A reader recently suggested using detachments of Marines on
Navy ships to conduct small land actions and, further, to supplement them with
sailors who have been give some land combat training. The reader noted that this was once a common practice.
The idea is intriguing and I’d like to run with it a bit. Is
it a feasible idea, today? Would it be
effective?
Let’s do a brief review of some historical naval Marine
actions to remind ourselves how they were used.
Sandwich – In May
1800, at Puerto Plata, Commodore Talbot, aboard the USS Constitution, sent a
raiding party of 90 sailors and Marines under the command of then Lieutenant
Isaac Hull to ‘cut out’ the Sandwich, a French privateer that had been plaguing
the area and was being refit under the protection of the nearby Spanish
fortress. They quickly surprised and
overwhelmed the Sandwich but needed time to prepare the ship for sailing. Hull ordered the Marines to seize the nearby
fort which they did with no casualties, ensuring the safety of the operation. The Sandwich was successfully sailed out of
the harbor.
Barbary Pirates –
In Feb 1804, at Tripoli, Captain Stephen Decatur led a small unit of Marines in
a clandestine night attack on the previously captured frigate Philadelphia, now
being used as an enemy gun battery. They
successfully boarded the vessel and burned it, thus denying its use to the
enemy.
Marquesas Islands
– In Dec 1813, a detachment of Marines and sailors from the frigate USS Essex,
Captain David Porter commanding, landed on Nukuhiva and secured the island to
enable refit and R&R operations.
They established a small fort and mediated a cessation of a local tribal
war.
Cape Antonio - On
December 16, 1821, USS Porpoise, conducting anti-piracy operations under the
command of Lieutenant James Ramage, located five pirate vessels and the merchant
brig Bolina. Forty sailors were lowered into five boats and Ramage led an
attack which burned the vessels and freed the Bolina.
Matanzas – In Nov
1822, near Matanzas, Cuba, USS Alligator, commanded by Lieutenant Allen as part
of the Navy’s West Indian Anti-Piracy Campaign, launched small boats carrying
40 men to attack a group of three pirate schooners and five prizes. The pirates were routed although Allen was
killed in the action.
It is interesting to note that shipboard Marine detachments
ended in 1998. Beyond that, the Marines
did, at one time, experiment with a Company Landing Team (CoLT) concept. I don’t know what became of that.
Analysis
Now, let’s analyze the historical examples to understand why
they worked and whether those same conditions for success would apply today.
In earlier times, the absence of timely long distance
communications meant that ship’s captains had to act as an arm of the country’s
diplomatic efforts, often creating policy on the spot. This offered captains a great deal of
latitude in the choice of options and force was often a preferred and effective
choice.
Another major factor that allowed the success of these small
naval Marine actions was the localized nature of affairs. An enemy couldn’t respond quickly to bring
reinforcements to bear. Indeed, it would
often be days or weeks before the enemy’s higher command or nearby forces even
learned of the action. Thus, if the
naval Marines could overcome the local resistance, they and their host ship
were assured of safety for days or weeks. Today, with instantaneous communication, aircraft,
missiles, long range artillery, etc., any local operation can potentially be
countered with overwhelming force in a matter of minutes or hours. A very lightly armed raiding force simply
cannot withstand aircraft, armor, missiles, etc. and, further, the ship that
they operate from is placed in immediate danger as well.
Today’s instantaneous communications means that the entire
world will hear about an action almost on a real time basis which means that any
action will have global political repercussions, good and bad. This, among other factors, has made today’s
leaders extremely reluctant to engage in the kind of ad hoc naval Marine
actions we’re considering. In earlier
times, communication lags meant that it would takes months or years for an
action to become known around the world and, by then, it was a past event and
limited global consequence.
Along this same line, small actions generally mean small
consequences. A small naval Marine
action would, almost by definition, have limited physical consequences – the
political repercussions being a separate concern, of course.
Manpower was another reason why naval Marine actions were
feasible. Sailing warships carried large
crews both for manning the labor-intensive cannons and to make up boarding and
prize crews. Thus, ships had an
abundance of sailors and Marines available for off board actions. Today, with minimal manning compounded be
extensive at-sea billet gaps, there simply aren’t enough personnel to even
consider such actions.
Yet another aspect of these actions is the defensive weapons
that an enemy could bring to bear. In
earlier times, the attacking naval Marine force would face only weapons similar
to their own with the exception of cannons which had limited, if any, mobility. Thus, the attacking force could not be
overmatched in weapons. Today, with
highly lethal, mobile, and often armored tanks and vehicles along with
artillery, missiles, rockets, and aircraft, the attacking force, with only
light weapons, is quite likely to face far superior defensive weapons. Thus, even a small, local defense force may
well possess superior firepower compared to a naval Marine force.
Finally, the most important factor in any potential naval
Marine action is the willingness to take decisive, forceful action. In earlier times, we were willing to use
force as a part of war or as an arm of diplomacy. Contrast that with today’s timid policy of
avoidance and appeasement. Even if we
had naval Marine forces, we wouldn’t use them.
Potential Uses
Understanding why earlier actions were successful and the
limits imposed on today’s potential actions, where/how could we use naval
Marine forces, today, if we did have them?
Here’s a few examples.
Anti-Piracy – On any number of occasions, a naval Marine
force could have used small UAVs to track today’s pirates back to their bases
of operation and then conducted raids to eliminate them.
Anti-Small Boat – A raid against any of Iran’s swarm boat
facilities would be a potential use for naval Marine forces.
Illegal Islands – As China attempted to build their illegal
islands in the South China Sea, naval Marine forces could have conducted raids
to destroy the island building efforts.
Cutting Out – Chinese vessels that violate allied nation’s territorial
waters could be ‘cut out’ and seized.
China has repeatedly, and illegally, sent swarms of fishing vessels and
“Coast Guard” vessels into Vietnamese, Philippine, and other waters.
Conclusion
Naval Marine forces for off board actions have been an
historically useful and fairly common occurrence. Today, for a variety of reasons, not the
least of which is timidity, this is no longer practiced. There are, however, situations that could
benefit from such actions if we had the mindset and wished to allocate the
required resources.
Timidity aside, the main drawback would seem to be the
potential for the attacking force to run into a level of weaponry that it
cannot handle.
As an alternative, many of the contemplated actions might
seem worthy of SEAL involvement although the need to transport SEALs to the
action site would largely negate the benefit of having an organic action party
always at hand.
It seems that there are situations that could benefit from a
naval Marine force but the infrequency of such combined with the cost in
additional manning and resources would seem to preclude the practice. A much better alternative would be to make
greater use of SEALs on carefully planned, small missions. Of course, that assumes a level of fortitude
we have not exhibited for many years.
