There has been a huge influx of readers over time and new
readers may not be familiar with the early posts, although it is the reader’s
responsibility to do so. That being the
case, I will, from time to time, offer re-posts, possibly updated, that I feel
are particularly relevant and worthy of additional attention.
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From Jun 2014, "Will To Win"
China has all but seized various islands and bits of land
from the Philippines and Viet Nam and expanded and strengthened its claims on
the entire East and South China Seas.
They have done this by establishing small outposts and oil rigs as well
as by establishing the habit of regularly patrolling the disputed areas so as
to establish the normalcy and, therefore, the acceptability and inevitability
of their claims. Add to this their use
of air defense zones and their control over, and successful exclusion of, US
ships and planes from areas of interest and the acquisition of the East and
South China Seas is all but assured.
We must recognize this very clearly. China is pursuing a policy of annexation
through normalization. Disputed
territories are being patrolled on a regular basis so that over time other
countries slowly come to accept the situation as normal. The Air Defense Zone, while illegal in its
implementation, is being enforced to establish the normalcy of the
control. The legal Economic Exclusion
Zone is being illegally interpreted as a military exclusion zone with a goal of
habitual enforcement to establish its legitimacy and normalcy. Tiny outposts and oil wells are being
established on disputed points of land (they barely qualify as islands) to
establish normalcy of Chinese control over those points. Eventually, most of these actions will come
to be accepted (a fait accompli) and those that aren’t can be claimed to be
legitimate through years of “ownership” (squatter’s rights or possession is
nine tenths of the law) and presented to the court of world opinion as custom
and tradition (common law).
The US appears to recognize that Chinese control over the
region is undesirable and ought to be prevented. Of course, we cannot hope to counter China’s
expansionist movement alone. The US must
develop close ties with the Pacific countries in and around the East and South
China Seas. Ideally, we would also
partner up with countries further away from the area but still invested in the
events and results. Together, this
coalition may eventually be able to counter China’s moves.
Hmmm ….
Do you see the disconnect in the previous paragraphs? China is able to pursue (successfully, so
far!) its plans for regional domination with only its own internal forces and
capabilities. It is not part of a broad
coalition of like-minded countries pursuing a mutually agreed upon conquest of
the area. It’s simply acting on its
own. The US, on the other hand, is
seemingly paralyzed, unable to act without the backing of a coalition, despite
having far greater military might, more resources, and a stronger economy (for
the moment, anyway!). Where is our will
to act forcefully and, if necessary, unilaterally to achieve our goals? Have we become so timid that we cannot and
will not act alone? Where is our will to
win? Lead, and others will follow -
that's how you build a coalition.
I’m not going to address the political aspect of this
(although recognizing that the political and military are intimately bound together!)
since this isn’t a political blog.
Instead, let’s look at the military, specifically naval, actions that we
can take, alone, to counter current Chinese moves.
The basis of China’s expansion is normalcy and the
methodology is routine patrols and outposts in disputed areas to establish that
normalcy. We must counter that with our
own routine patrols in disputed areas.
Ideally, every Chinese patrol ship should have a US ship sailing in
close formation. Ideally, the countries
involved in the territorial disputes should establish their own tiny outposts
with resupply and patrol support from us.
We should be routinely and heavily transiting the air defense zone and
economic exclusion zone (EEZ) so as to invalidate Chinese normalcy and
re-establish the normalcy of international rule and law of the sea. We should emphatically re-establish our right
of passage in international waters.
What we should not do is leave the 20-30 nm vicinity of a
Chinese naval group in international waters when told to do so. What we should not do is curtail flights and
passages through illegal air defense zones and EEZ’s just to avoid
confrontations. What we should not do is
allow the establishment of illegal outposts on disputed islands.
So, what do we need to accomplish these goals? The overwhelming answer is numbers. We need lots of ships and planes to establish
routine patrols. I can hear the whine,
now: “We can’t afford so many ships and
planes.” Well, that’s true in a sense. On the other hand, can we afford to cede the
entire East and South China Seas to China?
What will be the ultimate cost of that?
Can we afford to someday engage in a war with China in which they will
have fortified the entire first island chain because we didn’t have enough
ships and planes to prevent it? Yeah,
but even so, we just don’t have the budget to build additional ships and planes
even if we wanted to. Right and
wrong. We have the budget but we’re not
spending it correctly. Three Zumwalts
aren’t going to appreciably help us with the Pacific Pivot but the $24B or so
that they’ve cost would have bought a lot of aircraft and smaller ships
(there’s a use for your frigate). Even
at a cost of $1B each, we could have built 24 frigates for the cost of three
Zumwalts. Which would be more useful in
the Pacific Pivot, three Zumwalts or 24 frigates? We could buy a lot of Super Hornets, UAVs,
and patrol aircraft for what the JSF program is costing us. The LCS could have been the patrol ship for this
scenario except that it has no credible weaponry and insufficient range and
endurance to operate for extended patrol periods. Perhaps the coming upgunned LCS will have
improved range and endurance and find a purpose, at long last.
The needs of a Pacific Pivot are fairly clear. Now, we just need to align our procurement
with our needs and muster the will to act.
