USS Constellation Update

The Navy’s new frigate, the USS Constellation, is now expected to deliver 3 years late, or more (spoiler alert!  It will be more!).  What’s going wrong?  Let’s get an update.
 
 
Design
 
The Constellation contract was awarded in April 2020 which means the design work began more than 5 years ago and is still nowhere near complete.  That’s astounding.  Over 5 years to generate a design and it still isn’t complete.
 

… the U.S. Navy had to significantly modify the design to meet U.S. survivability and growth margin standards.
 
Speaking at the Naval Institute’s Defense Forum Washington event, Fincantieri Marinette Marine CEO Mark Vandroff said the Navy and the shipyard underestimated the complexity of altering the design.[2]

The entire point of the so-called parent design approach was exactly to avoid significant design changes and yet the Navy ignored that philosophy and instituted extensive changes.
 
Concurrency and Schedule
 
As we’ve seen with every acquisition program in recent years, concurrency (simultaneous design and construction) always causes cost and schedule havoc.  Despite this repeated, soul-deep lesson, the Navy opted for concurrency, yet again, beginning construction with only partial design plans.  Predictably (well … predictable by everyone except the Navy), this has caused schedule problems among other issues, with the ship now scheduled to deliver more than three years late.
 

The Navy’s decision to commence construction before completing the design has led to significant schedule slippages.[1]

Cost
 
As always, the Navy’s cost estimates have proven fraudulently underestimated.
 

Initially, the estimated cost for the first ship was around $1.28 billion, with subsequent ships expected to cost approximately $1.05 billion each. However, these estimates have proven to be overly optimistic. The actual costs have increased significantly, with some estimates suggesting that the final cost per ship could be as high as $1.6 billion. This 40% increase in costs has raised concerns about the program’s affordability and sustainability.[1]

Actually, those costs aren’t even true.  The Congressional Research Service Feb 2021 report notes,
 

The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission estimated that subsequent ships in the class will cost roughly $940 million each in then-year dollars.[emphasis added][2]

Weight
 

The weight of the ships has increased by over 10% from the initial estimates. This weight growth is attributed to design decisions and the challenges of adapting a foreign design to meet U.S. Navy requirements.[1]

Unfortunately, the Navy is now looking at reducing or eliminating other capabilities in order to compensate for the weight increase.  It is almost certain that the range and speed requirements will be downgraded among other detrimental changes.
 
Workforce
 

The shipyard is reportedly a “few hundred” workers short, which has contributed to delays in the construction schedule.[1]

Come on, now.  It’s not as if the builder didn’t know how many workers they had when the bid the project.  If they’re short of workers now, they certainly knew they were short of workers when they bid.  This is, again, fraud on the part of the builder and willful complicity on the part of the Navy who also knew the builder’s workforce compared to the project requirements.
 
Risks
 

The Navy has yet to demonstrate the full capabilities of the propulsion and machinery control systems … [1]
 
The Navy is considering additional land-based testing to mitigate these risks and ensure the reliability of the systems before the ships are deployed.[1]

When have we ever seen ‘risks’ not become problems?  The point of land based testing is to find problems and solutions before beginning construction.
 
Second Yard
 
Given the inability of Fincantieri to meet the contracted schedule, the Navy has begun looking at a second source shipyard.  Possibilities include:
 

… specifically mentioned Austal USA, Bollinger, HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works as potential second yards.[2]

 
Conclusion
 
The Navy’s absolute refusal to design and build a ship the proper way (complete the design and then begin construction) is, after so many demonstrated failures using this approach, a near criminal act of fraud and negligence perpetrated against the American taxpayer.
 
As we all knew, with 100% certainty, concurrency has, once again, caused schedule slippage and cost overruns.
 
The Constellation class is now in the process of having its requirements downgraded to compensate for weight increases.  So much for the supposed benefits of a parent design.  The Navy never had any intention of building the parent design.  That was just a ploy to evade additional Congressional oversight.
 
It bears noting that the yard’s manpower shortages are not exactly a new problem that suddenly reared its head.  Both the yard and the Navy knew they couldn’t build the ship in the required time frame with the workforce they had.  Essentially, the yard and the Navy conspired to hide the inability to meet the contract.
 
Worse than all the listed problems is the fact that even if there were no problems, it would only produce an obsolete design unsuited for modern combat.
 
There is no other way to describe this program than as a massive fraud and failure. 
 
 
 
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[1]1945 website, “The U.S. Navy’s New Constellation-Class Frigate Is In Big Trouble”, Isaac Seitz, 25-Feb-2025,
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/02/the-u-s-navys-new-constellation-class-frigate-is-in-big-trouble/
 
[2]USNI News website, “Navy: Constellation Frigate Design Will be Ready in May, Second Yard Could Come in FY 2027”, Mallory Shelbourne & Sam LaGrone, 13-Dec-2024,
https://news.usni.org/2024/12/13/navy-constellation-frigate-design-will-be-ready-in-may-second-yard-could-come-in-fy-2027

Navy Selects Fincantieri FREMM Frigate

The Navy awarded a partial contract to Fincantieri for the design and construction of the new frigate.  The $795M contract is for the basic hull.  Extensive Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) will be paid for separately and includes Baseline 10 Aegis Combat System, Mk 41 VLS, Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar, command and control electronics, decoy systems, Mk110 57mm gun, RAM point defense launcher, Naval Strike Missile launcher, SEWIP Blk II … basically everything that isn’t the hull.

The lead ship will cost $1.281 billion, with $795 million of that covering the shipbuilder’s detail design and construction costs and the rest covering the GFE, including the combat systems, radar, launchers, command and control systems, decoys and more. (1)

Fincantieri Frigate

Let’s take a look at some aspects of the Navy’s new frigate.

Selection Assessment.  Setting aside the fact that the Navy doesn’t need a frigate, I’ve got to admit to being surprised by the Navy’s choice.  I was 100% sure that the Navy would select the Freedom class LCS as the new frigate until, of course, they dropped out of the competition.  My ranking of the remaining contenders was:

1. Fincantieri FREMM
2. Huntington Ingalls
3. Navantia F-100
4. Austal LCS

Lo and behold, the Navy made the best choice!  How often do I get to say that? 

Now, recognize that the selection of the Fincantieri ship does not necessarily constitute a good selection, just the best of what was offered.  To put it in perspective, the Austal LCS was a joke which was why I rated it last.  The Navantia F-100 had serious design flaws as graphically demonstrated in the sinking of the Norwegian frigate from what should have been minor and recoverable damage.  The Huntington Ingalls ship was an unknown with almost no publicly released information and the underlying ship was likely the National Security Cutter which is not a warship, per se, and is a bit small for the frigate the Navy envisions.  That left only the Fincantieri offering so, by default, it got my top ranking.  Whether it’s actually a good design is unknown.  It may simply be the best of the worst.

Cost.  Let’s firmly keep in mind that the GFE portion of this program is extensive and expensive.  Publicly released contract figures are NOT the total construction cost even though the Navy will attempt to portray it that way.  Let’s also acknowledge that no Navy shipbuilding program has come in on time/cost in recent history so the claimed costs are going to increase, without a doubt.

That said, the choice of an existing hull and equipment should, theoretically, limit the extent of cost growth.  The hull and components are known quantities with existing, open production lines and proven performance.  If ever there was an opportunity for a Navy shipbuilding program to meet its cost goals, this is it.  A significant failure, here, would be most disheartening.

ASW.  The Navy doesn’t see it this way but the main purpose/function of the frigate ought to be ASW.  What concerns me in the ASW role is that the ship appears not to be designed for ASW but, rather, follows a modular construction scheme with some ASW equipment as an option.  As evidence, the FREMM frigates are offered and have been sold as user selectable general purpose, ASW, and anti-air versions.  This implies that the hull is generalized for any role rather than optimized for one.  As we’ve extensively discussed, no generalized asset is as good as an optimized one and ASW is one role where exquisite optimization is demanded.  The alternative is a resting place on the bottom of the sea.  I’ve seen no discussion of specialized quieting of the ship’s equipment, specialized shaping of the hull to decrease the acoustic signature, installation of a Prairie/Masker type system, selection of propulsion equipment specialized for quiet operation, etc. 

The ship will, apparently, operate a single helo.  For an ASW frigate, this is a significant limitation.  As the saying goes, if you have one helo, you have none. 

The ship has no close in RBU-type anti-torpedo and anti-submarine system – again, a serious deficiency in an ASW frigate. 

Oddly, the ship will not support the Vertical Launch ASROC anti-submarine torpedo (VL-ASROC).(2)  This is listed as a future capability but we all know that future capabilities are rarely implemented.  Again, a serious deficiency in an ASW frigate.

It is also interesting to note that the Navy capabilities graphic does not specify a hull mounted sonar although it does include a multi-function towed array and a variable depth sonar (CAPTAS).

Finally, the cost, at what is likely to be well over $1B per ship,  is too much for an ASW frigate that is going to be exposed to one of the most dangerous tasks in naval warfare.

In the ASW role, the ship appears to be significantly less than optimized.

Strike.  At the moment, it is unknown whether the VLS will be the strike length cells.  If not, the ship will have no Tomahawk capability.  Interestingly, the Navy’s capabilities graphic does not specify Tomahawk cruise missile capability.  The only offensive weapon of note is the Over-The-Horizon missile which is the Naval Strike Missile.

Gun.  The continued selection of the small caliber 57 mm gun, especially after it was rejected by the Zumwalt program in favor of the smaller 30 mm gun, is absolutely baffling.  If not a 5” gun, there are very good 76 mm guns available.  The Mk110 57 mm gun is decidedly non-lethal and has encountered persistent problems in use with the LCS.

SEWIP.  The SEWIP upgrade to the venerable and now obsolete SLQ-32 electronic warfare system is most welcome.  Currently, only the SEWIP Block II is specified but there are indications that a scaled down version of the Blk III may be planned although, again, future improvements are, historically, unlikely.  

Stealth.  The Fincantieri design appears decidedly mediocre in terms of stealth when compared to ships like the Visby and others that have clearly made a determined effort to embrace stealth.  The Fincantieri ship does have slanted sides but, beyond that, there is little effort at stealth.  The ship is covered with exposed equipment, masts, sensors, radars, and hull and deck fittings.  Even the slanted sides are only slightly slanted and would appear nearly vertical from an aircraft radar.

Summary.  While there is no need for a generalized, mini-Burke frigate in the US Navy, at least the Navy made the best choice of what appeared to be a poor stable of contenders.  The Fincantieri FREMM frigate represents a proven design, assuming it’s not too heavily modified for the US Navy, which, one hopes, will at least offer trouble free basic performance. 

As a mini-Burke, the design appears solid and somewhat useful, if not outstanding, with specified equipment that already exists and has largely been debugged.  All that remains is to integrate the various components. 

I still can't help but wish the Navy had put the money it will spend on this mini-Burke towards dedicated ASW corvettes, MCM ships, logistic support ships, etc.

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(1)USNI News website, “Fincantieri Wins $795M Contract for Navy Frigate Program”, Megan Eckstein, 30-Apr-2020,

https://news.usni.org/2020/04/30/fincantieri-wins-795m-contract-for-navy-frigate-program

(2)The Drive website, “The Navy’s Future Frigates Are Shaping Up To Be More Lethal And Capable, As Well As Cheaper”, Joseph Trevithick, 29-Jan-2020,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26217/the-navys-future-frigates-are-shaping-up-to-be-more-lethal-and-capable-as-well-as-cheaper