2^nd Marine Div.; 8th, 2nd, 6th, 10th, 18th Regiments plus other battalions; 27^th Army Div., 165^th Regiment, 3^rd Battalion/105^th Infantry Regiment
 
Kwajalein – 85,000 troops,4^th Marine Div, 7^th Army Div, 300 ships
 
Eniwetok – 3500 troops, 22^nd Marine Reg., 106^th Infantry Regiment
 
Saipan - 60,000 – 70,000 troops, 2^nd Marine Div, 4^th Marine Div, 27^th Infantry Div
 
Guam - 36,000 troops, 3^rd Marine Div, 77^th Infantry Div
 
Tinian – 15,000 troops, 2^nd Marine Div, 4^th Marine Div
 
Peleliu – 28,000 troops, 1^st Marine Div, 81^st Infantry Div
 
Luzon - 175,000 troops;  6^th Army, 800 ships
 
Iwo Jima – 110,000 troops, 3^rd, 4^th, 5^th Marine Div;  500+ ships
 
Okinawa - 200,000 troops, 1^st, 2^nd, 6^th Marine Div, 7^th, 27^th, 77^th, 96^th Infantry Div
 
Normandy – 173,000 troops, 4^th, 82^nd, 90^st, 101^st, 1^st, 29^th Infantry Divisions plus several British and Canadian divisions
 
Desert Storm – While not an amphibious assault and not even remotely approximating a high end, global, peer war, it still involved some 600,000+ troops of all types.

 
We’ve come to believe that an amphibious assault can be conducted by a platoon, company, or, at the high end, a 2000 man Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).  This is simply not true.  The best any of those can do is a minor raid and, in the context of a peer war, those would be very minor annoyance raids, at best.
 
In addition to noting the size of the ground forces, check the size of some of the naval components:  up to several hundred ships!  Our entire current Navy would be insufficient to conduct a single assault.
 
We’ve completely forgotten the magnitude of the forces necessary to wage a high end war.  The only point to this post is that we have got to start remembering what real war entails and start training for and factoring in the sheer magnitude of: 

• Ground force size (tens to hundreds of thousands of troops)
• Logistics required to support massive ground forces
• Horrifying attrition
• Naval force size assets (hundreds of ships)
• Industrial manufacturing capacity (see attrition)
• Munitions consumption on a staggering scale

  
Our pathetic exercises involving platoons and companies or a few ships is so insufficient and inadequate as to border on criminal (in the figurative sense).  We have to scale our exercises up to semi-realistic sizes.  We need to exercise actual divisions, not virtual simulations.  We need to assemble and exercise several dozen ships at a time and learn how to command and control them as well as keep them supplied with munitions and fuel (guaranteed we can’t).
 
Almost none of this involves the pursuit of new technology which seems to be the military’s main focus and default solution to any problem or question.  We are so far off the correct path we can’t even see it from where we are!  The Navy is, by their own public statements, facing an imminent Chinese war …  …  and they’re downsizing the fleet!  In what alternate reality does that make sense?
 
As I keep saying, we’ve forgotten what real war is.  Perhaps this post will help us remember.

War Five Years From Now

The Navy has publicly stated that they view a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and a war with China within the next several years as highly likely.  If so, what kind of shape will the Navy be in if a war starts, say, five years from now?

 

Here’s an overview of the Navy’s projected condition in 2027 based on the Navy’s most recent 30 year plan which includes the detailed 2022-2027 five year period[1]:

 

• Burkes will have begun retiring;  DDG-51 is scheduled to retire in 2027
• 1-2 Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) will be in service
• Down to 48 attack subs (SSN) with several unavailable for service due to multi-year waiting periods for maintenance
• Down to 9 active carriers (9+1 in RCOH)
• 1-3 Constellation class frigates (FFG) in service
• Another air wing will almost certainly be disestablished, dropping the number of air wings to 8, as the carrier level drops to 10
• Early retirement of a carrier is likely
• F-18s will be woefully obsolete but will constitute the bulk of carrier air wings
• No great amount of F-35s;  at most, one squadron of 10 aircraft in each air wing
• 20-50 unmanned, lightly armed vessels
• Ticonderoga class will all be gone

 

 

Projected 2027 Combat Fleet
Carrier	10
Burke	86
LCS+FFG	23
SSN	48
SSGN	1
Total Combat Ships	168

 

 

A total combat fleet of 168 ships is not a lot and 20 or so of that total will be the remaining LCS which have no combat capability due to their lack of meaningful armament and very short endurance/range for the Pacific theater.  The real combat fleet will be about 148 ships!

 

It is also quite possible that the Ford class carriers will not be combat-capable due to the ongoing, and seemingly unsolvable, EMALS, elevator, and AAG reliability issues.

 

The fleet is also projected to have 25 amphibious ships of various types, mostly the LPD-17 class.

 

It is absolutely baffling that the Navy believes war is imminent and yet they’re shedding ships as fast as they can.  If a Chinese agent had infiltrated the Navy and become CNO, he couldn’t do a better job of declawing the Navy than what we’re doing to ourselves.

 

 

A Burke and an Unmanned Vessel

This is Your Future Navy

 

 

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[1]Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023, Apr 2022 

Special Forces in a Conventional War

Desert Storm provided an interesting perspective on the use of special forces in a conventional war.  General Schwarzkopf was dead set against the use of special forces and had no plans to use them until forced by the President to do so.

 

Army Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, the four-star commander of US Central Command and the war's military leader, viewed unconventional-warfare units with skepticism.

 

Initially, Schwarzkopf was adamantly against special-operations units having any significant role in the conflict — though he did accept some Delta Force operators as personal bodyguards.

 

…  after some persuasion from the White House and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Schwarzkopf relaxed his no-commandos policy. (1)

 

The problem with special forces in conventional wars is that, by definition, they can’t provide any significant firepower effects due both to their small unit size and their lack of heavy weaponry.  The best case scenario is a minor, occasional, nuisance effect and that’s not a war-winning impact.  Balanced against that minor impact is the significant cost required to man, train, and logistically support an entire military branch.  In addition, special forces seem to constantly require emergency extraction which takes away from the activities of other forces.

 

I recognize that this is not going to be a popular post for many people but, objectively, it is what it is.

 

Now, let’s consider some of the historical successes by special forces in conventional wars:

 

WWII Coastwatchers – This consisted of individuals who were inserted into enemy territory to report on enemy ship movements.

 

Vietnam Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP, “Lurp”) – These small units inserted into enemy territory to provide deep reconnaissance.

 

French and Indian War (1754-1763) Rogers Rangers – This force was initially formed to provide scouting and reconnaissance but grew and morphed into light infantry.

 

Decima Flottiglia MAS – This Italian group of ‘frogmen’ conducted many ‘human torpedo’ attacks with a couple of partial successes such as temporarily disabling the British HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Valiant.  Overall, the effect was negligible and many/most forces were killed or captured.

 

 

 

The preceding examples demonstrate that there are a couple of characteristics of successful historical special forces:

 

Small Size – The forces have been small, ranging from individuals to small units.  Contrast that to today’s special force organizations which have ballooned in size and have become bloated, self-propagating entities.

 

Reconnaissance – The focus of successful historical special forces has been reconnaissance as opposed to firepower effects.  The question is whether the enhanced reconnaissance is worth the maintenance of entire organizations?  Could the information thus obtained have been obtained using other, possibly better, methods?

 

 

Unfortunately, the historical characteristics of successful special forces seem to be at odds – indeed, almost direct opposites – with today’s special forces which are large and ever-growing and have moved far beyond (left behind?) traditional reconnaissance roles and into light infantry roles.

 

How does all this tie into the Navy?

 

The Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) comprises approximately 10,000 personnel, including active duty and reserve component Special Warfare Operators, known as SEALs; Special Warfare Boat Operators, known as Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC); reserve personnel; support personnel, referred to as Enablers; and civilians. NSWC headquarters is located at Coronado, CA, and is composed of eight active duty SEAL Teams, two reserve component SEAL Teams, two SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams, three Special Boat Teams, and two Special Reconnaissance Teams. Because SEALs are considered experts in special reconnaissance and direct action missions—primary counterterrorism skills—NSWC is viewed as well-postured to fight a globally dispersed enemy ashore or afloat. NSWC forces can operate in small groups and have the ability to quickly deploy from Navy ships, submarines and aircraft, overseas bases, and forward-based units. (2)

 

That’s 10,000 people, untold quantities of equipment, and vast sums of money all to support a force that will have little use in a conventional peer war.  That’s a lot of resources that could be better used by the regular Navy.  None of this is to suggest that Navy special forces be totally eliminated – just that they be vastly scaled back.  Navy SEALs, for example, should stop deploying as a ground infantry force and get back to operations in the water.  For an in-depth discussion of SEAL forces and the kind of missions they should be performing see, “SEALs”.

 

 

Conclusion

 

The US’ special forces have grown out of the last few decades of continual small wars and anti-terrorism activities.  Given that impetus and the inexorable tendency of any organization to attempt to grow itself (the bureaucracy is expanding to meet the needs of the expanding bureaucracy), the special forces have expanded beyond all reason and need.

 

As stated about Navy SEALs , this is not to suggest that all special forces be eliminated but they should be vastly scaled back.  Conventional forces are more than sufficient for most of the missions we’re currently using special forces for.  We also need to reorient our military away from minor conflicts and back to peer war.

 

Future peer wars are going to be massive, fast, and deadly with armor and artillery being emphasized (as the US will quickly discover, to its regret).  This is not an environment where special forces will be particularly useful unless they re-embrace their roots of small size and reconnaissance.

 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

(1)Insider website, “How US special-operations forces helped the US military win its first post-Cold War victory”, Stavros Atlamazoglou, 23-Feb-2021,

https://www.businessinsider.com/how-us-special-operations-forces-helped-win-the-gulf-war-2021-2

 

(2)https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf

Ending War - True Victory

Today’s post addresses the issue of victory in a war.  As such, it relates to the formulation of a geopolitical strategy – victory being the presumed end result of any strategy – and builds on the previous discussion of the foundational principles of geopolitical strategy (see, “Foundational Principles of Geopolitical Strategy”).

War with China is inevitable.  The only question is when.  We’ve previously discussed victory conditions in a Chinese war and the need for a military strategy to achieve the desired victory conditions (see, "China War - Setting the Stage").  Most observer’s and commentator’s idea of strategy and victory conditions involve containing China within the first island chain.  If we can push them back to pre-war boundaries then we’ve ‘won’ in the sense that we will have achieved the specified victory conditions: in essence, a return to status-quo (see, "China War Strategy - Blockade").

The problem with this approach and this set of victory conditions is that it raises the nagging question of whether this is actually a long term victory. 

Before we go any further, let’s ask ourselves what ‘victory’ is?  The truest and most desirable ‘victory’ is when you never have to fight that enemy again.  Any other result is not really a victory, just a temporary cessation of hostilities during which the enemy can rebuild and rearm.

Will ‘victory’ that returns China to pre-war boundaries and status quo (assuming we can achieve it!) assure that we won’t have to fight China again?  I ask because a ‘victory’ that results in having to refight the war again is not really a victory, is it? 

Does history support this set of victory conditions (return to pre-war boundaries and status quo) as being an actual victory? 

Let’s look at the historical record of wars in modern times (since the 1900’s) that ended with the losing side intact and essentially returned to pre-war boundaries and status quo and see whether the ‘winners’ really won in the long term.

Russo-Japanese War 1904-5 – Japan won a significant victory but left an intact Russia.  .  What was the long term result?  Within 40 years Japan had to fight Russia again in WWII.  So, the war wasn’t really a victory for Japan, was it?

WWI – Germany was ‘defeated’ and returned to pre-war boundaries.  What was the long term result?  Within 20 years we had to fight Germany again.  So, WWI wasn’t really a victory, was it?

Korean War – NKorea was ‘defeated’ and returned to pre-war boundaries.  What was the long term result?  We’ve been fighting NKorea ever since.  They’ve developed atomic weapons, conducted vast cyber attacks against the US, torpedoed SKorean warships, brutally oppressed their people, developed intercontinental ballistic missiles, launched ballistic missiles into Japanese territorial waters, and forced the US to tie up significant military forces in SKorea.  So, the Korean War wasn’t really a victory, was it?

Cold War – While not an overtly kinetic war, the Soviet Union was ‘defeated’ and returned to pre-war boundaries, more or less.  What was the long term result?  The Soviet Union, now called Russia, is once again threatening Europe, annexing and invading countries, and threatening the US with new nuclear weapons.  Now, 20 years later, we’re engaged in a repeat of the Cold War.  So, the Cold War wasn’t really a victory, was it?

Arab-Israeli War (Six Day War 1967) – Israel defeated a coalition of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.  While Egypt lost the Sinai territory, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria remained intact military and political entities with their pre-war boundaries more or less intact.  What was the long term result?  Israel was nearly destroyed in the 1973 Yom Kippur War just six years later.  So, the Six Day War wasn’t really a victory for Israel, was it?

Israeli-Palestinian/Hamas War – Israel has repeatedly engaged and defeated Hamas while allowing the Hamas ‘country’ to return to its pre-war boundaries each time.  What has been the long term result?  Israel has had to repeat the war over and over again.  So, the Israeli victories haven’t really been victories, have they?

Gulf War / Desert Storm – Iraq and Sadaam Hussein were ‘defeated’ and returned to pre-war boundaries.  What was the long term result?  Within 12 years we had to refight Iraq and Hussein.  So, Desert Storm wasn’t really a victory, was it?

India – Pakistan War of 1965 – Though technically a stalemate, India had the clear upper hand but both countries returned to their pre-war boundaries.  What has been the long term result?  The countries have engaged in numerous clashes over the subsequent years.  So, there was no victory, was there?

I considered including the 1982 Falklands War but it wasn’t a war in the sense that we’re discussing here.  It was a sovereignty dispute that resulted in combat but was conducted as a very limited battle with neither side attempting to attack the other’s homeland or non-disputed territories and, outside the narrow point of disagreement, neither side harbored any particular animosity towards the other.

What’s the common theme in these historical examples?  The losing side retained its boundaries and political existence, more or less unchanged and, in every case, the winner had to refight the war within a shockingly short time.  To put it bluntly, the winning side, in each case, lacked the will to decisively and permanently destroy its enemy which ensured that the war would be refought.

The Korean War represents a slight deviation from this conclusion in the sense that we haven’t had to engage in actual combat with NKorea again but we have, in every other way, been continually engaged with NKorea since the end of active hostilities.  Given the required commitment of massive military resources on an on-going basis, it might as well be war.

Now, let’s look at examples where the losing side ceased to exist as a military and political entity.

WWII – The Allies defeated Germany and Japan and occupied the countries, completely disarmed the military, and replaced the leadership and government.  The pre-war military, government, and leadership ceased to exist.  What was the long term result?  There has been no repeat of war with either country and both have become strong, peaceful, productive world contributors.  So, victory produced a permanent improvement for all parties.

Vietnam War – NVietnam defeated SVietnam and the US, occupied the country, disarmed the military, and replaced the leadership and government.  What was the long term result?  There has been no repeat of war and Vietnam has become a productive member of the world community with, astoundingly, improving relations with the US of late!  So, victory produced a permanent improvement for all parties.

Iraq War / Operation Iraqi Freedom – The US defeated Iraq, occupied the country, disarmed the military, and removed the leadership and government.  What was the long term result?  There has been no repeat war with Iraq.  So, victory produced a permanent improvement for all parties.

While ending a war as soon as possible often seems like a good thing, at the time, the sad reality is that it is always unwise.  Prematurely ending a war is appealing from economic, humanitarian, and other aspects but ultimately costs more than following through and establishing complete and total victory.

A war that leaves the losing side intact is all but guaranteed to recur in a shockingly short time.

We need to consider this as we formulate our geopolitical and military strategy towards China.

Note:  I’ve used the phrase, ‘returned to pre-war boundaries’.  I’m using it as an approximate statement.  I will not entertain any irrelevant comments debating the exact boundaries.  That’s not the point of the post.

Note:  There may be an isolated example somewhere in history that runs counter to the proffered premise but that doesn’t alter the general validity of the premise.  I’ll take a dim view of comments along these lines.  You’ll also note that I limited the analysis to modern times.  Earlier times had different conditions regarding war due to lack of modern transportation/mobility, communications, global economies, etc.

Attrition Warfare - You Can't Avoid It

ComNavOps has frequently extolled the virtue of numbers, even over quality.  As the old adage says,

“Quantity has a quality all its own.”

When I advocate greater numbers, one of the common counter arguments is that we no longer engage in attrition warfare.  Supposedly, we now engage in maneuver warfare to paralyze our enemies and bring them to their knees with no casualties on either side.  Ahh …  the ideal war!  Or so the story goes.

The reality is that war is all about attrition.  We’ve just forgotten that.  You know, there’s another old adage,

“The enemy gets a vote.”

The enemy gets a vote, yes.  Sometimes, though, we can minimize or marginalize the enemy’s vote.  Iraq got a vote in Desert Storm but it didn’t amount to anything.  However, when it comes to attrition warfare, the enemy’s vote trumps ours.  Huh???  What does that mean?

It means that if an enemy is willing and determined to engage in attrition warfare, it’s almost impossible not to become inextricably involved in attrition warfare.  When the enemy sends a human wave attack at your troops, you ARE engaged in attrition warfare whether you want to be or not.  When the enemy is willing to send waves of aircraft at your ships to wear down your defenses and, eventually, sink your ships, you ARE engaged in attrition warfare whether you want to be or not.

Maneuver warfare will only work until you come into contact with the enemy and then, if the enemy so chooses, it becomes attrition warfare.  The hope is that your maneuvering put you into an advantageous position so that you’ll win the attrition phase of the battle but, barring Saddam Hussein type stupidity, you can’t avoid an attrition battle if the enemy wants it.  I don’t think China or Russia are going to be that obligingly stupid.

Speaking of China and Russia.  What are their single biggest military advantages?  That’s right … numbers. 

The biggest numbers advantage Russia and China have is manpower.  They have, literally, billions of people to throw at our forces and they have the required inhuman insensitivity to actually do it.  Such a tactic is abhorrent and almost unimaginable to us.  I say “almost” unimaginable because we actually saw the Chinese do it as recently as the Korean War and the Russians did it during WWII.  Given China’s uncaring attitudes towards human rights, as demonstrated repeatedly in modern times (recall the massacre of several hundred protesters in the Tiananmen Square incident), does anyone really believe that China wouldn’t hesitate to employ attrition tactics?  Given Russia’s uncaring attitude towards human rights as evidenced throughout their history (Stalin, KGB, Siberian camps, etc.), does anyone really believe that Putin wouldn’t hesitate to employ attrition tactics?

In fact, from a purely military perspective, China and Russia would be foolish not to employ attrition warfare.

For China, their numbers advantage will soon extend to aircraft and ships, if it doesn’t already.  And, unlike us, they tend not to early retire and throw away perfectly serviceable aircraft and ships.  For example, they have a very large contingent of second and third line aircraft that would work quite well as attrition fodder.  If they can throw early generation MiGs at us and destroy, say, a single F-22 for a loss of 10 second/third line aircraft, that’s a win for them.  Yeah, but that can’t happen, you say.  Even 10 MiG-21’s can’t match a single F-22.  Well, they don’t have to match the F-22, they just have to soak up the F-22’s missiles and distract the F-22 so that the first line Chinese aircraft can destroy the F-22.  Consider …  the Chinese have reportedly (Wiki) built 2400 MiG-21s and they are still operational.  That’s a LOT of aircraft to conduct attrition warfare with!  We have 150 or so combat-capable F-22s.

Warfare IS attrition.  We’ve just forgotten that in our desire to pursue clean, neat wars where everyone goes home at night, takes a hot shower, eats a good meal, watches some TV, and then gets up the next day and goes to work to conduct another neat, clean patrol or aerial strike while carefully avoiding collateral damage or casualties to either side.

Russia and China are going to come at us hard and attrition will be one of their major tactics.  We need to recognize this and begin preparing for it.  We need to stop pussyfooting around with networking, distributed lethality, jeep-based mobility, LCS, and the like and start developing massively effective cluster munitions, hugely increased artillery and self-propelled artillery, heavy armored personnel carriers, amphibious tanks, ships with serious AAW and ASuW capability and armor, and the like.  We need to start focusing on killing people in the most efficient manner possible.  We need to build up massive inventories of bombs, missiles, and rockets.  We need to prepare the framework to absorb hundreds of thousands of new soldiers (war draft) so that they can fight effectively without having to spend years learning the latest networking technology just to talk to the guy in the next foxhole over.  And so on and so on.

We need to start imagining what the next war will really be rather than what we wish it would be.  Brutal, ugly, and lethal.  That’s what it will be and that’s what we need to be.

Neller's Mismatch

Marine Corps Commandant Neller offers some amazing views of future combat as reported in a Marine Times article. (1)

“… the next fight will be far more complex and deadly than the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan that have shaped the force and its leadership over the past 16 years.

“I don’t think the next fight is going to be a stability op/counterinsurgency: It’s going to be a violent, violent fight,” Neller said …”

Neller is saying the right thing but his actions, meaning the acquisitions the Marines are pursuing, the developmental path they are on, and the doctrine/tactics they are pursuing, all indicate the wrong things.  There is a mismatch between his words and the Corps’ actions.  Despite the Nellers verbal recognition of where the Corps needs to be, the reality doesn’t match.  Even Neller acknowledges this.

“In June, Neller told Congress that, right now, the Marine Corps is “not currently organized, trained and equipped to face a peer adversary in the year 2025.”

Further indicative of the mismatch between words and actions is Neller’s assessment of the strength of the Marines.

““The center of gravity that we have to protect is the network, and the network is dependent on space.”

“The opening salvos of future wars will likely be fired in space, Neller believes.”

Neller fails to grasp that future peer warfare will be incredibly brutal and violent and victory will go the side that can muster and apply the most explosives.  In contrast, Neller believes that victory will go to the side with the best network.  Ironically, he also acknowledges that space will be contested and compromised which means the network will fail and yet he believes this failure prone construct is the Marine’s center of gravity!  Unbelievable.

Consider further … Neller claims to see a “violent, violent fight” as the future of combat but the Marines are shedding tanks, artillery, and heavy vehicles, leaving tanks out of MEU/ARG loadings, emphasizing aviation, pursuing battlefield lightness over armor, and becoming a light infantry force.  How is that preparing for a “violent, violent fight”?  There’s a mismatch between words and actions.

China and Russia, on the other hand, see the future of warfare quite clearly.  They’re developing families of heavy armored vehicles, massive artillery forces, advanced cluster munitions (while we are unilaterally eliminating our ours), mobile anti-aircraft vehicles, and battlefield electronic warfare.  They’re preparing to fight and win a “violent, violent fight”.  We’re still preparing to fight another insurgency.

Neller needs to heed his own words, end the mismatch, and start preparing the Marines to fight and win a “violent, violent fight”. 

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(1) Marine Times website, “The Next Fight: The commandant is pushing the Corps to be ready for a ‘violent, violent fight’”, Jeff Schogol, 18-Sep-2017,

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2017/09/18/the-next-fight-the-commandant-is-pushing-the-corps-to-be-ready-for-a-violent-violent-fight/

Modern Day Marine 2016

In the course of researching other posts, I happened across Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Neller’s speech at the Modern Day Marine Exposition 2016 and it offered some interesting insights into his views of the future combat and the role the Marines will play in it (1).  Here are some of the highlights.  Rather than transcribe long passages, I’ve summarized most of the salient points.  If you want to hear the speech, you can follow the link below.

Neller astutely noted that recent enemies have had very little modern combat capability.  This seems like a “duh” moment but I call it an astute observation because so many people in and out of the military have come to believe that we’ve been fighting actual wars against valid opponents.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  Nothing we’ve done the last couple decades has been remotely like a real war.  Sure, there has been the odd firefight but, for the most part, it’s basically been a live fire exercise.  This is not to take anything away from those who served and especially those who gave their lives.  However, there’s no getting around the reality that our opponents, while deadly, offered no real military opposition.  Any success they had was because we foolishly allowed it – but that’s a topic for another time.  Thus, I give Neller credit for recognizing the basic truth about the utter lack of military competency in our recent enemies. 

Neller went on to describe future combat which, according to him, would involve the electromagnetic spectrum, space, complex terrain / urban sprawl, coastal regions, dense population centers, and slums.  This is superficially likely but completely fails to enumerate the fundamental characteristics of future peer combat which include, on our enemy’s part, if not our own,

• Wanton destruction
• Profligate use of high explosive and cluster munitions far beyond all pre-war estimates
• Complete disregard for collateral damage including civilian casualties
• Focus on explosives over technology
• Shocking willingness to sacrifice troops to achieve objectives
• Heavy use of artillery and armored vehicles
• Military barbarism on a scale we will have trouble believing

Thus, we see that Neller, while recognizing that we haven’t been militarily challenged and therefore need to prepare for more challenging combat, then fails to correctly anticipate what those challenges will actually be!  You can see from his list of future warfare characteristics that he’s still anticipating the kind of nation building, anti-insurgency warfare that we’ve been fighting.  Reread his list of characteristics and you’ll see the complete lack of high end combat references.

He then goes on to describe what he feels are the future domains (I hate buzzwords!) of combat and notes that there are six:

• Air
• Sea
• Land
• Cyber
• Space
• Information (public relations - PR)

Note that he’s added PR to the common domains.  This, yet again, demonstrates that he is fixated on fighting a low end battle and replaying the “hearts and minds” nation building that we’ve been doing for the last couple of decades.  This is all the more baffling given that there is absolutely no evidence that “hearts and minds” works!

Neller devoted a significant portion of his speech to the subject of winning the PR battle in various ways.

His lack of acceptance or recognition of the reality of high end combat can be summed up in this phrase in which he referred to how we will deal with enemies.

“… defeat the enemy, destroy them, if necessary …”

Again, this betrays a mindset that has not recognized and accepted the reality of the sheer brutality of peer warfare.  Destroy them “if necessary”????  That’s the only way to defeat an enemy!

Gen. Neller  - No Grasp of Peer Warfare

Neller referred to Gen. Krulak’s three block war and cited the three blocks as humanitarian assistance, counter insurgency, and training partner nations and added a fourth block, the public affairs officer.  Note that this is a slight modification of Krulak’s concept which contained full combat as one of the blocks.  Again, though, note the utter lack of reference to full combat and destruction of the enemy.  He appears to believe that future peer warfare will be a “hearts and mind” PR exercise with isolated bits of low end combat.

To sum up, Neller correctly recognizes that the US military, and Marines in particular, have not been facing militarily competent opponents and need to begin preparing for more challenging warfare but then goes on to describe an only somewhat higher end combat.  He betrays his utter lack of understanding of what a peer war will really be like.  Thus, the Marines are going to be unprepared for peer combat.  We already see this with the Marine’s and Neller’s focus on light infantry, mobility, and flexibility at the expense of firepower and armor.

We will relearn what peer warfare is like and will pay a bloody bill doing so.

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(1)wn.com website, Modern Day Marine Exposition 2016, Commandant Gen. Neller speech,

https://wn.com/gen._robert_neller_speaks_at_modern_day_marine_expo